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We aim to explore how chronic conditions reorganise family  
as well as citizen– state relations within the arena of care, 
while also discussing how care can lead to, shape, alleviate or 
complicate chronicity. (This volume, p. 8)
Hurricane Eta has been pounding Guatemala for days, and much of the 
country is underwater. The news is full of nightmares, including one 
story of a mountain in the highlands that suddenly liquified, burying 
houses and the people in them 30 feet deep (Alonzo 2020; Menchu 
2020). Already, 2020 has been the most active hurricane season in the 
Atlantic on record, with two months still to go. Five years of intense 
drought have added to the crisis. Crops everywhere in the country are 
failing – too little rain, too much rain – as people starve. ‘This is a crisis 
on top of a crisis on top of a crisis’, says the regional director of the 
World Food Programme when asked about the floods (Cuffe 2020).
The other news making international headlines out of Guatemala 
is about borders. Investigative journalist Jeff Abbott (2020) reports 
that the US has deported at least 1,400 unaccompanied minors to 
Guatemala so far in 2020 – three times more than in all of 2019. It 
does not seem legal, and by international laws it is not, but the Trump 
administration is citing the threat of coronavirus, making use of a 
loophole provided by an obscure 1944 public health law that grants 
executive power to block asylum claims and initiate deportations under 
conditions of communicable disease (Abbott 2020). That Trump has 
named COVID- 19 as the reason for closing borders is obviously disin-
genuous, since Guatemala’s first COVID cases came from US deporta-
tions (Dickerson and Semple 2020); the point was never to stop COVID, 





Meanwhile, the US government has classified many of the deported 
children as ‘unaccompanied’, but people inside and outside of Guatemala 
do not trust this classification. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
officials have violently separated thousands of children from their par-
ents at the border in recent years. Hundreds of children have yet to be 
reunited with their parents; several children have died from common 
illnesses in detention, making reunion impossible (Yates- Doerr 2019). 
Everyone leaving Guatemala for the US knows the journey is dangerous, 
but people are running out of food, aid programmes have disappeared, 
Indigenous healers have been murdered, and many of the few health 
clinics that do exist have been overwhelmed by the intersections of infec-
tious and metabolic disease.
This is the terrain of complex chronicity documented by Managing 
Chronicity in Unequal States, where the past and present loop together, 
creating sudden crises that manifest out of deep, enduring structures of 
violence. Whether focused on the forces of climate migration, medical 
diagnoses, viral plagues or the surge in long- present white supremacy, 
the book makes an excellent companion for thinking through conditions 
of ‘chronic disaster’ (Galvez et al. 2020; see also Moran- Thomas 2019; 
Manderson and Wahlberg 2020; and ‘Chronic living: Quality, vitality 
and health in the 21st century, an international conference’: https:// 
eventsignup.ku.dk/ chronic- living). It adds nuanced ‘ethnographic per-
spectives on caring’ (the book’s subtitle) to conversations about the 
emergence of illness and the temporalities of this emergence. Its focus on 
the chronicity of emergency sheds light on how acute and enduring crises 
co- constitute risk and poor health outcomes.
A strength of the book is how it shows ‘chronicity’ to be an inter-
active, negotiated space, which enfolds within it numerous temporali-
ties, rather than a linear movement from one point of time to another. 
The authors give visibility to the often slow and contested emergence of 
whatever becomes recognised as an emergency. For example, the death 
certificates of Guatemalan children who have died in detention may list 
the common cold as the cause of death, but the book would point us 
toward colonial dispossession, the legacies of genocide, and the envi-
ronmental racism that makes certain kinds of lives disposable. Montesi 
and Calestani (this volume, p. 2) write: ‘social inequalities are the great-
est determinants of ill health’; not only do they become embodied, they 
also produce stigma that ‘By strengthening racism, classism, sexism and 
many other “isms” … further exacerbates the social inequalities that 




The book’s ten chapters together help readers understand how 
health- care delivery – be it competent, compassionate, neglectful or neg-
ligent – is deeply informed by social histories, and shaped by a dynamic 
interaction between the state, public health systems and kin or other 
social networks. In this foreword, I use some of the book’s core arguments 
to unpack analytical dilemmas I have encountered in my own fieldwork, 
taking up the authors’ call to draw sociopolitical histories of care into the 
landscape of illness and how we write about it.
The concept of care is permeated by moral and political ten-
sions. (This volume, p. 10)
In 2009, at the conclusion of a large medical anthropology confer-
ence, I walked through downtown New York City with one of the key-
note speakers, Annemarie Mol, who had recently published a slim book 
describing diabetes management, titled The Logic of Care: Health and the 
problem of patient choice (2008). In her lecture, she had shown the audi-
ence a photograph of a wooden gate with a soft cord that could be looped 
around the fence – this simplest of technologies would loosely enclose 
pastureland in the Dutch countryside to keep animals safe. In a capitalist 
landscape that pushes ever- more elaborate and expensive technologies, 
good care, she suggested, could be as mundane as a well- tied knot.
I had just returned from fieldwork in Guatemala, where I had fol-
lowed how the diagnosis of obesity circulated between communities of 
scientists, nutritionists and patients as they shopped and cooked and 
nourished their families. ‘Stop talking about our bodies’ was a mes-
sage I had heard frequently from people who were tired of the calorie 
counting, body mass indices, and neoliberal mandates from doctors to 
‘take care of yourself’ that we also read about in Montesi and Calestani’s 
introduction.
People spoke to me instead about how traffic in their cities kept 
them from returning home for mealtimes, how the pollution caused by 
this traffic choked their lungs, the loss of city parks which were trans-
formed into strip malls, and frequent kidnappings and street violence 
related, in no small part, to how US weapons dealers pushed guns south 
(Yates- Doerr 2015; see also Yablon 2019). No one spoke about US drug 
trade and trafficking, but I suspect this was only because the topic was 
too dangerous to safely broach (Menchu 2019). The effect of it all was 
that people stayed fearfully inside far more than they wanted to. For 
many, the ability to safely enjoy Guatemala’s verdant mountain pasture-
lands was entirely out of reach.
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I had the three heavy deadbolt locks on the door of the home I shared 
with a Guatemalan family in mind when Mol showed her photograph of 
the knot. In this home, a rope enclosure would not be care but careless, 
facilitating an opening for violence. As we walked and talked about this 
problem of context – how technologies might travel or not, how theories 
might travel or not – we came to stand under a large billboard advertising 
Citibank. ‘We CARE’, it read, the bright bold printing of the advertise-
ment transforming ‘care’ into the promise of capital accumulation.
‘Don’t become too attached to the term,’ Mol cautioned me, her 
point clear: if one word becomes corrupted, look for another (see also 
Law and Mol 2020). This lesson is evident in Montesi and Calestani’s 
text, which charts networks of care from central London (Ballesteros, 
Chapter 1, and Kennedy, Chapter 4), rural Mexico (Bresciani, Chapter 6) 
and humanitarian projects in Tanzania (Brocco, Chapter 5) to show how 
technologies and the conceptual vocabularies that surround them do not 
remain stable from place to place, or from one moment to the next. For 
example, in Kottai and Ranganathan’s chapter on the psychiatric treat-
ment for the unhoused community in India, ‘care’ is not a feel- good path 
toward healing, but a violent means of policing. The care work in and of 
the book’s ethnography entails attending to how care happens, holds or 
falls apart. Since care is a temporary achievement, the trick of the text is 
to treat care as an always empirical issue.
‘Understanding how chronic conditions are lived through, experi-
enced and cared for is crucial,’ Montesi and Calestani write (p. 8), point-
ing to how paying attention to situated configurations of care is especially 
vital, given how care has frequently ‘given in to the lure of the market’. 
LaRusso and Abadía-Barrero (Chapter 9) discuss how health- care provid-
ers and patients who are invested in the care of paediatric acute- onset 
neuropsychiatric syndrome (PANS) negotiate diagnostic uncertainties in 
the context of ‘market- based health- care systems’ (p. 213). Brocco’s chap-
ter on albinism illustrates how the designation of a condition as chronic 
paves the path for intervention – yet many ongoing conditions should 
not be associated with disease and are not in need of treatment. Overall, 
rather than advance a master narrative about what care is, the chapters 
illustrate when, where, for whom and how care comes to matter.
Deservingness often goes hand in hand with extraordi-
nariness: people are increasingly compelled to demonstrate 




Coming to matter is a central theme in the book, which develops the ana-
lytic of ‘deservingness’ to point out how some lives come to be afforded 
better care and more chronicity than others. The book situates deserving-
ness as an outcome of pathways of inequity, which inform both official 
state policies and unofficial practices of care. At times in the collection, 
the state emerges as a shadow figure, as in the ‘penumbral periphery’ 
of the unincorporated US territory of St Croix, where people fight for 
citizenship (Flaherty, Chapter 2). At other times, the state is a command-
ing presence, as in Nordic welfare states (Takahashi, Chapter 3), or in 
Leeds, England (Andrade Neves, Chapter 10), where caregivers and their 
patients must fight bureaucracy for recognition. All chapters are con-
nected by the authors’ attention to how people must perform themselves 
as worthy of state- based care, whether this care takes the form of citizen-
ship protections or municipal support.
Montesi and Calestani suggest that an implicit ‘social contract’ 
between people and the state makes the claim to deservingness a con-
stant negotiation. Underlying the social contract is the idea that citizens 
will give up individual freedoms in return for state protection. A novel 
claim in the text is that deservingness of health care in the contemporary 
neoliberal era is determined by political-economic factors that give rise to 
capability assessments, affordability, citizenship rights and access to ser-
vices. In other words, people are not treated as deserving of care by virtue 
of their very existence, but must uphold contractual obligations to the 
state to be worthy of care – even if they never signed on to this contract. 
Treating the value of life as negotiable allows the state to assume the 
position of a gatekeeper that can distribute its protections and services 
differently to different groups and individuals, with those people who 
fit the ideals of the state (white, male, able- bodied and so on) granted 
more protections and services than others. Montesi and Calestani (this 
volume, p. 13) write:
We use the concept ‘distributed intensities of worth’ to address 
how care policies and practices can sustain or deepen inequali-
ties and shape (un)deserving subjectivities, while simultaneously 
normalising this stratification. In neoliberal capitalism, these dis-
tributed intensities of worth materialise through the politics of 
deservingness.
The book documents the authority of the state in distributing care, but it 
also recognises how people at the margins of the state have created alter-
native assemblages of support. In Chapter 8, Motta- Ochoa and Arruda 
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analyse the informal care networks that emerge among people who use 
drugs in Downtown Montreal. Participants in their research, who were 
struggling through city- sponsored gentrification, had to ‘create their own 
ways to provide care for themselves’, which included combining street 
and prescription drugs, and building an informal network for drug shar-
ing (p. 183). In Chapter 6, Bresciani shows how Pentecostal churches in 
Indigenous Mexico have become a primary site for the treatment of alco-
holisation, occupying the spaces where state- based medical treatment is 
lacking, or is racist and culturally insensitive.
A lesson of the book is that the state’s absence must be understood 
through a broader historical context of stratified violence that benefits a 
select, politically powerful contingent. In Guatemala, many people have 
necessarily stopped waiting for the state to deem them to be deserv-
ing. Investigative journalist Sandra Cuffe (2020) writes about mutual 
aid networks emerging in the highland Ixil region following Hurricane 
Eta’s heavy rains. Despite the devastation, the presidential adminis-
tration sent no real emergency or protective services. Instead, families 
with trucks drove those without transportation to dry land, families with 
homes offered shelter to those who had been displaced, families 
with food fed those whose crops had been destroyed, and mothers, 
grandmothers and aunts prepared herbal teas to help Eta’s victims with 
both obvious sickness and the trauma of the storm. As the destruction of 
the ever- more unpredictable climate combines with the destruction of 
the coronavirus pandemic across the region, neighbours are turning to 
each other – not to the government.
The move away from state services comes as no surprise when con-
sidering the social history of the Ixil region. This region was at the heart 
of Guatemala’s genocide, with tens of thousands of mostly Indigenous 
people murdered or disappeared by military or paramilitary forces. What 
is often framed as state abandonment or benign neglect might be bet-
ter understood as an extension of centuries of wilful violence, where the 
country’s political elite actively sought to keep the largely Indigenous 
plantation class of the country sick and subservient (Olson 2018; Manz 
2005). Here, ‘neglect’ of health and social services was a means of main-
taining political power. In other words, neglect is not a shortcoming, but 
a strategy of the state’s ‘regimes of care’ (Montesi and Calestani, this vol-
ume, p. 14).
Through caregiving/ receiving practices, however, individuals 
and group formations have carved room for resistance, devia-
tion, co- optation or simply adjustment. (p. 15)
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I phone a friend in Guatemala to check in on her and her children. She 
tells me that her city, for now, has been spared from the damage of the 
rains. The sun has come out and the streets are beginning to dry. The 
internet connection that facilitates our call crackles but holds. My friend 
speaks to me not of terror but about needing to get to the market to buy 
groceries later in the day, and being uncertain about what she will find. 
She is worried about the farmers in the countryside, and everyone’s 
future, but even in emergencies there are mundane chores, the kind that 
never make the news, that require care. In fact, we end up speaking not 
of the storm, but of the persistent cough that her teenage daughter has 
developed. It’s probably nothing, she says hopefully, although the spectre 
of COVID surrounds us all.
Managing Chronicity in Unequal States works to hold space for how 
quotidian practices intersect with deeply harmful structures of inequal-
ity. While the uneven struggles of the everyday are a product of state vio-
lence, these struggles can also work to remake the operations of the state. 
Defining politics as ‘the struggle for resources and control’, as the authors 
do (following Sampson 2014), allows politics to become the domain of 
the kitchen, as well as of the theatres of the state (see p. 11). Part of the 
call is to make the underappreciated activities of cooking, feeding and 
cleaning visible, so that readers can better understand the vital role that 
they play in health governance.
Yet the authors also do not take their eyes off the often- abusive 
forces of the state. It is telling that several of the cases of ‘care from 
below’ described in the book may provide crucial resources and com-
munity, but like a Band- Aid over a deep wound, do little to address the 
deep harm of gentrification, poverty and mental health stigma. Motta- 
Ochoa and Arruda, for example, show how networks of mutual support 
provide drug users with some comfort, but ultimately these networks 
are not enough. More than half of the 50 individuals they followed had 
died, far too young, within a few years of their research. In Bresciani’s 
chapter, the care offered by the evangelical church to those who have 
been alcoholised provides individuals with support and solidarity. Yet it 
also leaves Indigenous families deeply enmeshed in Christian religious 
orders, which comes with its own costs. In highland Guatemala, the 
mutual aid networks that have arisen in the shadow of the state provide 
a vital form of care, but whether it is enough to withstand the brutality of 
ongoing forces of genocide that leave people sick and suffering remains 
to be seen.
The tension between the violence and the healing power of the 
state, or between health work that merely trades one form of suffering 
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for another and health work that undertakes radical structural repair, lies 
at the heart of the care work encouraged by the book. The authors ask 
that we approach problems of health not from the outside, but through 
ongoing – chronic, we might say – engagement with people on the front 
lines of illness and its alternatives. They ask that we build this ongoing-
ness into our analysis, taking stock not only of what works in a moment, 
but whether and how it endures or transforms over time. This tempo-
ral commitment is especially critical given the longue durée over which 
chronic illnesses take hold of people’s lives. In Guatemala, so many of 
the nutrition technologies that claimed to make things better – the diet 
foods, the weight- loss pharmaceuticals, the nutrition supplements, the 
green- revolution agrochemicals – eventually made people sick. These 
treatments for obesity and malnutrition consolidated profit and exacer-
bated inequality, people told me, and I saw myself.
My friend is able to head to the market in Guatemala, and it is likely 
that today she will find food. Presumably this is the case for most of us 
reading this book, who are, by virtue of being in a position to read about 
the chronicity of unequal states, not in acute crisis ourselves. Although 
we may well be – whether we are aware of it or not. After all, one of the 
book’s enduring lessons is that crisis builds up over time – the boundaries 
around when it begins and when it ends are loose and contingent. Now 
has histories; the future is a composite of the various chronicities of now. 
Vital relief may come in the passing of the rains or a negative diagnosis. 
But an effect of analysing care, chronicity and deservingness as ‘an entan-
gled whole’ (this volume, p. 14), as Montesi and Calestani do, is that we 
must place this relief within a broader temporal context. A deadbolt offers 
little protection against an avalanche of mud, and at the time of writing, 
another storm is making landfall in COVID- stricken Guatemala.
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Managing chronicity in unequal 
states: Ethnographic perspectives 
on caring
Laura Montesi and Melania Calestani
Living with chronic conditions requires careful, ongoing management, 
or what Annemarie Mol (2008) has defined as ‘tinkering’. This means 
continually making adjustments, and not only to the fluctuating symp-
toms and moods, but also to the presence and action of the multiple, 
significant actors involved in the field of care. Anthropological research 
on chronicity and care has shown that ‘institutional, economic and other 
circumstantial factors’ have as profound an impact on the experiences 
of chronicity in highly industrialised settings as in resource- poor ones 
(Manderson and Warren 2016, 479). Chronic disease, as reflected by 
Moran- Thomas’s (2019a, 8) work on diabetes in Belize, signals a ‘global 
story’, while also taking ‘specific shape in each life, family, and nation’. 
Power differentials, which have crystallised into coloniality at a global 
level, have enduring effects resulting in embodied social inequalities with 
transgenerational potential (Kuzawa and Sweet 2009). Thus, processes 
of health and disease emerge as clear evidence of a society’s contradic-
tions (Berlinguer, cited in Menéndez 2015), with care practices undoubt-
edly being an integral part of them. Ethnography is ideally suited to 
addressing these contradictions, and to showing their impact on societies 
up- and downstream – from social and economic structures down to the 
most intimate relationships between individuals.
Upstream, within the global context of late capitalism, anthro-
pologists have documented how contradictions get ‘under the skin’ 
(Leatherman and Goodman 2011) of specific classes of individuals and 
populations, and how some ‘bodies’ become more worthy of care than 
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others. Some individuals become invisible to wider society, as in the case 
of the ‘nobodies’ (Green 2011), particularly those assumed to be ‘dispos-
able’ people, such as illegal migrants. At this point, it has become largely 
acknowledged that social inequalities are the greatest determinants of ill 
health (Mackenbach 2012): socially constructed, they become embodied 
(Venables and Manderson 2015; Kierans 2019; Singer and Baer 1995), 
and often end up in ‘stigmatised biologies’ (Horton and Barker 2010) or 
despised corporalities. By strengthening racism, classism, sexism and 
many other ‘isms’, this process further exacerbates the social inequalities 
that determined stigmatised biologies in the first place. As Lesley Doyal 
(1983, 23) warned decades ago, ‘the health needs of the mass of the pop-
ulation continue to come into frequent conflict with the requirements of 
continued capital accumulation. This produces contradictions which are 
ultimately reflected in historical changes in patterns of morbidity and 
mortality.’
Downstream, descriptions of ‘perceptions of care’, ‘individual 
values, motives of care, gender roles, and relevant life circumstances’ 
(Manderson and Warren 2013, 180) have provided an equally impor-
tant picture of how care relationships and activities are driving forces 
for what, within the context of chronic conditions, people consider a 
‘good life’ or a ‘good death’, themes which are resonant in Kennedy’s and 
Andrade Neves’s ethnographic contributions on dementia and tetraple-
gia in this volume.
Thus, engaging with up- and downstream forces simultaneously is 
central to this collection, showing how history and public policy influence 
state interventions and local (and personal) formations of care. Public 
and private institutions shape how care is provided, and how power rela-
tions play out in everyday practices of care (Darling 2011), leading to 
the formation of new and different ‘assemblages’ of care (Lancione 2014; 
Lamb 2020; Van Eeuwijk 2020). These care assemblages can strongly 
affect new and old forms of ‘kinship’ (Buch 2015), as Ballesteros’s and 
Takahashi’s chapters describe in this book.
This up- and downstream approach is of particular relevance in this 
historical moment, marked by the open wounds of the COVID- 19 pan-
demic, a seismic and global crisis whose origins, meanings and conse-
quences we are still largely unable to grasp. Yet, if epidemics can be said 
to have a ‘merit’, it is their capacity to expose the contradictions of the 
systems in which we live.
The SARS- CoV- 2 virus, the strain that causes COVID- 19, has 
revealed the frailty of the social contract between civil society and the 
state. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2001) defines ‘social 
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contract’ as ‘an implicit agreement among the members of a society to 
cooperate for mutual social benefit, for example by sacrificing some indi-
vidual freedom for state protection (originally promoted by theorists 
such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean- Jacques Rousseau)’.1 In 
particular, we are interested in looking at the role of the state in contrib-
uting to (in)effective health- care systems, whether they be tax- funded, 
social or private- insurance- funded (Saltman 2002), as well as disclosing 
how individuals within their networks craft their own strategies of care.
When it comes to the social contract in the time of COVID, this pan-
demic has unveiled decades of financial cuts to national health- care sys-
tems, and made inequalities visible both globally between countries and 
nationally within countries. In the latter case, lockdown measures have 
affected citizens differently. Some have lost their jobs, while others have 
been able to work from home and be less exposed to the virus.
Key or essential workers have been the most in danger of catching 
the virus. The mortality of health- care professionals in many countries 
has grown as we write. In the UK, the media have written extensively 
about the criticisms made by health- care professionals regarding per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE) (Stewart and Campbell 2020), as illus-
trated by the case of Serena, a European nurse in her forties interviewed 
by Melania in the middle of the first wave of the pandemic (Gamlin et al. 
forthcoming).
Serena had been living in the UK for more than 20 years, and she 
worked in an NHS hospital in London as a nurse in a high- dependency 
unit. She was happy in the UK, but with the COVID- 19 outbreak, she 
started to worry about her safety: ‘I didn’t feel safe at work anymore 
because the PPE was only provided if the patient was positive. I felt 
exposed to the virus’, she said. After a night shift, she developed symp-
toms similar to those from which a day- shift nurse, who had cared for 
the same patient as Serena, was suffering. However, neither of them was 
tested for COVID- 19. Therefore, she decided to leave London and her 
job: ‘I didn’t feel supported by the system. It felt like a bit of a must, such 
high expectations on the nursing staff. Of course, health- care profession-
als, cleaners and everyone, it’s been just literally expected that we go [to 
work].’
The point that Serena made during her interview is that since they 
were key workers, they were ‘obliged’ to go to work – but they did not 
‘deserve’ to be tested or protected. These are workers we depend on daily 
during this pandemic and yet, because of chronic underfunding that 
has adversely affected national health systems in favour of the private 
sector (Pfeiffer and Nichter 2008), the value placed on their health and 
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protection is limited. This requires analysis framed by critical medical 
anthropology theory that emphasises ‘the importance of political and 
economic forces, including the exercise of power, in shaping health, dis-
ease, illness experience, and health care’ (Singer and Baer 1995, 5).
Since the nineteenth century, the role of the modern state has been 
the implementation of policies to protect the body politic (Castro and 
Singer 2004). However, even in the case of universal health coverage, 
as in the UK, we have seen that neoliberal political and economic forces 
are fuelling postcode inequalities in access to health services (Wraight 
et al. 2007; Bungay 2005; Graley et al. 2011). The issue of scarce health- 
care resources caused by underfunding led Serena to blame what she 
perceived as ‘intransigence’ for the difficulties that key workers faced in 
trying to access PPE and COVID- 19 testing. These top- down decisions, 
often driven by a profit- making motive (Bales 2012), have dramatic con-
sequences for front- line workers, imposing what they consider to be a 
form of ‘structural violence’ (Farmer 2004), and transforming them into 
‘disposable people’.
Because of COVID- 19, hidden societal value systems based on ‘dis-
tributed intensities of worth’ have emerged, not only in regard to front- 
line workers, but also in regard to patients. What this highly contagious 
virus has revealed is the importance of ‘care’ as a complex human activ-
ity where moral, affective and sociopolitical forces intersect, coalesce 
and collide. In nursing homes and hospitals, unsettling dilemmas have 
surfaced about who deserves to be saved. Medical doctors have found 
themselves in the difficult position of first determining which patients 
are more likely to survive, and then allocating their limited medical 
resources to them.
Many national health- care systems were unprepared to deal with 
COVID- 19, despite past and present experiences with HIV/ AIDS, SARS, 
influenza A and MERS, as well as scientists’ warnings about the high 
probability of infectious epidemic outbreaks brought about by rampant 
ecosystem disruption and globalisation. In the past few decades of neo-
liberalism, public health- care systems have undergone massive financial 
cuts, leaving the private sector with greater margins of manoeuvre (see 
the example of Italy, as described by Armocida et al. 2020). According 
to some experts, the strong presence of private health- care facilities in 
some countries has contributed to greater numbers of people being hos-
pitalised and fewer receiving home treatment, which has led to a major 
increase in infections (Johnson 2020; Binkin et al. 2020).
Facing scarcity of medical equipment, several countries worldwide 
have drawn up bioethical guidelines establishing resource- assignment 
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criteria, which, it turns out, also reveal hidden hierarchies of human 
worth. Human rights organisations have denounced discrimination in 
the US against people who are elderly, in poor health or intellectually 
disabled; some states have singled out certain people as less worthy of 
access to ventilators in the event of rationing, shifting the decision from 
clinical need to specific human characteristics (The Arc 2020). Are people 
with moderate or severe dementia, or intellectual disabilities, less wor-
thy of treatment? In Mexico, a first draft of the ‘Bioethical Guide for the 
Assignment of Resources in Critical Medicine’ privileged young patients 
over old ones, causing widespread criticism (Elvira Vargas 2020). 
Specialists were forced to reformulate it, and explicitly to express that 
age, disability and other characteristics ‘shall not be taken into consid-
eration when assigning scarce resources of critical medicine’ (Consejo 
de Salubridad General 2020, 5). The Bioethical Guide had initially 
been working under two main principles: saving as many lives as pos-
sible, and saving as many years of life as possible (Saldaña 2020). But do 
these bioethical guidelines end up, albeit unintentionally, discriminating 
against people with chronic conditions, since pre- existing comorbidities 
such as diabetes and hypertension seem to play a key role in COVID- 19 
lethality? In this respect, Saldaña (2020) points out that the people most 
affected by chronic diseases belong to disadvantaged sectors of society 
because of ‘racism, poverty, and social injustice’, and concludes that, 
even in normal times, the system in which we live makes ‘some lives more 
possible than others’. Thus, as she contends, medicine- based bioethics 
is insufficient in contexts marked by profound inequalities – ultimately, 
‘responsibility belongs to the state’.
While it seems to be a generally acknowledged fact that people 
with pre- existing comorbidities are biologically vulnerable to COVID- 
19, much less attention is being paid to social vulnerabilities, structural 
violence and fragile regimes of care under strain from the pandemic. In 
this regard, Manderson and Wahlberg (2020, 429) call for paying ‘care-
ful attention ... to the long- term effects [of the pandemic] on the lives of 
those living with (multiple) medical conditions as well as to the survivors 
of serious cases of COVID, who may have had multiple organs damaged 
permanently’.
The COVID- 19 crisis is therefore revealing at least two things: that 
care is a set of activities imbued with tensions at micro and macro social 
levels; and that the social contract is fragile, marked by an unequal dis-
tribution of worth, which generates what we recognise as a politics of 
deservingness. This volume is a call to explore these dimensions together. 
It draws on ethnographies that analyse how care both responds to and 
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influences current patterns of morbidity and mortality, especially chronic 
conditions. Based on the premise that the current political economy sys-
tem has made ‘chronicity’ prevalent by increasing exposure to harm and, 
simultaneously, developing life- prolonging medical and technological 
interventions (Waldstein 2017, 7– 8), we show how chronic conditions 
lead to the emergence of certain types of care, as well as how care, in 
turn, can shape patterns of chronicity.
In this book, we take a political economy approach (Doyal 1983) 
to shed light on how everyday life under late capitalism is subsumed into 
a stratified system where morbidity and mortality are largely socially 
determined (Breilh 2008). We look at people with chronic conditions in 
Global North and South contexts, at all rungs of the social ladder, in order 
to explore how state regulations and care gatekeeping shape their per-
ceptions of good life, possibilities of choice and care strategies. We argue 
that the state plays a key role in how care is distributed among the popu-
lation, and that the cutting back of health- care services has consolidated 
a logic of deservingness that assigns different ‘intensities of worth’ to 
population groups and individuals. Although we think that the operation 
and reach of this logic are relatively new, its origins are deeply rooted in 
the social history of world systems, as well as of each individual country. 
In fact, while late capitalism is globally dominant, national differences 
in philosophies regarding care, entitlements and notions of citizenship 
influence the formulation of each country’s care system – and individu-
als, families and social groups find themselves having to navigate it amid 
unique challenges. By drawing on ethnographies from a wide range of 
countries and social contexts, this volume seeks to describe how deserv-
ingness and patterned forms of attention are the outcome of specific 
sociocultural and historical pathways currently informing policies and 
practices of care in relation to chronicity.
Defining and defying chronicity
Chronic diseases, mainly heart disease, stroke, cancer, chronic respira-
tory diseases and diabetes, account for 60 per cent of all deaths, according 
to the World Health Organization (WHO). In conjunction with impair-
ments and other chronic conditions, they also account for ‘a substantial 
portion of the global burden of disease’ (WHO n.d.). Although at first 
sight, the definition of chronicity may appear straightforward – a long- 
lasting condition which cannot be cured – a closer look at the wide range 




An explanatory model that, adopted by public health experts and 
decision makers, has had an extraordinary success in explaining ‘chro-
nicity’ is the ‘epidemiological transition’, consecrated by Abdel Omran 
in 1971. The epidemiological transition theory posits that with mod-
ernisation and development, mortality tends to decrease, life expectancy 
increases, and a sustained shift from infectious to degenerative, ‘man- 
made’ diseases occurs. As a corollary of this model, all human societies 
are expected to undergo this process, with Western countries leading 
the way. Although appealing, the epidemiological transition (with its 
focus on behavioural patterns) is inadequate to account for inequities 
and the social determinants of health (Gómez- Arias 2001). In point of 
fact, the epidemiological transition has contributed to our vision of chro-
nicity as an inevitable result of modernisation. It fosters a unilineal and 
evolutionary (ultimately neocolonial) vision of morbidity and mortality 
(Yates- Doerr 2015; Gómez- Arias 2001), while erasing the importance 
of social history and the role that inequalities and situated moral values 
play in shaping patterns of morbidity, mortality and care. Moreover, the 
epidemiological transition has somehow led to the linking of chronic-
ity with non- communicability, serving as a contrast with the pair acute/ 
infectious. Plenty of evidence, however, shows that infectious agents can 
lead to chronic diseases (certain types of cancer, for example), and that 
infectious and non- infectious diseases interact in synergy (Manderson 
and Smith- Morris 2010). COVID- 19 has thrown into sharp relief the 
long- term impact that infectious diseases can have, both on an individ-
ual level, as in the cases of people permanently damaged by the infec-
tion or with ‘long COVID’ sequelae, and on a societal level, with their 
cascade effect on sociopolitical and economic systems. Additionally, the 
epidemiological transition approach ignores how ‘care’ – be it the highly 
technified biomedical interventions in intensive care units or the more 
mundane activities of dressing and feeding – marks life- course trajecto-
ries. Is it therefore even possible to understand chronicity in relation to 
modernity without being tempted to provide all- encompassing, homog-
enising grand narratives?
Jaime Breilh (2015, 98) proposes that health and disease pro-
cesses be analysed through a dialectical lens that moves through differ-
ent scales simultaneously: from the ‘singular’ dimension of the genotype 
and phenotype, to the ‘particular’ dimension of the lifestyles and ways 
of life of individuals and social groups respectively,2 and finally up to the 
‘general’ dimension of social reproduction, currently subsumed within 
the capitalist mode of production. However, in order to avoid an imposi-
tion of ‘explanatory models from a distance’ (Yates- Doerr 2020, 384), in 
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addition to analysing global processes, we need to ‘understand past his-
tories and particularities’ and pay close attention to ‘context’ (Vaughan 
2019, 131). In a similar vein, Weaver and Mendenhall (2014, 97) under-
score that:
cultural contexts and chronicity dialectically shape one another, 
sometimes for the betterment of one’s health, but other times for 
the worse. The ways in which people experience and understand 
chronic illness over time are a corollary of cultural context, but also 
have important implications for their health outcome.
Likewise, anthropologists Manderson and Smith- Morris (2010) have 
demonstrated that degenerative conditions and chronic diseases, far 
from being a natural or inevitable result of the epidemiological transi-
tion, are induced by a number of biological, social and economic forces. 
According to syndemic theory (Singer and Clair 2003), social phenom-
ena such as unemployment, poverty and violence – made ‘chronic’ by 
the current political- economic system – can act as pathogenic forces that 
interact with and exacerbate infectious and non- infectious diseases. In 
this regard, understanding how chronic conditions are lived through, 
ignored or cared for is crucial.
Care is put together and carried out by multiple actors, whose inter-
ventions or omissions have tangible embodied effects. In examining expe-
riences of care in a range of different cultural and social contexts, this 
volume seeks to establish a link between two threads of anthropological 
literature: one on chronicity and one on care. While care responses are 
described ethnographically in the former, the actual ‘care’ as such is often 
assumed or left undefined. Conversely, chronicity in the latter is often 
either the background for the caregiving or the reason it is sought, but the 
experience of chronicity itself is not elaborated upon. In this book, we aim 
to explore how chronic conditions reorganise family as well as citizen– 
state relations within the arena of care, while also discussing how care 
can lead to, shape, alleviate or complicate chronicity. As Manderson and 
Warren (2016, 479) contend, ‘Chronic conditions are rarely an isolated 
problem for those who live with them.’ Thus, offering ethnographically 
rich portraits of the challenges people face when living with a chronic con-
dition – problematising the very notion of chronicity by listening to peo-
ple’s experiences – becomes imperative. This is particularly so in current 
times, when care has given in to the lure of the market, and the possibility 
of living a long and fulfilling life has been drastically reduced, transformed 
into a ‘reward’ for the few who have been deemed worthy of it.
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Care and the politics of deservingness
Since ancient Roman times, care (cura in Latin) has been characterised 
by ambiguity, encompassing two conflicting meanings:
On the one hand, it meant worries, troubles, or anxieties, as when 
one says that a person is ‘burdened with cares’. On the other hand, 
care meant providing for the welfare of another; aligned with this 
latter meaning was the positive connotation of care as attentive 
conscientiousness or devotion (Burdach 1923). (Reich 1995, 319)
Since care ‘includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair 
our “world” so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (Fisher and Tronto 
1990, 40; emphasis in the original) – including mundane (often under- 
appreciated) activities such as cooking, feeding and cleaning – it has 
gone largely unnoticed and untheorised, overshadowed by ‘cure’, which 
gained cultural prominence with the consolidation of biomedicine as the 
hegemonic model of care (Menéndez 1983). In the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, care did begin to surface as an interesting object of thought and 
contention, given the rise of chronic diseases and conditions worldwide, 
and thanks to the debates generated by feminist and disability- rights 
movements.
Struggling to make care visible, feminist theorists and activists 
showed that women have been historically burdened with the weight and 
responsibility of caregiving, all the while being ignored and underval-
ued. As Italian feminist Carla Lonzi (1978, 763) wrote, practices of care 
are ‘gestures in the air, like equilibrists’ gestures made of air. Upon these 
gestures with no final concretisation, our life is built’ (our translation). 
The feminist visualisation of care as a historically consolidated feminine 
activity has also been riddled with ambiguity, as the discussions sparked 
by Gilligan’s work In a Different Voice (1982) show. Here, she revendicated 
care as a uniquely feminine orientation marked by moral development, 
in contrast with the abstract notion of justice upheld by males. Thus, care 
was celebrated as a possible means to disrupt the patriarchal order of 
warfare and competition, which could be accomplished first by recognis-
ing ‘the worthiness of caring’ (Fisher and Tronto 1990, 36). However, as 
Fisher and Tronto (1990, 36) remark, ‘recognition alone does not auto-
matically improve the status of caring’, and its celebration can even end 
up ‘reinforcing the status quo of caring as women’s work’. Care was seen, 
therefore, under a darker light, as the materialisation of gender, class and 
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race inequalities. These discussions show that the concept of care is per-
meated by moral and political tensions.
Meanwhile, the rise of chronic diseases and long- term conditions 
(in tandem with the political positioning of disability- rights movements) 
aided in challenging the hegemony of cure over care, thus showing the 
necessity to overcome what Fuller (2017) terms ‘fractured care’, or the 
biomedical tendency to see and treat disease as distinct biological dys-
functions, a liability that hampers care provision, especially in the case of 
complex medical conditions such as paediatric acute- onset neuropsychi-
atric syndrome (PANS), described by LaRusso and Abadía- Barrero in this 
volume. Syndemic theory, developed by Merrill Singer in the mid- 1990s, 
works in this direction by positing that disease is not a single biological 
entity (Singer and Clair 2003), but a dynamic biosocial phenomenon 
interacting synergistically with other disorders. As we saw above, the 
pathophysiology of SARS- CoV- 2 undergoes changes depending on sev-
eral biosocial factors, including multimorbid conditions and multiphar-
macological regimes (Ecks 2020).
The rising numbers of ageing people, and people with disabilities 
or chronic diseases, together with the multiple economic and societal 
changes that make caregiving more challenging, have put care under the 
spotlight of governments, institutions, publics and the market. Moreover, 
the intensification of global flows has determined a global care econ-
omy, where some underprivileged bodies become caregivers of more 
privileged yet fragile bodies (Ibarra 2002; Francisco- Menchavez 2018; 
Raghuram 2012).
Anthropological scholarship on care has flourished recently. 
Attention is being paid to how care is a constitutive human activity, one 
urgently needed at times of crisis, but permanently unfolding, as it both 
repairs and enables life. Life itself is premised on vulnerability (Butler 
2004), or the ‘common human fate of depending upon others’ (Tronto 
2006, 17). Similarly, Kleinman and van der Geest (2009, 161) have 
described caregiving as ‘all the emotional and practical acts that enable 
life’, ultimately ‘an interpersonal experience’.
The attention to the interpersonal character of caregiving and care 
receiving has produced detailed ethnographic descriptions of how care 
materialises through emotional and practical acts. For example, Ahlin’s 
work (2017) has shown how transnational families cultivate care through 
communication technologies; Chudakova’s (2016) how elderly patients, 
in offering advice for self- care to their fellow sufferers, form a ‘bodily 
collectivity’ with them; and Heinemann’s (2013) how patients decide to 
undergo organ transplants out of the desire to resume their roles as family 
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member caregivers, showing the importance of morality and ideals of kin 
obligations in medical decisions.
Kin and care relationships constitute a key theme across the chap-
ters of our volume. For decades, anthropologists have debated about ‘kin-
like’ relationships (Stone 2002, 3) that do not correspond to bio logical 
bonds (Holy 1996; Schneider 1984). Fictive kin relationships have 
sometimes been referred to as ‘alternative families’, especially when it 
comes to caring for people affected by chronic afflictions (Heslin et al. 
2011). Families and their struggles are described in Kennedy’s, LaRusso 
and Abadía- Barrero’s, and Ballesteros’s contributions to this volume. In 
addition, Takahashi reflects upon the impact of ‘kinlike’ relationships 
with ‘informal’ carers in Finland. In this case, the state recognises their 
invaluable work and formalises their fictive kin role, which broadens sup-
port networks when there is a shortage of paid carers. It is therefore the 
political economy of a state that determines whether a care relationship 
is morally acceptable or not.
Morality stands out as a structuring force in care relationships. 
However, what is ‘moral’ cannot be taken as a given. According to its 
etymology, the word morality refers to customs that reflect what is held 
(im)proper and (un)valuable in a particular cultural and historical con-
text. Thus, it is especially important to take into consideration a broader 
understanding of value (Graeber 2001) and to analyse how care, with the 
act of caregiving, may be linked to moral obligation and sacrifice (Pratt 
et al. 1987; Holroyd 2001; Mendez- Luck and Anthony 2016), especially 
towards family members.
In this sense, morality is intimately linked with care, because both 
depend on specific ideological regimes, and both have the power to reveal 
‘what is locally at stake’ for people, or ‘what matters most’ (Kleinman 
1999, 70). In addition to showing ‘what’ really matters, care also unveils 
‘how’ it matters and ‘who’ really matters. This applies at both micro- and 
macro- social levels, including national health- care systems, whose organ-
isation and structure mirror national projects that are at once political 
and moral: ‘The struggle for resources and control, what we call “politics”, 
is always about translating moral values into life’ (Sampson 2014, n.p.).
Thus, a country’s legislation serves to crystallise moral idea(l)s of 
life and death, sometimes in contrast with its citizens’ incarnated expe-
riences, as Andrade Neves contends in his chapter. This is why it is so 
important to acknowledge the social histories and moral tensions perme-
ating both health- care systems and informal care networks.
Although most national health- care systems worldwide were 
consolidated during and after the Second World War, they are heirs of 
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more profound legacies. Some authors have noticed that early organ-
ised efforts to offer health- care protection to the poor and the vulnerable 
were motivated by ‘charity’ and, in fact, religious bodies were usually 
the ones in charge of health care at the time (Narváez 2013). With the 
advent of modern times and the consolidation of ‘citizenship’, nation 
states gradually took over this role of benefactor. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, states realised that population size was connected to military and 
political power (Hays 2009, 283), and started investing more in health 
care and public health actions. This trend solidified in subsequent cen-
turies thanks to several factors, including the consolidation of biomedi-
cine and states’ surveillance capacities. Since the advent of capitalist 
industrialisation, modern political economy and society as a whole – but 
health- care systems in particular – have tended to pursue two conflicting 
goals: health and profit (Doyal 1983, 44). This conflict manifests itself 
in the way resources are allocated, for example: in terms of geographi-
cal coverage or eligibility criteria, with the poorest receiving fewer and 
worse medical services; in the prominence given to specialised/ techni-
fied care over prevention; and in ‘the continued existence of a private 
market in medical care’ (Doyal 1983, 188). In Global South countries, 
this situation is direly evident.
Even though inequalities have been decreasing in many coun-
tries worldwide (Gwatkin 2017), disparity in access to health care due 
to social, cultural and economic barriers is still persistent, and is one of 
the major drivers behind poor health and shorter life expectancy. This 
is even more disconcerting when we know that health- care coverage 
and accessibility have a greater impact on people’s health than higher 
incomes (Orach 2009, S49). In light of their fragmented, segmented and 
unequal health- care systems, several ‘developing’ countries have sought 
to ‘reach the poor’ through specific development programmes and care- 
packages – see Brocco’s contribution in this volume – generating charity- 
welfare schemes with nostalgic colonial moral sentiments. Conditional 
cash- transfer programmes, for example, widely implemented in Latin 
American and Asian countries (Seki 2015; Valencia Lomelí 2008; Rossel 
et al. 2019), are the ultimate manifestation of assistentialism and, simul-
taneously, of the idea that monetary ‘help’ for health care, nutrition and 
education needs is a recompense for the ‘deserving’ poor, those who 
show responsibility by attending health talks and showing up at local 
clinics. Their right to monetary help is temporary and conditioned – and 
revocable if compliance is unsatisfactory – while the discriminatory line 
between the insured and the uninsured, the deserving and the undeserv-
ing, remains largely untouched. There exist, therefore, special types of 
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‘care’ for the poor, who, as the recipients of assistance programmes, are 
permanently kept in a position of dependence. Care for ‘disenfranchised’ 
people is premised on a ‘damage- centred’ approach (Tuck 2009, 420, 
409), delivering ‘reparations’ that ignore ‘complex personhood’, and 
instead reinscribe ‘a one- dimensional notion of these people as depleted, 
ruined, and hopeless’.
In the northern European context, with stronger welfare states, 
recent policy reforms regulating state benefits are redrawing the lines 
between the deserving and undeserving recipients of state support. 
Bambra and Smith (2010) illustrate that, in the UK, there has been a shift 
from a welfare to a ‘workfare’ regime, where people with disabilities and/ 
or chronic conditions are required to demonstrate that they are actually 
unable to work in order to be eligible for increasingly conditional state be-
nefits. This political shift is augmenting the general perception that living 
on benefits is tantamount to moral failure (Bambra and Smith 2010, 75). 
Overall, these kinds of reforms are restricting deservingness to more 
and more specific types of individuals, engendering notions of (‘morally 
 worthy’) deserving and undeserving citizens (Bambra and Smith 2010, 
77) – see, for example, Kottai and Ranganathan’s, Bresciani’s, and Motta- 
Ochoa and Arruda’s chapters in this book.
What we have illustrated so far shows that the way societies are 
organised – despite claims of equity among citizens – often makes some 
citizens more equal than others. Analysing racism in Mexico, Mónica 
Moreno Figueroa (2010) argues that this form of discrimination works 
in everyday life through ‘distributed intensities’: often it goes unno-
ticed (having been naturalised into the social fabric), and sometimes it 
emerges unequivocally. Taking our cue from Moreno Figueroa (2010), 
we use the concept ‘distributed intensities of worth’ to address how 
care policies and practices can sustain or deepen inequalities and shape 
(un)deserving subjectivities, while simultaneously normalising this 
stratification. In neoliberal capitalism, these distributed intensities of 
worth materialise through the politics of deservingness.
The notion of ‘deservingness’ unfolds in the anthropological study 
of migration, which has described the discrimination that migrants suf-
fer in host countries, particularly when they are undocumented, as well 
as the tortuous formal and informal steps they take to gain access to 
rights. Several authors have demonstrated that the health- care system 
can play a key role in shaping differential citizenships, often based on 
migrants’ alleged merits or moral worthiness. Horton (2004), for exam-
ple, has shown that in the US, Cuban immigrants are perceived as more 
deserving than Mexicans, as the former are seen as educated, responsible 
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and outspoken, while the latter are seen as passively dependent on public 
assistance. Fassin (2012, 1) has highlighted how ‘Moral sentiments have 
become an essential force in contemporary politics,’ and determined that 
the administrative and bureaucratic management of ‘illegal’ migrants 
operates by acknowledging ‘humanitarian reasons’, which means, for 
example, that the sick body is judged more deserving of legalisation 
than the poor body. In this context, life trajectories are scrutinised by 
medical and legal experts, who ‘translate’ biographical events into state- 
recognised categories; in other words, they evaluate whether people 
are ‘worthy of receiving legal rights’ (Giordano 2014, 1). This politics 
of deservingness often goes hand in hand with extraordinariness: peo-
ple are increasingly compelled to demonstrate extraordinary merits or 
needs to be considered worthy of care. Thus, refugees are more welcome 
than economic migrants, as they embody the image of the victim and 
enable the state to come across as a benefactor for granting them rec-
ognition through what could be perceived as more of an act of charity 
than of duty. Likewise, illegal migrants are granted ‘honorary’ citizenship 
after the performance of heroic acts, as in the case of the Malian man 
who scaled a building in Paris to save a boy in danger of falling (Reuters 
2018). Extraordinariness allows the state to bestow rights from a posi-
tion of power and moral superiority.
Yet the politics of deservingness, so tangible within the con-
text of migration, has much wider ramifications stemming from long- 
established racial, gender and class hierarchies. It has achieved a strong 
grip on society, facilitated by the ‘state of permanent crisis’ (de Sousa 
Santos 2020, 19) caused by neoliberal capitalism, which produces 
resource scarcity and makes deservingness seem an inevitable criterion 
of distribution. The politics of deservingness expresses itself across mul-
tiple regimes, including the ‘regimes of care’ (Kierans 2019) through 
which states organise care, protection and assistance in ambivalent 
ways. Over the last four decades, states have played a crucial role in the 
biopolitical management of lives in conjunction with a larger set of social 
actors, especially supranational bodies (for example, the World Health 
Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and 
private organisations such as charities, non- governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and foundations, to the point that ‘The institutional bounda-
ries of what constitutes a healthcare system’ have become ‘up for grabs’ 
(Beckfield et al. 2013, 128). In this volume, we seek to analyse chronic-
ity, care and deservingness as an entangled whole, contending that there 
are multiple interactions between the three. The logic of deservingness 
has achieved a certain cultural hegemony, permeating interpersonal 
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(even intimate) relationships. Through caregiving/ receiving practices, 
however, individuals and group formations have carved room for resist-
ance, deviation, co- optation or simply adjustment. Moran- Thomas’s work 
(2019b) in Belize, where diabetes has become a leading cause of death, 
ethnographically traces patient- driven health- care protests and activ-
ism. It examines patients’ and caregivers’ struggles to access dialysis in a 
country where basic health- care access has not historically been framed 
as a natural right of citizens. It also considers the challenges posed for 
small countries now facing rising issues of diabetes- related injuries and 
chronic complications.
Through other compelling accounts of life with chronic conditions, 
such as AIDS in South Africa (Fassin 2007) or ‘affliction’ in low- income 
households in Delhi (Das 2015), anthropological perspectives on care 
and chronicity have analysed different types of networks, relations and 
institutions (Buch 2015). As Lameire et al. (1999, 4) write:
Like other human service systems, healthcare services often reflect 
deeply rooted social and cultural expectations of the citizenry. 
Although these fundamental values are generated outside the for-
mal structure of the healthcare system, they often define its overall 
character and capacity. Healthcare systems are therefore differ-
ent all over the world and are strongly influenced by each nation’s 
unique history, traditions and political system. This has led to dif-
ferent institutions and a large variation in the type of social con-
tracts between the citizens and their respective governments.
Who deserves to be included in the body politic, and the how and why of 
such inclusion, are therefore important questions that need to be disen-
tangled in contested and ambiguous carescapes, while, at the same time, 
issues of health inequities need to be seen as part and parcel of cultural 
and political economies of care – as products of a specific social history, 
each with its own legacy of deservingness.
Structure of the book
This volume draws together the contributions of several authors explor-
ing how people in specific sociocultural contexts experience and make 
sense of chronicity. Taking an upstream and downstream approach, as 
outlined in the first section of this introduction, they describe the relevant 
politics, (post)colonial history and social formation, while also attending 
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to the concerns, anxieties and hopes of the individuals and their fami-
lies. All the authors reflect on how ‘caring for and about’ (Manderson and 
Warren 2013) comprises a complex social field giving rise to tensions, 
ambiguities and contradictions. In such a field, nation states work as 
providers, sanctioners and gatekeepers of care, while people living with 
chronic illnesses or conditions fashion their own (sometimes counter-
intuitive) ways to care for themselves and others. Within these circum-
stances, kinship relationships are particularly salient: care ‘work’ is often 
performed by family members. Yet the question of who counts as ‘family’ 
is not a natural fact, but one defined and framed through complex nego-
tiations across multiple actors and regulations.
The volume has a distinctive feature when it comes to the meth-
odological orientation adopted. All chapters are based on ethnographic 
research and engage with one or a handful of experience- near accounts 
(Wikan 1991), including autoethnography, an outcome of our focus 
on chronicity and care, which privileges subjective interpretations of 
chronic conditions and everyday struggles. Each story opens a window 
on a specific set of experiences marked by persistent, recurrent, periodic 
or degenerative affliction, broadening our understanding of what con-
stitutes ‘chronicity’ and the different ways it manifests itself. Personal 
accounts of the lives of people with chronic conditions, and the support 
they receive or offer to others, shed light on worlds of affliction and suf-
fering (Robinson 2002), as well as of hope and desire. Even though the 
ethnographic descriptions seem so person- centred, they are nevertheless 
premised on a ‘relational approach’ (Menéndez 2009), where subjects 
and structures are intertwined; the individuals or families described in 
these chapters are always embedded in wider and complex fields of care.
The volume opens with Lisa Ballesteros’s exploration of how fami-
lies with medically complex children experience chronicity and everyday 
life in the UK, engaging with the challenges families face when depend-
ent on paid carers for 24/ 7 waking care. She initially focuses on the fami-
lies’ adaptation to a ‘new normal’ after their medically complex child is 
born, and how the concept of the ‘good life’ is reworked and inextricably 
linked with the lives and experiences of the carers. Initially perceived as 
strangers, they often become part of the family at a later stage. With paid 
carers being a precariously employed group in society, the author shows 
how carers’ experiences are often shaped by political- economic fluctua-
tions, and post- colonial and gendered fields of practice or the afterlife 
of colonialism (Gamlin and Osrin 2018). Finally, she addresses issues 
of public policy and politics of deservingness by arguing that creating 
a better future for medically complex children and their families means 
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making sure that carers themselves are able to live a life where they feel 
valued, secure and supported. All this emphasises the relevance of pro-
viding better working and living conditions for those employed in the 
care sector in unequal states that often do not fairly reward their invalu-
able contribution.
Devin Flaherty describes the challenges of asserting the right to live 
well when older. Through a vivid ethnographic description of chronic liv-
ing in St Croix, an island in the US Virgin Islands, Flaherty shows how 
older Crucian residents with severe chronic illnesses have little choice 
but to recur to hospice care. Patients remain entrapped in a bureaucracy 
where medical equipment and services are only accessible through a 
reimbursement scheme that, designed with the continental US in mind, 
becomes largely inoperable on the American periphery. Flaherty draws 
attention to the silent workings of deservingness, demonstrating that St 
Croix residents are ‘not quite US citizens’, and thus fall into the category 
of the legally deserving but de facto undeserving. In this case, their claims 
to deservingness are not so much denied as they are simply not taken into 
consideration – Crucians being residents of an unincorporated territory 
of the US, and therefore ‘second- class citizens’ experiencing disparities 
in access to health care and welfare assistance (see, for instance, Matos- 
Desa 2010; Roman- Basora and Bland 2021). The author concentrates 
on ideas of deservingness, showing that the type of care that Crucians 
receive is the outcome of the colonial history of the island in relation to 
the US government and its lack of concern or disregard for older adults 
and their chronic conditions.
Similarly, although in a different social and political context, Erika 
Takahashi examines elderly care in Finland. By describing the neolib-
eral reform of the social- democratic welfare regime, she analyses elderly 
institutional care and how it has been shifted towards ‘informal’ home 
care through the Relative Care Support Act, whereby the state provides a 
financial allowance and respite services for carers. By ensuring the rights 
of relative caregivers, this law regards them to some extent as formal 
workers with specific criteria that intersect with the politics of deserving-
ness. Moreover, this Act broadens the definition of ‘relative’ to anyone – 
with or without consanguineal/ conjugal ties – who can prove that they 
provide caregiving. Neighbours and friends may then become part of 
the care networks providing support. However, there are various condi-
tions that affect the decision on who deserves to be a ‘relative’ caregiver, 
with certification criteria being less stringent in rural areas than in urban 
ones. The state, in fact, interacts differently with its citizens according 
to local political economies of care, becoming more demanding in areas 
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less affected by care shortages and the lack of care workers. This state 
interference is not always welcome, because some carers perceive it as an 
intrusion into their private sphere.
In her contribution, Lilian Kennedy looks at the strategies that 
people with dementia and their carers implement in the UK to under-
stand and procure state- funded support. In an effort to achieve a ‘good 
life’ within the context of living with dementia, people suffering from it 
and their carers face complex challenges when navigating the confus-
ing bureaucratic and legal systems of an increasingly privatised National 
Health Service. Kennedy focuses on ‘the hassle’ of trying to ‘get the power 
of attorney sorted’ and to ‘do the Carers Assessments right’, procedures 
that require translating intimate details of the relationship between care-
giver and care receiver into the language of governmental paperwork. 
This perceived ‘intrusion’ into one’s privacy dramatically intersects with 
the temporality of waiting for governmental services, which are often 
perceived to be inadequate, uneven and unable to deliver personalised 
care. The state becomes identified as a ‘bad relative’, who, by neglecting 
its citizens’ care needs, fails to meet expected moral obligations and reci-
procities of care. In this carescape, trust is compromised and the social 
contract partially undermined.
The four chapters following Kennedy’s contribution describe the 
key role that non- state actors play in the provision of care for so- called 
‘vulnerable’ subjects: they either compensate for the state’s negligence in 
providing quality care, or work as its right arm. It is here, at the margins 
of post- colonial societies, that care is assembled, and the state is then 
free to deny, impose or offer it as a biopolitical way to control deviant or 
undervalued bodies. In objecting to this exercise of disciplinary power, 
deviant bodies formulate their own ways of (self)caring. The ‘margins’ 
are, in fact, not ‘inert spaces and populations’, but ‘bristling with life’ 
(Das and Poole 2004, 30). The state clearly does not operate alone; it 
has ambivalent ties with many other actors, such as churches, NGOs 
and community- based organisations, driven by the commitment to ‘do 
good’ (Fisher 1997) through caregiving. These non- state actors influence 
notions and practices of (un)care, as well as how (and to what extent) 
the very experience of chronicity at the so- called margins is transformed.
By describing assemblages of care in contemporary, neolib-
eral Tanzania, Giorgio Brocco portrays the ideological and practical 
effects that the ‘NGOisation’ of carescapes has on people with albinism. 
Following the life and care trajectories of a woman and a man with albi-
nism, the author describes how they master and resignify the notions 
of ‘disability’, ‘rights’, ‘development’ and ‘empowerment’ that they 
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apprehend from humanitarian organisations, the state and the media. 
Although at first sight these notions might simply seem to be products 
of a neoliberal humanitarian ethos, the lives and (self)care practices of 
people with albinism show instead that they are polysemic and unstable, 
reflecting the specific and contingent ways in which people with albi-
nism construct their identities and strive for acceptance in society. The 
care practices of people with albinism are defined by state and non- state 
organisations and structures, funding opportunities and networks. This 
chapter also illustrates how defining a way of being as a chronic condi-
tion that requires intervention paves the way for the medicalisation of 
albinism.
In her chapter on an Indigenous community in southern Mexico, 
Chiara Bresciani analyses the historical (post)colonial reasons and per-
sistent health inequalities underlying alcohol overconsumption. Mexico, 
like Tanzania, has been significantly affected by structural adjustment 
programmes. Exploring the Mexican politics of care in rural, marginal-
ised areas, she describes how the chronically underfunded health sys-
tem fails to treat alcohol overconsumption and addiction, and how her 
research participants resort to alternative strategies of care and healing, 
such as religious conversions to evangelical churches. By demanding 
continuous participation in church affairs, and commitment to sanc-
tity, these institutions offer a spiritual and material option that transfers 
‘chronicity’ from the disease to the act of healing.
By contrast, Sudarshan Kottai and Shubha Ranganathan dissect how 
the care provided by mental health NGOs, working under the auspices of 
the Indian government, leads to chronicity and dependency. The authors 
show how psychiatric treatment for homeless people in India serves the 
purpose of controlling them. Through a complex assemblage of NGOs, 
mental health professionals, social workers and shopkeepers, the state is 
able to benefit from deviancy: ‘beggars’ under psychiatric treatment are 
entrusted to shopkeepers who become their caregivers, responsible for 
administering them drugs and including them in productive activities. 
Kottai and Ranganathan show us how the biopsychiatrisation of home-
lessness and the medicalisation of care can increase vulnerability, which 
is, in fact, functional to a post- colonial, neoliberal regime.
Based on research in Canada, Rossio Motta- Ochoa and Nelson 
Arruda vividly describe how drug users, often homeless or roughly 
housed, simultaneously manage multiple addictions skilfully as a form 
of self- care. Far from being indifferent, purely self- destructive individu-
als, as dominant narratives often portray them, addicts become ‘para- 
pharmacologists’, even advising less expert users on how to manage 
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drugs. In disrupting classic ideas of care as a life- sustaining practice, 
they compel us to consider its unsettling ambivalences. The authors also 
describe how difficult it is – despite the fact that Canada has a robust 
welfare system – for addicts to access support benefits and services such 
as housing or employment. It is actually easier for them to get pharmaco-
logical treatment for psychiatric issues and, ironically, their psychiatrisa-
tion adds to the diversity and number of drugs at their disposal.
The last two chapters of the volume show how the state, through 
the regulation of medical care (often in conjunction with private, market- 
based actors), functions as a gatekeeper, both enabling and obstruct-
ing citizens’ access to medical resources and procedures. It is through 
bureaucracy that the state often exercises its power over people’s bod-
ies and decisions to live or die. Living with medical conditions that may 
be rare or complex, patients and their families are forced to deal with 
the complexities of bureaucratic red tape to assert their rights to access 
health care in order to cure, manage or end their chronic conditions.
Maria LaRusso and César Abadía- Barrero examine how the emer-
gence of complex paediatric syndromes such as paediatric acute- onset 
neuropsychiatric syndrome (PANS) defies long- established medical 
nosologies and diagnostic practices, and how the US insurance- based 
medical system in turn hinders the provision of effective and humane 
medical attention to the children needing it. Following the care itiner-
aries of two families, the authors show how diagnostic ‘uncertainty’, 
controversy, hope and prognosis shape medical encounters and end up 
making PANS chronic. They also illustrate how unequal and inadequate 
welfare systems, largely subsumed into market rules, transform emerg-
ing syndromes into triggers of poverty and undeservingness.
By describing the vicissitudes of Paul Lamb, a tetraplegic man from 
Leeds whose fight for assisted dying made newspaper headlines, Marcos 
Freire de Andrade Neves questions what care and health mean. Subjected 
to a drug- based regimen in order to manage his pain, Lamb inhabits a 
world that he names ‘zombieland’, characterised by suffering, confusion 
and depersonalisation. Lamb’s condition is defined and controlled by the 
state, and decided on by his doctors. This prioritisation of physical health 
over emotional and cognitive wellbeing generates an irreconcilable frac-
ture between Lamb and his caregivers. When Lamb brings his case to 
court in order to demand the right to die, he finds himself having to show 
the judges his suffering body in the hope of being granted this right. This 
is a powerful account that deals with the management of pain, care and 




In sum, all the chapters, each with its own context, address how the 
managing of care gives rise to a vast variety of challenges, and how care 
relationships are built around entitlement rights that are constantly being 
renegotiated with state and non- state actors. This entitlement to care may 
be based upon difference (Brocco on albinism), loss of function (Kennedy 
on dementia, and Andrade Neves on tetraplegia), illness versus social dis-
enfranchisement (Kottai and Ranganathan on homelessness, Bresciani 
on alcoholism, and Motta- Ochoa and Arruda on drug use) or level of care 
(Flaherty and Takahashi on elderly care, LaRusso and Abadía- Barrero, and 
Ballesteros on medically complex children). Overall, these entitlements 
to care are shaped by political-economic factors that powerfully intersect 
with capability assessments, affordability, citizenship rights and access 
to health- care services. The marginalisation of particular population 
groups and individuals from public areas – see Kottai and Ranganathan, 
and Motta- Ochoa and Arruda in this volume, via gentrification and ‘social 
cleansing’ policies (Lees and White 2020) – suggests that a strategy of 
managing care needs through concealment. These individuals and popula-
tion groups could become difficult to classify and categorise, and therefore 
to take care of, acquiring an invisible liminal state (Little et al. 1998).
Concluding remarks
It could be argued that there is an ‘aura of invisibility’ that surrounds the 
significance of care in everyday life (Bowden 1997, 6). ‘By not noticing 
how pervasive and central care is to human life, those who are in a posi-
tion of power and privilege can continue to ignore and to degrade the 
activities of care and those who give care’ (Tronto 1993, 111). In addition, 
the ‘autonomy myth’ (Finemann 2004) suits politicians and policy - 
makers seeking to promote individual rather than collective responsi-
bility for welfare and wellbeing. When someone becomes ‘dependent’, 
they are then identified as of lesser worth (Fraser and Gordon 1994), 
with profound implications for the politics of deservingness. However, 
in the logic of care, as outlined by Mol (2008, 12), ‘We do not start out 
as individuals, but always belong to collectives already – and not just a 
single one, but a lot of them.’ These collectives, subject to the political 
economy of health and care, as shown in the ethnographies assembled in 
this book, need to be continuously (re)crafted and (re)negotiated.
How individuals manage their care circumstances, and how they 
access the informal and formal resources, as well as how they react to 
official diagnoses and decisions, are all important aspects that influence 
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how people come to terms with their chronic conditions, negotiate 
restrictions, and deal with issues of power and (inter)dependency in rela-
tionships of inequality and proximity. In considering different care con-
texts, we therefore explore the interrelations between the private level of 
personal and family situations, the social level of informal networks, and 
the public (state) level of structures and resources.
The ethnographies in this book shed some light on what living with 
chronic conditions means today in specific social and cultural contexts, 
and on the importance of close relationships in managing chronicity. 
Cultivating relationships with others is fundamental for making some-
thing of oneself within the limits set by one’s environment (Jackson 
2011) and chronic condition. Undoubtedly it may often be a complex 
coexistence. Although taking care of oneself and others is key to belong-
ing and wellbeing, profound and distressful tensions often arise.
Notes
 1. See Lazar’s (2013, 7) discussion of the social contract philosophers for more details on what 
the social contract implies and how it may frame the concept of ‘citizenship’. She describes very 
clearly why this has relevance for political anthropology and the anthropology of citizenship.
 2. Breilh (2015) distinguishes between ‘lifestyles’ and ‘ways of life’: the former refers to patterns 
of behaviour at the individual level, while the latter refers to the patterns of behaviour of col-
lectivities (similar to the concept of culture).
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A house of cards: Chronicity, care 
packages and a ‘good life’
Lisa ballesteros
Tuesday 8.00 a.m., November 2017, south- east London. The morning 
routine was in full swing. T, aged 3, was sitting in a sea of books and toys, 
contentedly sucking his fingers as he flicked through The Gruffalo, a book 
about a woodland monster that he had been obsessed with since he was a 
baby. His ventilator beeped as he gave a squeak of joy at a favourite page, 
and frantically bum- shuffled across the living room to match it with the 
appropriate stuffed animal. His father, B, jumped up just in time to adjust 
the long plastic tube snaking out of a hole in T’s neck, through which a 
steam nebuliser was running. Crisis averted, B went back to correcting 
essays for his freelance job as an online English tutor for Chinese teen-
agers, the only employment he had been able to find that fitted around 
T’s medical needs. The next intervention was not due for another half 
hour, after which it would be time to pack up T’s specially adapted buggy 
to go to nursery: ventilator, emergency bag, oxygen, posterior walker, 
suction catheters, suction machine, resuscitation bag, feed pump, gas-
trostomy connector, medications, urinary catheters, nappy bag. Oh, and 
a copy of The Gruffalo for the journey.
T is my son. I had planned to spend the day writing up my PhD in a 
corner of T’s room, the only place available to work in our two- bedroom 
flat. My desk was wedged between an oxygen concentrator and a pile of 
bowel irrigation supplies, bundles of medical gauze taped to its corners 
in an attempt to protect T’s head during his wobbly attempts to walk. 
I had done my fieldwork in between looking after T, although at this point 
in our lives B was doing the bulk of the childcare. T had been discharged 
from hospital at 11 months old, with tubes embedded in his brain and 
sticking out of his throat and stomach. Surviving the first year had been 
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a big achievement, but nobody with his set of conditions had lived long 
enough to take anything for granted and the first year of his life at home 
passed by in a blur of life- support interventions. These were punctuated 
by occasional admissions to various London hospitals for chest infec-
tions, neurological surgery and investigative admissions. Although the 
secondary school where B taught was initially sympathetic, after several 
months of leaving early to get to the hospital, they had not renewed his 
contract. Money was tight, but we had decided to try to get by on a com-
bination of my PhD stipend, disability benefits and whatever freelance 
work B could get.
Life had become easier when T turned 2, became more medically 
stable and eligible for 15 hours a week of government- funded nursery 
care. This was available a year earlier than for many other children, as 
he received the highest level of Disability Living Allowance (DLA).1 With 
his right to education protected through the 2010 Equality Act, our local 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG), the arm of the UK’s free National 
Health Service (NHS) responsible for commissioning local health ser-
vices for those eligible for continuing health care (Department of Health 
2016a), was legally obliged to provide a carer to attend nursery with 
him. The tracheostomy in T’s windpipe, which connected to the ventila-
tor on which he was totally dependent to breathe, was at risk of block-
ing or popping out when least expected, as had nearly happened during 
the morning’s Gruffalo- chasing mission. Failure to securely replace it 
would mean T could die in minutes, his airway deflated and fragile lungs 
collapsed.
Carers were, and still are, part of our lives. After almost a year of 
being moved between various hospitals, we were told that for T to safely 
come home, we would need a government- funded package of continuing 
health support to assist us in providing 24- hour waking care. The realisa-
tion that life as I knew it had come to an end was a turning point. ‘You’ll 
get used to it,’ the nurses said. ‘It’ll become your new normal. Twenty 
years ago you would have had to stay in hospital until he either got better, 
or, you know …’. I did know. During that year, I had seen enough hollow- 
eyed parents going home empty handed that, despite T not being likely to 
‘get better’ any time soon, there was an alternative I dreaded even more.
Eventually, having strangers in our home went from being a horrify-
ing prospect to something I depended on and felt grateful for, albeit with 
moments where I swung between resentment for the lack of privacy and 
control, and frustration when things did not happen the way they were 
supposed to. A carer not coming for the nursery shift meant that either T 
did not go in, or B or I cancelled our plans for the day and went with him. 
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A non- arrival at night meant one of us had to try and stay awake all night 
after being awake all day.
Becoming pregnant during my PhD had seemed like a minor set-
back. I planned to take six months off and carry on with my fieldwork 
overseas as planned, family in tow. B was going to be a hands- on, 
stay- at- home dad anyway. A ‘good life’ back then meant freedom and 
choice: where to live, who to have in my home, taking my child to meet 
family around the world. As the weeks in hospital turned into months, 
that openness and hope was sucked into what felt like a vortex of sus-
pended reality, and only gradually reconfigured into a completely differ-
ent conception of what a ‘good life’ was. Part of that is dependence on 
paid care from individuals who start off as strangers. All previous notions 
of a ‘good life’ suddenly became intimately intertwined with the complex 
universes of people we had not met yet, and the fluctuations of public 
policy in austerity Britain.
In this chapter, I explore how families raising medically complex 
children in the UK in the early twenty- first century experience chronic-
ity. I examine the extent to which changing perceptions of, and ability 
to live, a ‘good life’ intersect with the formal care system, and are mor-
ally expressed through notions of deservingness and gratefulness. To 
this end, I argue that the inherent relationality of ongoing ‘moral pro-
jects of becoming’ (Mattingly 2014), as lived by the families of medically 
complex children, and care as both a relational and institutional concept 
(Graham 1991; Thomas 1993; Shakespeare 2014), ensures that the 
lives and experiences of paid carers intertwine with those of the fami-
lies with which they work. The result is a complex field of social assem-
blages where moral and affective forces collide with political- economic 
fluctuations and post- colonial and gendered fields of practice (Bourdieu 
1977). Bearing in mind the particularly precarious nature of care work in 
contemporary Britain (Christensen 2010), I show how institutionalised 
statutory care relationships by their very nature – that is, racialised and 
gendered fields of power which occur in the most intimate of spaces, that 
of the domestic sphere – are marked by tension and contradictions.
Background
As medical technology has become more sophisticated, the life expec-
tancies of medically complex individuals around the world have 
become longer, although not necessarily more stable, moving from ‘cri-
sis’ to ‘chronic’ mode. This persistence of medical precarity in time is 
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fundamentally linked to the structural factors of modernity (Manderson 
and Smith- Morris 2010; Montesi and Calestani, this volume). Over the 
last 20 or 30 years, this has been reflected in a shift in policy regarding 
the long- term care of chronically fragile individuals in the social welfare 
democracies of northern Europe, where state- funded care has been spa-
tially reconfigured from institutional (hospitals, hospices, care homes) to 
domestic settings (Shakespeare 2014; Christensen 2010), determining 
an increasing hospitalisation of homes.
The NHS in the UK has always been free at the point of access for 
eligible individuals, a status which is based on citizenship and settlement 
rights. Once a child with complex medical needs has been assessed and 
accepted for a package of care by their local CCG, commissioners decide 
how the care will be provided and the resources required to deliver it 
through multi- agency panels (Department of Health 2016a). Each CCG 
has access to different levels of funding through their local NHS trust, 
whose available income can vary hugely from area to area, and even 
within cities. When a package of care has been agreed on, and the budget 
approved, this funding is used to commission the services of care agen-
cies.2 After a tendering process in which various agencies bid for a new 
care package contract, a handful of bidders are shortlisted based on who 
promises to deliver the best mix of quality and price, and presented to 
potential clients (in this case, parents), who choose a final provider. This 
agency is then responsible for hiring and training staff and the ongoing 
management of the package. Carers are trained in whatever interven-
tions are necessary to support families in meeting the care needs of the 
child in question. T’s daily care routines mirrored those of many families 
we got to know through online communities and through frequent hos-
pital visits: a meticulous operation of suctioning, nebulising, catheteris-
ing, and administering medicines and feeds through various artificially 
created points in the body, as well as always being alert to any signs of 
deterioration, which could quickly escalate into crisis.
CCGs are provided with a set of national guidelines via various 
decision- support tools and flowcharts, which are designed to assess lev-
els of needs, ranging from ‘no additional needs’ to ‘priority’ (Department 
of Health 2016b). Despite such tools, however, the ultimate decision 
about how much care a family is capable of providing ultimately rests 
with individual commissioning panels, and is often guided by budgets. 
This means that provision of care packages for those with similar medi-
cal prognoses varies widely across NHS trusts. The inequality of this 
postcode lottery is a common complaint among families with medically 
complex children, with ventilated children in some areas receiving seven 
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waking nights of domiciliary care a week in addition to several day shifts, 
while others are awarded two or three nights only. In recent years, aus-
terity cuts have exacerbated this problem, with funding available to local 
NHS trusts being reduced amid rising debts (Taunt et al. 2014).
In addition to variation in provision, the ability of agencies to actu-
ally provide staff for care packages also presents challenges. Although 
agencies claim that a background in health care is a necessary require-
ment in the training of new carers, when it comes to recruitment pro-
cesses, the specificities of what this means are vague, an issue which is 
linked to nationwide shortages of willing and competent individuals. 
A major factor contributing to this is the precarity of the work. Care work 
has always been poorly paid, unstable, undervalued and physically dif-
ficult (Christensen 2010). As a labour system, it is embedded in the UK’s 
colonial past and long history of using migrant labour to fill skill gaps 
in the health sector, making it not only historically gendered (Thomas 
1993; Graham 1991; Christensen 2012), but also reflective of divisions 
of class and race (Graham 1991). Despite the increasingly specialist skills 
required with the rise in the chronically medically complex population, 
full- time, permanent contracts which guarantee a minimum monthly sal-
ary are extremely scarce. At the time of writing, the average pay on a 
night shift for a London- based health- care assistant, Band 2 (their official 
NHS banding), was £11– 14 an hour.3 With monthly rental costs plus bills 
starting at around £1,000 a month for a one- bedroom flat in London’s 
Zone 2, and going up to around £1,400 for a two- bedroom flat, care work 
cannot provide sufficient income to support a family as a single salary.
Simultaneously, changes in public spending following the 2012 
Welfare and Reform Act have deeply affected access to supplementary 
forms of income. Although ostensibly a simplification of the benefits sys-
tem to improve incentives to work, the Act formed part of a controver-
sial discourse at nationwide level regarding access to benefits and who 
‘deserved’ them (LGIU 2012). In a city well known for its expensive hous-
ing and childcare costs, this chapter shows how, in one particular employ-
ment context, these changes especially affected women of African and 
Caribbean backgrounds. As a group in society for which historical racial-
ised and gendered inequalities and austerity policies, which draw on moral 
panics of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ recipients of social welfare, have 
conspired to leave precariously employed, they are disproportionately rep-
resented in the care sector in London. This precarity in turn undermines 
the integrity of the sector itself. In other words, financial, social and medi-
cal precarity combine into a relationally defined field of practice (Bourdieu 
1977) between carers and families which is in constant danger of collapse.
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Methods
The fieldwork for this paper consists of my notes and memories of the 
period from 2015 to early 2019, during which I lived with my son, hus-
band and, eventually, daughter in London before moving to a different 
city. The spatial marking of a ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of this period auto-
matically lends itself to a consideration of narrative along with auto- 
ethnography as a principal methodology.
My approach to narrative is inherently temporal, that is, character-
ised by an awareness of time. I follow Taylor (1989, 47) in drawing on a 
Heideggerian temporality in that ‘in order to have a sense of who we are, 
we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are 
going’. Similarly, Mattingly (2014) argues for the centrality of a narrative 
methodology and the inherent narrativity of ethical practice in her eth-
nography of families caring for children with complex needs. She refers 
to the temporality of the projects of care as historicity, a self- constituting 
nature with a middle emerging from a continually revised beginning 
and multiple possibilities of foreshadowed but suspenseful endings. For 
Mattingly (2014, 20), narrative framing as methodology, rather than 
presuming an overly coherent self, is a useful approach for investigating 
how moral projects are ‘riddled by uncertain possibilities and informed 
by pluralistic moral values, concerns and communities’.
Apart from my own experiences, I also draw on four years of par-
ticipant observation of other families of medically complex children that 
I met during long hospital stays and on internet forums. The proliferation 
of Facebook groups dedicated to niche areas of interest extends to sup-
port groups for families of tracheostomy children, bowel management 
support groups and disability benefits advice forums. I engaged in, and 
observed, heated debates regarding carer behaviour, unreliable/ dishon-
est care agencies, CCG policies and various other third- party actions 
that families see as impeding their ability to live a good life on their own 
terms. With this in mind, I created a survey entitled ‘Chronic Conditions, 
Care Packages and a Good Life’ in July 2019, and posted it in various 
groups. I use the results here to develop some of the more ‘thick’ descrip-
tions which I include from my own experience.
Theoretical framework: Temporality, ethics and care
Horton and Barker (2010) advocate the anthropological approach 
to health as ideally placed to examine how we physically incorporate 
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social and material environments, tracing material and lasting effects of 
public policies on the embodied self. Building on this approach, in this 
chapter I draw not only on anthropological literature on health and dis-
ability, but also on sociological and public policy research in order to 
emphasise the extent to which the deeply first- person methodology of 
auto ethnography/ narrative is shaped by the political and sociological 
implications of the UK health- care system.
Conceptually, I first advocate a strong temporal focus on chronic-
ity in its capacity as an ongoing process of medical precarity. In defining 
‘temporality’ as a consciousness of time, rather than a linear progression 
of past, present and future, I emphasise the specific temporal dimension 
and texture of living with chronicity. To explore this, I draw on anthro-
pological literature on different types of ‘crisis’, in particular, that of the 
financial crisis in southern Europe in the early 2010s. The use of ‘crisis’ 
here was the suspension of future thought, an examination of hopeless-
ness, waiting and survival after an extended period of belief in the neolib-
eral capitalist system in southern Europe as an arena in which one could 
thrive (Knight and Stewart 2016; Janeja and Bandak 2018). I argue for 
parallels in the lives of families with medically complex children, whose 
understandings of pre- and post- crisis conditions have had to adjust to a 
model where their expectations of the future can no longer assume a sta-
tistically average life expectancy and standard of health, as experienced 
by the ‘healthy’ population who benefit from Europe’s low child mortal-
ity rates and social democratic health- care systems. I propose hope and 
temporality as affective strategies to create spaces of possibility within 
potentially catastrophic circumstances, and also ask how they interact 
with experiences of guilt, deservingness and gratefulness.
I link the literature discussed above to a notion of care, in its dual 
conceptualisation as an institutional as well as an affective practice, 
which is firmly rooted in the anthropology of morality. As part of the ‘eth-
ical turn’, Mattingly (2014, 4, 5) refers to the suffering and challenges in 
the lives of families raising disabled children as a ‘complex reasoning task 
that engenders ongoing moral deliberations, evaluations, and experi-
ments in how to live’, which propels parents into a ‘new, often unexpected 
and unwanted project of becoming’. In reference to the ‘good life’ within 
this anthropology of ethics, as Aristotle argues, a good life is not just sur-
vival but flourishing, not a subjective notion of happiness but of leading 
a life worth living. A key concept here is Bernard Williams’s (1981) use 
of ‘ground projects’ – commitments so deep that they make life mean-
ingful in themselves, including ‘deeply cherished and self- defining ide-
als, activities and personal associations’ (Mattingly 2014, 12). These 
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activities consist of small moments and routine activities that may at first 
glance appear repetitive, pre- reflective or inconsequential, but that ‘take 
on depth as episodes in unfolding narratives of moral striving and as part 
of conscious commitments to realize particular versions of the good life’ 
(Mattingly 2014, 205).
Discussions of deservingness within ongoing moral delibera-
tions of ground projects have rich potential for theorisation within the 
anthropology of ethics, but they also appear in other disciplines. Within 
political science, deservingness can be found as a heuristic device to link 
values and political attitudes (Petersen et al. 2010). In critical public 
health, it appears via an analysis of how the new politics of welfare have 
reshaped articulations of ‘deserving’ versus ‘undeserving’ recipients of 
health- related benefits according to a specific political agenda (Bambra 
and Smith 2010). Sociology engages with the politics of deservingness 
through discussions of illegal migrants. Chauvin and Garcés- Mascareñas 
(2014), for example, locate it within a moral economy that is embed-
ded in legalisation claims and programmes. Most significant for the 
purposes of this chapter, however, is how deservingness appears within 
the extensive literature on care available within sociology, public policy 
studies and disability studies. This literature ranges from the experiences 
of being a care worker and being cared for (Christensen 2010, 2012), 
different models of care (Shakespeare 2014; Ungerson 2006), the theo-
retical underpinnings of care as an ethical model (Shakespeare 2014; 
Graham 1991; Thomas 1993), the meaning/ nature of formal care rela-
tionships and how they are experienced by both care workers and care 
users (Yamaki and Yamazaki 2004; Ungerson 2006; Woodin 2006; Kelly 
2010; Leece and Peace 2010; Christensen 2010; Mladenov 2012), and 
the sociohistorical context of care and its implications on neocolonial, 
class, gender and racial relations (Graham 1991; Thomas 1993). I draw 
on this literature in order to link the affective experience of participat-
ing in the institutionalised statutory care system as both a service user 
and a care worker to the wider social and economic aspects which shape 
different assemblages of care. This also incorporates a consideration of 
the wider discourse of deservingness at a time of welfare cuts, the moral 
panic surrounding ‘deserving’ beneficiaries of care and disability ben-
efits, and debates surrounding migration and the Other. I maintain that 
a reflection of the sociological context of my fieldwork complements the 
anthropological insistence on the question of the human condition within 
a particular historical and cultural space, and thus fills a gap in the litera-
ture for an analysis of affectivity and actual articulation between cared- 
for and caregivers, as mediated by larger structural forces. In particular, 
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I follow Shakespeare (2014) in calling for a theoretical underpinning 
within the feminist ethic of care as model for understanding care rela-
tionships in the disability sector, as well as Christensen (2010) in dis-
tinguishing different approaches to analysing the motivations of care 
workers. These approaches draw on a strong critique in sociology and 
disability studies regarding the false dichotomy and pure utilitarian-
ism of care as public/ private, waged/ unwaged (Graham 1991; Thomas 
1993; Shakespeare 2014). I join them in calling for a focus on relation-
ships and emotions in order to consider the heterogeneity of people’s 
support needs, aspirations and values.
Clarissa’s struggle and the house of cards
B and I were so excited when T started nursery: three hours a day, five 
days a week, after two years of being unable to leave him during the day 
with anyone apart from each other. However, it soon became clear that a 
new set of challenges was beginning. The agency who had won our con-
tract from the CCG were struggling to recruit and keep people for school 
hours. All our carers were women with school- age children or grand-
children, and they either had to take them to school themselves or only 
worked nights, as it was easier to get childcare. One carer confided in me 
apologetically that the amount the agency was offering for three hours’ 
work meant that it was not really worth her while to organise childcare 
and drive across London. Eventually Marie,4 a softly spoken 40- year- old 
woman from Ghana, agreed to take the job. She had lots of experience 
with medically complex children, and she learned the ventilator settings 
quickly. She lasted two months. Carrying the five- kilogram ventilator 
around all day aggravated her back condition, she explained, but she told 
us she had a solution and had set up her cousin Gloria with the agency. 
Gloria had never cared for such complex needs before, and after I saw her 
attempting to suction T’s tracheostomy with the wrong type of catheter, 
we asked for someone else.
Eventually, one of the carers who did night shifts agreed to move to 
days. Clarissa had a raucous laugh and superb clinical skills. T loved her, 
and she was one of the few people to whom he gave one of his rare hugs. 
Over the following months, she confided in us about her life, especially 
her 12- year- old son, Paul, who was six feet tall and ‘Looks 25! Oh my 
lord. God help him.’ She would also refer darkly to the mysterious father 
of her child, who had banned her from visiting her family in Nigeria over 
Christmas, yet did not contribute to the rent: ‘He has another family. 
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In Italy.’ She muttered, and tossed her head: ‘Paul and I, we don’t need 
him!’ Paul had been getting into trouble at school, and she was terrified 
of him getting involved in a gang, a big problem in that part of London, 
and especially so for young men of African or Caribbean backgrounds. 
T’s nursery teacher, who worked closely alongside Clarissa, and who we 
often saw around the neighbourhood, had a brother who, at the age of 
14, had been stabbed to death the year before in the estate just behind 
the nursery. Gang culture, socioeconomic inequality and institutional-
ised racism have long been major issues in this part of London.
Paul’s form teacher at school was a former colleague of B’s, and B 
offered to talk to her on Clarissa’s behalf. Our relationship soon moved 
to a liminal area where B and I felt emotionally affected by what Clarissa 
told us, where B wrote letters to the council on her behalf, and where she 
would cry on the sofa after taking another phone call from school. Yet 
there was always an agitated feeling of limbo, that our lives were on hold 
while she sorted things out. Clarissa often arrived late to look after T, as 
she had been called into meetings when she dropped her son off, mean-
ing that whoever out of B and I had less work to do would stay at nursery 
for an hour or two or three, fulfilling the role of T’s carer as we waited for 
her to arrive.
Eventually, backup was provided by a second carer, Ngozi. Ngozi 
had been a nurse in Nigeria, but her qualification was not recognised in 
London, so she was studying nursing part time at a local university. Her 
children were all grown up, so she was slightly more flexible and able 
to swap shifts with Clarissa during emergencies, such as when Paul was 
suspended from school for fighting. ‘I don’t want to leave him alone in the 
house,’ Clarissa told me. ‘Around here, there are so many gangs. And he 
looks like a man, but he isn’t, he’s just a little boy still! He doesn’t know 
to control his impulses.’
A few weeks later, Clarissa was off again. Gradual changes to state 
support since the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act meant 
that she was no longer eligible for contributions towards her rent. As 
a migrant and a single mother, Clarissa was constantly negotiating the 
ever- changing bureaucratic hoops she needed to jump through to access 
various in- work benefits, until she finally accepted that she would be un - 
able to continue paying the £1,200 a month rent on their two- bedroom 
flat on a single salary. She decided to declare herself homeless and go 
into council- provided temporary accommodation, telling me: ‘I will take 
matters into my own hands. This way, I can get on the list for housing.’ 
This involved Clarissa having to sit in the council office for two days in a 
row before she and her son were eventually sent to a one- bedroom flat in 
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another part of the city. For a few weeks, she could still manage the com-
mute to T’s nursery after doing the school run, but she was then told that 
she was going to be moved much further away. She looked exhausted as 
she explained that she would have to have some time off to move house 
and look for a new school for her son. Unsure whether we would ever see 
her again, I felt my insides twist at the unfairness of what had happened 
to her, and a large dose of self- pity that once again our precious respite 
hours were being taken away. I had already spoken to the care agency, 
who were unable to provide cover for the rest of the week as Ngozi was 
now on her nursing placement. There was only one other carer on the 
package, Lily, a tall and striking 28- year- old Sudanese refugee with two 
children who had done the odd cover day, but who was already doing 
four nights with us that week, in between her paramedic exams. The 
agency asked if I preferred night cover or day cover, and I angrily told 
them that I preferred to sleep, and to look after T myself during the day.
Adapting to our new lives and adjusted parameters of possibility felt 
like living in a house of cards. There was beauty in its complexity when 
everything was working well, and every day that T was healthy and we 
were able to live out our ‘new normal’ was a gift for which I was deeply 
grateful. Then, in a moment, it could suddenly compress and seem like 
the world had collapsed when the slightest thing failed. Everyday life felt 
like it was suspended while our carers sorted their lives out. Empathy 
for what Clarissa was going through mingled with frustration that there 
was no one else available to help, and that I would have to indefinitely 
suspend all the little daily routines in which I had learned to find hap-
piness in the absence of an ability to plan for a future that assumed my 
child would survive. Then, crashing guilt that, in her own way, Clarissa 
was in an even more precarious position than I was. Living in London, 
the same city to which my mother had migrated four decades earlier, and 
where I had friends and acquaintances of different racial backgrounds, 
I was aware of the privilege afforded by my light skin tone, citizenship 
status and middle- class upbringing, despite the restrictions that chronic 
illness had brought into my life. Clarissa, like all the other carers on our 
package, had arrived in London from one of Britain’s former colonies in 
Africa and the Caribbean, reflecting transnational care migration trends 
which have historically relied on low- paid, usually female, migrant work-
ers (Williams 2001; Ungerson 2006; Graham 1991). All of our carers had 
been in the UK long enough to be granted permanent residency and the 
legal status to work and live, although the nature of the work available 
was overwhelmingly precarious and focused on the service industries. 
Indeed, Graham (1991) argues that divisions of gender, class and race via 
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the historical employment in domestic settings (both paid and unpaid) 
of colonial (black) subjects as well as the white working class in Britain 
have been central to the development of the middle- class home as a loca-
tion of family care in Britain. As the twentieth century progressed, this 
domestic element of care became increasingly institutionalised as the 
expanding NHS increased the demand for what had previously been con-
sidered domestic labour outside of private homes, while post- war labour 
shortages in Britain ensured a continued racial element to the provision 
of such care via large recruitment drives in Britain’s former colonies in 
the Caribbean (Graham 1991).
Like Clarissa, I received benefits, but I had always been assured 
by those around me that ‘you deserve them’, as they were linked to T’s 
disabilities. At the same time, moralised discourses in the media were 
raging around people such as Clarissa, who, despite being in skilled 
employment, was attempting to claim state support as she was not paid 
enough to cover her rent and provide for her son. In turn, the inability 
of the care sector to adequately sustain our house of cards meant that, 
despite T being stronger, B was unable to return to the job he loved in a 
local secondary school, where as a teacher he would have been part of a 
system that might enable individuals such as Clarissa’s son to access a life 
outside of London’s gangs.
For different reasons, then, the families of carers and those they 
cared for are both unable to act against a care system that does not pro-
tect those on whom it depends to keep going. Sitting there as T had a nap 
that afternoon, I felt trapped, guilty for feeling frustrated when at least 
I had a roof over my head, and overwhelmingly disempowered over my 
own life and future, and that of my child.
Temporal/ spatial reconfiguration: a discussion
I suggest that the collapsed temporal worlds of acute crisis, when indi-
viduals are unable to conceive of anything beyond the immediate pre-
carious present (Knight and Stewart 2016), give way, in families with 
complex children who attain stability, to chronicity. Estroff (1993, 250) 
defines chronicity as ‘the persistence in time of limitations and suffer-
ing that results in disabilities as they are socially and culturally defined 
and lived’. In the context of this chapter, I suggest a conceptualisation 
of chronicity as less the persistence of suffering, and more the suspen-
sion of crisis as acute and hopeless (Knight and Stewart 2016); that is, 
chronicity as a longer- term experience of medical precarity within which 
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a reconfiguration of some sort of ability to visualise a future/ good life 
is possible, albeit one which is based on an adapted routine and sense 
of self.
The vignette in which I introduced T indicates the process by which 
my own initial appalled realisation that life had changed gave way to 
adaptation to a new normal, or ground project (Mattingly 2014). This 
was also reflected in the answers of the 37 families who responded to 
my online survey.5 When asked about what constituted a good life before 
their medically complex child was born, families reflected on variations 
on the concept of freedom – to travel, to relax at home in private, and to 
make plans for one’s own routine and future. When asked what a good 
life meant now, the focus underwent a spatial and temporal shrinking:
It’s freedom in a different way, in a much more micro- way like hav-
ing small chunks of time to exercise, read, plan for the not too dis-
tant future, have the occasional night out. And enjoy my children 
and family without feeling crowded by health professionals but at 
the same time knowing my boy is safe. I definitely focus more on 
mini- actions in the present now than scary ideas about the future. 
(Respondent 1)
Many prioritise health and stability now, rather than holidays and plan-
ning. There are more references to spending time outside, making mem-
ories and sleeping:
Now in order to have a good quality of life we have to rely on the 
generosity of strangers to support charities that support us. Going 
three months without a hospital admission. Having a little boy who 
lights up a room and is loved wherever we go. It means having to 
constantly fight and battle in order to get the bare essentials for 
your child so they can have a good life. (Respondent 30)
This is echoed by Respondent 33:
Making sure our daughter has a Good Day every day is our plan. 
We want to see her happy, enjoying life and as healthy as can be. 
We want to celebrate the small achievement and have lots of happy 
memories.
Respondent 13 writes about ‘spend[ing] precious time with our gor-
geous boy who has severe complex needs as we don’t know how long 
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we have with him’. There is a strong focusing inwards: a ‘good life’ is the 
‘bare essentials’, ‘micro- victories’ and ‘small achievements’, happiness 
materialising out of being rested, seeing smiles, staying out of hospital. 
Freedom is re- visualised and temporally and spatially shrunk to micro- 
events and the achievement of routine. Mattingly (2014) insists that for 
families of medically complex children in Los Angeles, seemingly mun-
dane domestic routines are not only achievements in the face of a back-
drop of crisis and trauma, but also allow possibilities for transcendence, 
the ongoing practical, dogged hope to create something better. She sug-
gests that ‘turbulence, uncertainty and drama are such pervasive quali-
ties that ordinary routines are not the daily expression of a habitual way 
of life culturally inherited so much as a fragile achievement, a hard- won 
moment of mundaneness’ (Mattingly 2014, 79).
Although I agree with Mattingly’s (2014) suggestion of routine 
as offering the possibility to transcend the ongoing experience of chro-
nicity as a micro- victory, I would expand upon this by proposing that 
the provision of care packages provides an extra layer of relationality 
which makes the fragile achievement of routine even more precarious 
and undermines the moral weight and symbolic density of such micro- 
victories. A key element within this notion of chronicity is the awareness 
that acute crisis, the suspension of future thought, could re- enter at any 
time. Although for many medically complex children this is crisis in its 
medical sense, a sudden medical deterioration, I suggest here that the 
institutional framework that provides the means for a care package is 
also chronically precarious and in danger of crisis at any moment, like 
the human body itself. The consequence of this is its disintegration into 
a state which leaves those who depend on it in the midst of crisis once 
more. This is what happened when historical, social, economic and insti-
tutional conditions converged to leave Clarissa unable to fulfil her role 
as carer. Her absence caused the immediate and complete collapse of 
the house of cards, the temporal and spatial reconfigurations of being, 
and a good life as acted out through routine and mini- victories against 
ongoing chronicity.
Relationality: a discussion
The relationality of care packages is both complex and turbulent. When 
asked about how they felt regarding amounts of care in general, respond-
ents to my online survey used expressions with moral weight which link 
to deservingness, such as ‘grateful’, ‘thankful’ and ‘lucky’:
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Although we’re [sic] rather we didn’t need them, we feel incred-
ibly lucky they’re there. Anyone living with a complex needs child/ 
young adult suffers from mental/ emotional & physical exhaustion 
on a regular basis, with carers life is bearable, without carers it can 
be unbearable. (Respondent 21)
Linked to this notion of gratefulness is the feeling that provision of a suc-
cessful package is crucial to a sense of self and inter- family relationships. 
This ideal sense of self as a familial being significantly differentiates 
between technical care activities and notions of care grounded in love 
and ‘normal parenting’:
We as Phoebe’s parents would not be able to be ourselves in the 
slightest without care. We lose our sense of self. We become a 
carer, a nurse. Not a parent. We constantly suction, or jej feed, 
or medicate, or physio, or splint, or change pads, or hoist etc. ... 
we become so routine in our delivery of care we forget to cud-
dle, kiss, parent. We become robotic in our duties because we’re 
so damned tired. We have no time or inclination for anything. 
(Respondent 17)
If our care package actually happened my husband and I could 
sleep in the same bed five nights a week, I could give my younger 
daughter the attention she needs and deserves. It would mean my 
daughter could enjoy the summer holidays like most five year olds 
rather than having to be stuck indoors because it’s too hot for her 
brother. (Respondent 30)
The care package provided is essential to my son’s ability to stay 
alive. I could not care for him alone 24/ 7 as he now needs two 
trained people to see to his needs when awake and one trained 
person (and me in bed on call) at night. Occasionally I am given a 
double up where I have two trained so I can go out and leave them 
to care for my son but I usually use this time to spend time with my 
son as his mummy rather than his carer. (Respondent 26)
In this context, the concept of care as paid work done by strangers, as 
opposed to emotional, unpaid work done by kin, is defined by the provi-
sion of the care relationship itself by the state. The nature of this insti-
tutionally defined relationship is subject to two poles of interpretation 
within families. On the one hand is a sense of a lack of control and help-
lessness, which manifests as existential frustration and resentment:
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Having strangers in your house, caring for your child, is one of the 
hardest things you can do. You do it because you know it’s best for 
your child but it means that your house is no longer your sanctuary. 
You have to fit life around your carers. We have so little control of 
our lives, so much is dictated by our son’s condition or profession-
als that our home was always our sanctuary and now we don’t even 
have that. (Respondent 30)
On the other hand, as well as frustration and resentment, there are feel-
ings of gratefulness. As a concept, gratefulness, and the extent to which 
one should feel grateful to the state for providing the means to allocate 
more technical aspects of care to paid individuals, arises when the pack-
age is working well. Central to this is the perceived quality of the carer 
relationship. Generally, there is a conflict between the two ideals of being 
professional (that is, competent) and loving (that is, one of the family).6 
For some, a good carer is someone who becomes like kin, with whom 
there is a strong affective bond and who is also fully trusted:
If I have one or two carers then the precious time with my son is 
diluted by having staff with us. The only time this is actually ‘nice’ is 
when the carer or nurse is so perfect that they become a member of 
the family but of course this upsets the professional conduct situa-
tion that agencies and CCGs insist upon. (Respondent 26)
During my years of observation of online forums, I frequently saw how 
the overall value system which prioritised care workers who were ‘like one 
of the family’ in the sense above could be disrupted at any time by inci-
dents of professional misconduct, most often overstepping boundaries or 
falling asleep on the job and putting the cared- for person at risk. On an 
everyday basis, therefore, while kin- like relationality is valued over cold 
professionalism, even the most cherished care workers were not immune 
to a total and sudden relational breakdown when they committed the 
ultimate sin of endangering their charge or the family’s wellbeing. This 
was often expressed by affected families through narratives of betrayal. 
Emotional responses of frustration and guilt in reaction to the precarity 
of the re- conceptualised good life (which appear as gratefulness when 
the routine works) are fundamentally linked to relationality and the 
moral projects of others. Such a consideration is particularly important 
when considering the extent to which power interweaves with affect in 
care relationships. Writing about adult disabled people– personal assis-
tant relationships in the UK, Shakespeare (2014) refers to a prevailing 
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mode of master/ servant, and cites privacy and ensuring that workers do 
not take over their social lives or interfere in family life as the ultimate 
reason for which service users cultivate such a relationship. Privacy was 
indeed a major issue for many families in my study, and many described a 
‘good carer’ not so much in familial terms, but as ‘dynamic’, ‘trustworthy’ 
and ‘professional’, maintaining a distance from the family, rather than 
being ‘one of the family’. Central to this is feeling invaded by representa-
tives of the state intruding into the family home:
We sometimes feel judged in the decisions we make. Privacy is 
important to us and very difficult to get a good balance with. We’ve 
had really good relationships with carers but gossip and Chinese 
whispers, expectations of duties, difficulties in recruiting and lack 
of sufficient management has made things very difficult at times. 
(Respondent 7)
Families sometimes felt as if they were ‘being watched all the time as car-
ers had to write everything down’ (Respondent 9). The maintenance of 
such a relationship, however, leads to a distancing and emotional exhaus-
tion between families and carers:
We are constantly reliant on someone else. Their needs are put 
before ours as they are protected through employment. Pregnancy, 
annual leave, illness, family members becoming ill or bereavement, 
broken down cars, everything you can imagine from a team of car-
ers then has an impact on us. We find it difficult to sympathise some-
times as we know when someone’s pulling a fast one and can’t be 
bothered to come to work. Our ‘bullshit’ filter runs on overdrive! It 
makes us sometimes seem very hard but our emotions are damaged. 
We don’t express the way we used to. We’re not good at the head 
tilt and ‘poor you’ which is often what people want. (Respondent 7)
This is far from the ideal of being like a member of the family, which 
other care package users suggest, an ideal which in itself advocates a 
blend of trust, competence and understanding. The two values of ‘profes-
sional’ and ‘like family’ are therefore not only qualitatively defined, but 
also, and more significantly, in a constant negotiation in order to achieve 
a good relationship. Respondent 26 writes:
Some are ultra professional and act at all times like they are at work, 
forgetting their work is our home. Some are disrespectful and lazy. 
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Some are just perfect. The balance between the two is so important. 
It is so difficult to find the right people.
Referring to this constant negotiation of ideals, Christensen (2012) sug-
gests that the way in which paid care systems are run is fundamental to 
how carer relationships are subsequently played out. She suggests that 
marketised approaches to care provision, such as those that are preva-
lent in the UK, are more likely to produce either extreme master– servant 
relationships or solidarity/ emotional types of relationships, while a more 
regulated system, such as the Norwegian model, encourages a more sus-
tainable hybrid relationship which combines friendship and paid care 
work (Christensen 2012; Shakespeare 2014). This combination encom-
passes the dual notion of care as described by Thomas (1993, 665) of 
care as ‘both the paid and unpaid provision of support involving work 
activities and feeling states’. An ideal hybrid in this context would con-
sist of friendship (as an intangible relationality based on mutual affect 
and trust) and the professionalism inherent in the concept of paid care 
work, as well as the accompanying tangible clinical standards needed to 
keep not just the carers’ charges stable, but the whole family able to live 
a good life.
Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that families with medically complex chil-
dren who experience chronicity do so via a spatial and temporal recon-
figuration of the ‘good life’. This good life is played out as ongoing moral 
projects which focus on the achievement of micro- victories and daily rou-
tines, a notion which has been documented in other studies of medically 
complex families (Mattingly 2014). However, I propose here that those 
who experience chronicity within the institutional structure of the state- 
funded, community- based care packages which are unique to northern 
Europe (Ungerson 2006) encounter a further layer of both precarity and 
relationality which works on a dual level and challenges the realisation 
of such moral projects and abilities to lead a good life.
This first takes the form of precarity regarding relationships with 
carers, and can be conceptualised as the ongoing negotiation towards a 
positive and mutually affective relationality within the carer– family rela-
tionship. This relationality is underscored by affective notions of deserv-
ingness and gratefulness, which can also intermingle with resentment 
that a care package is needed in first place. A successful relationship here 
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is one where carers who are ‘like family’ but also ‘professional’ facilitate 
access to the moral project of a good life.
The second notion of precarity appears around the working condi-
tions for carers within the care system itself as an arena of paid labour. 
Regardless of the relationships built between carers and families, this sec-
ond form of precarity exists as the ongoing potential for the breakdown 
of possibilities for the micro- victories of a good life when a carer is forced 
into crisis. Whether through acute reasons or longer- term structural in-
equalities which have their roots in historical, social and economic prac-
tices, the house of cards can at any time collapse into crisis for all parties 
connected by the relational practices of the care package.
This dual notion of precarity has a significant impact on those fami-
lies whose abilities to live a good life are already marked by the experi-
ence of chronicity. Throughout this chapter, I have suggested that a good 
life, as the spatial and temporal reconfiguration of what it means to flour-
ish, is strongly enabled and shaped by the provision of structural support 
that enables the basic provision of human needs such as sleep, routine 
and basic kin relationships. The structural support provided by carers 
such as Clarissa, who was able to facilitate a good life for T and his family 
on both a relational and clinical basis, was undermined by her position 
within a sector of the labour market which was defined by post- colonial 
and gendered socioeconomic inequality. This inequality is what chal-
lenges the solution proposed by sociological research on care systems, 
which calls for a more regulated system in order to encourage a better 
hybrid carer relationship (Christensen 2012), and in turn facilitate fami-
lies’ potential to lead a good life. The UK care system is also burdened by 
the economic realities of several years of austerity policies and reduced 
public spending. In order to conceptualise a future for medically complex 
children in which they and their families can live a good life to its fullest 
extent, a hybrid model of care needs to be developed in which not just 
care recipients but also carers themselves are able to live a life where they 
feel valued, supported and secure.
Notes
 1. Those on low incomes are also eligible for the 15 free hours at the age of 2. These latter families 
are means tested, whereas DLA recipients are not.
 2. At the time of writing, this situation was changing, with Personal Health Budgets increasingly 
being awarded directly to eligible individuals, who then recruit for and manage their own care 
team. However, although a legal amendment to the NHS and CCG Regulations in 2013 stated 
that ‘the families of a child or young person eligible for continuing care have a “right to have” 




A housE of CArDs 47
  
still relatively uncommon, and information regarding them is difficult to access from official 
bodies.
 3. In 2016, several agencies across London cut their rate to £11 per hour without any prior warn-
ing, explaining only that the CCGs were unable to continue paying them at the previous rate. 
The rate was partially reinstated some months later without explanation.
 4. All carers’ and survey respondents’ names have been changed.
 5. I also knew many of these families through online forums, and we interacted with each other’s 
lives through commenting on each other’s photographs and giving advice on the full array of 
aspects of life with medically complex children.
 6. At the other end of the scale, of course, is neither excess professionalism nor quasi- kinship, but 
gross incompetence, which I do not discuss in this chapter.
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(Un)Deservingness and disregard:  
Chronicity, hospice and possibilities 
for care on the American periphery
Devin flaherty
She stopped here today and tell me I’m n’ont get any betta. 
I wanted to cuss her so badly, but I couldn’t do it. Ya know. 
I said I am going to get betta, you might not feel I’m going to 
get betta, but I know I’m going to get better. (Ms Donovan)
When Ms Donovan said this to me, we were sitting in her living room in 
St Croix, an island in the US Virgin Islands. It was 2016. Ms Donovan was 
71 and was suffering from a number of ailments, all of which biomedi-
cine categorises as ‘chronic’: chronic heart failure, hypertension (high 
blood pressure), high cholesterol, diabetes and sciatica. The symptoms 
of these various ailments came and went, entangling with each other to 
create changing states of discomfort, pain and disability that shaped Ms 
Donovan’s everyday life (see Flaherty 2018a). Most days, she appeared 
to be a very sick woman. And yet, despite this, Ms Donovan often made 
claims that she was going to get better. Soon, she would often tell me, she 
would be herself again.
Who, then, was this ‘she’ who insisted to Ms Donovan that she 
was not, in fact, going to get any better? Who came to her house to tell 
her that she was, to the contrary, nearing the end of her life? This ‘she’ 
was Wanda, Ms Donovan’s hospice chaplain. At this time, Ms Donovan 
had been a patient with one of St Croix’s two home- hospice services for 
about five months. This moment – in which the two women butted heads 
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about Ms Donovan’s existential fate – was one of many, many instances in 
which Ms Donovan’s claims to future health and wellbeing clashed with 
the vision her hospice caregivers had for her future decline and death.
This chapter is about care, disregard and (un)deservingness, and 
about how their entwinement shapes possibilities for, and experiences 
of, end of life for older adults with chronic illness in St Croix, US Virgin 
Islands (USVI) (see Montesi and Calestani, this volume). To date, anthro-
pological analyses of ‘deservingness’ have been limited to those without 
a legitimised claim to legal rights. However, in St Croix, on the penum-
bral periphery of the nation, citizenship is contingent, and the division 
between rights and deservingness is blurred. As residents of an unin-
corporated territory of the United States, older adults in St Croix have 
a legal right to Medicare, the national health insurance programme 
that provides health care for citizens who are 65 years old and above.1 
However, there is such a dearth of health- care services on the island that 
older adults with chronic illness are often not able to exercise their legal 
right to curative care. Many in this situation turn to hospice care instead, 
which, since 1982, has been free for qualifying Medicare beneficiaries. 
This was the context that brought Ms Donovan into conflict with her hos-
pice caregivers.
This deficient landscape of care shifts the assumed boundary 
between the chronic and the terminal. Meaning simply ‘of time’, chronic 
indicates the extended temporal duration in which some ailments exist. 
Their chronicity is, of course, a product of social life (see Montesi and 
Calestani, this volume; Manderson and Smith- Morris 2010). These ail-
ments continue to exist through time both because they do not quickly 
kill the individual who is embodying them and because they are diffi-
cult (if not impossible) to cure. The naming of an ailment as ‘chronic’, 
then, assumes a particular infrastructure of care – including drugs, ser-
vices and monitoring – under which some conditions perdure through 
extended periods of time without killing the individual or being cured. 
However, in a context like St Croix, where hospice attracts patients who 
might otherwise seek curative care,2 the temporal expanse of so- called 
‘chronic’ ailments can be cut short. This is a case that demonstrates, as 
Montesi and Calestani argue in their introduction to this volume, how 
state- based care shapes and complicates patterns of chronicity through 
the assignment of unequal ‘intensities of worth’.
I argue that this is a situation created and maintained by the mutual 
constitution of attention/ deservingness and disregard/ undeservingness 
as it plays out in the federal governance of St Croix. This argument is 
founded in a theoretical claim about deservingness: that it is a relation 
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predicated upon particular forms of attention. This is a claim in line with, 
but to date not mobilised by, anthropological discussions of deserving-
ness (see Montesi and Calestani, this volume). Deservingness is not a 
property, a quality that exists whether or not it is noticed, but rather a 
relation that necessitates a noticing in order to be constituted. Because of 
this, disregard can lead to what I call de facto undeservingness: a situation 
in which claims to deservingness are not so much denied as they are sim-
ply not noticed. Situations of de facto undeservingness are characterised 
by the same kinds of inaccessibility of care and services that characterise 
situations of recognised undeservingness (see Montesi and Calestani, 
this volume). Furthermore, de facto undeservingness can characterise 
not just those outside the sphere of rights, but also those within it. I sug-
gest that a primary mechanism for maintaining disregard and undeserv-
ingness in the case of St Croix is the federal Medicare bureaucracy.
In what follows, I first present a review of recent anthropological 
approaches to deservingness, showing that deservingness as a relation 
constituted by forms of attention is an implicit concept throughout. Next, 
I turn to a theoretical discussion of (un)deservingness, attention and 
disregard, outlining their interrelations. I then turn to my ethnographic 
analyses, demonstrating how disregard has functioned, facilitated by 
the Medicare bureaucracy, along three social strata to create de facto 
undeservingness for older adults with chronic illness living in St Croix. 
I show how the health- care landscape in St Croix is a product of bureau-
cratic disregard predicated on assumed undeservingness; how local 
stakeholders’ interactions with particular others within the Medicare 
bureaucracy disclose the systematic mechanisms that maintain the dis-
regard shaping that landscape; and how that landscape situated Ms 
Donovan as someone whose claims to deservingness were subject to dis-
regard among her hospice caregivers.
This chapter is based on 14 months (2014, 2015– 16) of ethno-
graphic research in the US Virgin Islands, principally on the island of St 
Croix. St Croix is a rural, 82-square-mile Caribbean island situated just 
south- east of Puerto Rico. The island has a population of roughly fifty 
thousand, the majority of whom are Afro- Caribbean. My study focused 
on care for older adults near the end of their lives on the island (see 
Flaherty 2018b for a full account of research methods, sites and partici-
pants). The scope of the study included both everyday experiences and 
trajectories of older adults and their caregivers, and the structural forces 
shaping possibilities for those experiences and trajectories. There were 
70 participants in the study. Participants included 12 older adults near 
the end of life (9 of whom were ‘focal participants’ with whom I engaged 
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in intensive data collection over several months), 12 family/ friend care-
givers, 17 professional care providers, 19 administrators (including 
health- care and political), and 10 others involved in or knowledgeable 
about care, ageing and end of life in St Croix. Ms Donovan was one of the 
9 focal older adults who participated in the study; I engaged in intensive 
data collection with her over 11 months.
Deserving and undeserving of care
In recent years, anthropologists and other social scientists have examined 
how politics of deservingness shape the possibilities for, and trajectories 
of, those seen as existing in some way ‘outside’ of hegemonic claims to 
citizenship, rights or belonging. Many of these studies have focused spe-
cifically on migrants, and the processes through which they either gain 
or fail to gain access to citizenship, services and care in the country to 
which they have come (Carney 2015; Duke 2017; Holmes and Castañeda 
2016; Horton 2004; Marrow 2012; Willen 2015; Willen and Cook 2016; 
Yarris and Castañeda 2015; see also Montesi and Calestani, this volume). 
As Willen (2015, 75) puts it, the basic question constituting a politics of 
deservingness is this: ‘Who is deserving of a country’s attention, invest-
ment, or concern, and who is blocked from entry into the national body 
and body politic?’
The answer to this question in any given community, scholars 
have shown, is contested, ambiguous and far from straightforward. For 
instance, Holmes and Castañeda (2016, 13) have pointed out that while 
popular and political discourses in Europe around the then contemporary 
refugee crisis attempt to ‘morally delineat[e] the deserving refugee from 
the undeserving migrant’, such parsing is always contested, and indeed 
these two categories are themselves ‘often blurred, adding to the confu-
sion regarding what is actually possible legally and practically’ (Holmes 
and Castañeda 2016, 16; see also Montesi and Calestani, this volume). It 
is also clear that declarations of deservingness simultaneously delineate 
the limits of the responsibility of the state; admitting deservingness can 
in some cases even betray culpability (see Duke 2017).
Willen (2012a, 2012b; Willen and Cook 2016) has introduced the 
concept of ‘health- related deservingness’ in order to specifically analyse 
how migrants’ deservingness of access to state health care, and to social 
determinants of health, is reckoned at local scales. In their conceptual 
analysis of ‘health- related deservingness’, Willen and Cook (2016) argue 
that the concept of deservingness is importantly defined by its distinction 
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from rights. While claims to rights are articulated in, and engaged within, 
the juridical sphere in which ‘fundamental equality before the law’ is pre-
sumed, claims to deservingness are articulated in, and engaged within, 
the moral sphere governed by a mix of ‘subjective attitudes and presump-
tions with taken- for- granted truths regarded as collective “common 
sense” ’ (Willen and Cook 2016, 96).
Anthropologists writing about deservingness seem all to be in 
agreement that deservingness is an assessment of moral worth (see 
Montesi and Calestani, this volume). The logic underpinning Willen and 
Cook’s (2016) distinction, however, is troubled by accounts of the ambi-
guity integral to politics of deservingness, through which it is precisely 
whether or not particular groups or individuals can make legitimate 
claims to certain kinds of rights that is at stake. Indeed, the discursive 
distinctions that seek to frame migrants as either deserving or undeserv-
ing of care (for example, ‘refugee’ versus ‘migrant’) serve as meta- frames 
for invoking or excluding particular legal (rights- based) processes (see 
Holmes and Castañeda 2016, 16– 18). There exists a theoretical tension, 
then, regarding to what extent questions of deservingness are truly delin-
eated from questions of rights, and if indeed those who can be shown to 
have legal rights (for instance, to health care) have truly escaped a poli-
tics of deservingness.
I suggest that the legally liminal space of St Croix, US Virgin Islands, 
offers a distinctive viewpoint on this tension. As the USVI is an unincor-
porated territory of the US, residents of St Croix have rights that are rela-
tively dimmer and less fixed than their co- citizens living in US states. The 
implications of this status stem as much from the islands’ colonial history 
as they do from contemporary modes of US governance (see Boyer 2010; 
Flaherty 2018b, 2021; Goldstein 2014; Rivera Ramos 2001). Purchased 
by the United States from Denmark in 1917, the US Virgin Islands are 
a ‘(post)colonial’ (Stevenson 2014) space on the American periphery, 
where institutional and political legacies of colonialism – including eco-
nomic scarcity, lack of political sovereignty and a grossly insufficient 
health- care infrastructure – are perpetuated. While anyone born in St 
Croix is a US citizen, this is not a birthright citizenship, but rather one 
that can be revoked by an act of Congress: it is a contingent citizenship. 
Furthermore, USVI residents do not have a right to vote for federal repre-
sentation, and they do not have a right to vote for the president.
St Croix residents are thus both US citizens and also, when compared 
to the normative case of citizenship, not quite US citizens (a situation of, 
as Montesi and Calestani in this volume, p. 13, suggest, ‘mak[ing] some 
citizens more equal than others’). While the status of unincorporated 
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territory situates the USVI as politically peripheral (inside the nation, but 
only just), the islands themselves are literally not included in the conti-
nental bulk of the country (see Flaherty 2021). This peripheral, ambigu-
ous ‘included outside’ status (see Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Agamben 
1998) destabilises clear conceptual distinctions between inclusion and 
exclusion, citizenship and illegality, rights and (un)deservingness. Indeed, 
it is in this context that those with legal rights to certain forms of afford-
able health care – particularly older adults with chronic illnesses – are ren-
dered de facto undeserving of that care through processes of disregard.
(Un)Deservingness, attention and disregard
Attention has yet to become a seminal topic in anthropology, despite 
exciting work on the subject among phenomenological anthropologists 
(see Csordas 1993; Throop 2003, 2010; Throop and Duranti 2015). 
However, attention is a central undergirding constituent of intersubjec-
tive processes and social life. Our habituated patterns of selective atten-
tion (see James 1954 [1890]) delineate the world that we experience. 
These patterns are constituted in part through the differential distribu-
tion of prominence among objects in our everyday milieu, and the ways 
in which certain objects – novel or mundane – affect an ‘attentional pull’ 
on us (Husserl 2001; see also Throop and Duranti 2015), while others fall 
into the background, unnoticed. These patterns of attention – what we 
can, as well as what we do, pay attention to – become embodied through 
normative processes of socialisation across life course development as 
we become competent members of our society, take on professions and 
learn new skills (see Duranti 2009; Goodwin 1994; Ochs and Schieffelin 
1984). Indeed, Throop and Duranti (2015, 1056) have argued for ‘the 
organization and regulation of attention as a key dimension of our cul-
tural existence’.
In selectively distributing attention through habitual processes 
of foregrounding and backgrounding, socialised patterns of attention 
also selectively distribute disregard. Entangled with their role in co- 
constituting everyday practice, these patterns of attention and disregard 
are socioculturally embodied enactments of care, value, concern and 
interest. Thinking with patterns of disregard alongside patterns of atten-
tion, it is both that objects that matter are habitually foregrounded in our 
attention, or affect an ‘attentional pull’ (Husserl 2001) on us, and that 
objects that matter less (or do not matter at all) are habitually objects of 
disregard, and do not pull our attention. Considering patterns of attention 
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and disregard can disclose existing distributions of care and other forms 
of mattering (see Flaherty 2018b, 2021).
Questions of (un)deservingness are predicated on questions of 
attention and disregard because being constituted as deserving neces-
sitates being paid attention to in particular ways. Without the assess-
ment or recognition of another (such as a state actor), deservingness 
does not come into being. This is clear when we think again of the meta- 
frames through which claims to deservingness and undeservingness are 
made: ‘refugee’ brings to attention different characteristics and possibili-
ties than ‘illegal immigrant’ (see Horton 2004; Holmes and Castañeda 
2016; Yarris and Castañeda 2015). Discourses of deservingness and dis-
courses of undeservingness vie for attention, and the outcomes of such 
contests turn on what kind of attention is able to be garnered for each 
side. Returning to Willen’s (2015, 75) central question, ‘Who is deserving 
of a country’s attention, investment, or concern, and who is blocked from 
entry into the national body and body politic?’ (my emphasis), we can 
see that the politics of deservingness is itself a method for organising the 
selective attention of the state. Who is the state responsible for attending 
to, and in what way? Who can the state disregard, and to what extent?
Patterns of attention and disregard correspond to, but also func-
tion to reproduce, patterns of care, value, interest and concern. There are 
many people around the world whose legal rights are unsecured, but who 
are excluded from a politics of deservingness because their needs and 
status never rise to the level of public debate: they never gain attention 
(see Willen and Cook 2016, 96). It is those on whose lives states place 
the least value who are most easily subjected to disregard (Ong 1999; 
see Foucault 2004). This pattern is also mirrored, however, within citi-
zen populations. We now re- encounter the importance of deservingness 
as a dynamic that can seep into the sphere of rights. The US maintains 
systems of what Ong (1999, 217), in analysing a different social context, 
has called ‘variegated citizenship’: ‘the unequal biopolitical investment 
in different categories of the population [which] results in the uneven 
distribution of services, care and protection; while some subjects are 
invested with rights and resources, others are neglected outright’ (my 
emphasis; see also Montesi and Calestani, this volume). Ong’s wording 
gestures to an argument I will make explicitly: that between the US and 
the US Virgin Islands, a primary mode of this process of uneven distribu-
tion is disregard. Furthermore, I argue that this uneven distribution can 
productively be seen as de facto undeservingness.
Joining others who have positioned state bureaucracies as not only 
directly implicated in, but indeed productive of, suffering among those 
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under their jurisdiction (e.g. Gupta 2012; Kleinman et al. 1997), I sug-
gest that the US Medicare bureaucracy is a central mechanism of disre-
gard and de facto undeservingness for older adults living in St Croix. In 
proposing that the Medicare bureaucracy practises and perpetuates the 
US state’s stance of disregard vis- à- vis the USVI, I am arguing for a new 
perspective on how bureaucracies can act to create and maintain struc-
tural violence: by manifesting and reproducing the patterned attention 
of the state.
Shaping a landscape of care through disregard
The power of disregard in shaping possibilities, trajectories and expe-
riences for older adults with chronic illness in St Croix begins with the 
forced dependence of Crucian residents on the federal health- care sys-
tem.3 Because the US ‘owns’ St Croix, possibilities for health care are 
defined within federal bureaucratic logics upheld by the power of law. For 
older adults, this manifests primarily through Medicare and its govern-
ing institution, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).4 
It is because older Crucian residents usually have no choice but to rely on 
Medicare for health care that the disregard integral to Medicare’s bureau-
cratic operations in the US Virgin Islands is so significant. In this section, 
I discuss how modes of disregard within the regulation of Medicare ser-
vices determinatively shape the health- care landscape for older adults 
in St Croix, leaving hospice care as one of the only possibilities for older 
adults with severe chronic illnesses.
Disregarded costs and the disappearance of medical equipment
When I arrived in St Croix in September 2015, a crisis was brewing. As I 
was new to the island, it would be months before I came to recognise it 
at all. The urgent situation was regarding ‘durable medical equipment’ 
(DME), and it came to be known within administrative health- care cir-
cles on the island as the ‘DME crisis’. Once I caught on, and was allowed 
into the many meetings, phone calls and informal discussions surround-
ing the DME crisis, the crisis revealed itself as disclosing modes of disre-
gard that had been shaping health care on the island for decades.
The crux of the ‘crisis’ was that there was no longer any Medicare- 
certified supplier of durable medical equipment in the USVI. ‘Durable 
medical equipment’ is the official category for a number of material items 
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included, as are commodes, hospital beds, wheelchairs, oxygen concen-
trators and many other items. To have this kind of equipment covered by 
Medicare – that is, in order to make it affordable – it has to be purchased 
through a Medicare- certified supplier. Without a Medicare- certified sup-
plier of durable medical equipment, all older adults in St Croix only had 
access to the medical equipment that they could afford to pay for out of 
their own pockets (see Flaherty 2018b, 2021). These older residents are 
on average very low income (older adults in St Croix are twice as likely as 
those living on the mainland to be living under the poverty line (US Virgin 
Islands Bureau of Economic Research 2015)). In practice this meant that 
needed medical equipment had become out of reach for many.
How did this come to be? In investigating this question, alongside 
health- care administrators on the island, I came to find that it was due 
almost entirely to the bureaucratic mechanism of Medicare reimburse-
ment schemes. Or, I should say, to Medicare reimbursement schemes and 
disregard.
Medicare reimbursement schemes are designed to standardise the 
reimbursement that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services pay 
out to Medicare- certified medical equipment suppliers for the provision 
of a given piece of equipment (see Flaherty 2021). For instance, they 
might indicate that for every wheelchair of a particular type provided 
to an individual, a durable medical equipment supplier would be reim-
bursed a certain number of dollars by CMS. This reimbursement scheme 
determines how much it is possible for a medical equipment supplier to 
make for each item it provides, defining the business’s possibilities for 
profit. These reimbursement schemes, however, failed in making it pos-
sible for medical equipment suppliers in St Croix to stay in business.5
In my investigation into this disjuncture, I discovered that the final 
Medicare- certified durable medical equipment supplier in the USVI, 
Apex Medical Equipment (‘Apex’), explicitly identified Medicare reim-
bursement schemes as the main reason that they could no longer offer 
this service in the USVI. While I learned about this in part through ethno-
graphic interviews with Apex employees, the company also created and 
circulated a document that outlined the crux of the problem: Medicare 
reimbursement schemes did not account for the expenses integral to pro-
viding medical equipment to a small island over 1,100 miles from the 
continent. These costs included the costs of transporting equipment from 
the mainland to the territory (freight costs, a 4 per cent excise tax and 
a 6 per cent duty on foreign- made goods), and those of transporting it 
between the territory’s three main inhabited islands (including barge 
fees, freight fees and labour costs for the ‘extra’ work of coordinating 
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deliveries between ports). It was these costs that it had become impos-
sible for Apex to afford (see Flaherty 2021).
As a bureaucratic instrument Medicare’s reimbursement schemes 
regulating the sale and distribution of durable medical equipment are 
based on an implicitly continental model. All of the costs that were left 
out of Medicare’s reimbursement calculations were directly connected 
to the US Virgin Islands’ geopolitical status as islands with the status 
of unincorporated territory (see Flaherty 2021). This accounts not only 
for the excise and duty taxes (which do not apply to US states), but also 
for the fact that none of these costs were considered when calculating 
the appropriate reimbursement rates for the territory. Apex’s document, 
and the company’s subsequent giving up of its Medicare certification, 
points directly to the role of disregard in US– USVI governance.
Without Apex as a supplier of Medicare- certified durable medical 
equipment, many older adults in St Croix were left with a choice: they 
could go without, living as long as they could without the material sup-
port that their chronic illnesses called for; or they could – if sick enough – 
sign on to a service that provided any medical equipment they needed 
free of charge. This service was Medicare- certified home- hospice care. 
Unlike medical equipment provision, Medicare’s reimbursement schemes 
did make it possible for for- profit hospice services to stay in business in 
the territory (see Flaherty 2018b). And because medical equipment is an 
integral component of the palliative care that hospices deliver, eligible 
older adults could exercise their right to Medicare- certified hospice care 
as a way of obtaining access to the medical equipment they could other-
wise not afford.
I do not suggest that this consequence, essentially a funnelling of 
older adults with chronic illness into hospice care, was malevolently 
planned (see Gupta 2012). Rather, it is a consequence generated by dis-
regard: the USVI does not attract legislators’ attention in the creation and 
maintenance of Medicare policy; when the policy is practised (through the 
bureaucracy), seemingly haphazard situations result. I do suggest, how-
ever, that this disregard itself was enabled, and is maintained, through 
background assessments of undeservingness. As I suggested earlier, 
I frame deservingness as a social relation that can only come into being 
through particular forms of attention, and as one that defines bonds of 
responsibility. Seen as poor, black and culturally other, the residents of the 
USVI are barely ‘seen’ at all at the level of federal governance (see Boyer 
2010; Flaherty 2018b; Goldstein 2014; Rivera Ramos 2001). Ideologies 
of race, otherness and nationalism shape the selective attention of those 
in power. In the shadow of disregard, St Croix residents remain legally 
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‘deserving’, but de facto undeserving: with rights on the books, but in 
circumstances, shaped through disregard, that foreclose the possibility 
of exercising them. We might say that it is their right to chronicity – their 
right to live in an ongoing way with chronic illness, enabled by support-
ive medical equipment – that is being foreclosed.
Claims to deservingness and bureaucratic mechanisms 
of disregard
As the months went by, and the DME crisis wore on, health- care provid-
ers and administrators in St Croix were increasingly concerned – some 
were even panicked – about the unavailability of affordable medical 
equipment on the island. A large part of this distress came from growing 
numbers of patients that they had cared for, or that they had heard about 
from colleagues, whose lives were being severely impacted – and some-
times even cut short – by the unavailability of affordable medical equip-
ment. For instance, around this time, a story was being circulated among 
health- care professionals about an older man who had come to the hos-
pital with extremely low blood oxygen levels (see Flaherty 2021). His 
chronic health condition required that he be on continuous concentrated 
oxygen (requiring durable medical equipment), but when he arrived, he 
had been off it for some time. While his family had managed to afford the 
required equipment for a while, the oxygen had eventually run out and 
they could not afford more. The man’s blood oxygen was so low when 
he arrived at the hospital that before they were able to hook him up to 
oxygen, he died.
Stories like these were making health- care professionals on the 
island ready to fight for change. However, interactions with the Medicare 
bureaucracy demonstrated how hard it is to elicit change while being 
subject to sustained and systemic disregard. Indeed, the disregard inte-
gral to the Medicare bureaucracy’s governance of the US Virgin Islands 
was disclosed as much in the fight to stop the DME crisis as it was in the 
creation of the crisis itself.
In this section, I explore some of the bureaucratic infrastructure 
enabling the disregard central to the maintenance of a deficient health- 
care landscape in St Croix (see Flaherty 2021). The central locus for the 
effort to make Medicare- certified medical equipment available again in 
the USVI came from a task force made up of health- care providers and 
health- care administrators, which had been formed in response to the 
DME crisis.6 Through my inclusion in the DME task force, I observed and 
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participated in conversations between local health- care professionals 
and branches of Medicare involved in the certification of durable medi-
cal equipment suppliers and the provision of durable medical equipment 
more broadly. In discussing particular interactions between this task force 
and these branches of Medicare, I demonstrate how disregard is mani-
fest through the systematic drawing away of the attention of Medicare 
bureaucrats from the realities on the ground in the USVI (see Flaherty 
2021). Discussing three examples of the task force’s encounters with dif-
ferent branches of the Medicare bureaucracy, I explore two mechanisms 
of disregard: illegibility and inaudibility. Seeing these mechanisms in 
action shows not just how disregard is perpetuated through bureaucratic 
means, but also how it is maintained despite requests for attention and 
claims to deservingness.
Durable medical equipment ‘within reach’
The first disclosure of mechanisms of disregard in the task force’s interac-
tions with the Medicare bureaucracy emerged from conversations with 
representatives of the branch of Medicare in charge of provider customer 
service (see Flaherty 2021). This is the branch which doctors’ offices (or 
other ‘providers’) are supposed to contact if they have a concern about 
Medicare. However, while this was presumably the most appropriate 
branch of Medicare for the task force – a group of health- care provid-
ers (and one anthropologist) – to be contacting with their concerns, 
the group encountered an immediate obstacle. While the basis of the 
task force’s existence was the absence of any Medicare- certified medi-
cal equipment supplier in the USVI, the representatives of this branch of 
Medicare saw a different picture. This was due to the method on which 
this branch of Medicare relied to survey and assess the distribution of 
durable medical equipment suppliers in a given area: the online ‘provider 
search’ tool on the medicare.gov website (see Flaherty 2021). This tool 
allows users (including Medicare bureaucrats) to search for Medicare- 
certified durable medical equipment suppliers within a given geographi-
cal area. Using this tool, representatives of this branch of Medicare saw 
that there were several suppliers of durable medical equipment within 
what they assumed was a reasonable radius of the USVI’s capital. Without 
direct local knowledge of the USVI, however, what these Medicare rep-
resentatives were missing were the implications of those suppliers all 
being on the neighbouring, much larger island of Puerto Rico. Although 
the task force had previously researched the possibility of getting dura-
ble medical equipment from Medicare- certified suppliers in Puerto 
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Rico, they had learned that this was impossible. This was in part due to 
Medicare regulations: there is a required time frame with which durable 
medical equipment suppliers must comply when performing repairs on 
patients’ equipment – one that would be very difficult to meet if travelling 
between Puerto Rico and the USVI. It was also due in part to the (non- 
reimbursable) costs and logistical difficulties of setting up regular ship-
ments of durable medical equipment between Puerto Rico and the USVI, 
which existing suppliers were not interested in taking on. These obstacles 
to obtaining durable medical equipment from suppliers in Puerto Rico 
were not within the purview of this branch of Medicare. Through the tool 
at their disposal, these Medicare representatives had no way of systemat-
ically tracking what the actual availability of durable medical equipment 
was in the USVI. This limited view made it very difficult for them to pay 
attention to the DME crisis, and much easier to disregard it.
snowbirds
The next disclosure of illegibility as a mechanism of disregard within the 
Medicare bureaucracy came in the task force’s conversations with rep-
resentatives of another branch of Medicare involved in durable medical 
equipment provision (see Flaherty 2021). This branch was responsible 
for processing all of Medicare’s durable medical equipment ‘claims’ for 
the region, which get submitted as documentation by DME suppliers in 
order to request reimbursement when they provide a patient with medi-
cal equipment. In these conversations too, members of the task force were 
struggling to make clear that Medicare- certified durable medical equip-
ment was truly unavailable in the USVI. This was in large part because 
the records of this branch of Medicare showed them several recent 
durable medical equipment claims filed by suppliers in the mainland US 
for sales of equipment to patients with USVI addresses. So, while these 
Medicare representatives understood that there was not as much avail-
ability of durable medical equipment as would be ideal in terms of serv-
ing the local population, our claims of crisis – of urgent, life- threatening 
emergency – did not seem believable to them.
On one conference call in particular, a group of task force members 
and a handful of Medicare representatives went in circles around this 
issue, each group trying to convince the other of their version of reality 
(see Flaherty 2021). While members of the task force (myself included) 
insisted that there was no way for residents of the USVI to access Medicare- 
certified durable medical equipment in the territory, the Medicare repre-
sentatives assured us that some USVI residents did in fact have access to 
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such equipment (since they had the claims to prove it). Eventually, the 
Medicare representatives began expressing some openness to considering 
that perhaps it was possible that durable medical equipment was somehow 
not available to residents of the USVI, despite what their records showed. 
Then, finally, one of the Medicare representatives offered a scenario that 
would explain this disjuncture: she suggested that the USVI addresses 
shown on the claims might not be the primary residential addresses of 
the patients in question. In that case, these patients might be living most 
of the year in the mainland US. Indeed, she was right. While the Medicare 
representatives had been assuming that these claims showed USVI resi-
dents accessing durable medical equipment, this was not in fact the case. 
Instead, patients with multiple homes (likely wealthy retirees) were 
using durable medical equipment on the mainland, but it was their USVI 
addresses that were showing up on DME claims.
It turned out that the mobility of elite, temporary island residents – 
often called ‘snowbirds’ because they winter in the territory’s tropical 
islands – was blocking the ability of the Medicare bureaucracy to see the 
realities faced by full- time USVI residents. The information listed on the 
durable medical equipment claims – which did not enable the distinction 
between snowbird and full- time island resident – was the only bureau-
cratic lens through which representatives from this branch of Medicare 
could see DME accessibility and distribution. This lens obscured the DME 
crisis from their view, foreclosing possibilities for them to pay atten-
tion to it.
‘the only way to be heard’: inaudibility and absent complaints
The final example that I will discuss of a mechanism of disregard is one 
not of illegibility, but of inaudibility. One of the branches of the Medicare 
bureaucracy with which the task force worked most regularly was what 
can most simply be called the ‘customer service’ branch. This branch 
was in charge of receiving and documenting complaints from Medicare 
beneficiaries (patients) themselves. Throughout my participation with 
the task force, the perspective and role of their ‘customer service’ rep-
resentatives was made very clear: they were there to try to support an 
increase in patient complaints, and to monitor and relay progress in the 
numbers of patient complaints to the task force. While in some ways it 
might seem odd that a company in charge of customer service would be 
trying to rustle up more patient complaints, it was clear to them that the 
only way to have documentation of the DME crisis was for patients to 
make official complaints through the Medicare helpline. As far as they 
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were concerned, if there were not enough documented complaints, then 
there was no evidence that there was actually a problem.
This branch of Medicare passed this logic on to the task force, who 
enthusiastically took up the project of trying to increase patient com-
plaints. Flyers were produced and handed out at every meeting, and 
health- care providers were encouraged repeatedly to direct their patients 
to call the helpline and file an official complaint. This was a project that 
discursively aligned with pre- existing tropes of voicelessness among 
older adults in the local health- care sphere. Indeed, it was very common 
to hear among health- care providers or administrators, or local lead-
ers, that St Croix’s seniors ‘suffer in silence’, or that they ‘do not have 
a voice’ (Flaherty 2018b). This discourse was echoed in the reminders 
from the representatives of this Medicare branch to the task force about 
the importance of educating patients about their right to complain to 
Medicare: ‘It’s the only way to be heard,’ they would say.
However, despite the blanketing of the helpline message to health- 
care providers, the number of complaint calls remained extremely low. 
On one task force conference call, a representative of the ‘customer ser-
vice’ branch reported on the recent numbers. She said that there had 
been a definite ‘upswing’ in calls to the helpline, with four calls in the 
last month, compared to six calls in the previous 18 months. She made it 
clear, however, that four calls did not make a crisis, and that a lot more 
complaints would be needed from patients in order for them to be ‘heard’.
Unlike the other bureaucratic mechanisms of illegibility that I have 
discussed here, this constructed inaudibility places the blame for not 
being heard directly on older USVI residents themselves. The Medicare 
bureaucracy itself is entirely naturalised here: in this logic, it is not that 
the bureaucracy has muted the interests of USVI residents, but rather 
that USVI residents are making themselves inaudible by not registering 
their complaints in the correct fashion (Flaherty 2018b). The perduring 
disregard maintained by this stance of unhearing is positioned as the 
fault of the disregarded themselves.
I have presented these three engagements between the DME task 
force and branches of the Medicare bureaucracy in order to demonstrate 
some of the ways in which disregard for the USVI is built into Medicare’s 
contemporary bureaucratic operations, and thus into federal govern-
ance. In each of these examples, the task force’s claims to deservingness, 
made on behalf of those in the territory in need of medical equipment, 
met a different aspect of bureaucratic disregard. Through this systema-
tised disregard, older adults with chronic illness in St Croix end up in 
circumstances of de facto undeservingness, with unequal access to 
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state- sponsored care, such as affordable medical equipment, which 
would help support the continuing temporal expanse of their lives.
It is this continuance, this enduring survival, that is the precondi-
tion for chronicity. What happens to the chronicity of ‘chronic’ ailments 
when the normative supportive care for their continuance is absent? 
In this next section, I return to Ms Donovan. I present her case as one 
response to this question, and as an exploration of interpersonal disre-
gard and claims to deservingness in a context in which hospice repre-
sents the only chance at long- term (‘chronic’) care.
Ms Donovan
Of all the older adults in my study who signed up for hospice care in St 
Croix, none of them did so out of a readiness to die, an acceptance of 
death or a desire to halt curative treatment. This included Ms Donovan, a 
focal older adult in my study.
Ms Donovan was an Afro- Crucian woman who had lived most of her 
life in St Croix. While she had a large family that was spread out through-
out the USVI and the rest of the country, she was relatively estranged 
from most of them (including her only child), and she did not have any 
regular family visitors during her illness. Ms Donovan had held several 
jobs in the territorial government,7 primarily as the assistant principal 
at a public school. This meant that in her retirement, she received regu-
lar payments through the Government Employees’ Retirement System 
(GERS), income supplemented by her monthly Social Security cheques. 
While Ms Donovan was in a better financial position than many other 
participants in my research, she did not have any savings, and she was 
living from pay cheque to pay cheque. She lived by herself in the house in 
which she had grown up (which was currently owned by one of her sib-
lings). The house was not fully furnished, it was breaking down in some 
areas, and Ms Donovan did not keep it up.
As for many older adults in St Croix, Ms Donovan’s trajectory was 
shaped by St Croix’s deeply deficient health- care landscape. The absence 
of Medicare- certified durable medical equipment suppliers, on which 
I have focused here, is one very important example of these deficits, but 
there are several others. At the time of my fieldwork, there was no home- 
nursing service on the island, only one very small nursing home and 
extremely restricted opportunities for ‘assisted living’. For Ms Donovan, 
as for many other older adults with chronic conditions, hospice was her 
only option for daily professional care.
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While Ms Donovan had a number of ‘chronic’ ailments, as a hospice 
patient she was, like all hospice patients, treated as if her condition were 
terminal. While her care included efforts to help stabilise her condition, 
such as the provision of pharmaceutical drugs to lower her blood pres-
sure, and continual encouragement from her nurses to check her blood 
sugar regularly, she was not seen as someone who needed to be healthy 
enough to keep on living, or who deserved the kind of heroic care that 
biomedicine famously employs to save lives (see Chapple 2010; Kaufman 
2005). Once she became a hospice patient, the health- care landscape 
whose deficiencies drew her to that form of care was disregarded by her 
caregivers.
For her part, Ms Donovan staked many claims to her deservingness 
of care that would support her continuing to live with her chronic condi-
tions. In addition to Medicare, she maintained her membership with two 
other health insurance plans (one which she paid for out of her pocket, 
and one which was included as part of her government retirement pack-
age). She did this so that whatever care she wanted or needed – whether 
or not it was covered by Medicare – would be accessible to her.8 As a 
hospice patient, she often insisted upon extra nursing visits, beyond the 
number of visits inscribed in her care plan – beyond the number of visits 
that her hospice caregivers had decided was appropriate, given her level 
of need. If something felt wrong, or if she was worried about one of her 
symptoms, she never wanted to wait until her next scheduled visit, instead 
calling on a nurse to come to her house as soon as possible to do a check- 
up. She also frequently asserted her need for more medical supplies than 
the hospice was providing her, telling her hospice nurses that they needed 
to bring more than it had been determined she needed. This happened 
especially with ‘bed pads’, the large absorbent pads that Ms Donovan 
placed across every surface she might sit or lie down on in her house, as 
a way of managing her chronic urinary incontinence. In these ways, Ms 
Donovan made claims to care that surpassed what hospice was offering 
her. She was, through these actions, claiming her deservingness of more 
care – care that was actively supporting her life – instead of simply keeping 
her comfortable until death.9
These active claims to ‘extra’ care became, for Ms Donovan’s hos-
pice caregivers, paradigmatic of who Ms Donovan was as a patient. It 
was well known among the small hospice staff that Ms Donovan was, 
as was at times noted in hospice visit logs, ‘demanding’. They saw her 
as asking for more than was owed her, more than hospice was supposed 
to be providing. And because it was their job to respond, in some way 
or another, to her claims to more care, it wore on them, making them 
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often annoyed and sometimes even fed up. These attitudes are the 
result, I suggest, of the way her hospice caregivers’ attention toward 
their patients was organised: because they saw Ms Donovan as a dying 
woman who had chosen hospice care, her ‘demands’ felt excessive, even 
ridiculous. This was the view of her that was reinforced by daily engage-
ments with, and responsibility to, the Medicare bureaucracy. Medicare 
hospice guidelines regulate every aspect of patient visits, and caregivers 
document care according to Medicare procedures using hospice- specific 
software. This view was also reinforced by the shared discourse between 
hospice team members, and the informal training and socialisation 
they received from the more experienced members of the care team. 
The scope of their attention was co- constituted through their every-
day engagements in these and other practices; together, their habitual 
attention and everyday practices reinforced each other in affirming the 
boundaries of hospice care and the boundaries of what, as a patient who 
had ‘chosen’ hospice, Ms Donovan deserved. What this left out – what 
their attention was not drawn toward – was the deficient landscape of 
care that had brought Ms Donovan to hospice in the first place. Their 
attention was not drawn to the aspects of Ms Donovan’s situation that 
showed her to be a woman attempting to live with chronic conditions, 
but rather to those that showed her to be a woman whose chronicity was 
quickly coming to a close.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on three distinct, but ethnographically inter-
woven, arguments about (un)deservingness. The first is that deserving-
ness, as a politics, a discourse and a conceptual tool, is not restricted to 
those without claims to rights. While ‘deservingness’ has generally been 
used, among anthropologists, to explore the politics of inclusion of those 
in some way outside hegemonic modes of citizenship, rights or belong-
ing (such as undocumented migrants), I have argued that evaluations of, 
and claims to, deservingness can occur within the sphere of those with 
legal rights to the services or care in question (see Montesi and Calestani, 
this volume). The second argument is based in a characterisation of 
deservingness as a relation constituted by forms of attention. With this 
as a conceptual starting point, I have suggested that situations of de facto 
undeservingness – in which deservingness is neither granted nor denied, 
but, rather, ignored, recreating the situation of the undeserving – are 
constituted through disregard. Finally, I have argued that the de facto 
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undeservingness characterising the health- care landscape in St Croix, 
constituted through modes of disregard on the part of the federal gov-
ernment (specifically the bureaucracy of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services) shapes the experiences, possibilities and trajectories 
of older adults with chronic illness on the island. 
As a product of social life, chronicity can be created, and it can also 
be cut short (see Montesi and Calestani, this volume; see also Manderson 
and Smith- Morris 2010). For those on the geopolitical periphery of the 
nation, the de facto undeservingness constituted through disregard not 
only denies equal access to care and services, but also to chronicity itself.
Notes
 1. Medicare is an extremely complex programme whose intricacies are outside the scope of this 
chapter. What is important here is that Medicare is close to universally available to US citizens 
who are 65 years old and above residing in the USVI.
 2. It is important to point out that there are specific eligibility criteria that must be met in order 
to receive hospice care. These criteria relate to the severity of illness and overall ill health. 
However, in my experience, older adults in St Croix with chronic conditions, who had reached 
a point where they needed daily professional care, almost always qualified.
 3. For an extended version of the argument presented in this section and in ‘Claims to deserving-
ness and bureaucratic mechanisms of disregard’, see Flaherty 2018b; see also Flaherty 2021.
 4. In what follows, I often use the somewhat less precise ‘Medicare’ instead of ‘CMS’ or ‘the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ for purposes of readability.
 5. See Flaherty 2021 and Flaherty 2018b for more detailed explanations of how and why all 
durable medical equipment suppliers in the USVI went out of business at this time.
 6. The genesis of this task force was complex: while composed mainly of local health- care profes-
sionals, it was organised and facilitated by the Quality Improvement branch of Medicare itself. 
This was a quality improvement company that Medicare had contracted to serve this role within 
the organisation. What I refer to as the ‘branches’ of Medicare that the task force engaged with 
were similarly companies that Medicare had contracted to fulfil specific organisational roles. 
A full discussion of this arrangement is outside the scope of this chapter (but see Flaherty 2018b).
 7. At the time of my fieldwork (2014, 2015– 16), the most recent data showed that approximately 
28 per cent of employed residents of the USVI worked for the territorial government (US Virgin 
Islands Bureau of Economic Research 2015).
 8. It is notable that even despite Ms Donovan’s coverage by these multiple health insurance plans, 
she had no choice other than hospice for daily professional care (because nothing else was availa-
ble in St Croix). As I mention earlier, for most older adults in St Croix, Medicare is their only option 
for affordable health care, forcing reliance on a programme that then fails to fully serve them.
 9. It is worth noting that this kind of behaviour was very exceptional among hospice patients in St 
Croix. This is one of the reasons that it was so bothersome for hospice staff, as it was not what 
they had come to expect from their patients.
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Publicly privatised: Relative care 




Thinking about care brings up various inherent dichotomies, such as 
home versus institutional care (Shield 1988), informal versus profes-
sional care (Kemp et al. 2013) and private versus public care (Horton 
et al. 2014). While the precise framing of the care issue varies according 
to the context, public debate usually positions one type of care as supe-
rior to the opposed types because ‘it [care] evokes the goods and bads that 
are at stake in care practices’ (Mol et al. 2010, 11).
As extensively discussed in the introduction to this volume, the 
politics of deservingness often uses such dichotomisation to legitimise a 
certain category of people as designated caregivers. As Thelen and Coe 
(2017, 280) point out, ‘all forms of care have the potential to create polit-
ical belongings’. This ‘boundary work’ (Thelen et al. 2018, 11) aspect of 
care establishes divisions between people, organisations and institutions, 
as care is inevitably related to a political- economic structure, which 
introduces various political connotations into caregiving/ care- receiving 
relationships. By activating these boundaries, the politics of deserving-
ness ‘determines whether a care relationship is morally acceptable or not’ 
(Montesi and Calestani, this volume, 11).
Nonetheless, it is important to be aware that these normative 
dichotomies of care are not stable, especially when it comes to care sys-
tems in transition, because the boundary- drawing process is not con-






thought to entail a shift in focus between two opposing ideologies, such 
as the construction of a welfare state versus the privatisation of the care 
system. If a government changes its policy to allow private firms to per-
form public care services, the care system is regarded as having been pri-
vatised. However, the ideologies behind public and private care are not 
always mutually exclusive. For example, scholars have shown that public 
morality becomes more pronounced when public health care is privatised 
(Abadía- Barrero 2015; Ellison 2014). Therefore, the neoliberal reforms 
of care systems should be described not as simple transitions within the 
care dichotomy from a citizenship- based ideology to consumerism, but 
as a redrawing of this ideological boundary.
Given that care systems in transition involve redrawing the bounda-
ries of care dichotomies, the politics of care are more complex than sim-
ply swinging from one side of a dichotomy to the other. Even though 
policy reforms involve ‘distributed intensities of worth’, as Montesi and 
Calestani (this volume, 13), drawing on Moreno Figueroa (2010), con-
tend, the line between citizens who are said to deserve public health 
care and those who supposedly do not is constantly redrawn based on 
changing ideologies. The inequalities caused by policy reforms need to 
be redressed at least to some extent, especially in strong welfare states. 
Therefore, the new boundary instituted by the politics of deservingness 
becomes even more intricate.
For example, the ‘social- democratic welfare regime’ (Esping- 
Andersen 1990), also known as the Nordic Welfare State, was supposed 
to guarantee the equality of citizens via public care services. In Finland, 
the state has been responsible for caring for senior citizens since the 
1970s, which is typical of said regime. However, since the beginning 
of the twenty- first century, Finland’s care system has undergone vari-
ous changes, provoked by the fear of the financial impact that an ageing 
population would have on the social security system. Most interestingly, 
the Finnish state has started promoting informal care to ease the bur-
den placed on the public care system by the ageing population. This 
policy is called ‘relative care support’ (omaishoidontuki in Finnish and 
närståendevård in Swedish).1
The promotion of relative care is neither a simple abdication of pub-
lic responsibility by the welfare state nor an increase in senior citizens’ 
inequality, as Finnish relative care support entails economic assistance 
and the right to respite for those certified as relative caregivers. This 
Finnish policy is particularly intriguing considering that anthropological 
studies on intergenerational relationships have generally characterised 
support within extended families as supplementing the deficiencies of 
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the public care sector (Cruz- Saco and Zelenev 2010). According to these 
studies, informal care is distinct from state- sponsored care. However, in 
Finland, informal care takes place in collaboration with public eldercare 
services. So, to what extent is relative care a public matter? Which parts 
of informal care have remained private?
To answer these questions, I analyse the dichotomies associated 
with care, and explore the boundaries between the various dichotomous 
elements, by providing an ethnographic account of Finland’s relative 
care practice for older adults. Since ageing is a chronic experience that 
requires constant ‘tinkering’ (Mol et al. 2010), eldercare would be an 
ideal example to observe how the chronicity of care interferes with the 
volatile boundary of dichotomies. By describing what kinds of practices 
set informal caregivers apart from ordinary relatives, and how the local 
governments decide who does and does not deserve to be a relative care-
giver, I elucidate the newly established boundary of care.
The data are based on the ethnographic fieldwork that I have con-
ducted from 2001 to the present in a municipality called ‘Archipelago 
Town’ in south- western Finland. As the pseudonym indicates, this 
municipality consists of thousands of small islands. Archipelago Town, 
with a population of approximately fifteen thousand, has provided suf-
ficient institutional and home- based care to its citizens for decades. Its 
suburban- rural location and the close- knit nature of the community 
make Archipelago Town an ideal location for observing the emergence 
of informal care. Despite its geographical disadvantages, Archipelago 
Town’s public care system has managed to provide care services even 
to remote areas. In a privatised care regime, people with geographical 
disadvantages can easily be dismissed as unprofitable. For example, 
in Chapter 2 of this volume, Flaherty describes a bureaucratic process 
that systematically ignored the fact that the ageing population of the US 
Virgin Islands was denied fair access to eldercare services. In Archipelago 
Town, the rise of relative care is also connected to diminishing public 
care in remote areas. By describing how the meanings of kin and paying 
for their care intersect in the context of relative care support in a small 
municipality, this chapter shows that the various domains that are nor-
mally considered to be dichotomous, such as informal/ formal, private/ 
public and professional/ amateur, do, in fact, crisscross and interconnect 
in actual care practices.
The ethnographic description is based on fieldwork data from 
Archipelago Town. During the initial 18 months of intensive fieldwork 
between 2001 and 2003, I focused on developing a comprehensive under-
standing of the local eldercare system and its links with the collective 
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experiences of ageing. At the same time, the municipality was facing 
increasing pressure to cut its social services and health- care budget after 
Finland’s social welfare policy took a neoliberal turn. During the subse-
quent research period, which has lasted until the present time, I have 
carried out short- term fieldwork every year, for a total of 16 months, and 
shifted my research focus towards the reform of social care organisations, 
including relative care support, to understand the changing practices of 
eldercare in Archipelago Town. I have conducted interviews with sen-
ior citizens, relative caregivers and municipal employees ranging from 
administrators to care workers. I have also attended relative care support 
groups organised by non- governmental organisations (NGOs), observed 
respite care visits and attended municipal meetings. During this long- 
term research, I have had the opportunity to observe how the various 
national eldercare policies have been implemented and used locally. In 
particular, the implementation of relative care in Archipelago Town has 
unequivocally changed the definition and function of personal relation-
ships and relatives in the time of privatised care.
Two facets of privatisation in the care system
Since the beginning of the twenty- first century, the municipality of 
Archipelago Town has promoted informal care practices. This promo-
tion is based on the Act on Support for Informal Care (937/ 2005 Laki 
omaishoidon tuesta)2 of 2005, which urged Finnish municipalities to 
encourage relatives to take care of their family members by providing 
caregivers with municipal support. Before the enactment of this law, 
relative care was not a prominent practice in Finland, as the government 
had assumed the responsibility for looking after senior citizens.
The Finnish welfare state’s active role in promoting relative care 
practices is associated with a certain household structure in which families 
play a passive role when it comes to eldercare. In this household struc-
ture, it is common for children to live separately from their parents, with 
more than half of the population aged over 65 years living alone (Official 
Statistics of Finland 2018). Single- person household- dwelling units com-
prised 41 per cent of the total units in 2016. According to a United Nations 
report, this was the highest percentage among the 124 participant 
countries (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division 2017). Although most of those living in single- 
 person household- dwelling units are middle- aged, one- third of all 
single- person household- dwelling units are occupied by people aged over 
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65 (Official Statistics of Finland 2018). Besides the abundance of single- 
person household- dwelling units, the high rates of cohabitation (23.3 per 
cent) and divorce (40 per cent of marriages end in divorce) also affect the 
diversification of Finnish families (Suomen Virallinen Tilasto 2016).
These statistics indicate that Finland has undergone the ‘individual-
isation of families’ (Beck and Beck- Gernsheim 2002). This concept refers 
to the weakening cohesion of families and the social welfare system tak-
ing over certain traditional functions of the family, such as eldercare. In 
fact, as a social- democratic welfare state, Finland has provided sufficient 
care to those who have needed it since the 1960s, based on the principle 
of universalism (Kettunen 1997). In Archipelago Town, the municipality 
has been the primary provider of eldercare for decades.
So, why has there been an attempt to reappraise informal care in 
Finland in the twenty- first- century Nordic welfare state? The main force 
behind this movement is the growing concern over the country’s ageing 
population. It has become common for people to see the ageing popula-
tion ‘as a threat to the future capacity of the Finnish welfare state to pro-
duce public services’ (Henriksson and Wrede 2008, 125). The pressure 
to cut eldercare service costs has been further justified by invoking care 
recipients’ right to choose.
The 2012 Act on Supporting the Functional Capacity of the Older 
Population and on Social and Health Services for Older Persons (980/ 
2012 Laki ikääntyneen väestön toimintakyvyn tukemisesta sekä iäkkäiden 
sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluista) of 2012, also known as the ‘Senior Service 
Act’, declared that an organisational reform of the public service sec-
tor was required to establish customer- oriented care. This Act requires 
municipalities to investigate older persons’ service needs and provide 
services to meet those needs. According to Henriksson and Wrede 
(2008, 123), the key goal of neoliberal reform in Finland was to intro-
duce ‘more open competition’ within the structure of ‘a welfare mix, in 
which the public sector has the dominating responsibility for financing 
and control, while both private and public producers supply services’. 
Since the introduction of the Senior Service Act, Finnish munici-
palities have purchased more private sector services than ever before 
(Tynkkynen et al. 2013).
This focus on customer- oriented care has led to private enter-
prises participating in the provision of care services and caused 
the dissolution of institutional care. The Finnish Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health (2003, 101) explained their health- care and social- 
service policy as follows: ‘Providing services at home is the most 
humane and cost- effective approach, achieving huge results of welfare 
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by available resources.’ Consequently, the number of beds in Finnish 
nursing homes for those over 75 years of age has decreased dramatically, 
dropping from 22,180 beds in 1990 to 8,203 in 2015 (Väyrynen and 
Kuronen 2017, 4). To provide care for senior citizens in fragile conditions 
who choose to stay at home, Finnish municipalities have reinforced pub-
lic home- care services and utilised relative caregivers as human resources 
to supplement the increasing home- care needs of senior citizens.
Let us now turn to the particulars of relative care support. The 
Act on Support for Informal Care has ensured that relative caregivers 
receive financial compensation for, and respite from, their caregiving 
tasks. More specifically, relative caregivers receive a monthly salary and 
three days off per month. These conditions could be interpreted as the 
law ensuring support for relative caregivers and protecting the ‘workers’ 
rights’ of relative caregivers. Another notable fact is that the law does 
not regulate how closely related caregivers and care recipients should be. 
On the contrary, the law defines relative care as ‘taking care of elderly 
or handicapped people, or people with diseases, by relatives or someone 
who is close to the person in need of care’ (my translation). Logically, the 
law broadens the scope of ‘relative’ to include almost anyone, regardless 
of consanguineal or conjugal ties.
As a result of the financial incentive and the expanded defini-
tion of relative, the number of relative caregivers has increased. For 
example, in Archipelago Town, which had only 82 relative caregivers 
recognised by the municipality in 2001, the number increased to 123 
in 2012 and to 180 in 2020. Seeing that Archipelago Town has fifteen 
thousand inhabitants, this number of caregivers does not seem large 
enough to impact the local welfare scheme; in fact, the home- care ser-
vice is still the primary means of support for senior citizens who live at 
home. Nonetheless, the significant increase in the number of relative 
caregivers suggests that the municipality is strongly promoting rela-
tive care. Also, at the national level, the number of carers for older 
people (65+) who received the relative care allowance increased 
by 30 per cent between 1990 and 2010 (Kröger and Leinonen 2012, 
323). Kröger and Leinonen (2012, 323) interpreted this overall ten-
dency as ‘ “familialism by default” [that] has become the prevailing 
model in Finland concerning those older people who do not yet need 
intensive help’.
As described earlier, in Finland, the shift in the care system from 
the public to the private sphere has taken place along two axes, which 
could be summarised as the marketisation and familialisation of elder-
care. Increasingly, municipalities have purchased private providers’ 
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services, while simultaneously outsourcing a part of their care service 
provision to relative care. If the market and relative care resources com-
plement each other in the expanding private sphere, the current trend 
of social care provision cannot be summarised as a simple balance shift 
within the public/ private dichotomy. If this is true, then other boundary 
shifts in the era of neoliberal care reform should also not be taken for 
granted. To examine the intricate process of boundary shifting triggered 
by the promotion of relative care, we must look at the actual context in 
which relative care support has been put into practice.
Relative caregivers in Archipelago Town and municipal 
support
In Archipelago Town, the entry of for- profit service providers into the 
public care sector has been relatively slow. Although local government 
has rapidly grown to outsource its eldercare service to private service 
providers (Karsio and Anttonen 2013), private care services are signifi-
cantly more popular in urban areas (Puthenparambil and Kröger 2016). 
Archipelago Town is an especially tricky case because it is a bilingual 
municipality, with roughly half the population speaking Swedish and 
the rest Finnish, which makes fluency in both languages a prerequisite 
for care workers. This language requirement makes private care service 
providers reluctant to develop businesses in this area.3 Consequently, the 
public home- care service in Archipelago Town has not attracted much 
support from private care businesses. Instead, the municipality and local 
NGOs have tried to support the informal care provided by relatives.
In addition to a financial allowance, guaranteed respite and a 
health evaluation, the municipality provides relative caregivers with 
social gatherings and free lectures on relative care. The Red Cross, 
Folkhälsan4 and the Lutheran parish church also offer relative care-
givers opportunities to associate with one another and ask for advice. As 
the Act on Support for Informal Care legislates these forms of support, 
all Finnish local governments are statutorily obliged to provide economic 
support and guaranteed respite to relative caregivers. The aforemen-
tioned NGOs are active nationally,5 and each of their branches is engaged 
in providing support for relative caregivers. The relative caregivers in 
Archipelago Town receive similar kinds of support to those available in 
any other municipality in Finland.
Nonetheless, the size of the allowance that relative care givers 







Helsinki, the Finnish capital, has its own system for setting allowances. 
Relative caregivers in Helsinki are categorised into three classes based 
on their tasks. The monthly allowance for each class is: 1,699 euros for 
Class 1, 784 euros for Class 2 and 432 euros for Class 3. By contrast, in 
Archipelago Town (where there are four classes), as of February 2020, 
caregivers in Class 1 receive 803.84 euros per month, those in Class 2 
receive 681.64 euros per month, those in Class 3 receive 546.98 euros per 
month and those in Class 4 receive 410.78 euros per month. The allow-
ances for relative caregivers are generally higher in bigger cities, such as 
Helsinki, while in Archipelago Town, the maximum size of the allowance 
is significantly lower than what Helsinki offers.6 Currently, no relative 
caregivers are granted the Class 1 allowance in Archipelago Town.
Many factors, such as the financial conditions of municipalities and 
municipal prioritisation of social care policies, affect this urban– rural 
gap in relative care allowances, as well as municipalities’ different levels 
of eagerness to promote relative care. Differences in allowances between 
municipalities are related to the difficulty of the burden that relative care - 
givers are expected to bear. Each municipality has its own official cri-
teria for certifying relative caregivers. Archipelago Town grants relative 
caregiver status to applicants more flexibly than Helsinki. For example, 
Helsinki’s guidelines state that caregiving tasks, such as dining assis-
tance, movement assistance, medication, dressing, toilet assistance and 
other forms of health- care and nursing tasks, must be carefully consid-
ered when assessing relative caregivers. If a caregiver performs three 
tasks on the list, they would be classified as Class 3, while a caregiver 
needs to perform all six tasks to be classified as Class 1. Helsinki also has 
a rule that relative caregivers need to live in the same house as their care 
recipient(s).
The municipality of Archipelago Town uses much more flexible cri-
teria. For example, Class 4 relative caregivers look after a care recipient 
‘who needs daily and regular help for their routines to such an extent that 
the caregiver is bound to them’.7 The criteria are not based on a specific 
list of tasks, and care recipients can live alone. The differences in criteria 
across municipalities suggest that becoming a relative caregiver is easier 
in rural areas, although the allowance is generally lower in rural areas 
than in urban areas.
In urban areas, such as Helsinki, relative caregivers need to ful-
fil certain requirements to attain the status of a relative caregiver, as if 
they were applying for a regular job. In urban areas, there are enough 
for- profit service providers to ensure the provision of public care ser-
vices, which means that there is no necessity to lower the standards for 
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certifying relative caregivers. In the rural part of Archipelago Town, nei-
ther public care services nor services provided by for- profit providers are 
readily available because the town consists of thousands of small islands. 
Although bridges connect several islands, many islands can be reached 
only by public ferries or private boats.
Hanna Stenlund,8 an administrator in her mid- forties who has 
worked for Archipelago Town’s municipal relative care support office for 
eight years, told me:
No one could look after the elderly persons in need of care in the 
peripheral areas. In the town centre, some of the current care-
givers might be considered too old (and consequently too fragile) 
to receive caregiver status, but in a real archipelago area, they are 
the only choice.
Indeed, in the rural areas of Archipelago Town, the criteria for certifying 
relative caregivers are less demanding than in other places. For exam-
ple, quite often, relative caregivers live separately from the person they 
look after. Most relative caregivers undertake only minimal caregiving 
tasks (Class 4), such as watching over their older kin, cooking and help-
ing with grocery shopping. These tasks are not burdensome enough to 
be regarded as relative caregiving in the centre of Archipelago Town or 
in big cities.
Sometimes, according to Hanna, people do not apply for a rela-
tive caregiver position themselves; instead, the municipality asks them 
to become relative caregivers. Relative care support offers a financial 
incentive to people who may not have subjective reasons to care for 
those who require it. Applying different minimum criteria for relative 
caregivers in different localities can be understood as a strategic move 
by Archipelago Town to compensate for the shortage of public services 
in peripheral areas. To compensate for the scarcity of human resources 
in remote areas, the state and the municipalities rely on relative care-
givers to ensure health- care provision while working with a limited 
budget.
Families, relatives and caregiving practices in 
Archipelago Town
There is another feature of relative caregivers that is particular to 





between relative caregivers and care recipients are more varied than 
those in the central area. The registered caregivers are not only the 
spouses and children of those in need of care, but also their siblings, rel-
atives and neighbours. For example, according to Hanna, in September 
2015, five of the relative caregivers were not immediate family mem-
bers of the care recipients. In these five cases, the care recipients were 
people living on comparatively remote islands in the archipelago. One 
caregiver owned a summer cottage near the care recipient’s house, but 
the owner/ caregiver usually resided in another city. However, the care 
recipient refused to receive any care services, except those provided by 
this particular caregiver. The second caregiver who was not an immedi-
ate relative was the sister- in- law of the care recipient’s daughter- in- law. 
This recipient’s house was on an island so remote that even the meals- 
on- wheels service could not reach it (due to legal restrictions on driv-
ing distance). Again, there was no one else who could take care of this 
person. The third caregiver was the wife of the care recipient’s grand-
son. Both the caregiver and the care receiver lived on an island visited 
by ferries only twice a week. The fourth caregiver was the care recipi-
ent’s daughter- in- law,9 and the fifth was the care recipient’s niece. This 
wide range of ‘relatives’ indicates that, at least in the peripheral part of 
Archipelago Town, the relative caregiving practice can extend beyond 
the circle of the nuclear family and, in some cases, beyond consanguin-
eal ties. Does this situation indicate that families in rural areas are less 
individualised than families in urban areas?
Statistics do not indicate that the decreasing size of Finnish house-
holds is a recent phenomenon. Even before the construction of the 
welfare state, household- dwelling units were small in south- western 
Finland. In its coastal parishes, the mean household size was between 
2.9 and 3.7 in 1930 (Moring 1993, 402). Already by the end of the nine-
teenth century, the proportion of extended families within the total num-
ber of households had dropped to 20.6 per cent, from 51.3 per cent in 
1770 (Moring 1993, 405– 6). In Finland, the nuclearisation of families 
had already started before the construction of the welfare state.
Moreover, these five exceptional relative caregivers are not the only 
examples of relative caregivers outside the nuclear family. There are 
divorced spouses and cohabitating couples who are also certified rela-
tive caregivers. With divorce and cohabitation being relatively modern 
phenomena, it is not plausible to interpret relative caregiving as a revi-
talisation of traditional family values. Thus, it is necessary to regard ‘tra-
ditional’ kinship as just one of several types of relationship ties that link 
relative caregivers to care recipients.
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We should also not ignore the fact that relative caregivers are not 
simply relatives looking after their kin. To some degree, they are being 
paid for their caregiving tasks. Although it is quite common for relative 
caregivers to interpret the economic assistance from the municipalities as 
support rather than a salary, the fact that relative caregivers are receiving 
money often brings conflict into the practice of relative care.
Struggling with closed doors
When I started my research on relative caregivers, Hanna, the adminis-
trator from Archipelago Town, was sceptical about me getting consent 
to conduct interviews with relative caregivers. She told me that the rela-
tives might deny my interview requests because they do not want other 
people to know that they are paid to care for their relatives – that is, they 
may worry that receiving payment makes them appear cold- hearted. 
I sent letters to all the registered relative caregivers in Archipelago Town 
anyway, and, to Hanna’s surprise, a few people agreed to be interviewed. 
Still, all the acceptances came from caregivers who were spouses and 
children of the care recipients. None of the relative caregivers with the 
more unusual relationships agreed to be interviewed. Presumably, the 
remoteness of their relationship to the care receivers in terms of kinship 
makes the caregivers more cautious about outsiders because the care-
giving relationship may seem less legitimate.
Of course, none of the relative caregivers I interviewed stated that 
the economic benefit played any part in their decision to take care of their 
relatives. For example, Erna Laaksonen, who is in her sixties and is taking 
care of her husband, explained the reasons as follows:
It is very normal that people get divorced after the other gets ill. … 
We had been together for 15 years. There is a saying: If you want 
to have a very good crew, you have to marry it. And we got mar-
ried. He was very good crew. … It is very normal in my family that 
you take care of your relatives. I cannot understand that people can 
abandon each other when somebody becomes ill.
Even if relative care is not a predominant practice in Finland, the reasons 
behind it are often moralised.
As the fieldwork proceeded, it turned out that the wariness of out-
siders exhibited by many relative caregivers was a problem for munici-




be left alone’. Hanna’s statement was based on her constant struggles 
when offering help to relative caregivers. As the chief of Archipelago 
Town’s relative care support section, she planned various gatherings for 
relative caregivers, such as parties, seminars and camps, in cooperation 
with NGOs and the surrounding municipalities. However, she always 
worried about not getting enough participants, and sometimes her wor-
ries were justified. In fact, some caregivers flatly refused to receive any 
respite care services. As Hanna once said: ‘Our job is to make people 
think it’s not so bad to accept help. [To convince] those who say, “We 
don’t need outside help.” ’
Relative caregivers were often suspicious of municipal workers. 
This reluctance to cooperate became especially evident when relative 
caregivers decided to stop taking care of their family members and to 
apply for institutionalisation. Agnes Sjöman, who was in her late sixties 
when I interviewed her in 2014, had been taking care of her mother for 
some time. She found her caregiving task increasingly difficult to handle. 
However, she struggled to communicate her decision to the municipal 
officials. Her daughter urged her to contact the municipality, but Agnes 
was reluctant:
When you have a meeting [with the municipal officials to apply 
for the institutionalisation of a family member], you have to say 
you can’t cope with her anymore. I cannot manage anymore. But 
I couldn’t say it. You must say it: otherwise there is no chance [for 
the municipal authority] to understand you.
In principle, it does not matter whether the relative caregivers truly 
need outside help or not. They are certified relative caregivers entitled 
to receive respite and allowances, and they can quit if they want to. 
Nonetheless, they may wish to stay private, or their family values may 
clash with the public nature of being a relative caregiver as a job, which 
causes problems with getting paid and accepting outside help. In this 
regard, the state- led politics of care challenges and tries to expand the 
notions and practices of kinship, but encounters resistance.
The professionalism of relative care
In Archipelago Town, the municipal office must consider numerous 
factors when evaluating relative caregivers because the general crite-
ria do not always apply to specific cases. Consequently, evaluating and 
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supporting relative caregivers is a sensitive issue for municipal employ-
ees. The difficulty is especially prominent in childcare. For example, a 
single mother taking care of her disabled child requested that a respite 
care worker provide her with transportation so that she could buy clothes 
for her child. The municipal administrator decided that it would not be 
appropriate to provide transportation in this case because the child’s dis-
ability was not relevant to the mother’s difficulties in going shopping. 
Hanna told me that they never grant relative caregiver status to parents 
who take care of children with disabilities under 3 years of age because 
even a baby without physical or mental challenges needs a considerable 
amount of care from adult caregivers. ‘Ordinary’ parents also commit 
to feeding and bathing their children and changing diapers. Therefore, 
the parents of infants with disabilities must wait until their babies turn 3 
before they can be registered as relative caregivers.
This ambiguity between registered caregiving and ‘ordinary’ 
domestic care practices can also be found in eldercare. There was an 
application for relative care support by a son who claimed to be taking 
care of his father because he prepared his father’s food. The application 
was rejected because the preparation of food is a typical activity in every 
household. These requests were denied because the municipality found 
that the tasks that the applicants claimed to be performing as relative 
caregivers were no different from ordinary domestic chores. It is quite 
common for unregistered relatives to help their older relatives with daily 
tasks. For example, adult children often help their parents by going gro-
cery shopping, cleaning, making phone calls, filling in application forms 
to coordinate public services and attending care meetings with municipal 
care workers. It is possible to ask for outside help with these tasks. There 
are grocery- shopping services provided by the municipality and super-
markets, private cleaning services and various kinds of voluntary help 
from the Red Cross and the parish deacons. Still, these tasks are usually 
regarded as domestic chores, which indicates that there is a boundary 
between ordinary domestic chores and relative care.
As shown by these examples, municipal officers need to distinguish 
the specific difficulties faced by relative caregivers from the general dif-
ficulties faced by all families. What sets relative caregivers apart from 
ordinary family members and care workers is the skill required and the 
burdensome nature of the tasks. In other words, the tasks performed by 
care workers and relative caregivers entail a certain degree of profes-
sionalism, and it is this professionalism that municipal workers consider 
when distinguishing relative caregivers from ordinary family members 
and other actors. However, in certain conditions, the professionalism of 
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relative caregivers, or lack thereof, is sometimes overlooked by municipal 
workers. To illustrate this, I will describe a case in which a relative care-
giver’s qualifications became an issue.
In this case, Maria Froberg, a female in her early nineties, was the 
relative caregiver for her husband, Ben Froberg, a male in his early nine-
ties. They lived in an apartment in the city centre of Archipelago Town. 
They also relied on the home- care service to carry out physically burden-
some tasks for Ben. During these visits, the municipal officials noticed 
that Maria had a memory problem that was getting worse. For example, 
when the home- care worker visited the couple on one occasion, Maria 
said she was going to prepare them their morning coffee, even though 
it was actually evening. After the care worker had changed Ben into his 
pyjamas, Maria and Ben started drinking their evening tea. Because they 
had consumed a substantial amount of caffeine in the evening, the two 
probably stayed up until quite late, or so the leader of the home- care 
team surmised. The care worker reported that it was difficult to wake 
them up in the morning.
I asked Hanna about Maria’s case. She answered: ‘You have to 
respect them even if their choice is not the best one. But it is tough.’ Then, 
addressing whether Maria could continue to be a relative caregiver, 
she said:
I always try to think about what would happen to this person if 
I made them quit being a relative caregiver. Maria will surely take 
care of Ben. If so, it is better to have some support. Probably we 
would stop the allowance and keep the [respite care] service. There 
was such a case before.
Even though Maria and Ben lived in an apartment building in the city 
centre, rather than on a remote island, where sometimes simple domestic 
chores can be classified as relative caregiving because of the scarcity of 
public/ private services, Hanna was considerate towards Maria as the rel-
ative caregiver. She took into account not only the wellbeing of the care 
recipient, but also the chronic condition of the caregiver. In fact,  the 
availability of human resources, the intimate nature of the caregiving 
relationship and the caregiver’s objective skills were all weighed up.
As we have seen, the politics of deservingness often come into play 
when a municipality has to evaluate relative care practices. In sparsely 
populated regions, availability is what counts the most, whereas for 
older couples, a caregiver’s welfare and the relationship between a care-
giver and a care receiver matter more than the deservingness of the 
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caregiver. Therefore, during the process of providing municipal support 
for relative caregivers, the boundary between professional care work and 
relative caregiving is chronically redrawn based on the complex relation-
ship between a relative caregiver’s professionalism and other values, 
such as the geographical location of care recipients or caregivers’ per-
sonal welfare, which need to be considered in care situations.
The difference between relative caregivers and  
care workers
Another boundary of care has been brought into question by the promo-
tion of relative care. How can relative care be distinguished from other 
kinds of care work? In other words, how has the boundary between infor-
mal/ formal care been redrawn by relative care support in practice? The 
introduction of relative care support means that relative caregivers need 
to be distinguished from ordinary family members and from professional 
care workers.
According to the Act on Support for Informal Care, relative care-
givers are entitled to three days of respite per month from their care-
giving tasks. In Archipelago Town, two10 municipal care workers, 
who are qualified ‘practical nurses’,11 provide respite care services.12 
Becoming a practical nurse requires three years of vocational educa-
tion, including a one- year specialised course in home- care services. 
These care workers are trained professionals with specialised educa-
tion, skills and knowledge, although care work generally suffers from 
low wages due to its gendered nature (England et al. 2002). However, 
the tasks involved in respite care are quite different from those of home 
care, even though the care workers performing these two types of care 
have the same qualifications.
The case of Helena Enlund and her relative caregiver demonstrates 
the cooperation between relative caregivers, respite care workers and 
home- care workers. Helena, who was in her late eighties, was living in 
an apartment in the city centre. Being a large lady, she used a wheel-
chair, and she required a mechanical lift to get her out of bed and into 
her wheelchair. Her registered relative caregiver, Emil Abrahamson, was 
in his early nineties. He was her friend, and he lived more than a hun-
dred kilometres from Archipelago Town. He would spend three weeks 
a month at her apartment before returning to his hometown for a week. 
The respite care and home service providers had to cover the week when 






When I paid a visit to Helena with a respite care worker, we spent 
two and a half hours in the morning moving her out of bed, preparing 
her food and chatting with her. In the afternoon, it was the home-care 
worker’s turn to visit her, although they spent less time with her than we 
had in the morning because they had to attend to other clients as well. 
In this situation, relative care, respite care and home care are logically 
interchangeable, even though the three types of caregivers spend their 
time at Helena’s in somewhat different ways.
The division of labour between relative caregivers, respite care 
workers and home-care workers is neither static nor straightforward. In 
principle, the objective of respite care is to substitute for a relative care-
giver, while respite care workers are certified practical nurses who spe-
cialise in home care. In theory, the three kinds of caregivers can provide 
similar types of care to recipients. However, as Helena and Emil’s case 
indicates, there is a division of labour between the three kinds of actors 
based on the unique individual situation. Helena’s life was supported by 
a patchwork of care offered by three types of caregivers, who were spend-
ing their time in distinctly different ways.
Care workers and relative caregivers sometimes have conflicting 
opinions regarding the other party’s skills and knowledge. For example, 
the home-care team found Emil’s attitude towards Helena to be problem-
atic for a caregiver. Dorothea Sandel, the leader of the home- care team, 
told me how appalled she was when she found out that Emil had been 
showering Helena by seating her in her regular wheelchair. When she 
visited Helena to prepare a home-care service plan and asked about her 
hygiene, Emil demonstrated how he did it. Emil did not find his caring 
technique to be problematic in the slightest. However, because of the 
showering method, dirt was stuck to the wheels of the wheelchair, which 
impeded smooth mobility. Another problem was Emil’s refusal to use a 
nursing bed, which had been recommended by an ergotherapist. This 
bed would have prevented Helena from falling and would have made it 
easier for the care workers to lift her. However, Emil had returned the 
rented nursing bed to the municipal stockroom without explanation. 
A week later, Helena fell out of bed and had to be hospitalised.
As Helena’s case demonstrates, relative caregivers are not always 
responsible, logical or consistent. They make seemingly wrong choices or 
withdraw from their tasks. As Dorothea once commented: ‘Sometimes, 
relatives do not understand the condition of the customers [the relatives 
that they care for]. They do not want to. Because the truth is very sad, 
depressing and hard.’ Still, Dorothea and her home service team could 
not override the decisions of the relatives. Unless there are immediate 
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physical risks to the care recipient, relative caregivers are allowed to 
make the wrong decisions because they are not strictly professional care 
workers. Moreover, due to the aforementioned Senior Service Act, it has 
become even more challenging to address relative caregivers’ potentially 
problematic decisions. Dorothea explained that the Act has given ‘cus-
tomers a right to choose. [They can] decide as long as they do not harm 
themselves. But we know what will happen in the near future. But we can 
only wait for it [to happen].’ Home- care workers distanced themselves 
from relative caregivers when they encountered problems when provid-
ing services to relative care recipients. The tasks performed by both the 
professional and the relative caregivers were typically not different, but 
the professionals’ knowledge and judgement were usually better, or so 
they thought. Therefore, the boundary between formal and informal care 
is in a constant state of tension, and it needs to be renegotiated almost 
on a case- by- case basis depending on the arrangements between the care 
services and the relative caregivers.
Conclusion
This chapter has described the attempt by a Finnish municipality to 
incorporate relative caregivers into the public domain of care by offering 
them municipal support. Although a change in the care system is often 
regarded as a shift of focus within a certain dichotomy, it is more accu-
rate to interpret the neoliberal reform of Finland’s social democratic care 
regime as a process of redrawing the boundary between public and pri-
vate care. By promoting relative care, the public domain of care has been 
expanded, while the informal domain has narrowed in scope.
This does not mean that the state has wholly incorporated informal 
care practices into the public domain. There are always care practices, 
such as shopping, cooking and cleaning, that, in principle, do not qualify 
as tasks for certified relative caregivers. Especially in urban areas, these 
practices are deemed to be outside of relative care. However, as I demon-
strate in the ethnographic part of this chapter, care workers in a smaller 
municipality evaluate relative caregivers’ individual situations based 
on the relative caregivers’ skills, residence location and the caregiving– 
receiving relationship. Even when it comes to the same policy, the bound-
ary between public and private care is not stable.
Furthermore, relative caregivers are not entirely equal to profes-
sional care workers. When relative caregivers and municipal care workers 




workers have to deal with the fact that relative caregivers are ‘custom-
ers’ instead of fellow caregivers. The boundary between professional care 
workers and relative caregivers is constantly examined by the municipal 
workers, upon whom it falls to decide whether a relative caregiver is a 
dependable partner or a problematic customer.
Based on these ethnographic descriptions, we can now pose the 
following question: How exactly has the promotion of relative care 
impacted the actual practices of eldercare in Finnish society? First and 
foremost, the issue of family and kinship has gained public attention. 
There has always been informal support between relatives. However, 
after the introduction of relative care support, municipalities have had 
to ‘re- acknowledge’ relatives as a potential resource. Simultaneously, as 
diverse persons have been encouraged to take care of someone close to 
them, the definition of ‘relative’ has expanded. Now, it is the ‘related-
ness’ (Carsten 1995) created by the practice of care that ‘performatively’ 
(Butler 2010) binds a caregiver and care recipient together as relatives.
Nonetheless, the relatives recognised by the government as care-
givers are fundamentally different from the kinship organisation tra-
ditionally studied by anthropology. Since it is always an individual who 
receives support from the municipality, relative care giving/ receiving 
is a one- to- one transaction at the policy level. As I discussed earlier, in 
Finland, the rise of relative care and the individualisation of families 
are related phenomena. If we consider weakening cohesion and the out-
sourcing of its function to be symptoms of individualisation, then we can 
say that not just families but relatives too have been individualised, in 
the sense that being a relative depends on individual choices and public 
policies.
This chapter has also revealed that there is a fundamental ambi-
guity within relative care practice. By not recognising the deservingness 
of their status as relative caregivers, some caregivers want to keep their 
practice away from the public arena of care policy. Their attitude is pos-
sibly related to the ambiguous implications of the monthly allowance 
for relative caregivers. Relative caregivers may interpret their monthly 
allowance as public support for their hard work; however, their reluc-
tance to open up to outsiders may indicate that some interpret this 
monthly allowance as profiteering. Although there is established criti-
cism of domestic labour as ‘unpaid work’ (see Shelton 2006) in feminist 
literature, getting paid to care and being a relative contradict each other 
in principle. By assigning a publicly recognised role to informal care-
givers, the relative care support system exposes individualised relatives 
to this fundamental contradiction. Therefore, the introduction of relative 
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care support has opened up the possibility of observing how families and 
relatives deal with the constant pressure of individualisation.
Although this study has described the process of changing bounda-
ries in relation to care, the policy promoting informal care is not, in and of 
itself, inherently problematic. Municipal support can provide assistance 
to informal caregivers who are struggling alone or encourage someone 
to feel responsible about their kin. Nonetheless, this chapter has shown 
that the unequal opportunities in receiving care brought about by the 
neoliberal reform are too complex to be effectively addressed by simple 
solutions. As eldercare involves long- lasting, ever- changing interactions 
between people, achieving equality in the practice of care is always a pre-
carious undertaking. Such constantly shifting boundaries induced by the 
chronicity of care are fundamentally a part of the neoliberal ‘carescape’ 
(Milligan and Wiles 2010) that underpins the new reality of the Finnish 
care sector ushered in by the neoliberal reforms.
Notes
 1. This Finnish/Swedish word is usually translated as ‘informal care’. However, considering the 
basic meaning of the words omainen in Finnish (‘someone of your own’) and närstående in 
Swedish (‘someone standing nearby’), I believe ‘relative care’ is closer to the original meaning. 
When I refer to this specific policy service, I use ‘relative care’ to emphasise the local national 
context.
 2. For the English version of the law published by the Finnish Ministry of Justice, see Finlex (2005).
 3. There is a private medical clinic and private serviced housing with 24- hour assistance in 
Archipelago Town. However, home care is still operated by the municipality.
 4. Folkhälsan (Swedish for ‘public health’) is an NGO advocating for the social welfare and health 
care of Swedish- speaking minorities in Finland.
 5. This excludes Folkhälsan, which operates mainly on Finland’s eastern and southern coasts and 
in the metropolitan area, where Swedish- speaking municipalities are prominent.
 6. These data are based on the official document ‘Omaishoidon tuen myöntämisperusteet, hoi-
toisuusryhmät ja hoitopalkkiot Helsingissä 1.1.2018 alkaen’ (‘The Criteria, the Groups and the 
Fees of the Informal Care Support’) (Helsingin Kaupunki 2018).
 7. This quotation comes from an administrative document of Archipelago Town, which was pro-
vided by the municipal relative care support division.
 8. All proper names used in this chapter are pseudonyms.
 9. It is worth noting that daughters- in- law are common relative caregivers in countries with con-
servative welfare regimes. However, in Finland, this case was rare enough to be mentioned by 
the administrator.
 10. While this number may seem too low to provide respite for hundreds of relative caregivers, 
care recipients can also stay in municipal and non- profit care facilities for short periods. 
Relative caregivers request respite care services when they need to go out for a few hours and 
someone has to look after their care recipients while they are away.
 11. In Finland, ‘practical nurse’ (lähihoitaja in Finnish) is a basic qualification for workers in the 
social and medical field. This qualification covers 10 specialised professions, including home 
care for seniors and day care for children.
 12. In Finnish, a respite care worker is called lomittaja, meaning someone who interweaves in 
between, while in Swedish, the word is avlastare, meaning someone who helps to unburden. 
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The ‘hassle’ of ‘good’ care 
in dementia: Negotiating relatedness 




Dementia – living with it, or alongside it as a familial carer – is a mara-
thon. It is a chronic illness that demands care in the immediate everyday, 
but also into the future as behavioural, physical and cognitive symp-
toms emerge and deepen. Between 2014 and 2015, I spent 17 months 
in a range of activities run by Alzheimer’s Society staff members in south 
London, such as ‘Caring Cafés’, ‘Supper Clubs’, ‘Singing for the Brain’ 
sessions, support groups for carers, and support groups for people with 
dementia. The Alzheimer’s Society is a not- for- profit UK charity, which 
works to provide information and support to people living with demen-
tia and their familial carers, while also pushing for, and funding, greater 
research of dementia pathology, treatment and cure. Community- based 
Alzheimer’s Society activities are typically funded through one- to two- 
year grants from local city councils to provide services and support for 
members of their community affected by dementia, as well as through 
a form of charitable outreach from local businesses. The nature of 
Alzheimer’s Society activities is often informed by funders’ decisions 
about best practice. For example, a Caring Café I regularly attended had 
to change from social meetings focused on ‘support and respite’ for car-
ers to more formalised ‘advice and information’ sessions, due to a shift 
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and expectations of attendees who had been coming for years, mirroring 
the confusion that carers and people with dementia felt navigating other 
upstream factors which impacted their local experience. Through a focus 
on conversations in support groups for unpaid carers and support groups 
for people with dementia, this chapter unpacks the common and press-
ing issues they raised, which often related to the navigation of confusing 
processes to gain access to future support promised by national policies.
Support groups are private spaces of conviviality and, as such, fer-
tile ground for the difficult work of discussing the future. People come 
together to socialise and catch up with friends, as well as to share diffi-
cult stories of stress, exhaustion, frustration and sadness. What remained 
true, no matter the tone of a meeting on any day, is that support groups are 
sites of collaborative strategising, wherein people with dementia and car-
ers craft expertise on how to ‘live well with dementia’, despite biomedical 
uncertainty about the disease and a lack of cure. This chapter details the 
‘hassle’ of bureaucratic processes and paperwork with which my interlocu-
tors contended in an effort to access state- funded support in the face of a 
future coloured by expectations of growing care needs and the cognitive 
decline of a person with dementia. Social isolation and carer burnout that 
often accompany life with dementia (Serrano- Aguilar et al. 2006) were 
common grounds in group discussions, and underscored the necessity 
of support. Group members’ efforts to ‘keep managing’ were positioned 
against the backdrop of the 2009 National Dementia Strategy in England, 
and the Care Act 2014, which promised to address the needs of people 
with dementia and carers. However, the actualisation of these promises 
was uneven, and demanded that my interlocutors navigate large, abstract 
and often alienating bureaucratic structures if they ‘wanted to see anything 
from it’. What emerges is that ‘paperwork’ became a site at which concepts 
of agency and independence, and affective kin relationships, were rebal-
anced and reshaped to try and achieve ‘good care’ and ‘the good life’.
As in other chapters in this volume, the moralities of kinship and cit-
izenship structure my interlocutors’ care relationships, and the expecta-
tions of those relationships. In line with Adams et al.’s (2009, 1) theorising 
about the ‘state of anticipation, of thinking and living toward the future’, 
here I examine the ways in which my interlocutors navigate ‘the moral 
responsibility of citizens to secure their “best possible futures” ’ (Adams 
et al. 2009, 2). London support group discussions could often be coloured 
by a tone of ‘preparedness as living in “preparation for” potential trauma’, 
as well as a tone of ‘possibility as “ratcheting up” hopefulness, especially 
through technoscience’ (Adams et al. 2009, 1). While Adams et al.’s focus 
is on hope through technoscience, my interlocutors’ efforts show that the 
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possibility of less painful futures is instead pursued through care work, 
rendered by family members – perhaps one of the oldest human technol-
ogies. In the context of my research, families apply the ‘old’ technology 
of care work to the unfamiliar, bewildering legal and bureaucratic land-
scape of ‘sorting all the paperwork’. The particular ‘traumas’ of dementia 
become clear in looking at the working definitions and novel dynamics of 
‘good care’ created by support group members: navigating the hassle of 
‘sorting’ the future centred on a seeming paradox – acknowledging the 
growing dependence of a person with dementia, while maintaining their 
identity, autonomy and control. I argue that striking this balance is at 
the heart of my interlocutors’ care and ‘paperwork’ strategies to keep the 
‘who’ of a person with dementia ‘still there’ and present within relational 
dynamics – be they with family or with the state.
This chapter is a story of hassle in two acts: first, I present an illus-
tration of Londoners affected by dementia attempting to understand and 
‘sort’ power of attorney documents, and, second, I present them attempt-
ing to procure state- funded services promised by the Care Act 2014 by 
‘doing the Carer’s Assessments right’. These documents and bureaucratic 
processes were murky terrain that was badly signposted and demanded 
enormous reserves of time and determination. Many people sought guid-
ance from those ‘who actually know what’s what’ – namely, their peers 
and trusted ‘experts’, such as Alzheimer’s Society staff, attorneys and 
‘Carers Hub’ hotlines – which challenged the intimate boundaries of 
dementia care. What becomes clear is that engaging in the winding has-
sle of planning for, and safeguarding, the future through bureaucratic 
processes often created significant tensions in people’s relationships 
within and outside the home. Disagreements about care decisions, and 
who had the authority to make such decisions, emerged between fam-
ily members. Additionally, my interlocutors’ conception of the state as 
a reliable provider of care was often challenged, as people felt that the 
needs of people living with dementia, or their carers, went unrecognised 
or addressed, in contrast to what was expected after the Care Act 2014 
was passed. Questions of deservingness run through both these sets of 
tensions. Who is most qualified to be a ‘lead decision maker’ in the life 
and care of a kinperson with dementia? How should the sacrifices and 
burdens inherent in being a ‘carer’ be recognised by family members and 
the state? What say and responsibilities do ‘peripheral’ family members 
have in the context of dementia care? Should the state be responsible for 
the care of people with dementia? Is the state indebted to familial carers 
who care for its citizens with dementia? Questions such as these highlight 
how notions of relatedness are implicated in familial and bureaucratic 
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processes centred on care – at times, it was affirmed and strengthened, 
and at other times, it was made tenuous and painful. The questions also 
underline that care shows ‘what is at stake’ for people (Kleinman 1999), 
but also unveils ‘how’ it matters and ‘who’ really matters.
Discussion of the ‘hassle’ of these processes also contributes to 
theorisation about the temporalities of waiting created by prolonged 
efforts to secure governmental services that are seen as inadequate, 
uneven (Auyero 2012; Mathur 2014) and unable to deliver personalised 
care (Day et al. 2017). I suggest that my interlocutors’ experiences make 
room for a critique of the state as a ‘bad relative’ that does not recog-
nise carers and people with dementia as ‘deserving’ of such care. What 
becomes clear is that my interlocutors’ bureaucratic efforts often chal-
lenge notions of what ‘counts as care’, and, I argue, reveal a hidden aspect 
of dementia care – ‘getting it all sorted’ requires considerable exertion 
that ‘doesn’t necessarily come to much’. As such, when my interlocutors 
navigated bureaucratic systems that were meant to safeguard a future 
made uncertain by the unpredictability of dementia, these processes 
often lent futures a greater sense of precarity instead.
‘Official’ paperwork
At Alzheimer’s Society support groups, staff members often distributed 
handouts that were headlined with statements such as ‘Planning for 
the future’. They included explanations about different categories of 
‘paperwork’, such as lasting power of attorney (LPA), enduring power 
of attorney (EPA), advance decision, and advance statement, mirroring 
Alzheimer’s Society webpages (Alzheimer’s Society 2017). The explana-
tions in handouts often served as the cornerstone of group consensus 
about what different types of bureaucratic processes were ‘about’. They 
explained that power of attorney, often officially referred to as ‘lasting 
power of attorney’, is:
a legal tool that gives another adult the legal authority to make 
certain decisions for someone if they become unable to make them 
themselves. The person who is given LPA is known as an ‘attorney’. 
They can manage finances, or make decisions relating to a person’s 
health and welfare. (Alzheimer’s Society 2017)
In discussions about the future and ‘what should be sorted first’, carers, 
people with dementia and Alzheimer’s Society staff members brought up 
 
thE ‘hAssLE ’  of ‘gooD’ CArE in DEMEntiA 95
  
power of attorney documents frequently, and they often became a catch- 
all term to refer to a variety of this kind of ‘official paperwork’. Under 
this umbrella, medical directives, or advance directives also arose, which 
Edith, an Alzheimer’s Society staff member, explained as ‘hav[ing] to do 
with decisions about what the doctors would have to do to keep you alive, 
really, like if you wanted to go on life support or want extra measures’.
Notably, much of the information in handouts, web pages and staff 
members’ explanations was neatly laid out with ample use of acronyms, 
capitalisation and references to rights and powers. While these handouts 
were targeted at support group attendees, the style and presentation 
of ‘all this paperwork’ textually signified these documents, and work-
ing knowledge of how to complete them, as being apart from the every-
day and under the jurisdiction of governing bodies or those with legal 
expertise, in line with Bourdieu’s (1994) examination of written sources 
created and kept by the state. Indeed, during support group meetings, 
experienced carers often explained to new members that ‘getting this all 
sorted’ would help ensure that arrangements would be safeguarded by 
the state, as opposed to by casual conversations or agreements between 
kin ‘that might not hold up if you have to go to court’. Perla, a carer in her 
sixties, told me that she and her sibling disagreed about how to handle the 
finances of their father with dementia, and her sibling threatened to ‘try 
and get power of attorney themselves’. Maggie, a carer from a different 
support group, explained to me she and her husband with dementia had:
waited too long to set up the power of attorney, and even though 
we’d talked about how to spend his pension before his dementia got 
worse, we didn’t put me on his account at the bank, so now when-
ever I need to pay for his carer, or something, from his account, 
I have to go to court to get it approved.
The ‘official- ness’ imbued in a document sanctioned by the state often 
piqued people’s interest. They asked each other direct questions such 
as ‘Do you have your will sorted yet?’, and asked whether they had 
their ‘power of attorney done’, or had ‘thought about a medical direc-
tive’. People expressed frustrated confusion about ‘what exactly needs 
doing’ in terms of ‘paperwork’, and this was a frequent topic in support 
groups. This consistent attention to ‘paperwork’ is also grounded in my 
interlocutors’ acceptance, however uneven and uneasy, of the inevitabil-
ity of ‘needing the power of attorney’, because, as Terrance, a man with 
dementia, explained in his support group, ‘Herr Alzheimer’s going to 
come sooner or later.’ He went on to warn that:
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You know – some banks, when they find out you have dementia – 
I don’t know how they find out – they’ll freeze your account! And 
won’t let you into it without someone else, like my daughter [his 
named relative with power of attorney], signing off.
The Alzheimer’s Society website explains that people with demen-
tia ‘reach a point where they are no longer able to make decisions for 
themselves – this is known as lacking “mental capacity” ’ (Alzheimer’s 
Society 2017).
Power of attorney documents created an official bridge between 
the private arrangements within families, and public, official spheres 
outside of family life. People with dementia skirted the topic of capacity 
more carefully than carers did, but, nonetheless, the likely impending 
event in which a person with dementia would no longer have ‘capacity’ 
was spoken about more clearly and directly in discussions about power 
of attorney than in any other discussions to which I was privy. Group 
members proposed hypothetical scenarios to test their understanding 
of these documents. People with dementia usually focused on ‘when it 
would be triggered’ or how, and carers were most concerned with the 
extent of their decision- making power as the attorney in an LPA. For 
example, Melanie, a woman who had been living with dementia for 
about two years, put a question to Barbara, an Alzheimer’s Society staff 
member:
Melanie: If I make my daughter my power of attorney …
Barbara: [interrupting] She would be called just your ‘attorney’.
Melanie: Right, my attorney, what kinds of things does she decide? 
Money and medical things … you can’t know exactly why you’d be 
in hospital, would you? So, what are you meant to decide about 
what you want done? Or does the decision just go to her then [when 
the LPA is completed]?
Alzheimer’s Society staff were consistent and adamant that these docu-
ments ‘don’t give away your right to make decisions’, especially when 
speaking with people with dementia. For example, Barbara explained 
to Melanie that LPA documents housed one’s decision about an attor-
ney for the future, if that was what was wished, mirroring explanations 
I witnessed in other groups. During an interview with Karen, another 
Alzheimer’s Society facilitator, she explained that she makes sure:
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they [carers and people with dementia] know that drawing up your 
power of attorney and activating your power of attorney are two 
different things that can happen 20 years apart … so you can fill 
out an LPA, send it off and then actually wait a few years until you 
actually hand it over …
When it was highlighted in dementia support groups that paperwork was 
‘there to make sure [their] wishes’ were safeguarded and ‘followed through 
on’, this was often met with audible positive acknowledgment: ‘Oh, I see’, 
or ‘Well, good thing!’ Carers responded similarly with nods, and comments 
such as, ‘Now that I finally have it sorted – it’s good to know what he wants 
done is decided and written down.’ My interlocutors’ consistent attention 
to decision making – who held the power to make decisions, under which 
circumstances, and the boundaries of a person’s decision making – point 
to the cultural value of being able to make decisions.
Such explanations also helped to position these documents as rep-
resentations of future events. In explaining that they did not give away 
‘rights’ now, an implicit yet that pointed to an approaching future was 
evoked. Peers and staff members assured one another that LPAs could 
only be activated without a person’s wish if that person was deemed to 
have lost capacity to make sound decisions. Interestingly, however, how a 
person’s capacity would be tested in such an event was rarely discussed. 
People with dementia often skirted around asking this question, and staff 
members did not voluntarily go into any details. Explanations were often 
left to implications that a clinician would make such a determination, 
but how the results of a clinician’s assessment of lost capacity would then 
be carried over to other realms of one’s life – such as one’s bank – was 
left undiscussed. Thus, while LPAs were cast as ‘something that has to be 
done’ to safeguard one’s future, the specifics of how they accomplished 
this task was often left murky, with implications that it would involve 
people in positions of authority making decisions about capacity, and 
sanctioning a carer’s new role as ‘attorney’.
Medical directives usually only specified a few decisions about 
what should not be done, and LPAs generally did not lay out any details 
about ‘what would be done’. As such, I argue that these documents were 
predicated on an anticipated loss of mental capacity, and positioned 
‘safeguarding’ as deciding just one very important decision – to whom 
the power of making future decisions would fall. In this way, these docu-
ments not only legalised procedures having to do with autonomy, but 
stipulated the future nature of a kinship relationship – specifically, the 
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future decisions of a kinsperson so as to uphold both the right of a person 
with dementia to assert autonomy in these matters now, and their deci-
sions in the future.
Considering the significance of decision making to the making and 
maintenance of personhood (Lamb 2014), we can see how official docu-
ments become a place within which this capacity is housed and trans-
ferred to keep it alive. Indeed, advance directives were also, at times, 
referred to as ‘living wills’. Because the choices made by an autonomous 
person are laid down in official documents that must be enacted at a later 
date by someone else, usually their carer or family member, the concept 
of independence becomes both temporally suspended and relationally 
bound. In operating as attorneys, carers enact independence for their 
person with dementia when this person is seen as unable to reliably 
make sound choices to ensure the safety of their bodies, possessions and 
finances. Thus, I argue that the independence that is seemingly lost in 
later stages of dementia is resurrected in different and novel ways. Legally 
recognised documents in the context of dementia care are a medium 
through which the intimate workings of family life are made ‘official’. 
And often, the process of ‘sorting’ them – or having others recognise 
their validity – forced people to lay bare, and remould, family dynam-
ics. In what follows, it also becomes clear that reckonings of related - 
ness become implicated in moral calculations of the deservingness of a 
particular kinsperson to hold the power to make decisions for and about 
someone with dementia.
The fuss and trust of relatedness
Riona, an energetic and animated woman in her forties, sat across from 
me in a private room in the same building where the carers’ group that 
she attended normally met. In the previous group meeting, she had told 
her fellow carers that her father (with dementia) had recently wandered 
away from home, only to be found miles away in the early hours of the 
following morning. I opened our conversation gently, asking her, ‘How 
have things been?’ The quiet of the room was immediately broken by a 
hurried monologue:
It’s been awful, Lilian, really it has – Dad named me power of attor-
ney over all the money things ages ago, before my Mum died, and 
now that he can’t really do it for himself, I’ve got full run of his 
accounts to pay all his bills and for the house, and the carer that 
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comes four days a week. But my brother and sister are always on 
about how they want his money spent on other things – that I’m 
spending too much on his carer, they know they could find cheaper 
ones – but Lilian, I’ve tried the cheaper ones, and Dad hated it, 
always stuck at home, and now we’ve got Wallace, a sweet, young 
black man, who gets on really well with Dad. He takes him out to 
his favourite places – they play billiards; it works so well with him. 
And I say to them, ‘Look, it’s Dad’s money and he deserves to have 
the carer that he gets on with, and who I know I can trust; you 
know Dad wanted to stay at home,’ and they come back saying that 
I’m probably using some of Dad’s money for my own things, and 
that I’ve got no right to just spend it without checking with them 
first. And it’s terrible, really, it’s been bad enough that I can’t sleep 
sometimes, and so I ask our accountant, who we’ve had for ages, 
and I ask him, ‘Am I doing this right? Should I be talking with them 
about what I think needs doing?’ And he goes to me, ‘Riona, yes, you 
are doing this right, we have it all written down here, we can see 
that every bit of your Dad’s money is going to his things, I’ve got it 
all down and, Riona, it’s down to your decision – you’re the attorney.’
Riona looked up with a long inhale and shrugged her shoulders, sug-
gesting that this issue – these official, legal paperwork processes, these 
conversations with experts and siblings, her father and his professional 
carer – were far from resolved, but instead part of the ongoing duties of a 
carer of a family member with dementia. The decision housed in a power 
of attorney document, for example, needed to be ‘sorted’ via official 
channels, and then acted upon by third parties such as accountants for 
the powers they bestowed to be validated and actionable. This document 
is one example of the many ‘bits of paperwork that need sorting’ in the 
lives of carers and people with dementia. They matter in conversations 
with other officials, such as an accountant, and they allow for carers to 
‘do what needs doing’ for a person with dementia. However, the validity 
of these documents is not understood in the same ways across all spheres 
of the lives of carers and people with dementia.
Riona’s story also illustrates that official processes often impact 
the dynamics in families affected by dementia. In previous group dis-
cussions, Riona described exhaustion at having to manage relationships 
with her extended family, ‘not just Dad’, and that she ‘didn’t ask for this 
[to be named attorney]’. While in the abstract, a document giving power 
of attorney is ‘official’, and legally stipulates who holds which kinds of 
responsibilities at the moment, or will in the future, this did not always 
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play out the same way in familial life. Indeed, the family tensions that 
these processes instigate often make them ‘debatable’ long after they 
would be considered legally official, or settled. The LPA that Riona’s 
father put together created resentment in her family, as her authority 
appeared to be out of step with her siblings’ perceptions of prior family 
dynamics, reflected in part by their frequent questions about the ration-
ale of her choices. Other people’s experiences mirrored this. Another 
carer in Riona’s group, who held power of attorney over her mother’s 
finances, explained that her sister demanded to know ‘where every bit 
of money was going’. In another support group in a different borough, a 
woman named Claire warned others that ‘once that kind of relationship 
is started, it’s hard to close it down’, in reference to contentious discus-
sions with her brother about which care decisions were ‘best’. While it was 
unclear whether Claire’s mother’s LPA had been ‘sorted’, Claire explained 
that an LPA would not ‘change our [her and her mother’s] disagreements 
all that much’. These experiences illustrate that the meaning of power 
of attorney in carers’ groups, among carers, does not evenly translate to 
the understandings of other people in carers’ lives beyond these groups.
The public, ‘official’, ‘one- size- fits- all’ documents associated with 
future planning did not reflect the unique terrains of responsibility and 
power within families. Some carers felt that they were treated as though 
they had ‘stolen something from Dad’ and their wider families. Carers 
with familial tensions such as Riona’s often felt that their families under-
mined their status as attorney by questioning whether the carer- attorney 
was ‘really doing things the way he [the person with dementia] would 
have wanted’. Different family members held differing ideas about the 
importance of ensuring that the decisions of people with dementia were 
supported or enacted. Carers, who often saw themselves as ‘closest’ to 
their relative with dementia, explained that they best ‘knew what he 
would have wanted’, and felt compelled and deserving of the position 
to make decisions based on the desires of a person with dementia, not 
based on the opinions of other family members who sometimes ‘only see 
her once a year!’ and ‘don’t know what’s really going on’. For many carers, 
the responsibility of ‘being power of attorney’ encompassed determining 
which decisions to make that were ‘right’ and ‘what he would have wanted’. 
At times, this has to be done against the backdrop of familial worries and 
complaints that ‘there goes everyone’s inheritance’ when expensive in- 
home or residential care was selected. In the midst of, and often because 
of, these familial debates, carers often felt great doubt about holding 
the position of attorney. Riona and other carers often wavered about the 
validity of their position as ‘decision maker’, or wondered if they were 
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‘doing what he really would have wanted’. The persistent uncertainty 
that carers face about what LPAs mean legally, as well as relationally, 
contextualises the effort that Alzheimer’s Society staff and carers put 
into collective conversations and education about powers of attorney to 
create a coalesced understanding of the boundaries of these documents.
In an examination of both families’ and carers’ uncertainty about 
the deservingness of main carers to hold rights such as ‘attorney’, we see 
how this deservingness was often linked to having a history and close 
bond with the person with dementia. Relatedness to a person with 
dementia, evidenced by ‘knowing them well’, was key to being able to 
make decisions as their person with dementia would have, if they were 
cognitively well, as well as the grounds for having the moral ‘right’ and 
authority to be ‘attorney’. An underlying goal was to carry forth the deci-
sions of a person with dementia, by proxy, past a time in which mental 
capacity had been lost. This became most clear when people with demen-
tia explained who they had not named as power of attorney, and why. For 
example, a woman named Flora discussed her worries about her son’s 
interest in her moving into a care home, noting that they ‘hadn’t spent as 
much time together’. Flora had been widowed some decades before, and 
while she spoke of her late husband with clear grief, she was also proud 
of her independence, her many interests and the home she had made 
after her husband’s passing. Like many other people with dementia and 
elders, she felt strongly about remaining in her own home (Buch 2015), 
or at least ‘knowing where I’m going to’. She explained that she had been 
putting off ‘getting this [LPA] sorted’, and that she was eventually coun-
selled by an Alzheimer’s Society staff member not to give her son power 
of attorney, ‘because you have to trust the person you choose’. Other 
stories also underlined choosing one’s attorney based on a close, trust-
ing relationship with the person named. Maria, an elegant older woman 
with Alzheimer’s, told her group that ‘I’ve named my son [as attorney 
of my finances] – we’re very close, and he works in the bank, so I know 
my money is going to be in good hands [laughs].’ Meredith, in the same 
group, named her daughter ‘because she’s over all the time, helping all 
the time anyway – knows how things should be done’. People soothed 
their doubts about decisions being made well in the future because of 
trust between people, and a history of relational knowledge about how 
they ‘like things done now’. In these renditions, against the backdrop of 
an ambiguous and unknowable future, and confusing and murky bureau-
cratic processes, one’s closest kin could be a reliable mainstay. The ‘good 
life’ for people with dementia – now and in the future – is about relation-
ships and trust.
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‘getting it all sorted’: (Mis)adventures in bureaucratic hassle
So far, I have focused on legal documents, and the relational conse-
quences of this official paperwork. However, attention must also be paid 
to the bureaucratic processes by which these safeguards were ‘sorted’ to 
understand how the future is defined – or not – in the face of chronic ill-
ness. Sorting paperwork often involved tasks such as registering as a carer 
within the borough, qualifying for carers’ allowance and council tax waiv-
ers, requesting carers’ assessments and continuing care, or procuring a 
disability sticker if mobility became an issue. From interviews and group 
conversations, I learnt that only a few couples had their power of attorney 
arrangements in place previous to a diagnosis of dementia being made. 
In most cases, these were couples that did not have children, and were 
financially well off. For most, however, tackling paperwork of this nature 
seemed to be the first time that families and carers were aware that lay-
ing down wishes and choices for the future could be done in these terms. 
Many made comments such as, ‘I had no idea there was all this to do!’
In support groups, carers compared and contrasted methods to 
figure out what ‘actually works’, because many felt persistent exaspera-
tion that ‘everything is confusing’. There was rarely consensus, typified 
by comments such as, ‘Well, who knows what’s best, really?’, and ‘It is 
a bit of a mystery, isn’t it! What worked for Edith didn’t work for me!’ 
They were irritated that ‘social services, NHS [National Health Service], 
GP offices, etc. … each just offer parts of what’s needed!’, but that they 
could not be consolidated to form a complete and reliable care plan that 
approaches health holistically, in the present or in the future, a find-
ing well substantiated in research on UK health and social care systems 
(Pickard et al. 2016).
Carers, in particular, pursued these confusing and ‘mind- numbing’ 
processes because they were strongly encouraged to do so by their peers 
and staff. Carers emphatically reminded one another about the impor-
tance of breaks or respite, ‘to be able to manage in the long term’, and 
that the only way ‘to make it through’ is to ‘take breaks when you can’, 
underlining that their futures would be dominated by care. Many new 
carers had to be convinced by more seasoned carers that respite was nec-
essary, ‘because if you’re sick on your back, how are you going to look 
after him?’ – casting respite as morally ‘OK’ because self- care in this man-
ner was ultimately in the service of their person with dementia. Thus, 
respite was understood as a necessity to be organised, and it would need 
to be self- funded or made possible through contributions of time, and 
possibly money, from kin – in both cases, an impossibility for many. 
 
thE ‘hAssLE ’  of ‘gooD’ CArE in DEMEntiA 103
  
People explained that funds for respite ‘could be awarded from the coun-
cil – sometimes, but you have to ask for it’. This was cast as a somewhat 
daunting enterprise, and arranging for ‘help’ to take respite required help 
from others, such as Alzheimer’s Society staff, to ‘sort’ the paperwork to 
‘get away for a bit’.
The Care Act 2014 promised support to unpaid carers based on a 
carer needs assessment performed by a trained staff member from the 
local authority. There was great initial anticipation and optimism about 
the plethora of services, funding and help for carers that it would pro-
vide, but assessments were slow to be scheduled and the questionnaire 
proved to be confusing and awkward for many carers. Many carers were 
never able to reach the point of assessment because of prolonged waiting 
times due to understaffed council offices, and the frustrating ‘back- and- 
forth’ of bureaucratic paperwork. Many asked ‘What am I supposed to 
do in the meantime?’, and the Care Act 2014 was often described with 
exasperation, and as a broken promise and ‘failure to launch’ initiative. 
Many carers fell back on the expertise of the group to ‘figure out how 
to manage’. For those that were able to have carers’ assessments sched-
uled, staff and some carers warned about the difficulty of rendering their 
daily lives in terms of quantifiable levels of burden and caring hours that 
would secure ‘help’.
Carers described the significance of experts, particularly 
Alzheimer’s Society staff and social service workers recommended by 
word of mouth, in helping to translate their lives into ‘what counted as 
care’ in assessments. For example, a carer commented:
I had no idea how much I was actually doing! I was thinking, OK, 
I spend a few hours a day helping him wash and eat, and taking 
him to the day centre on Wednesdays, but then she asks me – ‘OK, 
are you also staying with him at home to make sure he’s not getting 
into trouble?’ (Which I am.) And ‘Are you doing all the cooking and 
cleaning for him as well? Staying up nights?’ She had me tally all 
that up, and it’s more than full- time hours! I hadn’t thought that 
those other things counted, for the assessment.
In sharing stories about this ‘ongoing hassle’ and ‘what I’ve managed’, 
people with dementia and carers often constructed narratives of success 
tied to help and advice received from charity professionals. These profes-
sionals were seen to have expertise about social services paperwork pro-
cesses, and a willingness to help with the repeated calls to council offices, 
GPs, mobility services and so on, on behalf of their clients, which were 
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required to ‘get something sorted’. Indeed, members frequently recom-
mended particular charity staffers, with explanations such as:
You have to call Nicky – she’s the one who knows all about the 
carer’s assessment – it’s too hard to figure all out on your own, so 
you’ve got to have her to help you … she helped with calling them 
[the council] to make sure they actually sent someone out [to the 
home to do the assessment].
In enlisting and recommending ‘experts’, carers and people with demen-
tia were effectively asking for help with interpreting their circumstances 
in terms of governmental ‘services’ language, frameworks and bureau-
cratic processes. Parallels can be drawn with Giordano’s (2014, i) work 
on ethno- psychologists working with foreigners in northern Italy, which 
explores the work of translation – beyond that of the linguistic variety – in 
which the ‘difference’ in people’s situations ‘poses the issue of alternative 
forms of life, of radically heterogeneous worlds that the state must reduce 
to recognizable categories’. While the context of Giordano’s interlocutors 
differs from that of mine, both illustrate the persistence of state- sanctioned 
‘categories’, as well as the need for others’ help in fitting one’s story into 
those categories to qualify for care – or cure – from the state. For the carers 
that I worked with, seeking out these ‘experts’ stood in contrast to support 
group discussions about members’ expertise and command over other, 
intimate aspects of their lives. This redefined realms of expertise: expert 
knowledge about processes and content of legal and social service bureau-
cracy was held by Alzheimer’s Society and governmental staff; expertise 
and success were crafted by carers (and, to a less pronounced degree, by 
people with dementia) by building knowledge and a network of people 
from whom to ask for help. Importantly, my interlocutors’ accounts also 
show that they were very particular about which ‘experts’ they sought 
out and recommended to one another. Carers made clear delineations 
between ‘experts’ who could recognise the complexities and nuances of 
dementia care and family life, and were able to appreciate that respite was 
not a ‘cure’ for long- term caring, but instead a necessary part of ongoing 
care to allow carers to ‘keep going’. For example, Nicky often came highly 
recommended because she ‘knows how the assessment works … how to 
make sure you really put in all you’re doing in each section’ – underlining 
both this woman’s expertise in state- sanctioned categories and an attuned 
cognisance that ‘what it means to be a carer’ ‘is different for everyone’.
Bureaucratic hassle was not accounted for in official assessments, 
but, I argue, can be cast as ‘hidden care work’. Carers did not consider 
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that the considerable time and effort that they put in to understand, 
track down, organise and complete the extensive legal and social services 
paperwork was care work. In support groups, it was rarely compared to 
the daily at- home, intimate work that many carers found themselves 
doing for their person with dementia, such as cooking, feeding, wash-
ing and supervising. These activities were what ‘counted’ as care work 
in their reckoning of the term, and they were what carers’ assessments 
and needs assessments focused on most. This connects to discourses on 
‘deservingness’, because to qualify as ‘deserving’ of state care and sup-
port, carers had to expend extraordinary efforts to ‘speak in the language’ 
of the state. However, these efforts remained unrecognised because there 
was no ‘category’ to tally this work. Many carers commented that their 
kin with dementia ‘has no idea how much time I spend trying to get it all 
sorted’ – a doubled invisibility.
Lack of appreciation is part of what made paperwork so maddening 
and draining, and why these efforts were not perceived as care work. This 
links with discussions about the significance of acknowledgement and reci-
procity of care in perceptions of, and constructions of, relatedness and kin-
ship in dementia contexts (Taylor 2008). Here, I push Taylor’s discussion 
further to suggest that the reciprocity and acknowledgement of care is what 
makes certain actions ‘count as care’, to use the language of my interlocu-
tors. This lack of acknowledgement is perhaps complicated by the fact that 
‘hassle’ pertains to public domains, and is undertaken by carers away from 
the private spaces shared with kin. Its visibility is thus obscured by both its 
lack of intimacy and the fact that the scope and processes of bureaucracy 
are only truly understood once one ‘actually tries to get it sorted’. Tellingly, 
carers became worried that they were being a ‘bad’ daughter, wife, son and 
so on when they spent ‘too much time chasing this [bureaucratic hassle] 
down, and not enough time with him [person with dementia]’, particularly 
since these efforts were at times dedicated to securing ‘respite – away from 
him’. Doing work that did not seem to be care work appeared to threaten 
bonds of relatedness between family members. At the same time, doing 
this bureaucratic work or, rather, trying very hard ‘to get anywhere with it’ 
also jeopardised people’s trust and expectations of the state.
The state as a bad relative
In line with other anthropological research on the topic, relationships 
between people in my fieldsite, as citizens, and the state are informed 
by the temporality of bureaucratic processes, and, specifically, the 
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temporality of waiting (Auyero 2012; Day 2016; Mathur 2014). These 
temporalities of waiting enervated, and thus illustrated, my informants’ 
relationship to the state, which, I suggest, is one predicated on moral 
framings of care that seemed to reverberate with traces of kinship.
It is significant that my research was among a group of people, 
mostly British English by birth or current nationality, who strongly asso-
ciated their identity with a nationalised system that boasts the NHS and 
socialised social care services. In her work on waiting for health care in 
UK contexts, Day (2016, 180) argues that the ‘recognition of the care 
claimed and given … defines a public to which you belong’. In strongly 
identifying with socialised services, my interlocutors positioned them-
selves as belonging to, identified by, and deserving of care by these sys-
tems. I make the leap from expectations of care from the NHS and related 
services to suggesting a moral relationship to the state, as envisioned by 
my interlocutors, through a consideration of their commentary about the 
role and responsibilities of the NHS and state to provide care over the 
course of their lives. ‘Early’ carers often spoke with confidence about how 
‘services will help sort things’, that is, the increasing needs of a person 
with dementia, alongside proud comments that ‘I’ve had the NHS all my 
life.’ Carers at all points in their journey often made comments that ‘the 
government really does have a duty to take care of them [people with 
dementia]’, and ‘dementia is an illness – it’s part of the NHS’s remit – every - 
one’s health is important … has to be looked after’. These expectations 
of care were further underlined when ‘new’ carers, over time, began to 
express confusion that ‘nothing was happening’, and exasperation: ‘but 
we have the NHS!’ Their disappointment mirrored more seasoned car-
ers’ more subdued resignation that ‘dementia has shown’ that ‘they don’t 
even care about us!’
In considering my interlocutors’ comments that they and people 
with dementia were ‘owed’ by the NHS through the concept of the moral 
obligation of care (Faubion 2001), it is possible that carers’ beliefs in the 
aims and promises of the NHS were derived partly through a nationalised 
identity as British. Some commented that the unpaid care that they were 
performing for their person with dementia was care they were ‘doing for 
the government’, which they had ‘paid into my whole life’, and that they 
should be given support for doing this care ‘for free’. While the comments 
of carers and, to a lesser degree, people with dementia that they ‘had 
paid in my whole life – working, taxes’, and hopes for payments from the 
government, might seem to undermine this moral underpinning of care, 
this can be read otherwise. Kinship relations and economic relations 
are not necessarily oppositional in straightforward ways. If we consider 
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that reciprocation of care is an important element underpinning kinship 
(Faubion 2001; Pettersen 2011), then my interlocutors’ lifelong invest-
ment in the economic health of the state can be seen as akin to an act 
of care that prompts reciprocal support in return. This point is strength-
ened if one considers other findings, albeit based on work in Botswana, 
exploring how care also encompasses financial and material resources 
(not only labour and sentiment), which can contribute to wellbeing 
or ill- health in others (Livingston 2003, 2005). As discussed by Reece 
(2015, 119, 121), the ambiguous position which ‘contributions’ occupy 
between gift and commodity in Tswana families ‘beget[s] further con-
tributions in their turn … giving them a cyclic, continuous temporality 
and generative potential’ that ‘adapt the moral framework of exchange 
to incorporate … collectivity’. Here we see that ‘contributions’ to and 
from the state have a potential constitutive power to create bonds that 
define an inclusive group. Further, some carers’ comments that much of 
the work that they were doing ‘should be done’ by the state likens the 
care they provided to that which the state could and should provide. 
Noting the importance they placed upon maintaining the embeddedness 
of their relative within family and society, this signals a nod to NHS and 
state support as more akin to the moral charge of kinship care than only 
the moral fulfilment of obligations and debts. Indeed, carers worked to 
establish their family member with dementia as a continuing citizen of, 
and participant in, the state, and an individual who was ‘owed’ some-
thing, and not only as a cared- for appendage to the family unit.
The expectation of reciprocation became most clear in my inform-
ants’ discussions about extended waits for NHS and social care support. 
Feelings of betrayal and bitterness often marked carers’ discussions about 
the kinds of care and support that they felt they were due. They traded tips 
on how to navigate the confusing bureaucratic hassle of powers of attor-
ney and medical directives to ‘be able to arrange things’, ‘because they 
[the state or NHS staff] don’t explain anything’. These processes were 
also frequently altered by new ‘promises’ (such as those offered by the 
Care Act 2014), alongside the slow implementation of these new policies 
due to understaffing in local and national teams. At a large forum about 
the Care Act 2014, hosted by a university in central London in March 
2015, many people in the audience who identified themselves as carers 
used the microphone to ask panel members ‘when will we actually see 
any of this?’, referring to provisions for stipends and respite for support 
carers, and whether ‘everyone gets this, or is it up to your local author-
ity?’ They highlighted that ‘much of this is too little, too late – I’m lucky 
that I could even come here today – so many carers can’t even get out. We 
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deserve better than this.’ Some of the more frustrated and disbelieving 
carers who I recognised from support groups, as well as new contacts 
that I made on the day, commented to me privately that ‘I’ll believe it 
when I see it,’ and ‘The NHS, all of it, really is going downhill.’ Tellingly, 
one woman likened the help she had received from the state thus far to 
family that just wanted to ‘pay lip service’. These carers’ frustrations also 
mirrored how they felt when family members found them ‘undeserving’ 
of the position of attorney over the affairs of the person with dementia – 
at a Carers Conference I attended, one carer told me that ‘if they [the 
state] really wanted to help, they would’. Carers’ frustrated comments 
signal a debt unpaid and recognition withheld, as well as dissatisfaction 
that the support promised ‘won’t reach everyone’, but instead would dif-
fer between local authorities.
Auyero’s (2012, 157) work illustrates the ways in which waiting 
for health and social care among the urban poor in Argentina ‘appears 
to be “in the order of things” – as something normal, expected, inevita-
ble’. Day (2016, 180) points out that waiting as an activity in the UK and 
other Western settings, with ‘connotations of a delay endured, and an 
expectation unfulfilled’ is relatively recent, and that before the early part 
of this century, it was not associated with queuing. Auyero (2012, 157, 
emphasis in original) argues that through waiting, ‘the everyday recon-
struction of political domination’ is created. He casts waiting as a state tool 
to regulate the poor that turns citizens into patients and binds them to 
the state. However, my interlocutors’ experiences of waiting for bureau-
cratic processes and state services to be implemented actually worked to 
unbind and distance citizens’ perception of being cared for by the state 
and their embeddedness in socialised health systems. The disjointed, 
complicated governmental processes and responses to the specific needs 
of my informants created room for their sharp critique of the state. 
Among my informants, this critique centred on the state’s default on 
promises of care earned. This analysis also reinforces findings on research 
with cancer patients using UK health services, wherein patient pathways 
became increasingly complicated by initiatives to introduce ‘stratified 
medicine’ approaches, aimed at personalisation and precision (Day et al. 
2017). Day et al. (2017) show that the hassle created actually resulted in 
less personal care. Like their informants, instead of being drawn into a 
closer, more personal caring relationship with the NHS and support ser-
vices, my interlocutors seemed to regard the relationship as estranged, 
often in bitter terms.
The aggrieved nature of these critiques signals an affront com-
mitted that was personally felt, pointing to an unravelling of a sense of 
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relatedness with the state and a diminishment of membership of the very 
‘public’ created through such services. As such, my material corroborates 
tensions between care and waiting in Day’s (2016, 180) findings, which 
show ‘the tensions within such a public, since participants consider that 
the NHS belongs to them while, at the same time, they are defined, con-
tained, and put on hold by “the system” ’. This state of affairs played out 
against a backdrop of warnings in the media that the ‘NHS is in trou-
ble’, and providing less care support to the elderly (Triggle 2017), and 
an influx of privatisation that ‘continues to threaten’ the NHS – both in 
terms of viability and ethos (The Guardian 2019). Thus, we can see that 
in contemplating their futures, my informants reworked their relation-
ships with the state as they redrafted their perception of the state as will-
ing to recognise their needs, and as a capable provider of security against 
uncertain futures.
Conclusion
The bureaucratic hassles of familial carers’ lives demonstrate the value of 
particular ‘collectivities’ (Mol 2008) in my interlocutors’ lives: charities 
such as the Alzheimer’s Society, and the power of peer support through 
support groups. They also reveal the profound impact that national pol-
icy projects such as the Care Act 2014 can have on the local and intimate 
details of people’s lives. Perhaps most importantly, they reveal the signifi-
cant creativity that people wield in finding their ‘way through’. Looking 
at these people’s willingness to continually wade through the ‘hassle’ 
also illuminates for what and why my interlocutors made this significant 
effort: the importance of the autonomy of a person with dementia, their 
decision- making capacity, and their deservingness of care emerges. My 
informants safeguard the wishes of a person with dementia in legal paper-
work, in effect preserving their autonomy and ‘right to choose’ beyond 
their cognitive ability to do so. The ‘what’ and ‘when’ of genuine deci-
sion making are made more complex, and come to include the possibility 
of autonomous choice by proxy of close kin. As people with dementia 
become more dependent on the care and decisions of others, many peo-
ple waded through the discomfort of confusing paperwork with ‘stran-
gers’ to put plans in place to ‘sort’ the future, and also to ‘sort’ a delayed 
activation of ‘what he wanted’. Further, carers and people with dementia 
sought consistent return to considerations of people’s personal decisions 
and views, now and in the future, through paperwork – and tense argu-
ments with extended kin about what authorities this paperwork grants.
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Considering the importance of choice and autonomy in Western 
constructions of personhood (Mol 2008; Lamb 2014), my interlocutors’ 
determination to navigate and mould legal and bureaucratic frameworks 
works to construct a personhood that can be extended into a future of 
marked, inevitable cognitive decline. Further, the deeply relational 
projects of using legal, official frameworks to preserve the choices and 
autonomy of people with dementia speak to debates about the impor-
tance of relationality in constructions of Western personhood (Carsten 
2004). Carers’ family discussions about the legal power and authority to 
‘decide what he would have wanted’ pivot on questions of who is deserv-
ing of the power to make decisions in the future, based on who ‘knows 
him the best now’, at the time of the drafting of paperwork. Carrying 
forward the present frameworks of care of a person’s life past the point 
they could autonomously do so themselves was paramount. Likewise, 
my interlocutors felt deep betrayal when promises of care from the state 
went unfilled and they were ‘just put on a waiting list’ – events they did 
not anticipate based on their previous conceptions of the state’s nation-
alised health and social care, and therefore could not prepare for ‘before 
it was too late’.
While relational, the work involved in safeguarding the choices of 
people with dementia into the future was often a deeply lonely and frus-
trating experience. Taking a bureaucratic lens on dementia care uncovers 
the disturbing realisation that carers’ significant time and effort, and the 
very real emotional burden of ‘hassle’ to protect their family’s wellbeing 
is not ‘counted’ as care – in their own reckoning, in acknowledgement 
from kin, or in the ‘official’ frameworks of the state. Indeed, this is what 
makes ‘all this hassle’ truly a hassle – it is hidden and unappreciated, and 
seems to produce little certainty. Thus, the enduring necessity of pursu-
ing it to assemble some form of future security points to the chronic pre-
carity of UK dementia care.
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Assemblages of care 
around albinism: Kin- based networks 




From the early 2000s onward, international and Tanzanian media cov-
erage has reported that groups of assailants guided by ‘traditional heal-
ers’ (waganga wa kienyeji) have orchestrated attacks on, and murders 
of, people with albinism in various regions of north- western Tanzania 
(Bryceson et al. 2010; Burke et al. 2014). The neoliberal context of the 
national fishing and mining industries triggered the rise of these vio-
lent events, fuelling the commodification of the limbs of persons with 
albinism throughout the country (Bryceson et al. 2010; Schühle 2013). 
Overlooking the social and political reasons behind the violence, most 
humanitarian agencies, such as the United Nations (UN), and numerous 
non- governmental organisations (NGOs) have assigned blame to ‘witch 
doctors’ (a depreciative term for traditional healers) and remarked on 
the importance of asserting human rights values for people with albinism 
throughout the African continent (Burke et al. 2014).
In biomedical terms, albinism refers to a group of related conditions 
resulting from a genetic mutation that causes a deficiency in melanin pro-
duction in the hair, skin and eyes. Various health- related outcomes are 
associated with albinism: visual issues (for example, nystagmus, strabis-
mus, photophobia, lack of both stereopsis and binocular vision) and high 
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to previous research on albinism in Tanzania, people with the condition, 
generally living in contexts of economic precarity, can encounter com-
munity marginalisation and discrimination (Blankenberg 2000; Baker 
et al. 2010; Reimer- Kirkham et al. 2019). One reason for these social 
outcomes pertains to a set of ideas that consider albinism as an ambigu-
ous condition. Machoko (2013) points out that in some African regions, 
people with albinism occupy an ontological place between humanity and 
the spirit realm. Other research has pointed out that moral discourses 
about albinism as a ‘bad omen’ resulting from previous moral misdeeds 
have underpinned the stigmatisation of people with the condition (Baker 
et al. 2010). Considered as unable individuals or people with cognitive 
impairments, Tanzanian people with albinism have to prove to society 
that their condition does not prevent them from realising their poten-
tial and contributing to neoliberal forms of development (maendeleo) of 
their communities. Nevertheless, in various African urban and rural con-
texts, effective enhancements of social inclusion depend on the presence 
of networks of support and care (Braathen and Ingstad 2006; Brocco 
2016). The formation of self- help groups (Chelala 2007) and local 
activist organisations are two social factors that can further inclusion. 
Conversely, recent media appearances by musicians and fashion mod-
els with albinism contribute to the fetishisation of bodies with albinism 
in national and international public media platforms (Hohl and Krings 
2019; Brocco 2020). While these political, media and humanitarian 
efforts focus on reframing albinism, these narratives have simultaneously 
contributed to the further victimisation of people with the condition in 
Tanzania. Individuals with albinism have been portrayed as subjects in 
need of protection from attack, (economic) help, and care because of the 
murders, high rates of skin cancer and widespread social stigma (Baker 
et al. 2010; Reimer- Kirkham et al. 2019; Brocco 2016).
In light of the killings and the subsequent media/ humanitarian 
publicity, the present analysis has a double goal. First, it sheds light on 
how my interlocutors with albinism navigated and interacted with vari-
ous forms of care and dependence, enacted within and shaped by their 
kin- based networks, neighbours, religious congregations, national and 
international organisations, and the Tanzanian nation state. The second 
goal is to reveal how notions of care over the last decades have shifted 
from being characterised as communitarian practices to individual-
ised endeavours enmeshed within narratives of national development 
(maendeleo) and a spirit of (individual) empowerment (kuwezesha). By 
introducing the recent post- colonial history of Tanzania, I point out that 
institutional, political and economic changes have modified individual 
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and social trajectories and practices of care. Despite this shift, people 
with albinism have shown that their practices of care are defined by 
efforts of mutual help and communitarian networks. To call attention to 
the interacting networks of care and support around them, I invoke the 
analytical perspective of ‘assemblages of care’, a concept that explains the 
intertwinements of heterogeneous discourses and divergent practices of 
care in various temporalities and (urban/ rural) contexts.
The stories of Florentina1 and Daudi, two research participants 
from the Ilula ward (Kilolo district, Iringa region) and Dar es Salaam, 
provide the ethnographic data on which my analysis is based. Their sto-
ries illustrate that people with the condition do not represent themselves 
as exclusively objects of care, as highlighted by humanitarian and media 
narratives. Rather, they see themselves as caring subjects able to forge 
various networks of mutual help and support. I collected Florentina’s and 
Daudi’s stories, and other life trajectories, over 18 months of fieldwork 
in Tanzania (2012– 15) carried out during various research stays, first 
as an NGO staff member, and then as a PhD student. Florentina’s and 
Daudi’s cases exemplify similar vicissitudes experienced by other people 
with albinism in Tanzania in terms of creating various mutual networks 
of care and support. However, their stories also shed light on personal 
attitudes and diverging relationships of care in relation to various social 
contexts (for example, employment, social status and geographical 
areas) and gender differences. During these research stints, I conducted 
participant observations, semi- structured interviews and group discus-
sions with people with albinism, their relatives, community members, 
NGO staff members, traditional healers, political representatives and 
religious (Muslim and Christian) local leaders. Hence, I spent the long-
est period of research in the villages of the Ilula ward (Kilolo district), 
inside the Iringa region in south- western Tanzania. This area is charac-
terised by agricultural businesses of hybrid maize, onions and potatoes, 
and a regional market for tomatoes (considered to be a dominant crop). 
One Lutheran- Protestant hospital and several health dispensaries were 
the main health facilities in the area. Low- priced hotels and guest houses 
for seasonal migrants and truck- drivers (mainly from Dar es Salaam and 
headed to eastern Tanzania) represented specific characteristics of the 
Kilolo district. Two Christian (Catholic and Protestant) missions, two 
Muslim mosques and six Pentecostal churches underline the multiple 
and disparate religious presence in the Ilula ward. In addition to my field-
work inside the Ilula ward, I also conducted research in Dar es Salaam, 
the most economically important city in Tanzania, where many NGOs 
and government officials are located.
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Multiple assemblages of care around people with 
albinism
The concept of assemblages of care indicates the diverse connections, 
articulations and materiality of practices and ideas that constitute territo-
rialised forms of care in specific temporalities and social contexts (Lamb 
2020, 324; Van Eeuwijk 2020). In line with its analytical sense (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987; for a critique of its use in sociocultural anthropol-
ogy, see Bialecki 2018), I consider assemblages as conglomerations of 
contingent, diverse social attitudes that are, therefore, not stable, but 
structured around multiple criticisms, ethical discourses, contestations 
and moral practices (Ong and Collier 2004, 4– 5; Zigon 2011, 31; Marcus 
and Saka 2006; Rabinow 2003). For people with albinism, for instance, 
assemblages of care materialise in the intricate networks of families, 
communities, the state and NGOs. To illustrate how assemblages of care 
are formed, I describe Florentina’s and Daudi’s attitudes of (in)depend-
ence, which are specular, but intrinsically interrelated, and a counterpart 
to caring practices in Tanzania.
Care is ‘a shifting and unstable concept’ that is ‘moral, relational, 
historically specific, and embedded within forms of governance and 
global political economic transformation’ (Buch 2015, 287). Everyday 
practices, daily engagements with various social domains, and networks 
constitute important focuses in which relations ‘to do with the good’ 
manifest in their multiple ‘practical tinkering’ and ‘active experimenta-
tion’ (Mol et al. 2010, 13; Mol 2008, 2010). The analysis of care for/ 
about and by people with albinism/ disability takes into account the 
contingent and fluid processes of creating relatedness and forging social 
bonds among people living in similar precarious conditions (for exam-
ple, Carsten 2000; Manderson and Block 2016). Intended as a set of 
relational and enacted practices (Warren and Sakellariou 2020), care 
involves both affective dimensions (caring about) and real practices (car-
ing for) (Buch 2015, 279).
Forms of hierarchical subordination and patronage between the 
population and state/ supra- national entities such as humanitarian agen-
cies and NGOs (variously interpreted as forms of modern sovereignty 
(Ecks 2004)) represent an important perspective to comprehend vari-
ous notions of care generating multiple ‘politics of deservingness’ (see 
Montesi and Calestani’s introduction in this volume). Social relation-
ships based on ‘declarations of dependence’ (Ferguson 2013) within 
economic landscapes of ‘distributive labour’ (Ferguson 2015) lead to the 
understanding of how various forms of care are enacted in, and shape 
 
MAnAging ChroniCitY in unEquAL stAtEs116
  
the life experiences of, people with albinism in Tanzania. On the one 
hand, an analysis of assemblages of care and dependence reveals how 
individuals with albinism in economic situations of precarity endeavour 
to assert their rights and social claims towards actors with a greater socio-
economic capacity to provide (such as NGOs, political parties and the 
state). In this way, these people establish symbolic and material relations 
of hierarchy and dependence as vehicles for social and economic mobil-
ity; these are the means for securing and sustaining life in circumstances 
of relative deprivation, where the state cannot be counted on, or fails to 
provide, support (Ferguson 2015; see also Kennedy’s contribution in this 
volume). On the other hand, this perspective underlines that people with 
albinism are enmeshed in mutual relationships of care and dependence 
with other people living in similar or divergent socioeconomic contexts 
(Ferguson 2013, 231). The latter also defines how social networks are 
sustained and enacted.
The non- normative bodily difference of people with albinism in 
Tanzania is another relevant element to understanding assemblages of 
care. Anthropological studies on forms of care and dependence around 
people with disabilities, debility (Livingston 2005) and other chronic 
conditions in the Global South and African regions are fundamental. The 
analysis of modes of citizenship (Ingstad and Whyte 2007, 21– 2; Das and 
Addlakha 2007), understandings of economic and political activities of 
people with mobility disabilities (Kohrman 2005; Devlieger 2018), com-
prehension of deaf social worlds and activism (Nakamura 2006; Friedner 
2015) and studies of agency, politics of appearance and belonging among 
people with various forms of human difference (Staples and Mehrotra 
2016) highlight the centrality of modes of care and belonging enacted 
within kin- based relationships and social networks around rights claims. 
For people with albinism and other disabilities/ chronic conditions in 
Tanzania, for instance, manifold actions of caring depend on economic 
and political situations. In this regard, Dilger (2010) observes that prac-
tices of caring and nursing for people with HIV/ AIDS rely on kinship net-
works and religious congregations in the context of international funding 
strategies and implementations of structural adjustment programmes in 
the country.
In present- day Tanzania, my interlocutors with albinism used vari-
ous terms to refer to their assemblages of care. While kutunza entails 
acts of care for sick or disabled people, kujitunza is related to the care 
for oneself and one’s kin- based relatives. Kujali translates the action of 
taking care of, or looking after, someone with a vulnerable condition 
within specific kin- based networks. Kusaidia, instead, concerns practices 
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of providing help in more general terms. These words not only illustrate 
practical actions and affective dimensions in inter- subjective relation-
ships in Tanzanian society; they also address the meaningful emergence 
of interventions by humanitarian and health organisations implement-
ing multiple regimes of care (Fassin 2011) which are the expression 
of ambivalent ‘politics of deservingness’ (see Montesi and Calestani’s 
introduction in this volume). These words are the practical terms that 
translate the assemblages of care within which my research participants 
were immersed. To unpack the semantic complexity of these terms, the 
following section explores notions of care that have emerged in the post- 
colonial history of Tanzania.
The reduction of institutional care and the ‘NGOisation’ 
of the nation state
In the 1970s, the socialist government of Tanzania under President Julius 
Nyerere (1964– 85) suffered from growing external debt and exploding 
costs in its heavily subsidised economy and over- funded external systems. 
The international oil crisis and global economic depression further exacer - 
bated this situation. With the end of the Nyerere era and the election of 
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985, the Tanzanian state accepted the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment 
policies. This political decision marked the start of the country’s neolib-
eral phase, and the implementation of various types of economic reforms 
concerning the implementation of cash economy, trade liberalisation, 
deregulation of foreign investments, and para- statal and civil services. 
The adoption of these economic and political measures caused a steep 
reduction in governmental expenditures for health care, education and 
housing programmes. As a consequence, the Tanzanian state started to 
greatly rely on external socioeconomic support from international insti-
tutions and NGOs for services, and international private companies for 
industrial development (Dilger 2010, 103– 4).
The years from the 1970s to the 1990s, however, constituted an 
important period for the legal and political recognition of people with 
albinism and disabilities in Tanzania. Under the Nyerere government, 
the Tanzania 1977 Constitution prohibited discrimination against people 
with disability (Aldersey and Turnbull 2011, 161– 2). Through a series of 
subsequent legal acts, people with albinism and other disabilities (deaf-
ness and blindness, for example) succeeded in constituting their first 
organisations. Under the Nyerere government’s motto of self- reliance 
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(kujitegemea), freedom (uhuru) and national unity (umoja), people 
with non- normative bodies were considered to belong to the Tanzanian 
national community at large (Nyerere 1966). The Tanzania Albinism 
Society (TAS) was one of three state- funded organisations. Founded in 
1978, TAS was categorised by the state authorities as a Disabled People’s 
Organisation (DPO). My interlocutors with albinism did not agree with 
this classification, as they believed that the label ‘disability’ could add 
even more social burden and stigma to their daily experiences. Between 
the 1980s and the early 2000s, a series of international documents, dec-
larations and legal acts for the enhancement of human rights for people 
with disability were promulgated (Ingstad and Whyte 2007, 4– 5). Post- 
Nyerere governments in Tanzania later ratified these official documents 
(Aldersey and Turnbull 2011, 160). The Disability Act of 2010 is the most 
recent legislation that attests to the right of people with a disability to 
make human rights claims and demand protection.
Despite the promulgation of these legal acts, the Tanzanian state 
continued to reduce funding for the welfare, health care and educa-
tion systems, and awareness activities by many national DPOs. Instead 
of being administered through public funds allocated by networks of 
state- supported health facilities and the former Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (Wizara ya Afya na Ustawi wa Jamii), the material forms 
of care and economic relief for disabled individuals and people with 
albinism and/ or other chronic conditions began to depend solely on 
their families, religious congregations, international NGOs and infor-
mal networks of community solidarity and mutual help. In various post- 
colonial countries in Africa, these assemblages of care, although flexible 
and unstable, sustained the sociality of people with non- normative 
bodies, and provided them with material means for their daily sur-
vival (Livingston 2005; Whyte 2014; Dilger 2008; de Klerk and Moyer 
2017; MacGregor 2018). In addition to practices of caring for and car-
ing about, acts of care for oneself (kujitunza) in neoliberal times also 
became relevant. Kujitunza constituted the material means through 
which disabled people could react ‘to the demands of their positions 
as parents, as children of elderly parents, as partners, as patients’ (de 
Klerk and Moyer 2017, 315– 16).
During the two decades before the outbreak of news about the 
killings of people with albinism in about 2006/ 7, TAS was the first 
Tanzanian organisation supporting people with the condition, mainly 
those living in Dar es Salaam. Despite the organisation’s claim of having 
many regional and district offices throughout Tanzania, only a few local 
branches existed in the past and were still active during my fieldwork 
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in 2014/ 15. From the early 2000s onward, there was political pressure 
from various international institutions (for example, the United Nations 
and the European Union) and NGOs on the Tanzanian government to 
mobilise after the spread of news about the murders of people with albi-
nism. Various international NGOs and the Tanzanian government started 
to conduct privately and publicly funded awareness campaigns and 
humanitarian interventions using booklets and educational activities in 
rural and urban areas (Engstrand- Neacsu and Wynter 2009). To protect 
children with albinism, the Tanzanian state instituted special camps. 
Under the Same Sun (UTSS), a Christian- Protestant NGO from Canada, 
was founded in 2008 by Peter Ash, a wealthy Canadian entrepreneur 
with albinism. Starting from 2009, the organisation conducted public 
awareness campaigns in both rural and urban north- western regions 
such as Mwanza and Shinyanga. Subsequently, UTSS provided students 
with albinism with approximately 320 scholarships countrywide, and 
compiled a research database with information on albinism in Tanzania 
and other African states. Although TAS had been under- resourced, the 
members continued organising the state- funded National Albinism Day. 
In 2015, this celebration day became the UN- recognised International 
Albinism Awareness Day. From the early 2000s onward, TAS also received 
economic support from other international NGOs and private donors for 
conducting awareness and health- related campaigns in Tanzanian hospi-
tals, mainly in Dar es Salaam and Morogoro. Another important NGO for 
people with albinism is Standing Voice, a UK- based organisation founded 
in 2013 by Harry Freeland, director of the documentary In the Shadow of 
the Sun (2012). Standing Voice addresses advocacy and health issues for 
people with the condition. The main interventions include collaboration 
with the Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC) in Moshi, aimed 
at implementing various mobile programmes on low- vision care and skin 
cancer prevention.
However, these humanitarian activities have concentrated mainly 
in the north- western regions and Dar es Salaam, and they have not 
reached other parts of the country. During my fieldwork, few humani-
tarian and state- funded projects were located in the Iringa region. One 
of these interventions (supported by the Tanzanian state, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UTSS), intended to distribute 
sunscreen lotions to the population with albinism. In 2015, the KCMC 
provided the Iringa Regional Hospital with hydrogen therapeutic instru-
ments for curing skin cancer lesions. Additionally, the health facility in 
Moshi (Kilimanjaro region) started compiling national lists of people 
with the condition who could undergo surgical operations for removing 
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skin cancers. The Tanzanian state, headed by the then President, Jakaya 
Kikwete (2005– 15), allowed free ophthalmological and dermatological 
check- ups once a month in every public hospital, and the free distribu-
tion of second- hand sunscreen and hats to the population with albinism. 
In 2010 and 2013, the Iringa regional government, in collaboration with 
the Kilolo district office, organised meetings with local TAS members and 
other people with albinism living in the area. Their scope was to deliver 
sunscreen and hats to people with albinism, and to provide them with 
safety guidelines against possible attacks, as well as information on how 
to prevent the onset of skin cancer. In addition to the few humanitarian 
and state projects, the Christian- Catholic mission and the Ilula Orphan 
Project (a Norwegian– Tanzanian NGO) included disadvantaged children 
with albinism in their support programmes.
From the post- independence history of Tanzania, it emerges that 
the negative outcomes of the liberalisation measures have affected the 
life experiences of many people with non- normative bodies. Welfare ser-
vices, social benefits and activities for people with albinism by NGOs were 
mainly based in specific regions. Although there have been a few national 
measures taken by the Tanzanian government (for example, the creation 
of a governmental task force for preventing murders and promoting the 
presence of politicians with albinism in the Tanzanian Parliament), un - 
equal and temporary distribution of humanitarian care remains across the 
Iringa region. Additionally, some interlocutors with albinism from Dar es 
Salaam have refused to become involved in the NGOs’ activities because 
they were critical of the provisional dimensions of their humanitarian 
interventions and services. Within this scenario, religious (Christian and 
Muslim) congregations, kin- based and communitarian forms of care 
assume a relevant status. Individual modes of caring for oneself and 
one’s family also become important, especially in big cities such as Dar es 
Salaam. The two cases of Florentina and Daudi epitomise the materialisa-
tion of all multiple and unstable assemblages of care in the wake of neolib-
eral measures and the correlated ‘NGOisation’ of carescapes in Tanzania.
Kin- based care and humanitarian discourses in 
Ilula: Florentina’s experiences
In 2015, Florentina, a 30- year- old woman with albinism, shared a 
house with her mother, in her sixties, in the Ilula ward of the Iringa 
region. Florentina’s father had passed away 10 years earlier. While two 
of Florentina’s brothers had migrated to Iringa city and Dar es Salaam 
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looking for more suitable job opportunities, one sister and two other 
brothers chose to settle in the area. After her second marriage failed, 
Florentina and her three children returned to Ilula. Despite her vulner-
able social conditions and economic uncertainty, Florentina has experi-
enced love and care from her relatives since birth. Her mother described 
this event in the following terms:
When Florentina was born, we all were very surprised [tulishangaa 
sana] to have had a child zeruzeru [albino]. Some villagers brought 
more presents than they used to bring for the birth of normal chil-
dren. They gave us soaps, cloths or money as presents [sabuni, vitenge 
au hela kama zawadi] and our neighbours [wajirani wetu] were keep-
ing saying ‘amepata mzungu jamani, amepata mzungu [we have an 
albino, people, we have an albino]!’ … When Florentina grew up, any-
way, I came to think that she was a normal child [mtoto wa kawaida], 
and also my husband, who was really sceptical [mwenye shaka], 
began to consider her as normal. … At the beginning, actually, my 
husband suffered a bit because we were all black, but afterward he 
was relieved when we discovered that binti mwenye ukoo wetu ali-
kuwa zeruzeru tu [a daughter within our lineage had had albinism 
too]. … By asking within our family group [familia], we also got to 
know that mama yetu na ndugu zetu [our grandmother and our fam-
ily members] had 11 children with albinism as well. … We saw many 
persons zeruzeru but, of course, there were other neighbours [watu 
wengine wa jirani] who asked me why Florentina was this way, and 
I always replied saying that skin colour is not important … According 
to the choice of God [uchaguo wa Mungu] she was a normal woman!
At first, the birth of a child with albinism was considered an unusual 
event. However, Florentina’s parents succeeded in identifying the pre-
sence of other relatives with the condition and associated it with God’s 
will. In the meantime, neighbours and other community members 
behaved in an ambiguous way. On the one hand, they brought presents 
for Florentina’s birth, as usually happens. On other hand, they empha-
sised Florentina’s bodily difference and related her corporeality to a 
white person, as signalled by Florentina’s mother. The material and 
symbolic forms of care enacted by Florentina’s parents were concerned 
with finding an explanation for the birth of a child with albinism. In 
this way, they aimed to explain Florentina’s condition to the entire 
community, and asserted the normalcy (kitu cha kawaida) of albinism. 
Overall, their attitude intended to dismiss the ambiguity in the words 
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and actions of some of Florentina’s neighbours. This form of kin- based 
care facilitated the introduction of the child with albinism into the com-
munity’s social life, and the reassertion of her family’s moral position. 
As underlined by other interlocutors with albinism, the birth of a child 
with the condition could also provoke a fracture in kin- based networks, 
especially on the father’s side. The appearance of a child with albinism 
could be understood as a curse (laana), a sign of the child’s mother’s 
amoral conduct towards her relatives and ancestors. As many interlocu-
tors mentioned, children with albinism were usually hidden by their 
parents. Thus, Florentina epitomises a positive example in which her 
parents’ moral integrity was re- affirmed by the presence of previous 
family members with albinism. Therefore, the stigmatisation and mar-
ginalisation of people with albinism within their nuclear and larger fam-
ily circles do not represent fixed affective and behavioural states. On the 
contrary, these attitudes are mobile, vague and variable across a wide 
spectrum of feelings and affects.
In her younger life, Florentina helped her mother as a housekeeper, 
and later worked as a hired hand cultivating fields around the Ilula ward. 
Once married, she traded vegetables in Ilula and neighbouring villages. 
The majority of her family income was provided by her two, consecutive, 
husbands. Once her last marital union ended, she was employed by her 
sister, who had a tiny restaurant along the paved highway from Dar es 
Salaam to Iringa. In our discussions, Florentina explained that she usually 
spent time with her female neighbours talking about various subjects, such 
as unexpected events in Ilula, the lives of other villagers, their children, or 
rumours about the priest of the nearby Christian- Catholic mission. These 
networks of relatedness were built up on a reciprocity of words, but also on 
mutual care in the case of an unexpected disease, on economic support and 
affective relations. Relevant elements in the assemblages of care around 
Florentina were also constituted by her membership of the Christian- 
Catholic religious congregation of Ilula, and her relationships with other 
people with albinism in the Kilolo district. Her relationships of care within 
the Catholic community, and with some of her neighbours, materialised 
in 2014, when they donated food and money to help Florentina and her 
children overcome a separation from her second husband. On another 
occasion, they also financed her journey to Moshi for a surgical operation 
to remove a skin cancer. For these reasons, Florentina asserted that she felt 
protected by her parents (wazazi) and friends (marafiki) against possible 
attacks and stigma by unknown people.
After the organisation of the first state- funded meetings for peo-
ple with albinism in 2010/ 11, Florentina got in touch with other people 
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with albinism from neighbouring villages. She met them in the spo-
radic gatherings organised by TAS and the Kilolo district office during 
the time when people with albinism were being murdered. Afterwards, 
in 2014/ 15, she regularly saw some women with albinism every three 
months for sunscreen lotion distribution organised by the KCMC in the 
Kilolo district. During this period, Florentina hosted two of these women 
who came to Ilula to buy and sell their crops and other items in the local 
markets. Thus, she underlined that she considered them as her friends. 
Thanks to her contact with the national humanitarian world, Florentina 
started to envision albinism not only as the will of God, but also as a dis-
ability. She expressed her thoughts in this way:
Albinism [uzeruzeru] is a disability! Of course, this condition [hali 
hii] is! Everything is more difficult for us … You cannot carry out 
duties in the field if you have a skin like mine. Your skin burns and 
you aren’t able to see nothing. … My disability of the skin [ulemavu 
wangu wa ngozi] is different from the one of deaf people, cripples 
or blind persons! I feel to have a distinct disability [ulemavu tofauti 
tofauti] because I have both my physical strength [nguvu zangu za 
kimwili] and cognitive capacities [akili]! … I didn’t do anything 
wrong and I am a creature of God!
Being a single woman with albinism generated difficulties for Florentina 
and did not facilitate the construction of new networks of relatedness 
outside her circle of kin- members and friends. Therefore, her words and 
practices highlight how she tried to create networks of solidarity and sup-
port with other people with albinism, and relied on discourses brought 
forward by NGOs and humanitarian agencies. Her definition of albinism 
as a distinct disability allowed her to prove her capacities and skills to 
other community members, while highlighting her humanity and desire 
to be part of society in a material way. Her body acquired another mean-
ing, understood as a difference that did not diminish her physical and 
cognitive capacities. Florentina’s parallel between albinism and repre-
sentations of the condition as a disability pointed out how she intended 
to stress the needs for special care for people with albinism. In her opin-
ion, she felt part of the national community of people with albinism in 
Tanzania, especially during the waves of killings and violence. Between 
the lines, she also stated that albinism was not due to her or her parents’ 
moral misdeeds. For this reason, her consideration of albinism as a dis-
tinct kind of disability marked her as belonging to all human beings cre-
ated by God.
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While Florentina worked in her brother- in- law’s restaurant in 2015, 
she continued farming the small piece of land held by her mother and 
two of her brothers. One day, she remembered that her previous farming 
as hired hand represented ‘hard work’ (kazi ngumu):
I cannot work as others do because under the sun my skin becomes 
nyekundu [red] and develops vidonda sana [many wounds]. … Like 
today, the only way to cultivate the field is to go there at dawn. … 
Before, my husband didn’t work and I needed money, so I was going 
there every day no matter what! … Thanks to God, I am with my 
sister working in the restaurant!
Florentina’s words underline two important elements in her life trajec-
tory. On the one hand, her socioeconomic condition is characterised by 
precariousness and economic vulnerability. Her agricultural activities 
further exacerbate her worsening health, and have produced two can-
cerous lesions on the back of her neck. The onset of her wounds pro-
voked a reprocessing by the KCMC health worker, who signed her up 
for a free surgical operation at the KCMC hospital in Moshi. Despite the 
harshness of her life, the direct and indirect socioeconomic support pro-
vided by her closer relatives (mother and sister) constitute the materi-
alisation of forms of care that manifested within her networks of family 
and friends. However, the precariousness of her socioeconomic con-
ditions did not allow her to autonomously care for her three children 
and give back the material care provided by her relatives as economic 
support.
Florentina’s assemblages of care are constituted by her parents’ 
behaviours, social networks of relatedness, religious affiliation, new 
acquaintances with other people with albinism, and the various humani-
tarian organisations. Although the NGOs and the Tanzanian state applied 
their institutionalised regimes of care as guidelines for protection against 
the killings and the onset of skin cancer, people with albinism such as 
Florentina continue to be sustained by established and new, unstable 
but strong, wider assemblages of care. On the one hand, national activ-
ist organisations and international NGOs influence life experiences and 
subjectivities of people with albinism by creating relationships of (in)
dependence based on the financial and material support they claim to 
provide. On the other hand, humanitarian narratives such as the equa-
tion of albinism with a disability represent tangible ways for people with 
albinism to claim equal social and political rights to health, education 
and job opportunities.
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(In)dependence in Dar es Salaam: Daudi’s self- care,  
care for and care about others
During the time of my fieldwork in Dar es Salaam, I met Daudi, a 45- year- 
old bajaji (auto rickshaw) driver with albinism. Having spent his youth 
in his hometown Tanga (a city in north- eastern Tanzania) trading veg-
etables and farming, he moved to the economic capital of Tanzania in 
the mid- 1990s. Thanks to a contact of a friend from Tanga, he started to 
work as a bajaji driver. In the early 2000s, Daudi decided to buy a small 
wagon with economic support from one of his sisters living in Zanzibar. 
By transporting goods and vegetables from various coastal cities to Dar es 
Salaam, Daudi saved enough money to purchase an electric millstone – an 
enterprise in which his sister and a bajaji renter participated. Some years 
later, he also bought a bajaji for one of his brothers to start a business 
in Tanga. In the meantime, Daudi was able to set up a small restaurant in 
Morogoro, managed by his wife, his two older sons and two nephews. 
In addition to Daudi using his personal earnings, two of his brothers liv-
ing in Dar es Salaam contributed to the construction of the restaurant. In 
2008, however, Daudi lost almost all his savings. In an attempt to enlarge 
his net worth, he set up a society with a man from Kenya who defrauded 
him. Due to these circumstances, he sold the millstone and the bajaji to 
repay his accumulated debts. To keep his restaurant, he resolved to ask 
for money from two of his friends, who were in the bajaji business in Dar 
es Salaam. With this economic support, he succeeded in renting an auto 
rickshaw and started working again as a bajaji driver. He once said to 
me: ‘35,000 TZS per day for normal rickshaw or 50,000 TZS for bigger 
vehicles. It is a bit expensive, but I can get by!’
When I asked Daudi to describe his life trajectory and the way he 
had created various business opportunities in both Tanga and Dar es 
Salaam, he used two terms related to neoliberal vocabulary: develop-
ment (maendeleo) and empowerment (kuwezesha). However, rather 
than being considered as a triumph of individualism, these two terms 
referred to his ability to establish networks of care and dependence in 
contemporary Tanzania. Kuwezesha derives from the recent ‘NGOisation’ 
of the Tanzanian state, and the importance of the humanitarian sector in 
improving the life experiences of Tanzanians, and ameliorating the func-
tions and services provided by the national state. Development is a con-
cept dating back to Nyerere’s times, and entails community or national 
improvement through the participation of all the state’s citizens. For 
Daudi, the assemblages of care materialised in the support and help pro-
vided by his networks of family members and friends from both Tanga 
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and Dar es Salaam. These relationships of care consequently demanded 
interdependence, established through mutual exchanges of economic 
and moral obligations towards the extended family (familia) and migra-
tion community (jamii), considered as social contexts for the realisation 
and sustainment of an individual. As proof of such networks of mutual 
help, people employed in either Daudi’s restaurant or his millstone busi-
ness were younger members of his extended family, and people belong-
ing to his urban network. In his story, the only person who jeopardised 
his plans was a man from Kenya with whom he wanted to build a busi-
ness relationship.
The production of new, and the maintenance of old, networks are 
also ways by which people with albinism are able to prove to society and 
other family members that they can empower others and contribute to 
their socioeconomic ‘development’. For instance, Daudi encountered sev-
eral issues of acceptance by his wife’s relatives. He recounted:
I started to know my wife in Dar es Salaam, and I wanted to marry 
her. At that time I was also thinking of going back to Tanga as 
I wanted to buy a bajaji. I had the money and I had already bought a 
machine ya kusaga mahindi [a millwheel to grind maize]. I remem-
ber that I had lots of troubles, as her relatives did not allow their 
daughter to marry an albino. They said, in particular her mother, 
that they were afraid to have a grandson albino, and that I would 
not have been able to provide for my family … It was not nice, but 
my wife wanted to marry me, and I had the money to marry her 
at that time, so at the end we got married. … Afterward, even her 
parents understood our will.
In addition to the economic status of his paternal family, Daudi had to 
show his wife’s relatives that he had multiple sources of income to pay his 
wife’s bride- wealth and create a stable future for her and their children. 
Therefore, his albinism became for his wife’s family just a non- normative 
bodily difference that did not entail any disability and/ or physical 
impairment.
Although every person with albinism born in Tanzania auto-
matically becomes a member of the TAS, Daudi did not feel part of the 
national organisation. Unlike Florentina, who saw her membership as a 
chance for personal improvement, he confessed: ‘I do not have the time 
to go there! It is not useful at all, and they are not even able to collect 
sunscreens! … I had to work!’ Even though Daudi was aware that he 
could become a victim of murder or target of stigma in Dar es Salaam 
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due to his appearance, he believed that through the ‘will of God’ and 
hard work (kufanya kazi ngumu), every person with or without albi-
nism could succeed in life and provide help to (kutoa msaada) his own 
networks.
While NGOs, humanitarian institutions and broadcast media gen-
erally portray people with albinism as victims who deserve care and 
humanitarian support, Daudi’s story underlines the individual agency 
and subjective dispositions of many people with the condition. His life 
trajectory underlines the individual capacities of people with albinism, 
and the network of relatives and friends that sustain their efforts. In the 
creation of Daudi’s networks of friends and kin- based relatives, notions 
of masculinity also played an important role. While Florentina was aban-
doned by the fathers of her three children, Daudi succeeded in marrying 
his wife and having other occasional sexual partners in Dar es Salaam. 
My male interlocutors with albinism were married to wives with or with-
out albinism, while many female research participants did not have sta-
ble partners, or experienced troubled relationships. Gender differences 
for people with albinism are further underlined by the fact that, unlike 
Florentina, Daudi did not look for active participation in the humanitar-
ian world. Nor did he emphasise his membership in a Pentecostal congre-
gation in Dar es Salaam.
Daudi’s ethnographic case underlines that care for others is strongly 
connected with the economic capacities of the people providing support. 
While Daudi’s assemblages of care seem to only epitomise values of self- 
reliance and independence, these relationships highlight the importance 
of networks of care and dependence towards others. Nevertheless, his 
insistence on notions of care as caring for himself and his relatives/ 
friends imply a resemantisation of current political and NGO narratives of 
empowerment (kuwezesha) and development (maendeleo). These mate-
rial forms of care therefore point out that the socioeconomic improve-
ment of Daudi depends on the related amelioration of life conditions of 
other persons within his own networks of relatedness and community 
(jamii). Such constellations of care semantically refer to the values set 
up during the Nyerere government’s socialist period. Finally, masculinity 
constitutes a further substantial element in this articulation of care that 
can subvert the corporeality of the subject of care through relationships 
of (in)dependence and labour. While in other social arrangements (such 
as the family, the state and international NGOs), articulations of care are 
directed to the person with albinism, Daudi’s case underlines how the 
‘male’ person with the condition has to, and can, provide care and eco-
nomic stability for himself and other members of his networks.
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Conclusion
The two ethnographic cases of Daudi and Florentina highlight the mul-
tiple assemblages of care and dependence of people with albinism in 
Tanzania. Florentina drew a parallel between albinism and representa-
tions of the condition as a disability to stress the need for special pro-
tection against the killings and claiming human rights for people with 
albinism. However, her strategic definition of the condition as a physi-
cal impairment also refers to the humanitarian categorisation of albi-
nism as a disability that is not an inability to be productive and work. 
Therefore, Florentina’s equation of albinism with a physical disabil-
ity represents a symbolic and regimented form of care that NGOs, on 
behalf of people with albinism, use to claim rights to education, health 
and work, and access to various material resources. Florentina’s con-
ceptions of albinism indirectly derived from her networks of care that 
materialised in both her family’s and her neighbours’ reactions to her 
birth, and the support she has received from her neighbours and the 
members of her Catholic congregation in Ilula. In the neoliberal dis-
abling Tanzanian society in which people with albinism can encounter 
various forms of stigma and discrimination, the informal material sup-
port provided by relatives, parents and other community groups con-
stitute a way to cope with economic vulnerability, precariousness and 
social uncertainty.
Unlike Florentina, Daudi did not consider himself as a disabled 
person. On the contrary, he affirmed his able- bodied capacities to sort 
out his life by himself and contribute to the improvement of his family 
and friends. Despite his critiques of the humanitarian activities and the 
importance of social relationships in terms of social care, Daudi’s prac-
tices illustrate the relevant role played by his kin- based and communitar-
ian networks in Tanga and Dar es Salaam. While he was critical about 
the care and the lack of welfare benefits provided by the Tanzanian state 
and NGOs, Daudi’s life experience epitomises a resemantised form of the 
neoliberal values of empowerment and development that he indirectly 
criticises. Instead of remarking on the values of individuality and self- 
reliance, his notion of empowerment and development underlined the 
relevance of assemblages of care in the affirmation of the ‘male’ subject 
in Tanzanian society. Daudi’s ethnographic case shows this middle- aged 
man’s efforts and difficulties when trying to economically support his fam-
ily and gain recognised social status in Dar es Salaam. His life trajectory 
also highlights that care is entangled with relationships of dependence 
involving relatives, neighbours and friends in contexts of out- migration 
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(Dilger 2008, 2014). These are practices that can be performed by people 
with non- normative bodies such as Daudi’s.
Assemblages of care around the life experiences of my interlocu-
tors with albinism are therefore made up of multiple and diverging rela-
tionships and networks that change over time and across social contexts. 
The forced adoption of neoliberal reforms, the transformation of the 
Tanzanian economy, and the ‘NGOisation’ of its public services have pro-
voked modifications in the institutional care provided to the most vulner-
able members of the population. Despite these macro- transformations, 
and the presence of stigmatising attitudes towards people with albinism 
in society, the assemblages of care around them rely on multiple and 
conflicting networks and relationships with relatives, parents, commu-
nity members, religious congregations, NGOs and the Tanzanian state. 
These unstable and vulnerable, but strong and effective, assemblages are 
symbolic and material arrangements of care that sustain the lives of my 
interlocutors with albinism against neoliberal abandonment.
Note
 1. All the names used in this chapter are pseudonyms.
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Alcoholism and evangelical healing 
in Indigenous Mexico: Chronicity and 
care at the margins of the state
Chiara bresciani
Broken men, severed relations and a polarised society: the repercussions 
of alcohol addiction require forms of care capable of reassembling the 
scattered pieces of broken subjectivities by reintegrating them into the 
social body. This holistic perspective on care contrasts with that of bio-
medicine, which detaches individuals from their social structure and 
dismembers their bodies into parts, cog- like malfunctioning organs, as 
mandated by its Cartesian legacy.
Religious care of addiction fills the gaps left by struggling, deficient 
public health systems, and thrives thanks to its focus on the salvation, 
agency and social inclusion of the deviant par excellence: the addict. By 
refusing to separate physical health from the functional integration in 
a social network of relations and obligations, religious care acts on the 
phenomena that produced addiction in the first place.
Responding to the invitation of critical medical anthropology to 
focus on the intersection of biography and history, I use the concept of 
alcoholisation to contextualise alcohol abuse and religious conversions in 
Indigenous Mexico within historically produced conditions of inequality 
and marginality. My analysis, grounded in ethnographic research con-
ducted in San Dionisio del Mar, a Huave village in Southern Mexico, con-
siders two options for the care of alcoholism: biomedical treatment and 
the religious healing performed by evangelical congregations. By retracing 
the exemplary life of a former addict who found solace and acceptance in 
religion, I interpret evangelical conversions as strategies of care at the mar-
gins of the state, and analyse them through the temporal lens of chronicity.
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Heroin addicts of former Mexican settlements in New Mexico have 
been described as sharing a ‘historical ethos of suffering’, an identity 
based on melancholia and shaped by suffering, loss of land and dispos-
session at the hands of the United States. Their addiction is at the same 
time a product of their socioeconomic status and a way to escape nostal-
gia for their land, a reiterated, chronic expression of a perduring sense 
of loss (Garcia 2010). Similarly, alcohol abuse in Indigenous Mexico is 
the legacy of the colonial past, still alive and contributing to the impov-
erishment, marginality and helplessness of those living at the periphery 
of the state.
Evangelical healing and conversions may constitute a way out of 
the entrapment of chronicity, which I intend here both as recurrence 
(historical reiteration of different forms of dispossession) and perma-
nence (persistence of colonial structures based on ethnic and class hier-
archies). I argue that within unequal structures of relation, alcohol is a 
tool for the ‘conquest of the body’, by Spanish colonial power first, and by 
the neoliberal, capitalist economy today.
At the individual level, chronicity configures itself as the curse 
of the addict: by framing alcoholism as chronic illness, biomedicine 
defines and treats the alcoholic as a subject who is inherently vulner-
able to addiction, hard to treat, prone to relapses and often unde-
serving of care. Religion responds to the exclusion of the poor from 
biomedical forms of care, caused by the disinvestment in public health, 
through the provision of accessible and inclusive care. Where medical 
treatment is absent, racially biased and culturally insensitive, religious 
healing configures itself as an effective strategy by virtue of its holistic 
character.
From comorbidity to syndemics of alcoholism and 
marginality
Alcohol use in the Americas is 30 per cent higher than the world aver-
age, and it represents one of the major health risks in low- and medium- 
income countries (OID and CICAD 2015).1 Data collected in Mexico by 
the National Commission for Addictions report that 19.8 per cent of the 
general population (29.9 per cent of males) has consumed an excessive 
quantity of alcohol in the last month, and that 8.5 per cent (13.8 per cent 
of males) are habitual drinkers (consuming at least five units of alcohol 
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of diseases and traumas, is closely related to violence, crime and family 
desertion (OID and CICAD 2015, 33– 48), and is often present in comor-
bidity with noncommunicable diseases (mental disorders and diabetes 
in particular). In Mexico, alcohol- attributable deaths for males make up 
64.4 per cent of fatalities from liver cirrhosis, 33.1 per cent of road traffic 
injuries and 4.5 per cent of cancer (WHO 2018).
However, an increasing number of authors have argued that mor-
tality rates are not a reliable indicator of the impact of mental and addic-
tive disorders, since they are rarely recorded as the official cause of 
death, and their statistical prevalence is then underestimated. The use 
of disability- adjusted life years (DALYs), the sum of the years of life lost 
to premature mortality and disability,3 has therefore been proposed as a 
more valuable indicator of the impact of mental and substance- use dis - 
orders. When focusing on the number of years lived with disability, 
mental and addictive disorders emerge as the category with the high-
est disability burden, accounting for 18.7 per cent of the total. For men, 
alcohol- use disorders constitute the third cause of DALYs (335 point esti-
mated per 100,000 in 2016) (Rehm and Schield 2019).
Particular attention should be paid to data from middle- and low- 
income countries. Public health scholars have focused on the correla-
tion between the impact of mental illnesses and addiction on DALYs 
and income inequality (as per the Gini Index). The growth of eco-
nomic inequality (measured through indicators such as low income, 
unemployment and quality of housing) has been linked to the increase 
of mental and addictive disorders, with gaps in prevention and treat-
ment making their impact even more devastating (Rehm and Schield 
2019). Characterised by a developing economy and high income divide, 
Mexico is experiencing a skyrocketing incidence of noncommunicable, 
comorbid diseases, particularly diabetes, obesity, hypertension and 
alcohol abuse.
Critical medical anthropology has elaborated a comprehensive 
concept to shed light on both the individual and the collective dimen-
sion of illness experience. Syndemics are clusterings of two or more dis-
eases produced and intersecting with contextual social, biological and 
psychological factors, so that their synergistic interaction increases the 
disease burden beyond the simple concept of comorbidity (Weaver and 
Mendenhall 2014). In the case of alcohol, syndemic suffering is shaped 
by structural violence and co- produced by biosocial conditions such as 
diabetes, mental illnesses, violence, poverty and marginality.
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Five centuries of alcoholisation
The entanglement of alcohol abuse with the impoverishment and mar-
ginality of Indigenous Mexicans dates back to the unequal society that 
came into being after the Spanish Conquest. Prior to conquest, alcoholic 
beverages in the Americas were fermented, and their use was gener-
ally limited to ceremonial events. We know from the sixteenth- century 
Florentine Codex that severe sanctions were in place in pre- colonial 
Mexico against those who broke the rules that regulated the consump-
tion of alcohol (Olivier 2000).
With Christianisation, the process of dismantling the pre- Columbian 
social order began, which caused the end of ritual limits associated with 
intoxicating drinks and specifically pulque, a traditional drink made 
from the fermented sap of the agave plant (Ávila Palafox 2001, 171). 
After the conquest, distilled spirits (with a higher alcoholic grada- 
tion than fermented drinks) were introduced as commodities, to the be - 
nefit of the Spanish crown, which held a monopoly on alcohol production 
and sale. The commodification and widespread availability of alcohol 
resulted in the increase and generalisation of consumption. As elsewhere 
in European colonies, new categories of people, such as young men and 
women, started consuming alcohol (Dietler 2006, 241).
In the twentieth century, alcohol continued to play a role in the 
exploitation of natives and poor Ladinos by the dominant classes. 
Workers of plantations and industrial sites often had their salary paid 
in alcohol: in Chiapas, aguardiente, a distilled spirit produced from the 
fermented molasses of sugar cane, was used to keep workers tied to their 
patrons through addiction and indebtedness (enganche laboral) (De la 
Fuente Chicoséin 2009). Alcohol functioned as an antidote to organised 
forms of political action, as indebtedness and the induced state of semi-
permanent intoxication contributed to keep a largely dispossessed work-
force dependent on daily subsistence wages.
Despite the use of alcohol in cementing inequalities in the Republic, 
many ethnographers have stressed the functional value of drinking in 
social integration. The role of drinking in traditional medicine and to 
foster social cohesion has been described for distinct Mexican ethnic 
groups (Aguirre Beltrán 1994; Bunzel 1940; Eber 1995; Gross 2014; 
Lupo 1991), providing ethnographic insight into the concept of construc-
tive drinking (Douglas 1987).
Concerned about the devastating impact of alcohol on Indigenous 
communities, some anthropologists have called for the acknowledgement 
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of the dysfunctional traits of drinking (Spicer 1997), and of the conse-
quences of alcoholism in contexts already plagued by poverty, margin-
ality and violent forms of acculturation. Eduardo Menéndez, whose 
research on alcohol in Mexico spans over four decades, has argued for the 
need to consider the complex social worlds, values and ethics revolving 
around the ingestion of alcohol. Through the comprehensive definition 
of alcoholisation (alcoholización), he asserts the historical continuity in 
alcohol consumption from colonisation to the present day, highlighting 
its effects on physical and psychological health, family and societal struc-
tures. Alcoholisation contributes to the preservation of socioeconomic 
hierarchies by hindering upward mobility of lower classes through the 
impoverishment of households and intra- class violence. Alcoholisation 
emphasises the contradictory nature of alcohol consumption: it includes 
the positive cultural values associated with drinking (reinforcement of 
ethnic or class identity through festive exchange and sociality), as well 
as the pathological ones that biomedicine labels alcoholism (Menéndez 
Spina 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991; Menéndez Spina and Di Pardo 1996).
The multifaceted and processual character of alcoholisation draws 
attention to the limits of the biological, individualist clinical approach. 
While alcohol abuse is irrespective of social classes, careful consideration 
of its historical, socioeconomic, political and cultural aspects illuminates 
why its consequences are harsher for the weakest segments of society 
(Menéndez Spina 1984), where it is syndemic with poverty, marginality, 
violence and other diseases.
Drinking at the margins
The Southern state of Oaxaca is home to 17 of the 65 Indigenous and 
Afro- Mexican groups of Mexico. In 2018, 69 per cent of its inhabitants 
lived below the poverty line, 37.4 per cent in extreme poverty; 58.3 per 
cent lived in housing with inadequate access to basic services such as run-
ning water and drainage; 27.9 per cent experienced food insecurity; and 
27.1 per cent did not complete secondary education (CONEVAL 2018). 
All socioeconomic indicators are markedly lower for the Indigenous 
population, which accounts for 32.2 per cent of the total – the highest 
percentage at national level (Dirección General de Población de Oaxaca 
2018). San Dionisio del Mar is one of only four Huave villages. It is 
located on the shores of the Pacific Ocean in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 
and most Sandionisians work as fishermen and in agriculture. However, 
with 84.4 per cent of the inhabitants living below the poverty line, and 
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39.5 per cent in extreme poverty, most families are heavily dependent on 
remittances and public subsidies (CONEVAL 2015).
The beginning of mass consumption of alcohol in San Dionisio can 
be traced back to the mid- 1970s. Its history is strikingly similar to the 
course of events described above at national level, and it exposes the 
continuity between old and new forms of colonisation and accultura-
tion in structuring geographies of addiction (Bresciani 2012). Between 
1973 and 1975, a governmental credit was granted to fishermen for the 
purchase of 20 motorboats. The abandonment of traditional cayucos 
(wooden dugouts) resulted in an increase in the amount of fish caught, 
and this surplus led to an increase in trade. Cash went directly into the 
pockets of the fishermen, thus subtracting an important part of family 
income from the control of the women. Fishermen began spending time 
in the cantinas,4 whose number increased from 9 (before the motorboats) 
to 15 in 1985, and reached 32 between 1989 and 1992, when the grant-
ing of new permits was halted.
At the same time, significant improvements in infrastructure con-
tributed to the circulation of industrial beverages in San Dionisio: in 
1976, work started to improve the road that connected San Dionisio to 
the railroad, with the aim of linking it to the Pan- American Highway. Beer 
producers started trading beer directly with the cantinas shortly after-
wards (1978), without intermediaries and paying a yearly entrance fee 
(impuesto por pago de piso) to the local authorities. The alcohol market 
in San Dionisio became controlled by global corporations, which since 
then have been commercialising two brands of industrial beer through 
agreements of exclusivity with local cantineros and successful marketing 
strategies such as the sponsorship of major festivities. As happened in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, alcohol in San Dionisio became a 
commodity within an economy increasingly based on cash and integrated 
in a national market readily accessible thanks to better infrastructure.
Consistently with colonial times, the commodification of alcohol 
implied a shift in consumption from ritual drinking of mezcal to frequent, 
recreative ingestion of beer in commercial establishments and fiestas. As 
in much of Latin America, the most important celebration in San Dionisio 
is the annual feast of the eponymous patron saint, the costs of which 
are now totally covered by the beer corporations. Some Sandionisians 
describe this as the degeneration of the religious meaning of the festiv-
ity, traditionally based on the economic sacrifice sustained by the may-
ordomos (the local hosts and sponsors of the fiesta) as a public display 
of their faith and devotion. In the eyes of the Protestant population, the 
worship of saints – a key element in Mexican Catholicism – thus came to 
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be associated not only with idolatry, but also with the lavish ingestion of 
alcohol in the annual fiesta, disorderly conduct, waste of resources and 
an assorted variety of alcohol- induced ‘sins’.
The introduction and diffusion of beer brought about a change in 
habits and contexts of drinking, but also in demographics, since the spon-
sorship of religious festivities extended consumption to broader strata of 
the population, such as women and young people – virtually all members 
of the Catholic majority. By the 1980s, alcohol abuse had quickly become 
a major social problem, requiring new and innovative strategies of care 
targeted to new, specific patterns of drinking (Bresciani 2012). To many, 
evangelicanism started to seem a feasible, culturally apt way out of both 
the cantinas and the festive cycle of prescribed alcohol consumption. 
Religious conversion thus emerged as the prime answer to this increased 
need of care.
Care for whom? Drinking patterns and the possibility 
of care
Different explanatory models orient the choice towards one or more 
modalities of care (Kleinman 1980, 1988). An understanding of the dif-
ferent options available for the care of alcohol problems (therapeutic itin-
eraries) should start from the analysis of the ways in which coexisting 
disease models define health (health ideology) and treat illness. In San 
Dionisio, the choice of a strategy of care (and the choice to seek care at 
all) are made on the basis of accessibility (which options exist for care 
and how easy it is to access them) and qualitative criteria concerning the 
modalities and spaces of consumption, the social values and functions 
associated with drinking and the consequences of the ingestion.
In San Dionisio, a context marked by poverty, food insecurity and 
high rates of infectious and noncommunicable disease, health and illness 
are not defined in exclusively biological terms. Health is a measure of 
one’s social functioning, and it is defined in relational terms: a healthy 
person is someone who complies with culturally expected behaviours, 
such as engaging in work in accordance to their gender and complying 
with age- appropriate life steps. A healthy masculinity is that of a man 
who works and is able to provide for his family and fulfil his obligations 
towards the community.
Local ethnophysiology is premised on the accordance of physical 
health, affective states and social relations; pain is measured through 
one’s behaviours, and when social relations are negatively affected, the 
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whole network is in pain (Kleinman 1988, 72). The quality of social rela-
tions is reflected in the body, and a healthy person is someone whose 
relations with others have not been compromised: illnesses, and typically 
diabetes, are in fact believed to be a consequence of strong emotions con-
nected to interpersonal relations, such as fright (espanto), rage (muina) 
and public shame (vergüenza) (Montesi 2018a). To be effective, care 
must therefore take into account local conceptions of health and disease, 
and the entanglement of biological and social dimensions. Knowledge 
of the local health ideology, and of the options available to patients, can 
shed light on their therapeutic choices, be they biomedical or religious.
The main consequence with regard to Sandionisians’ choice of care 
is that, differently than for biomedicine, this is not based on the quantity 
or frequency of alcohol ingestion, but rather on the modalities of con-
sumption and values attached to them (Bresciani 2012). Binge drinking 
during fiestas and family gatherings is not considered problematic per se, 
despite the fact that it is a common trigger for violence, and heavy inges-
tion may last for days. On the contrary, social drinking is part of a local 
moral economy of sharing and reciprocity: participating and contribut-
ing to the organisation of fiestas, reciprocating invitations and drinking 
beer together reassert the networks of family, professional and social 
relations of which all Catholics are part, thus reaffirming and performing 
the group’s identity and unity.
Conversely, males drinking beer or adulterated mezcal in the can-
tinas or in the streets are considered deviant and threatening, since 
they jeopardise the food security of women and children. This drinking 
pattern is unanimously considered in need of care, which sometimes 
means attending one of the two local Alcoholics Anonymous groups. 
More frequently though, the addict’s family make use of the services 
of a curandero (traditional healer and sorcerer) or, if they can afford 
to do so, resort to the hospitalisation of their relatives into in- patient 
structures for detoxification known as anexos, in the district capital of 
Juchitán.
Anexos are notorious for humiliating and abusing patients, yet they 
are the most accessible mode of care for families in contexts plagued by 
poverty and endemic violence. Their capillary presence in the poorest 
Mexican neighbourhoods highlights the ways in which socioeconomic 
inequalities translate into differential access to the treatment of addic-
tion (Garcia and Anderson 2016). The former patients I interviewed in 
San Dionisio have stressed the use of coercive measures such as depriva-
tion of food and clothing, overcrowding and physical violence, describ-
ing confinement in anexos as ‘prison- like’. The undeservingness of 
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Sandionisian deviant drinkers is constructed from the margins through 
isolation from family and society, and materialises through abusive prac-
tices of care. It is through such ‘distributed intensities of worth’ that care 
practices sustain inequalities and shape the undeserving subjectivity of 
alcoholics (Montesi and Calestani, this volume).
Medical (un)care: Governmental health providers
The context of the medical options for alcohol care in the Mexican public 
health system is characterised by the fragmentation into multiple insti-
tutes and structures of care, and practical limitations in the implementa-
tion of their goals. Of these, the most relevant actors are the National 
Commission for Addictions (CONADIC) and the Youth Integration 
Centres (CJI).5 More recently, 341 Centres for Primary Care of Addictions 
(CAPA) were established, managed by CONADIC and part of the network 
of the Units of Medical Specialties (UNEME).6
However, these options for biomedical treatment of addiction 
are not accessible to the majority of the population, particularly in the 
poorer states of southern Mexico and in rural and Indigenous areas. The 
four million inhabitants of Oaxaca are served by only seven CAPAs, three 
out- patient CIJs and only one in- patient facility accredited by CONADIC, 
located in the capital. Oaxaca is the state with the highest number of 
municipalities in the country, and presents a pattern of geographically 
dispersed rural settlements throughout a vast, mostly mountainous ter-
ritory. The cost of transportation often makes travelling impossible for 
the lowest socioeconomic sectors of the population, even when medical 
care is needed.
In most rural and Indigenous communities, primary medical care 
is provided through a network of public clinics, which are notoriously 
underfunded, understaffed and inefficient. In an effort to ensure low- 
cost primary care in the most disadvantaged areas, where it is difficult 
to retain medical personnel, 40 per cent of rural clinics are managed by 
one or more pasantes. Pasantes are final- year medical students at public 
universities; in exchange for the free education they have received from 
the state, they are required to work for one year in a clinic in a rural or 
urban disadvantaged area before graduating.
The San Dionisio clinic serves more than 5,000 inhabitants living 
in three main settlements, and is usually staffed by one pasante and two 
local nurses working in shifts. Sandionisians lament the low quality of 
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who can afford to pay for private health care usually choose to do so and 
travel to town.
The pasantes of San Dionisio have an urban, middle- class back-
ground and are students at the National Autonomous University of 
Mexico (UNAM), the largest Mexican higher education institution. The 
relations between them and the patients often reproduce structural in - 
equalities based on race, economy and education. Many patients com-
plain about not being listened to and respected during the clinical 
encounter, and criticise the inexperience and attitude of pasantes, who 
are often much younger than themselves.
Medical anthropologists have stressed the reproduction of rela-
tions of subordination along gender, class and ethnicity lines through the 
infantilisation of the users of health services, ultimately resulting in their 
distrust and self- exclusion from the health system (Muñoz Martínez et al. 
2017). In San Dionisio, such distrust is explicitly referred to by some 
patients, who express the persistence of colonial legacy through their 
fear that the state uses the health system as a tool to eliminate the poor 
(Montesi 2018b, 14).
In the interviews and daily talks with four Sandionisian pasantes 
that I conducted between 2010 and 2015, they expressed dissatisfaction 
with the little time that they can dedicate to patients, as priority must be 
given to public health programmes (particularly those promoting family 
planning and hygiene). Young and unfamiliar with the social realities of 
rural Mexico, they lament the distrust of their patients, the long hours 
of service and the burden of being in charge of more than 5,000 people.
Primary care in Mexico has historically been developed around a 
hierarchical and assistentialist model of care that disregards the under-
lying socioeconomic and cultural structures, the needs of civil society 
and the necessity of collaboration between clinicians and patients in the 
design of treatment (Menéndez Spina and Di Pardo 1996, 25). A com-
mon complaint among Sandionisian pasantes is non- compliance with 
treatment, which they explain in terms of ignorance and stubbornness, 
even when non- adherence is due to structural issues such as a lack of 
access to adequate nutrition and clean water. In the context of a rela-
tion of care marked by the symbolic power of educated, urban, mestizo 
(non- Indigenous Mexican) pasantes over their Indigenous patients, non- 
compliance emerges as a moral term ‘predicated on a professional view 
of the doctor– patient relationship that is paternalistic and one- sided’ 
(Kleinman 1988, 136).
The mutual relation of distrust and the material limitations of the 
health care provided by the clinic seriously affect people’s perception of 
MAnAging ChroniCitY in unEquAL stAtEs142
  
biomedical care as a whole. The technical advancements of biomedicine 
remain out of the reach of most locals, and when it comes to alcohol, the 
structural limits of the health care provided in the local clinic become evi-
dent. Data on addiction and its impact on public health are not collected, 
and there is also a lack of data on chronic pathologies related to heavy 
alcohol consumption (with the exception of diabetes), at least until they 
have evolved into organ failure.
The self- medication hypothesis of alcohol addiction has emphasised 
the comorbidity of addiction and psychological issues, defining heavy 
substance abuse as a way to escape and cope with unresolved psycho-
logical conflicts and trauma. However, data are not available for mental 
illnesses either, although common psychiatric illnesses often occurring 
in comorbidity with addiction (typically schizophrenia, psychosis, para-
noia, major depression or severe anxiety disorder) could be managed 
relatively easily with pharmacological treatment. This lack of data makes 
it impossible to design and implement strategies of intervention against 
addictions at community level.
In the absence of dual diagnosis and treatment for addicts suffering 
from mental illness, the pasantes tend to consider alcohol abuse as an 
individual choice with strong environmental influences. Current medi-
cal understandings of alcohol abuse include theories of genetic predis-
position, according to which some individuals are intrinsically at risk 
to develop addiction. However, in San Dionisio, pasantes are instead 
inclined to give cultural explanations, placing the blame on a regional 
culture that they believe to be intrinsically tied to heavy drinking. In 
highlighting the central role of festive drinking, pasantes swap the bio-
medical paradigm of genetic predisposition with what we may call a 
theory of ‘cultural predisposition’ based on widespread, middle- class 
stereotypes of Indigenous groups. This happens despite the fact that, as 
argued above, alcohol abuse in San Dionisio was virtually non- existent 
until alcohol became a commodity in the 1980s. Moreover, data do 
not support higher alcohol consumption among Indigenous over non- 
Indigenous Mexicans: alcoholisation affects all social classes, although 
the consequences of alcohol abuse are perceived as stronger in the lower 
socioeconomic groups (Menéndez Spina 1984), because they are syn-
demic with marginalisation, poverty, malnutrition, psychological trauma 
and sociocultural disintegration in general.
Biomedicine has traditionally focused on mostly quantitative indi-
cators to define problematic alcohol use: alcohol does not constitute a 
problem in itself, as long as it is not excessive in quantity, too frequent 
or constitutes a risk to the individual’s health, behaviour or functioning. 
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Although nowadays medicine conceives problem drinking more holisti-
cally, taking into account psychological conditions, behaviour and social 
functioning, the biomedical health system remains primarily concerned 
with the impact of drinking on the body (what is considered an accept-
able degree of bodily function).
The ideology of the biomedical model is, then, substantially distinct 
from that of the Huave health system, which assesses illness and health 
on the basis of the drinker’s social integration and the quality of his inter-
personal relations. Medical anthropology is premised on the fact that ill-
ness is not an individual experience, but is relational, embedded in the 
social world and ‘inseparable from the structures and processes that con-
stitute that world’ (Kleinman 1988, 186; Weaver and Mendenhall 2014). 
In chronic illnesses, social suffering is central. However, the primacy of 
biology in the medical care of substance abuse (Hansen 2018, xiv) entails 
that care is limited to clinical settings, and does not deal with the social, 
political and historical determinants and characteristics of consumption, 
which are instead taken into account by the holistic concept of alcoholi-
sation. Biomedical care is doomed to failure because it is built upon the 
medicalisation of the concept of ‘alcoholism’ (Singer et al. 1992), see-
ing it as a behavioural problem to address through individual treatment, 
without acting on its structural socioeconomic causes (Menéndez Spina 
1984; Menéndez Spina and Di Pardo 1996).
A recurring element emerges from the interviews with pas-
antes: they are overworked and unfamiliar with local conceptualisations 
of body and personhood, and how illness is made meaningful. They do 
not detect alcohol abuse because they do not know which symptoms to 
look for; despite the fact that primary care is of pivotal importance to 
tackle problem drinking, public clinics only provide emergency care of 
alcohol- induced disease, accidents and violence (Menéndez Spina and 
Di Pardo 1996, 20, 33). In the clinical practice I observed, the comorbid-
ity between alcohol and diabetes is overlooked by the pasantes, despite 
diabetes being one of the main diseases most attended to in the clinic, 
and although the interactions of diabetes and alcohol consumption have 
been demonstrated for Mexico and for San Dionisio itself (both as biolog-
ical pathways, and as behavioural and socioeconomic associations and 
local aetiologies) (Montesi 2018b).
Regardless of the syndemic of alcoholism, poverty, violence and 
other illnesses, specific conditions and practices are prioritised by the 
Mexican health system and attended to in the clinic, particularly infec-
tious diseases, diabetes, infantile malnutrition, pregnancy checks and 
pap smears. Despite its impact on health, poverty and domestic violence, 
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prevention and treatment of alcohol addiction pay the price of the scar-
city of resources allocated to rural clinics. This leads to a biased concep-
tualisation of alcohol abuse as a condition ‘undeserving of attention’ 
compared to other problems, eventually failing addicts and their families 
(see Menéndez Spina and Di Pardo 1996).
Having little awareness of the psycho- social determinants of alco-
holism, and not adequately trained to treat addiction, clinicians often feel 
powerless and resent addicts, seeing them as difficult patients, comor-
bid and non- compliant. They doubt that they are deserving of care, as 
they are patients who ‘don’t want to be saved’, whose relapses are to be 
expected due to lack of willpower (Garcia 2010; Hansen 2018, xiv, 16– 
18; Menéndez Spina and Di Pardo 1996). Both primary health care and 
private institutions (anexos) share this bias towards addiction as a self- 
inflicted condition, contributing to the construction of the addict body as 
undeserving, and to patients’ mistrust in medical (un)care.
The failure of primary care in San Dionisio, and Mexico in general, 
to tackle alcoholism is due to the structural limits of the facilities and 
to the adoption of the biomedical approach with its medicalised focus 
on the individual, rather than on the syndemics of alcoholism and other 
conditions. The fieldwork data I collected through interviews and par-
ticipant observation over the years also regularly highlight the distrust 
of the community towards medical care provided in the clinic. However, 
at the margins of the state, and in the cracks of the public health system, 
new forms of ‘care from below’ emerge.
Evangelicals and alcohol: Healing within the community
The development of new forms of care at the margins of the state has 
been described in post- colonial contexts as a consequence of neoliberal 
structural reforms and globalisation: the disengagement and failure of 
states in their duty of care towards citizens made them more depend-
ent on international funding, particularly by faith- based groups such 
as charismatic Pentecostal congregations (Dilger 2009). The globalisa-
tion of health care was favoured by the ‘social, economic, and spiritual 
uncertainties that have shaped people’s lives in the context of neoliberal 
reform processes and growing inequalities’ (Dilger 2009, 97), and this 
has also been the case for Mexico. From the periphery of the state, among 
the most marginalised groups, religious actors have come to assume 
state- like functions, coexisting with the health system of the nation 
and sometimes, as in San Dionisio, overshadowing and substituting it. 
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Moreover, when it comes to addiction, public health services work more 
as means of punitive containment than care, with the result of perpetuat-
ing, instead of breaking down, the cycle of addiction (Garcia 2010, 192). 
Responsibility for the care of the addicted poor is thus assumed by pri-
vate actors such as families and communities. From the lack of services, 
new opportunities emerge precisely ‘through experiences of loss, mar-
ginality and illegality’ (Garcia 2010, 194).
The arrival of Protestant congregations in Mexico dates back to the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but it was not until the 1950s that 
numbers started increasing across the nation. The Protestant population 
in San Dionisio was 5.12 per cent of the total in 1990; it had increased 
to 20.6 per cent by 2010, and it is currently 34.9 per cent (according to 
the 2020 Census, INEGI 2020), although there is a remarkable difference 
between the main centre (24.9 per cent) and the smaller settlement of 
Huamuchil (53.3 per cent). Four Protestant denominations are present, 
but Pentecostals are by far the most numerous groups. Addressing alco-
holism is not the reason why evangelism arrived in San Dionisio; nev-
ertheless, it is one of the main reasons for its successful trajectory. The 
efficacy of care provided by the hermanos (literally, ‘brothers’ – evangeli-
cals) lies in their capacity to effectively deal with alcohol problems, to the 
point that these, together with a number of diseases, are today the main 
reason why people choose to convert.
Avelino (not his real name) is a Sandionisian Pentecostal fisherman 
in his thirties, and a former alcoholic. My interview with him quickly 
took the form of a testimonio, a narrative style typical of evangelical con-
versions that the convert is expected to reiterate through public perfor-
mance. A religious framework is superimposed on to the illness narrative, 
so that this specific discourse practice contributes to reorient the illness 
experience in a Christian sense (Hardin 2018, 54). Testimonios design an 
‘arc of addiction’, from the mismatch to the alignment of the person with 
the Holy Spirit (Csordas 1994), highlighting the role of the divine inter-
vention in their personal history. The years lost to addiction and suffering 
are not meaningless; instead, they led the person to conversion, and are 
therefore part of a grander divine design (Hansen 2018, 61– 2).
Avelino’s testimonio begins by recalling how he was introduced to 
alcohol at a young age, for which he blames the local gender expecta-
tions regarding the performance of manhood. Like most Sandionisian 
males, his drinking worsened after marriage, when he started spending 
the money he earned working as a fisherman in the cantinas. Shortly 
after that, Avelino was hanging out with other alcoholics in the bars of 
Juchitán; often intoxicated for several days, he eventually separated 
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from his wife. At that point, he only worked to sustain his drinking habit, 
alternating weeks of work with days of binge drinking and visits to the 
city’s red- light district.
Eventually, Avelino stopped fishing and visiting the village at all. 
Penniless, he joined one of the city’s escuadrones de la muerte (‘death 
squads’), gangs of homeless alcoholics, and started engaging in petty 
crime and risky sexual behaviours. Under the leadership of the most 
violent among them, the members of the escuadrón ‘lived like broth-
ers’: forced to beg, sharing the little food they had, sleeping on the side-
walks of the market and drinking adulterated, cheap mezcal. Abandoned 
by his family, Avelino was looked at with disdain by the villagers who 
came to Juchitán to shop at the market, until a member of a Protestant 
congregation visited him to introduce him to the faith. Under the guid-
ance of the congregation, he briefly reunited with his wife and stopped 
drinking.
Like hundreds of thousands of Indigenous Oaxacans before them, 
the couple decided to migrate to the industrial city of Ciudad Juárez, on 
the Mexico– US border. Avelino easily found a job; however, the experi-
ence of migration further exposed him, as an Indigenous person with 
no kinship or social support, to precariousness, racism and isolation. 
Work without protective equipment in a food processing plant in Ciudad 
Juárez left him partially deaf, and at the time of our interview, he still 
could not afford a hearing aid. In the ‘North’, his drinking habit wors-
ened, and eventually led him to heavy drug use. Once again, he joined 
other addicts, begging and working irregular jobs to pay for alcohol and 
drugs. His family abandoned him and returned to San Dionisio. Sick and 
in pain, Avelino saw his friends die one after the other, and he was tor-
mented by terrifying voices and visions.
He was again approached by evangelicals, and again he left drink-
ing, returned to his family and tried to fit into a new life as a born- again 
Christian. However, the days of addiction and homelessness had caused 
lasting damage to his body, and Avelino was too weak and in pain to 
work. An hermano took him to fish on his boat, sharing with him the 
money they earned. Just as his faith grew stronger and his life seemed 
to be taking a turn for the better, his wife fell sick. A serious haemor-
rhage led to the discovery that she – and Avelino himself – were ill with 
AIDS. Their lack of money made it impossible for the couple to reach 
the hospital in Oaxaca, but Avelino kept praying, until divine help came 
in the form of a wealthy stranger who paid for an ambulance. In the 
hospital, the couple experienced first hand the structural violence of 
the national health- care system, inefficient and discriminatory against 
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people such as them: poor, Indigenous and with AIDS. Avelino, unable to 
pay for the transfusions and the expensive machinery that his dying wife 
needed, recalls how medical personnel took away her oxygen tank and 
discharged her:
The doctor said that they could not stop her haemorrhage, he said 
the virus had destroyed her defences. I was heartbroken and des-
perate, and then I received a revelation, something supernatural, in 
a dream. I was hopeless and wondered why we even got to Oaxaca, 
we were struggling and spending everything we had and there was 
nothing to do. That night I was spoken to, I was told that it would 
be the last night, that I would receive help. ’Cause I did not have 
any money left to buy platelets, I had nothing, nothing. I was told to 
go back to the blood bank tomorrow to get the last bag of platelets. 
Be strong, have faith, this will happen. I got up in the morning and 
told my wife that I had received a message, that she was going to 
get help, would have one last transfusion and would then be fine.
Motivated by this voice that urged him to have faith and to keep search-
ing, Avelino eventually found people who donated their blood and 
offered him money for his wife’s treatment, saving her life. When the cou-
ple returned to the village, Avelino’s faith was stronger than ever. Thanks 
to the assistance and monetary donations of the hermanos, he was able 
to overcome his wife’s sickness and physically recover. He definitively 
stopped drinking, and slowly went back to work to sustain his family, liv-
ing a new life with ‘a different conception, believing in God’, and ‘liv[ing] 
with faith, and this is how I could stop drinking forever’.
Like many HIV- infected migrants from rural areas, Avelino and his 
wife had been rejected by their families and had lost the support of their 
kinship networks. The congregation offered them monetary, but also 
moral, spiritual and psychological support. The couple forged new rela-
tions within the church, finding in the congregation a new ‘spiritual fam-
ily’, a system of support that could take the place of kinship networks, 
care for their material and emotional needs and mobilise resources 
quickly and efficiently (Dilger 2009). Detoxification can be accomplished 
by creating new forms of sociality that do not expose the convert to 
risky situations such as the Catholic fiestas through which kinship is re - 
affirmed and performed. While overlooked by the pasantes, alcohol 
abuse is a central concern for Sandionisian evangelicals, who are deeply 
aware of the ways in which local forms of sociality enable and mandate 
heavy consumption. They respond by providing a holistic form of care 
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that does not separate the biological, the social and the spiritual realms, 
consistently with the Huave health ideology.
However, and precisely because of the interdependence of 
these domains, the addict body is always vulnerable. The first failed 
detoxification- conversion of Avelino shows that health obtained through 
divine intervention can be definitive, but must be maintained through 
spiritual and bodily practices to perform within the congregation. 
Changes and obligations characterise the life of the former drinker: the 
convert would pay the tithe (diezmo), attend religious events (cultos), 
help spread the Gospel by organising public events (campañas de evan-
gelización), take part in collective fasts and prayers, and provide mate-
rial support to the hermanos in need through work, money or spiritual 
gifts. It is by submitting to God and the congregation that the individual 
regains agency and freedom, intended as a space and language to make 
new, non- conventional choices, such as removing oneself from the sys-
tem of festive obligations and expenses. Also, the frequency of mandated 
communitarian duties and mutual surveillance permit the early detec-
tion and care of relapses of recovering alcoholics.
Conclusions
The lack of out- patient structures and support for recovering addicts has 
been recognised as one of the major obstacles to the long- term success 
of detoxification programmes (Garcia 2010). This difficulty, ingrained in 
the medical treatment of addiction, is greater in peripheral places such 
as San Dionisio, where primary medical care is deficient and premised on 
the perpetuation of racial hierarchies between the rural, Indigenous and 
impoverished population, and the urban, middle- class, educated medical 
staff. The failure of the state in its role of health provider leaves space for 
the successful realisation of forms of collective care from below. These 
alternative forms of care emerge when illness and suffering are syndemic 
with poverty and discrimination, ‘rooted in the effects that globalisa-
tion and modernity are understood to have on local life- worlds’ (Dilger 
2007, 622).
The life of Avelino has been marked by a syndemic of alcoholism, 
poverty and marginalisation that led him to experience isolation, home-
lessness and migration. This clustering of diseases, disability and social 
problems has caused greater harm to his health and family than alcohol-
ism alone could have produced were he to live under different socio-
economic circumstances. His story is also the story of the failure of the 
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public health system: hard to reach, expensive to use, inefficient and bru-
tal with the most vulnerable members of society. His case, emblematic of 
the life trajectories of the former addicts I interviewed, shows how the 
success of Pentecostal churches lies in their capacity for building a com-
munity of care and their preparedness to tackle a number of problems 
and conditions that are inextricably entangled, such as addictions and 
infectious diseases, but also poverty and other ills of the social groups 
most affected by unequal modernisation.
Religious healing provides lifelong support to those who share 
the same experience of vulnerability. Care takes the form of mutual 
responsibility, as the members of the congregation care for one another 
in moments of endangerment and isolation (Garcia 2010, 203). Their 
church offers them a form of collective care that gives meaning to suf-
fering, in which everyone, and especially the addict, is deserving of 
care. Pentecostal healing configures itself as an ethics of care able to 
neutralise the alienation eminently linked with addiction (Garcia 2010, 
182) through the creation of new, strong social networks and restora-
tion of a sense of belonging. Since chronic illness is a symbolic bridge 
that connects body, self and society (Kleinman 1988, xiii), the efficacy of 
care depends on the adoption of a holistic approach that also takes into 
account the socioeconomic environment, inseparable from physical dis-
ease. This form of mutual care from below proposes a model of shared, 
collective responsibility in response to the hierarchical relations inherent 
to biomedicine, premised on the submission of the patient to the therapy 
prescribed by the clinician (compliance).
Intrinsic to Christianity is the faith in the possibility of salvation of 
all individuals upon conversion. While all humans are born into sin, their 
moral weakness does not make them less worthy of saving. Based on the 
acknowledgement of this shared human condition, evangelical healing 
of addiction is devoid of moral stigma, and care is offered to everyone. 
On the contrary, stigma towards alcoholics is perpetuated by a medical 
system that considers them difficult patients, undeserving of the little 
time and scant resources allocated to primary care in the rural milieu. 
Since the 1960s, medical understanding of addiction has been premised 
on the paradigm of a genetic and/ or environmental predisposition and 
on chronicity: addiction could not be treated, but only controlled and 
stabilised through ‘prostheses’ such as pharmacological and psycho-
logical therapy (Garcia 2010, 16; Hansen 2018, 16). The addicts would 
thus be condemned to remain hopelessly trapped in the system of unjust 
relations that produced their addiction in the first place. The temporal-
ity of alcoholism is chronicity, not only as chronic disease, but also as 
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embodiment of the suffering and social conditions of the drinker, and 
of a history of colonisation and alcoholisation (the endless recurrence of 
structural violence).
Examining evangelical healing of alcohol forces us to think in new 
terms about the entanglement of chronicity and care: through the lens 
of deservingness, it shows how chronicity can be shifted to healing itself. 
Religious conversion offers addicts a way out of the vicious cycle of chro-
nicity, as by breaking the curse of the chronic disease, alcoholism is no 
longer an unescapable destiny. A shift is produced from chronic disease 
to chronic healing: the recovering alcoholic must actively engage in the 
religious activities of his congregation, or else he could experience terri-
ble relapses. The addict can escape the ineluctability of his condition, as 
long as he is committed to a lifelong (chronic) healing process. No longer 
a victim of historical circumstances or genetic predisposition, he assumes 
an active role in shaping his own future.
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Notes
 1. The 2018 World Health Organization (WHO) Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health 
reports a per capita consumption of 11.1 litres of pure alcohol per year for males overall in 
Mexico, which rises to 19.7 litres among male drinkers. WHO figures sketch a multifaceted 
situation, with a minority (6.6 per cent) of Mexican men affected by alcohol use disorders or 
dependence, but also a high percentage (43.6 per cent) of men abstaining from consumption 
in the past 12 months (WHO 2018, 211).
 2. Data from the National Commission for Addictions and from the WHO (2018) Report; both 
report data from 2016.
 3. Disability is defined by the WHO (2021) as an umbrella term covering physical impairments, 
limitations on activity and restrictions in participation in life situations.
 4. Originated in the nineteenth century, cantinas are the emblems of traditional Mexican drink-
ing culture. With their rudimentary furnishing and sombre atmosphere, these rustic establish-
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 5. CONADIC is a federal agency within the Ministry of Health in charge of coordinating the pre-
vention and treatment of problems related to drugs, alcohol and tobacco. The CIJ network is 
a civil, semi- public association founded in 1969 and now managed by the Ministry of Health, 
constituted by a network of 106 out- patient centres for the prevention and treatment of addic-
tions, plus 11 residential facilities across the nation. In 2016, 2,423 new patients accessed the 
services provided by the CIJs.
 6. In 2016, 53,000 patients were treated at the UNEME- CAPA centres, 37.1 per cent of them for 
alcohol problems.
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When ‘care’ leads to ‘chronicity’:  
Exploring the changing contours 
of care of homeless people living 
on the streets in India
sudarshan r. kottai and shubha ranganathan
Recently, mental health policies and practices in India have increas-
ingly focused on the issue of homelessness. One of the objectives of 
the National Mental Health Policy 2014 (Government of India 2014) 
is increasing access to mental health services for homeless persons 
through inter- sectoral collaborations between government and non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs). Section 18 (7) of the Mental Health 
Care Act (Ministry of Law and Justice 2017, 10) states that:
Persons with mental illness living below the poverty line whether or 
not in possession of a below poverty line card, or who are destitute 
or homeless shall be entitled to mental health treatment and ser-
vices free of any charge and at no financial cost at all mental health 
establishments run or funded by the appropriate Government and 
at other mental health establishments designated by it.
Many mental health NGOs in India have been focusing on homelessness 
since the 1990s. As these NGOs originated as mental health NGOs, their 
emphasis has been on homelessness as a mental health problem. The fram-
ing of social issues such as homelessness as mental health issues is part of 
a broader tendency to ‘correct’ social deviancy by ‘treating’ it. In looking 
at how broader structural issues are increasingly medicalised into mental 
health issues, Mills (2014) draws on examples from mental health NGOs 
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working on complex issues such as homelessness and farmers’ suicides. 
She describes how these come to be framed as psychiatric problems, where 
free medicine and its compliance are prioritised, rather than the structural 
bases of suffering. Mills also illustrates how this is part of a broader global 
mental health agenda, one that has invited widespread criticisms (Jacob 
2016; Summerfield 2012). Importantly, scholars have argued that the 
approach of the Movement for Global Mental Health of paying exclusive 
attention to psychiatric categories shifts focus away from the structural 
determinants of health (Whitley 2015) that shape global health disparities. 
In this context, increased diagnosis of mental disorders in homeless people 
is being viewed with extreme concern (Christensen 2009; Dej 2016).
Homelessness, mental health care and chronicity
While the link between homelessness and mental illness cannot be 
denied, research has critiqued the representation of mental illness as 
the primary cause of homelessness (Johnson and Chamberlain 2011; 
see also Sullivan et al. 2000). Pointing to the dangers of psychocentrism, 
Dej (2016, 118) argues that the homeless industry in the contemporary 
neoliberal era frames homeless individuals as mentally ill and induces 
them to be responsible for their ‘varied experiences of social inequality’. 
Ravenhill (2003) finds that a ‘homeless culture’ is often produced by a 
variety of pull factors, such as the need for friendship and acceptance, 
or a pseudo- family, or gaining approval for a drinking/ drug habit, that 
draw people to see homelessness as the solution to their problems.
However, when homelessness is medicalised, it becomes framed as 
an individual’s problem, rather than a social problem rooted in broader 
political- economic structure (Etter 2012). Cohen and Thompson (1992) 
exhort psychiatrists to collaborate with other social scientists in address-
ing social problems related to homelessness. Marginalised people who 
deviate from the ‘normal’ always confront the ‘obligation to recover’ 
(Rose 2011). In this context, care interventions are closely tied up with 
the politics of deservingness.
In the biomedical model of psychosocial disability, care is mostly 
contingent on the course of illness – acute and chronic. Chronic ill-
nesses require lifelong care and regular medicine compliance. However, 
‘chronicity’ need not be linear or disease- driven, but is often shaped 
by chronic sociopolitical and structural conditions which mitigate or 
aggravate a ‘chronic’ medical condition (Manderson and Smith- Morris 
2010; Manderson and Warren 2016; Whyte 2012). ‘The associated 
 
whEn ‘CArE ’  LEADs to ‘ChroniCitY ’ 155
  
representation of conditions as either/ or, patterned predictably on “nat-
ural history of disease,” denies the fluidity of life states that are simulta-
neously biological and social’ (Manderson and Smith- Morris 2010, 3). 
Manderson and Warren’s (2016) reference to syndemic suffering high-
lights how structural vulnerability and precarity predict the chronicity 
of non- communicable diseases and their recursivity. This creates new 
avenues to think about ‘risk’ away from the biomedical conceptualisation 
of chronicity that frames it in terms of temporality (life cycle). Writing on 
chronic identities in mental illness, von Peter (2013, 49) takes cues from 
Bruno Latour to ‘think the world through connections’ of the material 
and social world, rather than fitting people into distinct categories such 
as ‘chronic’, so that we see the ebb and flow of chronicity and identity. He 
cautions that biomedical ‘classifications evolve into “master narratives”, 
influencing patients’ expectations and (self- )evaluations as well as those 
of their surroundings’ (von Peter 2013, 49). As outlined in the introduc-
tion to this volume, for us ‘chronicity’ is thus as much related to chronic 
conditions of living, chronic social inequalities and structural violence as 
it is to biomedical factors.
The transactional nature of care also produces power relation-
ships and inequalities (Bradley and Kennedy 2017). Kittay (1999) cau-
tions that all of us are dependent on each other owing to the fragility of 
our bodies, a situation that she refers to as ‘nested dependencies’. Visse 
(2017) writes about the negotiations between dependency and auton-
omy, and vulnerability and strength, involved in trusting relationships.
Drawing on these debates, and on fieldwork data, this chapter illus-
trates how the texture of care alters when particularities of deservingness 
are attached to an especially vulnerable category: people living on the 
streets. We explore how a complex social problem such as homelessness 
is managed by NGOs running a community mental health programme ‘on 
the ground’. When care is articulated within a biopsychiatric paradigm that 
uses a decontextualised and reductionist approach, it results in increased 
vulnerabilities for the cared- for. Mainstream biomedical psychiatry almost 
always fails to ‘recognise a physiological body which is inextricable from 
the imagined and lived body, the body which carries a person through 
space and time’ (Mattingly 1998, 22). Following these contentions, we 
specifically look at how NGOs conceptualise the ‘homeless mentally ill’, 
and differentiate ‘homeless mentally ill’ persons from ‘homeless’ persons 
along the chronicity narrative. Yet narratives of street dwellers and social 
workers challenge strict biomedical definitions of chronicity. Leading from 
this, this chapter argues that care and chronicity get embroiled in complex 
ways when dealing with mental health care for the homeless.
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Street beats: Differentiating the ‘homeless’ and the 
‘homeless mentally ill’
An ethnographic study of community mental health services run by 
two prominent mental health NGOs was conducted in 2017. Fieldwork 
was conducted at Shanthi in Kolkata city (West Bengal) and Mondip in 
Assam. These are pioneer NGOs set up expressly for the care of ‘homeless 
mentally ill’ persons, and they have won national awards for their work. 
We attended daily ‘street beats’ by social workers and weekly mobile 
street consultations by psychiatrists, observed the clinical interactions of 
mental health professionals and social workers with people living on the 
streets, and interviewed the shopkeepers designated as caregivers by the 
NGOs and police officers. To protect the identities of the NGOs and par-
ticipants, we employ pseudonyms.
The care work of the NGO starts by differentiating the ‘homeless 
mentally ill’1 from the ‘homeless’ population, as the NGO workers put it. 
A typical day at Shanthi, Kolkata begins at around 10 a.m. on weekdays, 
when trained social workers2 (many without a degree in psychology or 
social work) hailing from the city converge at the office. After reporting 
to the project head and completing documentation, by 11 a.m., the social 
workers are set for street beats in their designated areas. They make sure 
to carry medicines that are to be given to their ‘patients’, as well as food 
packets containing two rotis3 each. During street beats, social workers 
traverse their designated area on foot on the busy city streets in search 
of ‘homeless mentally ill’ persons to be identified and inducted. A female 
social worker trained by Shanthi spoke about the process of identification 
of the ‘homeless mentally ill’: ‘We can identify mental illness by just talk-
ing to them. They would be unkempt, untidy, irrelevant and incoherent 
in speech. Primary symptom of mental illness is wandering behaviour.’ 
Shanthi collaborates closely with police in the training, identification and 
rehabilitation of homeless mentally ill persons. When we interviewed the 
officer in charge of the police station which houses the drop- in centre for 
homeless mentally ill persons – the first police station in India to do so – 
he confidently asserted that ‘anyone can identify a mentally ill person’. 
He went on to elaborate:
A person who is not in a position to take decisions on their own, and 
who does not talk normally is mentally ill. If we ask their names, 
they would respond with a different answer. Eating habit would not 
be normal. The way they have food is different from us. They will 
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For the sub- inspector of police, identification of mental illness was even 
easier, as he remarked, ‘We understand that a person is mentally ill when 
his speech and behaviour is different.’ His remark can be read along the 
lines of commonsensical ways of equating homeless people in India with 
the deviant and the different – the errant, the mad, the wandering sack-
cloth man or woman denounced as illegal and breaching the ‘normal’ 
life of the public spaces.4 But in many cases, this quick identification is 
flawed, as the presentation of a self marked by untidiness and lack of 
self- care serves vital lifesaving/ self- care functions for people living on 
the streets. ‘Sexual and physical abuse are uncommon, as they are very 
untidy while on the streets,’ a social worker remarked.
Social workers informed us that the assistance of the police is used 
if the person does not yield to their persuasive attempts at rescue. An 
excerpt from a case file highlights the point:
[Dhanjit] was seen loitering around Paltan Bazaar area [Guwahati 
city] by our rescue team members. They immediately approached 
him and started talking to him. However, he couldn’t be convinced 
to get inside the van. So one of our team members approached a 
policeman in the locality. When the police told him to get inside 
the vehicle, he immediately entered. Then rescue [team] brought 
him to the shelter and admitted him for further necessary psycho-
social inputs.
Another excerpt from a case file describes a different rescue pro-
cess: ‘Rescue van stopped nearby [the street dweller] and observed his 
behaviour for some time and found that he has symptoms of mental ill-
ness, and he was brought to shelter home.’ Such instantaneous diagno-
sis and identification of mental illness by the social workers reflect what 
Rose (1998) calls ‘governing at a distance’, which relates to risk- thinking 
in contemporary psychiatry. It is the new way of working in terms of risk 
assessment and risk management strategies,5 which shapes the conduct 
and types of judgement in which mental health professionals engage. 
The NGOs and the state collaborate to provide the rescued person with 
Aadhar identity cards,6 which fix the identity of the person in a 12- digit 
number. Acquiring government documents such as a ration card and a 
voter identity card entitles them to state- sponsored welfare benefits, but 
these are contingent upon the state ‘knowing’7 the person. This, in turn, 
also enables the state to control their identities and movement across 
time and space. The director of the NGO told us that their relationship 
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all our programmes are housed in government buildings. They gave us an 
ambulance, and the cost of running it is borne by us.’ Hence, the NGO acts 
as an extended arm of the state, partially fulfilling the state’s pursuit of 
proof (Sriraman 2018) in keeping people under surveillance. Thus, self- 
identification as a homeless person, without a home that has been reg-
istered in a census, ‘obliterate[s] constitutional identity’ (Chandrachud 
2018, 480), denying fundamental rights.8
The social workers are mostly drawn from non- mental health dis-
ciplinary backgrounds, often with minimum general education. After 
recruitment based on interviews, social workers are trained by psychia-
trists and psychologists in basic psychopathology and identification of 
symptoms of mental illness, using psychiatric rating scales. Over time, 
psychiatric terms enter into their language repertoire, and their confi-
dence in diagnosing mental illness increases, thanks to hands- on mentor-
ing by mental health professionals: ‘We can identify homeless mentally 
ill, as they are filthy, keep silent, mutter to self, don’t talk to anyone and 
nod their head. We gather information about them from the surrounding 
community’ (male social worker).9
Prachanda, a 53- year- old man, was ‘rescued’ from the street by 
the social workers at Mondip in Assam and brought to the shelter home 
for homeless mentally ill people. He was pleading with everyone to 
release him. Despite repeated attempts, his requests fell on stony ground. 
Finally, he chose to communicate with us to express his complaint, and 
his requests to the authorities, because the workers at the shelter nei-
ther paid attention to what he wanted to say nor met him as he wished. 
The shelter reminded us of the ‘total institutions’ that Goffman (1961) 
described: a closed system with rigid boundaries of communication 
between inmates and staff, where every aspect of a resident’s life is con-
trolled. The inmates are lodged inside a pavilion, a long building having 
a bed capacity of 40. The pavilion is fenced on the front side. Cots are 
spread out for the inmates inside, with beds similar to those in hospi-
tals. In summer, the hot air simultaneously blows up from the concrete 
ground and descends from the tin roof. The plastic coating of the bed 
makes it even more uncomfortable without a bedspread and fan during 
summer. A foul smell pervades the pavilion due to bad maintenance of 
lavatories. The inmates are locked inside the pavilion for most of the day 
except during designated times for food, exercise, yoga and work. The 
shelter has a structured daily routine governing when to wake up, when 
to bathe and when to eat. Forbidden from any social interactions of their 
own will, residents undergo ‘disciplining’ of their bodies (forced haircut, 
uniform, restriction on movement).
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Prachanda was dolorous when he spoke to us as we stood face to 
face leaning against the iron fence:
We are poor people from Nepal. We don’t have electricity in our 
home. I don’t have a telephone in my home to inform my family 
that I am alive. I have a disabled son aged 25 years; another one of 
my sons expired at the age of 25. His wife and children are being 
looked after by me. My life has been a very difficult journey; I am 
the only support for my family.
When asked how and why he was found on the streets, he explained:
I worked as a cleaner in a lorry for 15 days, and since I asked for 
my salary, I was deserted by the driver. I was searching for the rail-
way station. I was hungry and thirsty. That is when these people 
came and took my photo. They told me that they would give me 
food, and so I consented to come along with them here. Now I am 
not being released. Why do they do this? I want to go home; my 
grandchildren would die of starvation without me. The authori-
ties talked to me only once. Some say I will be freed in two or 
three days; some say it will take one month; others say one week. 
Someone said I would be released after the rains stop. And the res-
idents here say that I will have to stay here life- long, just like them. 
I am not able to sleep properly due to worries about my home and 
my grandchildren – they are so small, 10 and 11 years old [cries 
inconsolably].
Prachanda ended up staying in the shelter home for more than three 
weeks, just because he was found roaming the street in a dishevelled 
state – a blatant violation of human rights. Rose (1998, 179) draws atten-
tion to the role of community psychiatry in governing ‘risky’ individuals:
With the emergence of community as the new territory upon which 
psychiatry must work, asylum walls no longer mark a simple and 
fixed distinction between those within and without the psychiat-
ric system. A complex institutional topography of community has 
emerged: out- patient clinics, open wards, day hospitals, sheltered 
housing, community psychiatric nurses, and so forth. The task for 
psychiatric professionals is now less therapeutic than administra-
tive: administering problematic persons on this complex terrain in 
an attempt to control their future conduct. It is through the notion 
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of risk, and the techniques and practices to which it is linked, that 
care and control have become inextricably linked in the community.
The psychiatric gaze failed to acknowledge the struggles that Prachanda 
has endured throughout his life, including the most temporally valid 
one: a dispute with his employer. For the staff, inmates are simply ‘men-
tally ill’ people to be charitably treated. The programme officer told us 
that their main aim was to create awareness that people who are ‘men-
tally ill’ are not always violent, as they seem to be, for they are prone to 
physical abuse as a consequence of any transgressive/ aggressive behav-
ior. According to the shelter coordinator, 80 per cent of referrals come 
from the police; other referrals come from community members when 
people are seen in vulnerable states. The director termed it not only a 
mental health issue, but also a health risk (alluding to the high risk of 
HIV/ AIDS, dehydration and tuberculosis) and a human rights issue; ‘It 
is also a law and order issue, as there is a Vagrancy Act in force which 
empowers police to arrest and lodge them in a vagrants’ home. These 
people don’t have an identity too.’ Thus, the NGO situates its work pri-
marily within development logics of welfare and rehabilitation.
The caregiver who was part of the team who ‘identified’ Prachanda 
on the streets spoke about his experience of dealing with the ‘homeless 
mentally ill’ for the past four years:
Some patients speak a lot; some don’t speak at all, even if we per-
suade them. They are mentally ill. They have homes, but they roam 
on the streets; they don’t know what they are doing; they even eat 
from the dustbin. Beggars don’t eat from the dustbin, but mentally 
ill people do.
The caregiver’s narrative brings to the fore how psychosocial disability 
is stigmatised more than poverty. Also, the spontaneity on the part of 
the mental health workers in identifying the ‘mentally ill’ reinforces the 
idea that mental health disciplines have a set of algorithms to identify/ 
diagnose psychosocial disabilities,10 analogous to diagnostic tests used 
in other medical disciplines. Lack of recognition of the fact that human 
experiences are diverse, and that psychiatry cannot be like cardiology, 
has enormous repercussions for care- receivers, as Prachanda’s case illus-
trates. This case also evidences the absence of intersectoral collabora-
tion in the Community Mental Health Programme for finding solutions 
to Prachanda’s problems. Davar (2012) reminds us that social position, 
gender and mental distress are co- determined. Dhanda (2000) draws 
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attention to the infringement of legal capacity of persons with psycho-
social disability, as mental illness remains a medicalised field overdeter-
mined by law.
Medicines and employment as the mainstays of ‘care’
The initial contact and rapport built by providing food to the street dwell-
ers become the conduit for providing psychiatric care by administering 
medicines, either with or without the person’s knowledge. The medicines 
administered were haloperdidol, amisulpride, clozapine (antipsychot-
ics), fluoxetine (an antidepressant), sodium valproate (a mood stabi-
liser) and Parkin (an anticholinergic medicine used to treat side effects 
of psychopharmaceuticals). The following anecdote throws light on the 
prioritisation of medicines by the psychiatrist at Shanthi:
This programme is for those who beg on the pavements, for whom 
there is none to look after. So we decided that medical help can be 
given at the place of their stay. We thought of sensitising the peo-
ple about this issue. Community is already giving them food and 
clothes. Medicines also need to be given. Building rapport with the 
community is paramount. We have been successful in this attempt. 
If patients resist medicines, we go for covert medication11 with the 
help of caregivers.
The social worker also chiefly ‘prescribes’ medicines:
We meet them [people living on the streets] every day, build rap-
port, after which they take [medicines] on their own. One of my 
patients didn’t take medicines from me. I tried to persuade him, 
but in vain. One day I asked him what he wants. He replied bhujiya 
[a north Indian snack]. The next day, I brought it for him. Now he 
takes medicines daily from me.
Medicines are represented as good things by the social worker when 
people complain about side effects: ‘When I tell Binoy with love, he will 
take medicine. Side effects do happen, but medicines will not harm. 
We provide medicines and counselling on the street and, later, voca-
tional rehabilitation and resettlement’ (male social worker). Social 
workers do admit that medicines can cause side effects, but they are 
obliged to administer the medicines on time as part of their assigned 
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care work. A social worker was teary eyed when he said: ‘When I am 
on leave, I remember my patients. I worry about whether they have 
taken medicines.’ Due to the overwhelming task of medicine adminis-
tration,12 and its careful documentation, they equate the core of their 
work with davai khilana (feeding medicines) and ensuring compliance 
with this. In this way, caregivers move from ‘feeding food’ to ‘feeding 
medicines’, quite like the psychiatrists in Kolkata, who equated drugs 
with food, utilising the Bengali cultural connotations about belly and 
food (Ecks 2014).
After administering medicines, the priority of the NGO shifts to find-
ing employment for the client. Life without labour is unacceptable, and 
vagrancy is a crime according to the colonial Vagrancy Act 183813 and 
Indian Penal Code Section 283 (danger or obstruction in public way or 
line of navigation). The persistence of coloniality in contemporary, post- 
independence India is indicated by the dominance of biomedicine over 
Indigenous healing practices, the seepage of English psychiatric nomen-
clature among laypersons (Mills 2014) and the realignment of Indian 
systems of medicine such as Ayurveda with the dominant allopathic 
systems (Lang 2017).14 Scholars working on development aid organisa-
tions in the Global South have written critically about how development 
programmes in the Global South, often drawing on international funding 
or international support, become extensions of colonisation, leading to 
a continuing of colonisation in the contemporary (for example, Escobar 
1995; Grech 2015). Escobar (1995, 13) presses on the need for ‘local eth-
nographies of development and modernity’. Working on disability in the 
Global South, Grech (2015, 20) invites attention to ‘development’s own 
disabling practices, including the fact that it remains a source of much 
impairment, for example through displacement, industrial practices and 
environmental degradation’.
The obligation to work and earn is another form of social pressure 
that street dwellers face, just like any other modern neoliberal citizen. 
Psychiatry, like the state, is disturbed not only by deviant behaviour, but 
also by the unproductiveness of the lazy street dweller, who ‘eats with-
out doing any work’. The NGO strives to employ ‘patients’ with their 
shopkeeper- caregivers, for some sort of menial work, mostly cleaning 
vessels and drawing water from wells in restaurants. They are often over-
worked and underpaid, and they have to endure side effects, forced labour 
and subjugation silently without proper food and wages. Other aspects 
of their lives beyond medicine compliance and work are neglected. This 
shows an assemblage between disparate actors – the state, NGOs, mental 
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society) – who work together to silence the voices of ‘homeless mentally 
ill’ people.
Non-compliance triggers frictions in the relationship between pro-
viders and users. In an ethnography of a government- run community 
mental health programme in north India, Jain and Jadhav (2009, 71) 
explain that:
patients who do not visit the clinic or are non- compliant with 
medication were viewed as ‘irresponsible’ (rural, uneducated) 
as opposed to the ‘responsible’ (urban, educated) professional. 
Conversely, clinicians view patients’ non- compliance as antitheti-
cal to progress and advancement, construing patients as backward, 
uneducated, and irresponsible.
Whyte et al. (2002) talk about the ambiguity of psychopharmacy, where 
it suppresses disturbing symptoms but produces disastrous side effects of 
varying nature – pills make illnesses (Whitaker 2011). Breggin (2007) 
describes deactivation syndrome, referring to the reduction in the inten-
sity of psychotic symptoms by medicines, along with the diminishing 
of other physical and emotional functions integral to mental activity. 
Applbaum (2015) argues that side effects and withdrawal syndromes 
have not received sufficient attention in clinical research.
While on a field visit, a social worker gave two rotis to an older man 
who was dozing off due to the side effect of medicines. He was found 
tired and sleeping, with swollen eyes and slurred speech. He was unable 
to drink water from a tumbler due to hand tremors. It seemed to be an 
effort for him even to open his eyes. We asked the social worker how the 
man got food:
Social Worker: He gets it from the shop.
Researcher: Does he need to pay for it?
[The social worker had no answer and was confused.]
Social worker to ‘patient’: Do you get food from the shop?
[The ‘patient’ nodded his head affirmatively.]
Social worker: He is taking medicines; that is why he sleeps.
Two weeks before, while on a doctor’s visit, the man was so drained, 
sleepy and emaciated that the psychiatrist had prescribed multivitamins, 
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oral rehydration solution and antibiotics. The side effects incapaci-
tate him, preventing him from begging and fetching food, because he 
dozes off.
When concern was raised about side effects of medicines, the 
Assistant Director of the NGO replied that it is a necessary evil. The sen-
ior psychiatrist was in agreement:
There are side effects for medicines, and risks can’t be taken. We 
try to give medicines in low dosage. But that doesn’t mean that we 
always prefer low dosage or give medicines only once a day. These 
matters are decided after taking feedback from the social worker 
and community caregivers.
As mentioned above, after administering medicines, the priority of the 
NGO shifts to employing the client with the shopkeeper for some sort of 
menial work. The whole dynamic of the shopkeeper– street dweller rela-
tionship shifted with the advent of the NGO, as shopkeepers were trans-
formed from individuals who expressed their primordial affinity with 
fellow beings living on the streets, into official overseers of medication 
and employers for the ‘homeless mentally ill’. A weak welfare state thus 
tasks the ‘productive’ members of society to take care of ‘non- productive’ 
members, mediating action through the NGO and various other actors 
in precarious and yet capillary chains of ‘care’ that assume a hierarchical 
structure. Talking about the dispersal of development activities among 
NGOs, donors, informal institutions, social entrepreneurs and the private 
sector, Mosse (2013, 236) comments: ‘In the age of neoliberal reform, 
the terms weak state, fragile state, crisis state, and collapsed state are 
especially prominent in the development policy lexicon.’
Once, when the ambulance stopped at a shop where a patient was 
working, he continued doing work even after he saw us, fearing repri-
mand from the shopkeeper for interrupting work. He stopped work only 
when the shopkeeper called him. When the social worker gave him two 
rotis, he ate them at once, standing, holding them in one hand, bearing a 
large vessel for carrying water in the other hand. When we broached the 
issue of exploitation, the psychiatrist maintained that it is a reality: ‘In 
the name of caregiving, there is also exploitation – they are made to 
work a lot without adequate pay. He gets food very late. The hotel owner 
gives him food at the end [after all the tasks].’ In another instance, a 
social worker explained: ‘Those who are employed get to have food only 
while they clean vessels, as they have to work continuously with mini-
mal wages. When I tell the employers about this, they say that they are 
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giving food and shelter.’ However, the same psychiatrist complained 
that the caregiver was not forcing the patient to take medicines: ‘Both 
the caregiver and patient are having conflict. Caregiver doesn’t want to 
give medicines to him.’ While on the streets, medicines are fed without a 
break by the caregiver- shopkeepers; once the person is employed under 
them, the caregiver- shopkeepers stop giving medicines, or taper the dos-
age, as the side effects badly affect the work of the street dweller.
A social worker commented on the lives of street dwellers: ‘If they 
maintain hygiene, nobody will offer them money; they have to get up, 
work and earn money to get food. They want to earn maximum with 
minimum effort.’ In this rendering, the social worker acts as an agent of 
psychiatric capitalism15 by ‘labeling as deviant those who defy or chal-
lenge the prevailing capitalist socioeconomic formation. The homeless 
defy and challenge by their mere existence, their mere presence’ (Wilson 
2018, 7). Writing on capitalist commodification of homeless people, 
where value is extracted from deviancy, Wilson (2018) expands her 
argument by saying that capitalism commodifies not only the proletariat, 
but also those who are unpredictably un/ employed, such as people living 
on the streets. We do not deny the importance of good psychiatric care 
for those who need it, which can lead to a resumption of social roles and 
respect. Judicious use of medicines on a case- by- case basis by sensitive 
psychiatrists is beneficial. Our concern has more to do with essentialised 
assumptions that medical treatment is automatically equivalent to ‘care’, 
a point on which we elaborate later.
Chronic illness or chronic suffering? Medical, social and 
experiential understandings of homelessness
While social workers are aware of the everyday struggles and lived expe-
riences of the street dwellers, with training received from the mental 
health professionals from the NGOs, they begin to develop a ‘psychiatric 
eye’ for ‘symptoms’ exhibited by street dwellers. The following excerpts 
illustrate the discordance between the perspectives of social workers 
and mental health professionals regarding homelessness and/ or mental 
illness:
They have become homeless due to the extreme pain that they 
have suffered in their lives. Muzammil was so poor that he didn’t 
get enough food to eat during childhood, due to which he started 
stealing fish and crops in the field. He went to Delhi and worked 
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as a rickshaw puller, but he was not given salary. He was married, 
but he was not happy in that relationship. He didn’t get satisfaction 
from anything in life. Due to all these problems, he got schizophre-
nia. Now he has property disputes with his brother. I have seen that 
trauma is linked to relationships. Mental illness does not develop 
out of thin air. Some are unable to tolerate these stresses, and they 
become mentally ill. (Male social worker)
The most senior psychiatrist’s explanation of homelessness, however, 
took a more medical perspective:
Homelessness happens because they become mentally ill and leave 
home. I have not seen cases the other way, where homelessness 
leads to mental illness. Once a person in a low socioeconomic status 
becomes ill, their family is unable to take care of them and bear the 
cost of treatment. The patient also becomes uncooperative due to 
the disease process. They also stop medicines, leading to relapses. 
Proper treatment is not given, so problems become chronic. For 
those who don’t even get one square meal a day, mental health is 
not a priority for them – surviving from day to day is more impor-
tant. Genetic predisposition is also a reason.
Homelessness is as complex as any other social problem in India. Our 
participants had histories of immense trauma, mainly regarding family 
conflicts, property disputes, domestic violence, poverty, migration for 
work, sex trafficking and elder abuse. Many of them had homes in the 
vicinity but still preferred to live on the streets, demonstrating the fact 
that, for some people, a home with a roof is more traumatic than a home 
without a roof. Many were disturbed when asked about their families. 
Many responded with memories of torture and conflicts at home, which 
propelled them to leave. The following narratives by street dwellers 
reveal their negotiations between home and the streets:
I am not attached to family at my home. I am not close to anyone at 
home. I am being sent back home. I had to discontinue my educa-
tion in 3rd class due to poverty. Life is hopeless. (Shankar, male, 55)
My father and mother passed away. Wife too died of cancer. I was 
working as a security guard after reaching here. I used to be tor-
tured by hooligans because I did my job sincerely. Everything was 
stolen from me. (Debnath, male, 50)
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These accounts attest that many people have assimilated the identity of 
being a street dweller. For Shiva, being in self- exile through homeless-
ness is a response to his existential crisis.16 For Bichitra, however, it is 
hard to get along without a home after it was trampled by elephants, an 
instance of recurring stories of human– animal conflicts in Assam.
The contrast in perspectives among the various actors raises the 
question of what is chronicity – chronic suffering or chronic illness? On 
the one hand, mental health discourse is bombarded with the ‘chronicity’ 
narrative and the need for lifelong ‘care’. On the other hand, in the light 
of the increased commodification of health- care practices and declining 
welfare states, increasing social inequalities have complicated the easy 
distinction between chronic and acute conditions. Examining India’s dis-
turbing socioeconomic realities shows that it performs poorly on various 
development indicators17 related to health, gender commitment, envi-
ronmental performance, democracy and equality.
A study of homeless people in Australia found that the widely held 
belief that homeless people have mental health issues and that men-
tal illness is a primary cause of homelessness is flawed (Johnson and 
Chamberlain 2011). Another study concluded that mental illness is only 
one of several vulnerabilities, along with childhood histories of family 
instability, violence, and economic and social disadvantage. Those who 
became homeless before becoming mentally ill have the highest levels of 
disadvantage and disruption (Sullivan et al. 2000). Cohen and Thompson 
(1992, 817) argue that ‘the conceptual dichotomy between homeless 
persons with and without mental illness is largely illusory’. The increas-
ing gap between rich and poor, and other sociopolitical shifts, contribute 
to homelessness across all groups, regardless of mental illness. As social 
workers from diverse backgrounds are trained by mental health experts, 
their focus shifts from the sociopolitical contexts of homelessness to 
signs, symptoms and diagnosis of mental illness. For social workers, their 
experiential knowledge becomes invalid, and the knowledge acquired 
from professionals becomes valid and actionable. As a result, they fail to 
acknowledge the strategies that people use to live on the streets, which 
almost always mimic ‘mental illness’.
Caregiver– social worker alliance: ‘Chronicity’ as the 
ground for care
As critical stakeholders in the care of people living on the streets, shop-




MAnAging ChroniCitY in unEquAL stAtEs168
  
regular supply of medicines to the street dwellers under their care. The 
role of the shopkeeper- caregiver becomes central, since most of the street 
dwellers do not take medicines provided by the social worker except 
when given by caregivers. The local caregiver community in Kolkata, who 
unconditionally fed and clothed the street dwellers before the coming of 
the NGO, typically have small shops that line the busy streets of Kolkata. 
The NGO workers were vocal about the shopkeeper community’s pivotal 
role, which sustains their community mental health programme. The 
director said: ‘It is each shopkeeper who helps us, and we believe that 
philanthropy can also be done by the poor like the rich.’ For the shop-
keepers, social workers are ‘educated experts’ on a noble mission. They 
listen to the social workers’ advice carefully with reverence, as they see 
them as the executive arm of the psychiatrist who visits once a week. 
Questions are rarely asked, and clarifications are very rarely sought. The 
very visit of the doctor to the streets is seen as an extraordinary gesture of 
care, which should be deeply appreciated. Local people strive to help the 
team in this ‘humanitarian’ mission by following the instructions of the 
experts. The social workers explained their care work involving the care-
givers: ‘If there is resistance to take medicine, we find out from where 
s/ he gets food. We approach those caregivers and ask them to mix medi-
cine in food and give.’
Caregivers are instructed to administer medicines by hook or by 
crook. There is no discussion about side effects of medicines, or the need 
to identify side effects and report them. One of the caregivers thought 
that medicines were not good for the street dweller, and that he was 
entirely all right. The social worker spent about an hour convincing the 
‘erring’ caregiver that mental illness is incurable and requires lifelong 
management with medicines. As the social worker failed to convince 
the caregiver, he asked the street dweller to swallow medicines without 
water. His mouth was inspected to ensure that the tablet was ingested. 
The social trauma which defined the homeless person for the layperson- 
social worker was divorced from the ‘illness’ from which he is suffering.
The chronicity narrative is pervasive among mental health profes-
sionals. Beyond the right to free medicines and to employment (often 
exploitative bonded labour), their lives revolve around the priorities set 
for them by the NGO. The perspective that mental distress is something 
chronic requiring a standardised protocol for rehabilitation is directly 
lifted from training programmes imparted by the mental health profes-
sionals. Attributing ‘lifelong’ temporality to individual deficiencies alone 
fails to acknowledge the situated, shifting and ephemeral nature of 
‘chronic’ beings (von Peter 2013). Studying heterogeneity in the course 
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of schizophrenia in Indonesia, Good et al. (2010) argue that chronicity 
is not inevitable for psychotic illness. The chronicity narrative of mental 
illness acts as political grounds for psychiatry to obliterate social struc-
tures and institutions, legal violence and human rights violations, and to 
replace it with a straightforward brain- based disease narrative of mental 
illness.
The caregivers and social workers collaborated in persuading and 
insisting that street dwellers take medicines regularly, reducing care - 
giving to medicine- giving. One major emphasis of treatment is work: 
employing the person in some form of occupation and reintegrating 
them with their families. Until the person is employed, shopkeepers 
aligned with social workers in imposing medicine compliance without 
concern about the complaints of side effects expressed by street dwellers. 
When street dwellers tried their level best to voice their troubles with 
medicines, the caregiver- shopkeeper joined the social worker in silencing 
them. However, once they were employed, side effects disrupted their 
work, which pushed shopkeepers to taper off the medicines, or to align 
with the street dweller in voicing concerns about the side effects. Hence, 
the tension between medicine compliance and the need to become ‘active’ 
and productive members of society ensues only after their employment 
with the shopkeepers.
This realignment of the street dweller– shopkeeper relationship 
into that of a caregiver– care receiver one disrupts their shared con-
sciousness. Ironically, once the shopkeeper becomes defined by the NGO 
as a ‘caregiver’, we see the transformation of organic, spontaneous and 
individually tailored care into the adoption of routinised and standard-
ised protocols of medical treatment. As highlighted in the Introduction 
to this volume, Mol’s (2008) insightful analysis of ‘tinkering’, that is, 
constantly making adjustments and modifications based on individual 
requirements, is crucial to the concept of ‘care’. While these carers pre-
viously used to spontaneously provide food, water and refuge to the 
homeless, after the entry of the NGO, their focus shifted from ‘care’ to 
‘treatment’ of mental illness, primarily through psychiatric medicines. 
Medicines now become the sine qua non for the street dweller, and the 
local carers, in effect, become the official medicine overseers. Mental 
illness thus becomes a means of social control. When street dwellers are 
left medicated on the streets without adequate medical monitoring, side 
effects disable their capacity to fetch food and to carry on daily activities 
as before. After administering medicines, the shopkeepers play fast and 
loose with the provisioning of food, as ‘patients’ are now found asleep 
when they happen to offer food, and thus go hungry. Those who used 
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to work or beg are now out of this routine due to the side effects. This 
increases the dependency of the street dwellers on everyone, including 
the NGO, which adds to their perceived ‘chronicity’, further compound-
ing the need for ‘care’. Yet this ‘care’ has now become ‘medicalised care’, 
because the NGO responds with psychiatric medicines interspersed with 
multivitamins and oral rehydration solution. Thus, the texture of care 
alters when particularities of deservingness are attached to the espe-
cially vulnerable category of people living on the streets. When care is 
articulated in a biomedical paradigm of mental illness, and relayed to 
the cared- for through community social workers and lay shopkeepers, it 
results in increased vulnerabilities for the cared- for. Care and chronicity 
need to be rethought critically as modern forms of biopolitical surveil-
lance to sanitise the different and the deviant, sugarcoating the larger 
violations of the modernising state.
Conclusion
This chapter has critically examined the role of psychiatry in restraining 
people living on the streets both physically and chemically, often with 
questionable effects. As we have demonstrated, homelessness is not just 
a mental health problem, but one inescapably intertwined with poverty, 
domestic violence, trafficking, communal violence, international politics 
and allegiance to the free market and inequalities. In the Commitment to 
Reducing Inequality Index, India ranked 147th of 157 countries analysed, 
with the country’s level of commitment to reducing inequality described 
as ‘a very worrying situation given that it is home to 1.3 billion people, 
many of whom live in extreme poverty’ (Oxfam International 2018, 10). 
‘Government spending on health, education and social protection is 
woefully low and often subsidises the private sector. Civil society has 
consistently campaigned for increased spending,’ it reported, indicating 
a long way to go for India to achieve the United Nations Sustainable De - 
velopment Goals on reducing inequality (Oxfam International 2018, 10). 
The high rate of diagnosis of mental illness in the homeless population 
is a cause for grave concern, especially in the context of India, where the 
psychiatric system is particularly medicalising in its approach to men-
tal health and illness (Samudre et al. 2016). The cases examined in this 
chapter suggest that caution is necessary to ensure that the inclusion of 
homelessness in the National Mental Health Policy (Government of India 
2014, 6) does not lead to psychiatric overreach.
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As this chapter has shown, there is a dire need to resist the gravita-
tional pull of psychiatry in defining and redefining the political economy 
of increasing inequalities, hunger and homelessness (Mander 2012). We 
suggest a shift away from psychiatric forms of knowledge- making about 
homelessness that would help us to ensure mental health care for those 
who are really in need of psychiatric services.
Notes
 1. The terms ‘homeless’ and ‘homeless mentally ill’ emerge from the narratives of NGO personnel.
 2. The social workers are hired from the city itself and trained by mental health professionals 
from the NGO in the mainstream biopsychiatric paradigm.
 3. Roti (also known as chapati) is a round flatbread native to the Indian subcontinent made from 
wheat flour and water combined into a dough.
 4. The identification of a person as homeless authorises the police to arrest them without a war-
rant, leaving them in a persistent state of exclusion and fear. As homelessness is perceived as 
a crime in India, prevention of beggary laws (Bombay Prevention of Begging Act 1959) allow 
the forcible removal of homeless people to ‘sanitise’ the streets. The homeless identity in India 
is often enmeshed with that of migrant populations within and outside the country, those liv-
ing in slum areas, pavement dwellers and transient populations such as transgender persons 
who beg on the streets and the spiritual pontiffs who leave their homes in search of enlighten-
ment. Such people are excluded from the census as they do not live in a census house, render-
ing them non- citizens and prone to state surveillance and police atrocities. In recent times, 
the state has been engaging in a welfare- centric approach towards homelessness – removing 
people living on the streets to mental health institutions and the shelter homes built for their 
rehabilitation – rather than a rights- based approach that promotes their agency in deciding 
about their course of life.
 5. This risk thinking has also been a central feature of the Indian state in recent times, evidenced 
by the National Registry of Citizens – an exercise carried out in Assam to remove 1.9 million 
‘illegal Bangladeshis’ (for whom detention centres have been set up) and the enactment of 
the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019, which enables Indian citizenship to be granted to non- 
Muslim migrants/ refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan that has ruffled feath-
ers en masse in India. The process of ascertaining citizenship through the state’s definitions of 
identity through family lineage is exclusionary, as it runs the risk of including only those who fit 
into the heteronormative family structure as citizens. See Sharma (2019) for a detailed account.
 6. Aadhar is a 12- digit individual identification number issued by the Government of India that 
serves as a proof of identity and address across the country. It is the largest biometric identi-
fication project in the world. The Supreme Court of India partially struck down provisions of 
the Aadhar Act in 2018. The dissenting judgement by Justice Chandrachud termed the whole 
Aadhar project unconstitutional. ‘Technology deployed in the Aadhar scheme reduces differ-
ent constitutional identities into a single identity of a 12- digit number and infringes the right of 
an individual to identify herself/ himself through a chosen means’ (Chandrachud 2018, 480).
 7. Massive protests, shutdowns and public outcry are continuing as citizenship debates have 
taken centre stage in India after the enactment of the controversial Citizenship Amendment 
Act in 2019.
 8. In a different context, there have been critiques of the National Population Register, National 
Registry of Citizens and the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 brought out by the federal gov-
ernment, which dilute the broad definition of citizenship and employ religion as a criterion for 
citizenship, thus violating the basic structure of India’s secular constitution (see Desai 2020; 
Karmakar 2019; Muktiar et al. 2018).
 9. Most of the social workers in these NGOs are men who traverse the city streets on beats. There 
are only two women social workers who conduct street beats. The woman street dwellers in 
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women came into existence after a street dweller who was treated and reformed by the NGO 
(given medicines, hygiene care, new clothes and later employed at a wayside shop in the city) 
was gang raped and killed. In our fieldwork in Kolkata, we have seen only one woman who 
lives on the streets.
 10. The mental health workers develop their knowledge about psychosocial disability through the 
hands- on training in the biopsychiatric paradigm from the mainstream mental health profes-
sionals in the NGO. They identify ‘homeless mentally ill’ people by observing their behaviour 
and employing psychiatric rating scales.
 11. Medicines are mixed in with the food following the instructions of the social worker, and are 
given to the street dwellers by the shopkeepers who were already caring for them out of com-
passion. The shopkeepers are now redesignated as caregivers by the NGO for the care work.
 12. The most common psychiatric medicines administered on the streets by the NGO are olan-
zapine, amisulpride, Parkin and risperidone. When patients are found very tired, we saw the 
psychiatrist prescribing B- complex, multivitamins and oral rehydration solution. We were 
not allowed access to the case records, so we have limited information regarding the range of 
medicines being prescribed.
 13. Another colonial act, the Bengal Vagrancy Act 1943, defines vagrants as not only those people 
roaming in public places seeking alms, but also people ‘wandering about or remaining in any 
public place in such condition or manner as makes it likely that such person exists by asking 
for alms’. Other than this, there are scores of similar pieces of legislation in India that draw on 
the colonial legacy and state paternalism to criminalise vagrancy – for example, the Bombay 
Prevention of Begging Act 1959, the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Begging Act 1971 and 
the Karnataka Prevention of Begging Act 1975. (See Mukherjee (2008) and Raghavan and 
Tarique (2018) for a critical review of anti- begging laws in India.) In 2018, the Delhi High 
Court struck down several provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act that crimi-
nalise begging, observing that ‘Criminalizing begging violates the most fundamental rights 
of some of the most vulnerable people in our society’ (In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi 
2018, 15).
 14. See also Lang and Jensen (2013) and Lang (2018) on how depression is appropriated and 
institutionalised by Ayurvedic psychiatry, and how Ayurveda practitioners creatively appro-
priate International Classification of Diseases categories and reinterpret Ayurvedic scriptures 
and practices in the light of biopsychiatric categories to reframe ‘depression’ according to local 
contexts in India.
 15. Psychiatric capitalism exposes the myriad ways in which psychiatry and capitalism are related 
to each other. Scholars have shown the direct impact of capitalism on mental health, as well as 
how psychiatry is driven by the profitability motive, akin to capitalism focusing on individual-
ism, work and consumption, thus enlarging markets for psychiatric services, which in turn 
serve neoliberal capitalist system. See U’Ren (1997) and Cohen (2016) for detailed analysis of 
the topic.
 16. Shiva has been living on the footpaths for 22 years voluntarily. He rescues people who jump 
into the famous Hussainsagar Lake in Hyderabad to attempt suicide. To date, he has rescued 
99 persons. He also helps Hyderabad police remove dead bodies from the lake. In an interview 
with a national daily newspaper, he explained that the death of his younger brother was the 
cause of his ‘homelessness’: ‘My brother, who came to live with me, drowned in a lake near 
Monda Market, and nobody helped me to fetch the body out. I ran to more than one police sta-
tion, but they asked me to come the next day. Finally, I had to fish the body out myself. I vowed 
then to shift totally to Tank Bund [a place in the city] and engage myself in this work. I am not 
a beggar or a thief. I stay here out of my own volition’ (Vadlamudi 2018, n.p.).
 17. India was ranked 103rd out of 119 qualifying countries in the peer- reviewed Global Hunger 
Index 2018. According to the report, India is among the 45 countries that have ‘serious lev-
els of hunger’. At least one in five Indian children under the age of 5 are wasted, reflecting 
acute under- nutrition. The only country with a higher prevalence of child wasting is the war- 
torn nation of South Sudan. The report notes that ‘factors that could reduce child stunting in 
South Asia include increased consumption of non- staple foods, access to sanitation, women’s 
education, access to safe water, gender equality, and national food availability’ (von Grebmer 
et al. 2018, 12). India ranked 95th out of a total 129 countries in the first- ever Sustainable 
Development Goals Gender Index, which measures strides made in achieving gender com-
mitments against internationally set targets. India’s score of 56.2 means that it is among 43 
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‘My body is my laboratory’: Care 
experiments among persons who use 
drugs in Downtown Montreal
rossio Motta- ochoa and nelson Arruda1
To Carl and François, who cared for us.
Carl,2 a man in his early fifties and one of our close research par-
ticipants, was hospitalized for almost five months due to life- 
threatening complications associated with a chronic infection. As 
he explained to us, he caught a rare infection by injecting cocaine 
that, at a certain point, manifested as an endocarditis (infection 
of the inner lining of the heart’s chambers and valves). He did 
not want to go to the hospital, and his friends brought him to the 
emergency room when the infection had already advanced. During 
one of our visits at the time of his hospitalization, Carl noticed that 
Rossio, one of the members of our research team, was particularly 
tired: ‘I swear, you are working too much and not sleeping enough. 
Look at you!’ Rossio laughed, and told him that she has trouble fall-
ing asleep. ‘If I don’t take my Serax, I also can’t fall asleep … why 
don’t you take a Xanax, a Rivo [Rivoltril] or another benzo [benzo-
diazepine3]?’, Carl suggested. Rossio declined politely, saying that 
she could not take a benzodiazepine because she did not have a pre-
scription. A couple of days later, when Rossio visited Carl again, he 
noticed that she looked even more tired: ‘Look at the bags under 
your eyes! You really need a good night of sleep.’ At the end of the 
visit, Carl offered to give Rossio his dose of Serax. Rossio was sur-
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he does not share with anybody is his Serax. He explained to her 
with a half- smile in his face: ‘I’m offering you my Serax because at 
this point you are my friend.’ He made a pause, and then added 
timidly: ‘And I care for you.’ (Fieldnote excerpt)
In this chapter, we will examine how psychiatric drugs such as Serax 
(oxazepam) are used among street- drug consumers in Downtown 
Montreal, Canada. We have observed that our research participants use 
psychiatric medication to perform care for themselves and others in a 
complex interplay of intimate moral reckonings and socioeconomic con-
straints. Although the use of psychiatric medication in combination with 
street drugs can be seen as a set of self- destructive and risky behaviours 
at first, a deep understanding of these practices could unsettle common- 
sense assumptions of so- called addicts as purely self- harming and uncar-
ing subjects. We suggest that if we shift our understanding of care away 
from its exclusive association with morally life- sustaining actions, and 
include its disruptive ambivalences (Stevenson 2014), there is room to 
see these so- called destructive and risky practices as care. Furthermore, 
how our participants use psychiatric drugs could challenge a few limi-
tations of common notions of care, expanding its conceptual range by 
showing how care can be configured by practices in which what is usually 
‘considered good and bad may be intertwined’ (Mol et al. 2010, 12). In 
line with the introduction of this book, we understand care as complex 
human activity where moral, affective and sociopolitical forces intersect, 
coalesce and collide, constituting an ambivalent ground.
We will also explore how persons who use drugs in Downtown 
Montreal enact these practices to manage the persistence of their addic-
tion over time. Biomedicine defines addiction as a chronic brain disease 
characterised by compulsive drug seeking and use, despite its harm-
ful consequences (National Institute on Drug Abuse 2007). Based on 
this approach, public policies and interventions aim to reduce drug 
abuse and its associated harms over the lifespan of the addicted person. 
However, politics of deservingness crucially influence how these poli-
cies are implemented, and to which extent they provide the comprehen-
sive care that persons who use drugs need. Here, we will examine how 
despite Canada’s robust welfare system, its public policies limit access to 
state- funded support for persons who use drugs, and how, under these 
conditions, our participants use psychiatric medication to provide care 
for themselves and others. In addition, we will reflect on harm- reduction 
strategies and interventions that, despite being far- reaching and effec-
tive in the control of blood- borne diseases, locate addiction and related 
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health issues in the individual, rather than in socioeconomic inequalities, 
which have been widely acknowledged as the greatest determinants of 
ill health (Mackenbach 2012). Finally, we will understand the chronicity 
of our research participants’ problematic drug use through a syndemic 
lens (Singer 1994, 1996), positing that addiction is not a single biologi-
cal disease, but a biosocial phenomenon that interacts with other health 
conditions and is sustained by structural forces and social inequalities 
(Singer and Clair 2003).
Fieldwork and research strategy
Our research was conducted by an interdisciplinary team composed of 
two anthropologists (the authors of this chapter, Rossio Motta- Ochoa 
and Nelson Arruda), a public health physician, a psychologist and a psy-
chiatrist. Members of the research team with a medical background had a 
critical public health perspective, were aware of the benefits of the cross- 
disciplinary dialogue between public health and ethnography (Bourgois 
and Bruneau 2000), and had been previously involved in multi/ interdis-
ciplinary projects that included ethnography (Roy et al. 2011; Roy and 
Arruda 2015).
We did 10 months of fieldwork (from May 2015 to January 
2016) in several sites frequented by persons who use drugs in Downtown 
Montreal (living places, injection and crack- smoking sites, locations 
where drugs and psychiatric medications were sold, pharmacies and 
community- based organisations). We conducted participant observation 
to describe the use of psychiatric medication among 50 individuals, and 
closely followed 10 of them across their everyday routines. Additionally, 
we conducted semi- structured interviews with 25 participants to further 
explore their perceptions of psychiatric medication and related practices. 
Nelson Arruda knew most of the research participants from previous 
studies, and he had already established relationships of trust and friend-
ship with them, which facilitated the development of our research.
Research participants’ background, public policies and 
deservingness
A significant number of the study participants were men between 20 and 
60 years old. They were white Canadian citizens, born in the province 
of Quebec, and spoke French as their first language. All used more than 
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one drug, and their preferred mode of drug administration was injection. 
They were regular cocaine consumers (crack, cocaine or both), but they 
largely used heroin and prescription opioids. To a lesser degree, they also 
used cannabis, amphetamines, methamphetamines, ecstasy, ketamine, 
GHB, hallucinogens and alcohol. Additionally, several participants were 
in opioid substitution therapy (methadone or suboxone) for heroin and 
prescription opioids, although this treatment did not preclude them from 
using these and other drugs. Although some of our participants had pre-
viously joined rehabilitation programmes, at the time of our research 
none of them wanted to stop their drug use, and they did not envision 
their lives without drugs. François, a man in his early forties and one of 
our close research participants, eloquently described this desire, alluding 
to the chronicity of his drug use over his life time: ‘I began using drugs 
when I was a teenager, and I loved their effects ... I have been in detox, 
in rehab programmes a few times, mostly because of external pressure. 
I was never so convinced, because I love drugs, they are part of my life 
and I can’t imagine my life without drugs.’ From a public health perspec-
tive, our participants would be labelled as refractory drug injectors and 
polydrug users, who simultaneously and strategically manage multiple 
addictions.
Like most persons who use drugs in Downtown Montreal, our par-
ticipants were homeless and/ or lived in precarious and temporary hous-
ing, such as illegal squats, cheap hotel rooms4 and friends’ places (Roy 
et al. 2011; Motta- Ochoa et al. 2017). This co- occurrence of addiction 
and homelessness observed in our participants is a frequently reported 
phenomenon: numerous studies show that substance use is prevalent 
among persons who are homeless (Palepu et al. 2010; van Laere et al. 
2009), and homelessness is associated with drug use, particularly with 
drug injection (Bourgois 1998). According to our participants, the harsh 
conditions of living on the streets (cold weather, difficulties obtaining 
food, exposure to police and drug dealer harassment, as well as rob-
bery and other forms of violence) and associated stress increased their 
drug use.
Of note during our fieldwork, homeless persons who use drugs were 
progressively displaced from their living quarters due to an ongoing gen-
trification process. Until recently, the municipal programmes designed to 
revitalise Downtown Montreal were deliberately socially mixed, where 
middle- / upper- income gentrifiers owned properties next to social hous-
ing and homeless encampments (Rose 2004). However, a few years prior 
to our research, the municipality began promoting the development of 
new condominium buildings and the transformation of public places in 
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tourist destinations, favouring more aggressive gentrification dynam-
ics. ‘Livability’ for a few who deserved to occupy Downtown Montreal 
replaced the prior inclusive approach of inner city revitalisation (Wyly 
and Hammel 2004). In the last decade, measures to create such livabil-
ity, including the removal of marginalised groups from public areas, or 
so- called social cleansing (Lees and White 2020), were implemented. 
When we conducted fieldwork, most participants gathered in small 
encampments located in Saint- Paul Square, which was one of the last 
public places occupied by homeless persons who use drugs in Downtown 
Montreal.5 As suggested by Kottai and Rangathan in this volume, home-
less people were seen as deviant, and consequently rendered invisible in 
public areas, and their care needed to be managed in concealment.
All our participants lived under the poverty line.6 They were unem-
ployed, and their main income source was social welfare. However, they 
were often excluded from welfare support for short and/ or long periods 
of time due to its internal rules, such as the need of an address to apply 
for welfare and the suspension of welfare payments to anyone who leaves 
the province of Quebec for more than seven days (Government of Quebec 
2020). In addition to welfare, all our participants had as complementary 
sources of income street- based economic activities, including panhan-
dling, ‘squeegeeing’ (wiping the windshields of cars stopped in traffic in 
exchange for money), sex work and petty drug trade.
Due to drug- related petty crime, our participants were periodically 
incarcerated in provincial and federal prisons. Although incarceration is a 
frequently reported phenomenon among persons who use drugs (Beyrer 
et al. 2003), it was striking for us to find out that almost all our partici-
pants had experienced detention, and some had spent the most part of 
their adult lives in prison. According to them, their criminal records pre-
cluded them from being employed within the formal economy.
Our participants had health issues commonly associated with injec-
tion drug use, including viral and bacterial blood- borne infections (for 
example, hepatitis C, HIV, chronic infections) and injection- related inju-
ries (Islam et al. 2012). Some of them also had chronic pain that they 
linked to their harsh living conditions and exposure to violence. As resi-
dents of the province of Quebec, they were covered by the public health 
insurance plan to treat their health problems, and they sporadically vis-
ited health services, mostly primary care. However, the stigma associated 
with illicit drug users strongly influenced how health providers related 
with our participants. Most were reluctant to seek institutional care, par-
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Contrary to their refusal to attend institutional health services, our 
participants partook in various harm reduction programmes provided 
by the government of Quebec through community- based organisations. 
The staff of these organisations had a non- judgemental attitude toward 
persons who use drugs, which contributed to create an environment in 
which our participants felt comfortable and welcomed. They partici-
pated in needle and syringe programmes, crack equipment distribution 
programmes and opioid substitution treatment, among others. Our par-
ticipants considered that some of these programmes had reduced certain 
risks associated with drug use, including HIV and hepatitis C transmis-
sion, which is consistent with the extensive evidence about harm reduc-
tion interventions (Wilson et al. 2015). Despite the wide availability of 
harm reduction programmes and their beneficial effects, current harm 
reduction in Canada mostly focuses on medical outcomes, without 
addressing the structural conditions at the root of substance use and 
health inequalities. This version of harm reduction privileges the bio-
medical brain disease model of addiction, central to public health policy, 
as well as the bio- corporal risks of injection (for example, blood- borne 
disease transmission), locating the problematic substance use in the indi-
vidual and dismissing larger political issues that crucially influence peo-
ple’s health and wellbeing (Carrier and Quirion 2003; Roe 2005).
Most of our participants reported having mental health problems, 
and over half of them were diagnosed with one or more psychiatric 
disorders at certain point(s) of their lives, with anxiety disorder and 
depression being the most frequent. The co- occurrence of mental health 
problems and addictions has been extensively reported in the literature, 
and it is particularly prevalent among homeless persons (Drake et al. 
1991; Palepu et al. 2013). As pointed out in this volume by Kottai and 
Ranganathan, high rates of diagnosis of mental illness among homeless 
populations are constitutive of a medicalising approach that aims to indi-
vidualise a social problem that is inescapably intertwined with poverty, 
violence, international politics and free market inequalities. Our partici-
pants were also aware of the close association between mental health 
problems and addictions, and they pointed out that this association was 
widespread among health providers, shaping the diagnosis and pre-
scription practice of doctors in Montreal. In the words of François, who 
had been diagnosed with four different psychiatric disorders in recent 
years: ‘If you are a drug addict, doctors almost immediately rate you as 
mentally ill, they will diagnose you with at least one psychiatric disease 
and will prescribe you pills.’ The dominant biomedical model of addic-
tion that conceptualises it as a brain disease has progressively equated 
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addiction with mental illness, psychiatrising the diagnosis of addiction 
and its treatment (Becoña 2016). Those participants who had the ‘dual 
diagnosis’ (mental disorder(s) and addiction) received psychiatric treat-
ment that was mostly pharmacological, of which the costs were fully cov-
ered by the public drug insurance of the Province of Quebec for people 
in social welfare (Régie de l’assurance maladie du Québec n.d.). None 
of our participants received psychological services, despite the fact that 
several of them wanted psychotherapy. Publicly funded psychological 
services are very limited and difficult to access (Chodos 2017). They are 
mostly restricted to a few regular users of mental health services and/ 
or those with psychological conditions that cannot be treated pharmaco-
logically (for example, borderline personality disorder). As the biomedi-
cal model of addiction has reduced it to a brain disease, divorced from 
its psychological dimension (among other dimensions), persons who use 
drugs were not suitable candidates for receiving psychotherapy.
In keeping with the approach of Singer (1994, 1996), we under-
stand our participants’ drug use not as an isolated health issue, but as 
constitutive of a syndemic, or a set of closely intertwined and mutually 
enhancing health problems that are developed and sustained in this 
group of individuals because of structural forces (for additional descrip-
tions of syndemic clusters that include addictions, see Bresciani’s chapter 
in this volume). For example, Carl’s chronic infection that manifested as 
endocarditis and his drug use were not two distinct conditions that hap-
pened to occur in the same body. As we will see later in the chapter, both 
health issues interacted with each other and with other illnesses in com-
plex ways, as well as with the socioeconomic conditions in which they 
took place. Moreover, these interactions changed over time, shaping the 
ways in which Carl experienced both conditions from day to day, and 
cared for himself.
We have also described how the public services to which our par-
ticipants were entitled as Canadian citizens and residents of the Province 
of Quebec (social welfare, housing, health services, psychiatric services 
and harm reduction programmes) operated, and failed to provide them 
with the care they needed. Noticeably, social and health policies that reg-
ulated access to care services were influenced by ideas of deservingness 
that distinguish between those that are worthy and unworthy of receiv-
ing support (Bambra and Smith 2010; Petersen et al. 2011). Except for 
harm reduction programmes, in most publicly funded services, so- called 
drug addicts were stigmatised and perceived as undeserving of state sup-
port. These perceptions reflected on the over- regulation of the welfare 
service that periodically excluded our participants from financial help, 
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the systematic displacement from their living quarters, and the discrimi-
natory treatment they received in health services. Thus, despite their citi-
zenship status, our participants somehow fell through the policy safety 
net of the state, and they had to create their own ways to provide care for 
themselves.
Street- level psychiatric drug circulation
As previously mentioned, most of our participants were diagnosed with 
one or more psychiatric disorders and had a prescription for psychiatric 
drugs, which were covered by the public drug insurance of the Province 
of Quebec. However, at the beginning of our fieldwork, we did not exactly 
know how widespread the use of psychiatric drugs was. The prescription 
drugs most widely used and sold at the street market were opioid- based 
painkillers such as Dilaudid (hydromorphone hydrochloride tablets) and 
Hydromorph Contin (hydromorphone hydrochloride time- release cap-
sules), which persons who use drugs dissolved and administered through 
injection, obtaining effects similar to heroin at a lower cost (Roy et al. 
2011).7
We started by asking our participants if they took psychiatric drugs. 
Their first reaction was to say that they were not using this type of drugs 
because they were for ‘the crazies’. There was a strong stigma attached to 
psychiatric medication due to its direct association with mental illness, 
but during subsequent conversations they often remembered having 
taken a Rivotril (clonazepam) or the second- generation antipsychotic 
Seroquel (quetiapine)8 in the week due to problems sleeping after inject-
ing or smoking cocaine. Thus, we came to learn that the use of psychiat-
ric medications was pervasive, and that all our participants were taking 
them regularly. In a continuum of psychoactive substances, where the 
divide between illicit and prescription drugs was sometimes blurred, psy-
chiatric drugs seemed to be at the bottom of the hierarchy. Yet psychiat-
ric medication was also considered to be safe and trustable. In contrast 
with street drugs, whose origin and composition is uncertain, psychiat-
ric medication is produced by renowned pharmaceutical companies. As 
stated by Carl: ‘We can be sure of what the medication contains, we don’t 
have bad surprises, we get the substance and quantity of the substance 
that are written in the box.’
We also followed the commercial circuit of psychiatric drugs, which 
was not always obvious. The sale of these substances occurred in spots 




MAnAging ChroniCitY in unEquAL stAtEs184
  
controlled by criminal groups through violent procedures, but by small 
dealers or individual sellers who exchanged a portion of their own pre-
scriptions. Nonetheless, the place of psychiatric drugs within the street 
drug market was marginal: neither the demand nor their prices were 
high. A 2 mg Rivotril, the most popular psychiatric drug, costs around 
CA$2. Additionally, other prescription drugs such as Seroquel, and even 
the replacement treatment methadone, did not have an established mon-
etary cost.
As fieldwork developed, we learned that the low cost and demand 
of psychiatric medication was related to the significant number of drug 
users who had prescriptions for psychiatric drugs, free of cost. Moreover, 
the availability of psychiatric medication generated circuits of exchange 
that exceeded the commercial ones. Persons who use drugs bartered 
psychiatric medication, according to Carl, ‘for cigarettes, food or small 
favours’. And, as we will see in the following sections, they also gave psy-
chiatric medication for free to their friends, turning these drugs into sub-
stances through which they performed care.
Para- pharmacologists
Kyle, another of our participants, had a large knowledge of psychiatric 
medication, its interactions with street drugs and their combined effects 
on brain chemistry. He dedicated a fair amount of his time to reading 
about these topics and experimenting with unthinkable drug combina-
tions. His friends told us that he had studied science at university, but 
that his habitual drug use did not allow him to complete his degree. 
Due to his vast expertise in drug- related matters, they called him 
‘para- pharmacologist’.
Kyle knew how to mix psychiatric drugs with street drugs in ways 
that potentiate the effects of the latter while reducing their side effects. 
For example, he explained to us that he sometimes liked to use heroin 
and benzodiazepines together. While dissolving heroin for injection, Kyle 
added a little bit of benzodiazepine to simultaneously increase the pleas-
urable effects of heroin and reduce some of its side effects, such as drows-
iness. Although the combination of heroin and benzodiazepine largely 
increases the risk of overdose, through experimentation, Kyle found 
how much of each substance he had to put in the mix so as not to over-
dose. He also used to add ‘a pinch’ of benzodiazepine when preparing a 
combination of heroin and cocaine, which is known as a speedball. The 
interaction between the stimulant effects of cocaine and the depressant 
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effects of heroin can trigger a fatal respiratory depression, so this mix is 
considered particularly dangerous. According to Kyle, however, the pinch 
of benzodiazepine he added made it possible to decrease the amount of 
heroin in the mix, reducing the potential negative interactions of heroin 
and cocaine.
Kyle’s knowledge on how to mix different drugs to get the best 
possible effects was the result of endless processes of experimentation. 
‘My body is my laboratory,’ he told us in a conversation about his phar-
macological experiments. When he obtained the expected results, he 
made a mental note of the different amounts of drugs that he had used. 
Afterwards, he experimented again in his body/ laboratory to reproduce 
the results. He liked to share his knowledge with his peers, but given that 
each of their bodies was a different laboratory, every one of them had to 
run their own separate experiments. ‘Every drug addict has to become 
a little bit of a pharmacologist,’ said Kyle, and then he added that this 
was because drugs, including psychiatric medication, were ‘dangerous 
substances’. Experimentation was the only way in which persons who use 
drugs tamed drugs; through experimentation, they could enhance the 
effects of drugs, minimise their risks and thus take care of themselves.
In Kyle’s description, drugs have the capacity to be beneficial and 
detrimental for the same person at the same time. Drugs are both medi-
cine and poison. This refers us to the polyvalent figure of the pharmakon, 
which in philosophy and critical theory has been associated with scape-
goat, remedy and venom (Biehl 2011; Derrida 1981). Anthropologist João 
Biehl (2011) uses the notion of ‘human pharmakon’ to speak of Catarina, 
a woman with an unknown degenerative disease who was misdiagnosed 
and overmedicalised within the Brazilian public mental health system, and 
finally dumped in Vita, a zone of social abandonment where the unwanted 
of society were left to die. Catarina described herself in Vita as becoming 
one with the psychiatric medication she took, Akineton, changing her 
name to Catkine. According to Biehl (2011, 224), after the pharmacologi-
cal interventions did not improve Catarina’s condition, she was cast out 
in Vita by her family; she became a ‘failed medication that, paradoxically, 
allowed the life, sentiment and values of others to continue in other terms’.
It is tempting to see Kyle and our other participants as human phar-
makons. There are several resemblances. Like Catarina, they are social out-
casts, with addictions and other medical conditions that have been mostly 
addressed by somehow failed pharmacological interventions. However, 
they are not only human pharmakons, but also para- pharmacologists. 
More than pure objects of pharmacological experimentation, they had 
the ability to experiment themselves with drugs in their own bodies/ 
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laboratories. And in these ongoing experiments, they attempt to control 
the poisonous capacities of drugs. In this context, using psychiatric medi-
cation enacts their attempts at taking care of themselves.
Caring for oneself: Practices of psychiatric drug use
Our participants were seen as undeserving of state support and excluded 
from several public services, which strongly affected the ways in which 
they cared for themselves. Other chapters in this volume explore how 
non- state actors provide care to marginalised groups, filling the gaps 
left by deficient public health systems (see Bresciani, and Kottai and 
Ranganathan). Conversely, our participants assumed several of the 
duties associated with their own self- care. Moreover, the chronicity of 
their addictions influenced their care practices: they did not envision a 
life without drugs, rather they wanted a good life using drugs. Although 
the overall goal of harm reduction is providing care while minimising the 
negative harms associated with substance use (Pauly et al. 2007), its nar-
row focus on medical outcomes failed to address crucial dimensions of 
our participants’ lives that also required care. Through our fieldwork, we 
observed several practices of psychiatric drug use that were related to 
forms of self- care, and four of these practices were part of their day- to- 
day lives, as discussed below.
Downing from a high
Once François told us jokingly that in the last years, he had received a 
‘collection’ of psychiatric diagnoses, including depression, bipolar dis-
order, borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality disor-
der. He was hospitalised for a drug- related injury, and during that time, 
a psychiatrist evaluated him and diagnosed him with depression and 
borderline personality disorder. Later, he was incarcerated for drug pos-
session: ‘I got into a few fights, I was sent to the psychiatrist and he told 
me I had antisocial personality disorder. Then, I was depressed because 
I was in jail! I saw the psychiatrist again and I came back with a diagno-
sis of bipolar disorder.’ Because of these diagnoses, he had prescriptions 
for several psychiatric drugs. Although these psychiatric drugs were pre-
scribed to treat his multiple diagnoses, he used them to ‘come down from 
cocaine highs’. He used to take Rivotril and Seroquel to be able to sleep 
when he used ‘too much cocaine’ and was particularly agitated and over-
excited. François opened his hands beside his eyes to graphically describe 
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this state: ‘I get these gigantic eyes, I cannot close them, but with some 
Rivos or one Seroquel I can fall asleep.’ He explained to us that getting a 
good night’s sleep when a person lives on the streets was by default a ‘big 
challenge’, which often becomes impossible under the effects of cocaine. 
Without ensuring some hours of sleep, François was not able to function 
the following day, when ‘you really need to wake up with some energy to 
go around and do something to get money for your next hit’.
François and several of our participants also used benzodiazepines 
and Seroquel to counter the side effects of a cocaine high or the after- 
effects endured while ‘coming down’, a period commonly known as ‘the 
down’. While François described cocaine as his ‘drug of choice’ because 
it gave him more ‘excitement’, ‘pleasure’ and ‘self- confidence’ than any 
other drug, he also pointed out that the after- effects can be very distress-
ing: ‘I become very anxious and paranoid.’ To limit his down, François 
takes benzodiazepines: ‘I take two, three Rivos [Rivotril 2 mg] to cut the 
mess ... the Rivos help me to calm down a bit, to relax, and sometimes 
I just fall asleep and ... the day after, I am fine.’
Managing withdrawal
Our participants told us that when they were not able to buy heroin or 
prescription opioids, they took benzodiazepines to supress or reduce 
their withdrawal symptoms. Kristelle, a young woman in her early twen-
ties and a good friend of François, vividly described the disabling effects 
of being ‘dope sick’, or heroin withdrawal: ‘It’s just unbearable! I feel so 
drowsy, I cannot breathe well, I vomit my guts ... I feel so cold ... I shake 
like a leaf.’ She always kept a couple of benzodiazepine pills to stave off 
the withdrawal: ‘Some days I don’t have money for my next shot, and if 
I don’t wake up in shape, which is generally the case [laughs], I can’t go 
squeegee to make a couple of bucks, so I take some benzos.’
Kristelle was one of the few participants who did not have a pre-
scription for benzodiazepines. She usually got benzodiazepine pills for 
free from François and other experienced drug users, who also advised 
her to keep these pills to manage her withdrawal symptoms: ‘They give 
[benzos] to me, and say: “Save it until you are sick.” ’ Like any good stu-
dent would, Kristelle showed us a small pocket in her backpack where 
she kept her benzodiazepine pills along with other medications ‘for fever, 
stomach ache and PMS [premenstrual syndrome]’. She explained to us 
that benzodiazepines worked as an insurance or last resource against 
withdrawal: ‘I would prefer to get my dope [heroin], but if I don’t have it, 
Rivos will help me out.’
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Detoxing from drug use
Our participants also use benzodiazepines to do what they call ‘Rivotrips’. 
Carl told us that sometimes he wants to take a break from heavy 
drugs: ‘When I felt sick of cocaine, you know injecting coke is hard on the 
body, so I need to stop from time to time. I go to my little corner, I prepare 
everything to be comfortable and I take several Rivos [Rivotril 2 mg] – 
four, seven, eight, no more than that.’ He did not take all the Rivotril pills 
in a shot: ‘It’s not about getting high, it’s to clean yourself, so you take 
your time. You take one Rivo first, you wait. One hour later, one or two 
more Rivos, and you continue like this.’ Carl described the Rivotrip as a 
process of ‘making a fire’, in which he regularly and patiently had to ‘add 
wood to keep it burning’. Benzodiazepines, taken this way, bring him 
another type of ‘buzz’ that he described as relaxing and safe. This way, 
Carl ‘detoxed’ from cocaine without craving it too much.
Carl has had a prescription for Serax for 20 years, and recently he 
also got a prescription for Rivotril. He had sleep problems because of 
chronic back pain: ‘I was hit in my back a long time ago during a riot 
in the Lyon Prison. I was distracted, so a guy caught me by surprise and 
hit me ... with a piece of wood. I’ve never fully recovered, and as I get 
older, I feel more pain.’ Ageing, and the harsh living conditions of the 
streets, had increased Carl’s back pain. His refusal to seek institutional 
health care due to previous experiences of exclusion left his back pain 
undertreated (he only received sleep aid pills, and not chronic pain treat-
ment). In addition, his back pain interacted with other chronic health 
issues, such as his infection that manifested as endocarditis and his drug 
use, which strongly influenced his day- to- day care choices. For example, 
sleeping well was crucial for Carl, and he used Serax as a sleep aid: ‘If 
I don’t take my Serax, I’m not able to sleep. I don’t use it for anything else, 
I don’t share it, I kept it for myself.’ However, he did not use his Rivotril 
pills for sleeping as prescribed by the doctor, because he also had to take 
care of other needs related to his drug consumption and used them to 
do Rivotrips: ‘Sometimes, I kept my Rivos for a few days, three, four, five 
days, and then I have enough to go to my little corner, relax and clean 
myself.’ We asked Carl if he could use Serax for detoxing. He said that 
it was ‘technically possible’, but that: ‘My Serax does not feel, anymore. 
It just relaxes my back a little bit and helps me to sleep because I’ve 
had it for 20 years ... my body is used to it. When you eat peanut but-
ter on toast the first time, it is good. If you eat it for 20 years, it tastes 
like yesterday.’ Although Serax and Rivotril are both benzodiazepine- 
based drugs, they can produce different effects and fulfil separate care 
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purposes: ‘They are from the same family but … it is like two sisters. They 
have their own character each of them: they are cute, but they have their 
own qualities.’ Carl built a different relationship with each of these two 
benzodiazepines, based on his body’s habituation to each substance and 
his care choices: ‘I’m going to feel the Rivotril more than the Serax, so 
I use Rivotril to clean myself.’
Medicating mental health problems
Most of our participants used benzodiazepines and Seroquel to treat 
mental health issues. Almost all of them told us that they had sleep-
ing problems, were stressed, felt depressed or could not control their 
aggression. One of these participants was Étienne, a young man in his 
late twenties, who was the running partner of François. When we started 
our research, we told Étienne that we were looking for people who used 
psychiatric medication. He looked at us overly suspiciously, and asked 
in an inquisitive tone: ‘Who told you that I’m taking psychiatric meds? 
It was François, right?’ We calmed Étienne down and told him that we 
were just searching for participants for a study. He apologised for being 
so ‘paranoid’, went to a nearby trashcan, started digging inside and came 
back with a bottle of Ibuprofen. He opened the bottle and took out three 
benzodiazepine pills, a couple of Seroquel pills, one Effexor (antidepres-
sant), a rock of crack and a small Ziploc bag containing cocaine pow-
der. With a nervous laugh, he said that he liked to keep his drugs in a 
safe place. In the insecure conditions of the streets, Étienne feared being 
robbed, and he temporarily hid his belongings in unexpected places, such 
as the bottom of a trashcan. While showing us his drugs, his hands were 
shaking. He suddenly put all his psychiatric pills in one of his trembling 
palms, brought them closer to us and asked: ‘What do you wanna know 
about my meds?’
Étienne defined himself as an anguished man: ‘I worry all the time, 
I’m always fearful ... it’s like living with a heavy weight inside of me.’ 
He connected these feelings with childhood experiences of abandon-
ment: ‘My parents never cared for me, I am the product of a one- night 
stand! [laughs] My mother dumped me at my grandmother’s place for a 
while, then I bounced from one foster home to another, then back to my 
grandma ... I’m not mad at my parents anymore, I’m in contact with them 
... but it hurts, it still hurts.’ Since childhood, Étienne has had frequent 
and short ‘panic attacks’, which although uncomfortable were not disa-
bling. But five years ago, he had a major breakdown, after his girlfriend 
left him: ‘I had this big panic attack, I couldn’t breathe and I fainted. 
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I ended up in the hospital.’ His doctor diagnosed Étienne with anxiety 
disorder, and prescribed him benzodiazepines and Effexor (also used for 
anxiety and panic attacks), as well as Seroquel to improve his sleep.
When we were doing fieldwork, Étienne only used cocaine. He 
injected powder cocaine and smoked crack. A couple of years ago, he had 
entered a methadone programme to stop his heroin and prescription opi-
oid consumption. Étienne noticed that, since he had been in methadone 
treatment, his cocaine use had increased: ‘Methadone ended my heroin 
cravings, but my hunger for cocaine is bigger now. I shoot up 50 per cent 
more than before.’ Because of his higher cocaine intake, ‘The anxiety is 
always present and I can become extremely aggressive, dangerous ... and 
I easily get into troubles.’ He also felt more stressed: ‘I don’t take heroin 
now, and the bad side is that I’m more nervous because heroin really 
relaxed me.’ Additionally, his sleeping problems increased: ‘The good 
side [of not taking heroin] is that I save a bunch of money ... but then 
I take more coke, that is cheaper, but still, then I’m wondering at night 
how to get the money, and I can’t sleep.’
Étienne told us that benzodiazepine helped him control his anxi-
ety and aggression, and that Seroquel: ‘Knocks me like a hammer. I take 
300 mg and it’s like a massive blow to my forehead, I sleep deeply.’ He 
used psychiatric medication to treat the mental health issues for which 
these drugs are prescribed: ‘I don’t mess up with my meds. Before 
I mixed benzos with heroin, but now there is no need, I follow my doc-
tor’s prescription.’ However, Étienne could not follow the instructions 
for use because of the increase in his cocaine intake: ‘Sometimes, my 
anxiety is too big. After shooting up, my anxiety is huge and to really 
calm down I should take more benzos ... Same thing with Seroquel, 
I have to take more to fall asleep’. He needed to take more psychiatric 
drugs, but ‘not too many because I’m not going to wake up the day after 
or I’m going to be too sleepy’. Étienne kept experimenting to find a bal-
ance between the quantity of cocaine he took and the right amount of 
psychiatric medication.
The four practices described above illustrate how our partici-
pants experiment with psychiatric drugs to counteract the side effects 
of street drugs. As undeserving subjects differentially excluded from 
state support, their use of psychiatric medication to control the after- 
effects of cocaine, to reduce or suppress the heroin and prescription opi-
oid withdrawal symptoms, to detox from their use of heavy drugs and 
to medicate their mental health issues, reflect their somewhat messy 
attempts to care for themselves without having to renounce their poly-
drug consumption. Nonetheless, the combination of benzodiazepines 
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and street drugs entails risks of overdose and accidental death, and 
from a purely public health perspective, rather than care, these prac-
tices are described as harmful and even lethal. The elevated health 
risks of these practices also exceed the scope of harm reduction that, 
although comprehensive of a variety of interventions, aims to minimise 
the health impacts of drug use without threatening the lives of persons 
who use drugs (Lenton and Single 1998). However, if we stop asso-
ciating care only with morally life- sustaining actions, and include its 
ambivalences, such practices can be understood as care. There are also 
other ways in which our participants use psychiatric drugs that could 
be more directly associated with forms of compassionate, altruistic and 
life- affirming care.
Caring for others: The moral value of psychiatric 
medication
We met Kristelle at night in a community- based organisation, when 
she was picking up sterile injection material. She had virtually disap-
peared from our field site after a big argument with François around 
drug sharing. We already knew François’s version of the story. 
According to him, Kristelle was a ‘messy girl’ who did not know how 
to manage her drug use. She ‘burned all her money’ on cocaine. She 
never saved for heroin or prescription opioids and, consequently, 
she often had withdrawal symptoms. When Kristelle found herself 
in these situations, François helped her out, giving her heroin or 
prescription opioids. But when Kristelle was ‘back in shape’ and had 
cocaine, she did not want to share it with François. That night, we 
learnt Kristelle’s version of their argument. According to Kristelle, 
François was ‘getting old’, and forgetting ‘how to enjoy life’. He was 
‘obsessed’ with saving money for heroin or prescription opioids, 
and tried to control how Kristelle administered her money: ‘I left 
my parents’ house because I was fed up of someone telling me what 
to do, and François is even worse than my parents!’ Thus, Kristelle 
rebelled against François’ control by withholding her cocaine from 
him: ‘I wanted to show him that buying cocaine makes sense; he 
also likes cocaine! ... We can’t just think about having money for 
heroin or Dilaus [Dilaudid].’ (Fieldnote excerpt)
That night, Kristelle told us that a few days before, she had reconciled 
her differences with François. She started her account by acknowledging 
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that, although controlling, François was often ‘right, because he has lived 
on the street for much, much longer than I’. To avoid withdrawal symp-
toms, François had advised Kristelle not only to save money for heroin 
or prescription opioids, but also to keep benzodiazepine pills. As she had 
shown us, Kristelle used to carry benzodiazepines in her backpack, but 
one morning, after losing her backpack and having forgotten to get new 
pills, she woke up: ‘Totally dope sick, with no strength in my body to score 
heroin or Dilaus.’ Despite being angry at Kristelle, François helped her 
out: ‘François brought me ... Rivos, and I came back to life.’ Excitedly, 
Kristelle told us that François was a ‘good guy’, incapable of ‘holding 
grudges’, and that they were friends again. According to Kristelle, by giv-
ing her Rivotril when she was sick, François had shown that he still cared 
for her.
In Kristelle’s description, psychiatric medication did not have 
an economic value of exchange, but a moral one. It ‘becomes the 
substance through which care is performed’ (Garcia 2010, 128), and 
through which social ties are reinforced or rebuilt. By giving a ‘gift 
of care’ in crucial moments, persons who use drugs become part of a 
moral economy of gift exchange that facilitates their survival in the 
precarious conditions of the streets (Bourgois 1998; Roy et al. 2011). 
Their participation in this moral economy ensures the continuity of 
their existence not only in the present time, but also in the future. For 
example, Carl also told us that when a street friend was dope sick, he 
helped him out, giving him any psychiatric medication (except for his 
Serax): ‘This is something I give to a buddy in need, because I know 
that later when I’ll be dope sick, the favour will be returned.’ The chro-
nicity of addictions shaped the way in which they envisioned their 
future: although this future was uncertain, they could not imagine an 
upcoming life without drugs.
Knowledge of how to experiment with psychiatric medication and 
other drugs was also part of this moral economy. When Kyle gave his street 
friends information about the drugs and quantities they had to combine, 
or recommended that they test this information by running experiments 
with their own bodies, he contributed to reducing the harmful effects of 
drugs, and therefore cared for them. Additionally, this knowledge also 
circulated under the form of advice when experienced drug users such as 
François told younger ones such as Kristelle to keep benzodiazepines as 
insurance against heroin or prescription opioid withdrawal. Again, the 
chronicity of addictions among persons who use drugs shaped the trans-
mission of the knowledge needed to survive on the streets, and what it 
meant to care for others in this context.
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Deservingness, chronicity and care: Final reflections
Carl and François, our key informants and beloved friends, died in the last 
couple of years due to chronic health issues that co- occurred with their 
use of drugs. Carl’s infection generalised, compromising vital organs, 
and François developed a throat cancer that he linked with crack smok-
ing, which aggressively spread throughout his body. Carl’s infection and 
François’s cancer were part of syndemic clusters of mutually enhancing 
health problems sustained by the detrimental socioeconomic conditions 
in which they lived, and by limited access to health and social services. 
Similarly, from the 25 persons who we interviewed for this research, 13 
have already passed away, and we estimate that we have lost more than 
half of the 50 individuals we followed during our fieldwork. This painful 
reality pushes our reflection in two different directions. First, it is possible 
that the care experiments of our participants failed in the long run. Most 
of them wanted to live and to keep using drugs. The care that our par-
ticipants performed for themselves and others using psychiatric medica-
tion allowed them to live their lives using drugs and, consequently, to 
ensure the chronicity of their addictions. But addictions are chronic, not 
endless. The chronicity of addictions has a final point. They can only last 
the lifetime of the addicted person. Psychiatric medications enabled our 
participants to inscribe addictions within the length of their lifetime, but 
did not allow them to extend their lives for much longer.
Our second train of thought brings us to question how politics of 
deservingness influence public policies that target homeless polydrug users 
in Canada, a country with a still robust welfare state, and one of the leading 
countries in harm reduction interventions. If our participants are dying at 
such a pace, these policies might be disserving one of the most vulnerable 
populations of the country. Due to their drug addict status, our participants 
were perceived as not deserving state support and, therefore, were excluded 
from several public services. Conversely, harm reduction programmes 
reached our participants and had positive outcomes on blood- borne dis-
ease transmission. Nonetheless, these programmes neglected not only the 
larger structural forces that influence our participants’ drug use, but also 
critical medical areas closely linked to the harm reduction approach. For 
example, several of our participants discussed with us their need to treat 
the psychological issues that they saw as the root of their addictions, and 
their desire to receive psychotherapy in the community- based organisa-
tions that provided harm reduction programmes. They could not access 
the limited state- funded psychological services, and the only mental health 
resource they received was free psychiatric medication. As described in 
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other anthropological studies, this availability of psychiatric medication is 
part of an ongoing global process of ‘pharmaceuticalization of public health’ 
(Biehl 2007), which aims to circumscribe chronic conditions to the individ-
ual sphere and to overshadow the social inequalities that shape these very 
conditions. However, we would like to conclude this chapter not only by 
criticising the scope of public policies, but also by asking for comprehensive 
interventions that include the needs and desires of chronic drug users and 
target the socioeconomic conditions that perpetuate health inequalities.
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Notes
 1. The authors contributed equally to this work.
 2. To ensure anonymity, we have changed the names of all participants, institutions and sites.
 3. Benzodiazepine is a class of psychiatric substance that has sedative, hypnotic, anxiolytic, anti-
convulsant and muscle relaxant effects. It is used to treat anxiety, insomnia, agitation and alco-
hol withdrawal symptoms. Examples of types of benzodiazepines distributed in Canada are 
clonazepam (Rivoltril), alprazolam (Xanax) and oxazepam (Serax).
 4. A single room in a cheap hotel in Downtown Montreal costs around CA$30 per night. Persons 
who use drugs paid daily and did not permanently live in hotel rooms. They used hotel 
rooms strategically, for a few days, to ‘take a break’ from sleeping on the streets and to wash 
themselves.
 5. At the time of this publication, persons who use drugs in Downtown Montreal have also been 
displaced from Saint- Paul Square.
 6. Canada’s official poverty line is the Market Basket Measure (MBM). According to the MBM, 
a family, or a person who is not in a family, lives in poverty if they cannot afford the cost of a 
basket of goods in their community. When we conducted this research, the annual income of 
all our participants was under CA$17,714, the MBM threshold for a person living in Montreal 
(Statistics Canada 2017).
 7. The lowest dose of prescription opioids costs CA$5, and the lowest dose of heroin (half a ‘point’ 
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 8. Quetiapine, commercialised in Canada under the name Seroquel, is a second- generation anti-
psychotic prescribed for the treatment of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major depressive 
disorder, and off- label as sleep aid. It is considered that quetiapine has no abuse potential, and 
thus this medication is widely prescribed among persons who use drugs. However, increasing 
research shows that quetiapine has been abused among different populations (Hussain et al. 
2005; Keltner and Vance 2008).
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‘These doctors don’t believe 
in PANS’: Confronting uncertainty and 
a collapsing model of medical care
Maria Larusso and César Abadía- barrero1
Introduction
Diagnoses are products of history: they are both a classificatory tool and 
a process that shapes how societies think about diseases and act upon 
those who receive a given diagnosis. Rather than simple and uncontro-
versial, diagnoses are highly complex processes ‘involving hierarchies, 
interests, paradigms, and power’ (Juttel 2018, 9). Social scientists have 
demonstrated that disease entities, rather than existing in nature, are 
‘made’ through the work of diagnosis classification and clinical practice 
(Mol 2002; Nissen and Risør 2018; Smith- Morris 2016). The irregular 
human experience that characterises living with illness, suffering or 
afflictions, is made to fit in to a particular nosology, a landscape of uni-
formity that hides the many ambiguities, guess work, uncertainty and 
‘tolerable’ margin of error involved in setting boundaries for a set of signs 
and symptoms (Risør and Nissen 2018; Smith- Morris 2016).
When something is ‘off’ or ‘wrong’ with people’s bodies and does not 
fit with neatly defined diagnoses, the unspecific umbrella terms ‘disorder’ 
or ‘syndrome’ are used to capture the lack of distinctiveness and variabil-
ity across people (for example, HIV/ AIDS, metabolic syndrome, restless 
leg syndrome and, in our case, paediatric acute- onset neuropsychiatric 
syndrome, or PANS). When new diagnoses emerge, or when biomedical 
standards of care fail to recognise patients’ needs and demands (for exam-
ple, Lyme disease, chronic fatigue syndrome), the whole medical system 
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confronting the unknown and disputing the meaning of specific signs and 
symptoms, what to call them, the disease causation and the best thera-
peutic options (Dumes 2020; Smith- Morris 2016). Even when the medi-
cal community agrees on specific diagnoses and treatment guidelines, 
the debates that surround specific conditions, including causes, progress 
and course of treatment, continue. Hence, diagnoses are ambiguous, and 
fluid in meaning and practice, with clinicians, patients and communi-
ties of care using a given diagnosis to mean different things (Nissen and 
Risør 2018; Smith- Morris 2016). The efforts of biomedicine to present 
diagnoses as ‘value free’ (Risør and Nissen 2018) and undisputable can 
be understood as reflecting how biomedicine deals with uncertainty, and 
how it has a hard time recognising its limits and, as the families we will 
present in this chapter argue, remaining open and being curious.
This chapter presents ethnographic research in the United States 
with families with children affected by PANS, a relatively new condi-
tion that is defying the disciplinary borders between infectious diseases, 
environmental causes of immune dysregulation, neurological problems 
and developmental psychopathology in paediatric care. PANS opens a 
window to examine critically why the hegemony of a biomedical model 
of care structured around sub- specialties is collapsing. In facing the 
uncertainty of the new condition, families’ approach to care emphasises 
the need for comprehensiveness and immediacy; however, biomedicine 
seems to be ill equipped to meet those needs. Rather than offering support 
and facilitating a path to recovery, clinicians often challenge the knowl-
edge of families, negate PANS as a viable diagnosis, and delay adequate 
care, which results in increased harm to both the child and the family. 
Furthermore, the chapter shows how families incur significant debt by 
trying several therapeutic options that are not covered by insurance. This 
signals how the inadequacy of the social welfare and broader safety nets 
in the United States further magnify children’s and parents’ suffering.
A brief description of PANS
In the early 1990s, researchers under the leadership of Susan Swedo of 
the Child Psychiatry Branch of the US National Institute of Mental Health 
reported on the first set of children who shared several psychological 
symptoms associated with GABHS (group A beta- hemolytic streptococci) 
(Swedo et al. 1993; Swedo 1994). She proposed to call this novel dis-
ease PANDAS: paediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorder associ-
ated with streptococcus infections (Swedo et al. 1998). Importantly, all 
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the children shared a very sudden, dramatic symptom onset, increased 
emotional lability, motoric hyperactivity, irritability, distractibility, age- 
regressive behaviour and, particularly, obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD). Over time, it became clear that other viral and bacterial infec-
tions, environmental factors, metabolic disorders and other conditions 
could also trigger similar symptoms, prompting Swedo’s group to pro-
pose the new label PANS (NIH National Institute of Mental Health n.d.; 
Swedo 2012).
The most prevalent neuropsychiatric symptoms reported are OCD 
and/ or a tic disorder, anxiety, emotional lability and/ or depression, 
behavioural (developmental) regression, deterioration in school perfor-
mance, attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder, sensory or motor abnor-
malities, and somatic signs and symptoms, including sleep disturbances, 
enuresis or urinary frequency (Calaprice et al. 2017; Swedo et al. 2015). 
The first episode typically lasts between 2 and 12 weeks, and is severe 
and incapacitating in about 50 per cent of cases. Recurrences, called 
PANS flares, vary in severity and are rather common (84 per cent of the 
cases) (Calaprice et al. 2017). Earlier diagnosis and treatment geared 
towards the specific trigger improves the chances for a full and complete 
recovery (Calaprice et al. 2017, 2018).
The fact that the condition has been recently established within the 
medical community, with the WHO including it very recently (October 
2018) in its ICD- 10 diagnosis code under ‘disorders involving the immune 
mechanism’, raises concerns about the preparedness of paediatricians, 
other health- care providers, and health- care systems as a whole to iden-
tify and adequately treat the children. Indeed, a study with 698 children 
with PANS indicated that clinicians struggled to ‘identify and appropri-
ately treat affected patients’, which might explain why from age of onset 
to diagnosis, these authors found a significant time lag of between 1.1 
and 3.8 years (Calaprice et al. 2017).
Our research focuses on the experiences of families with children 
affected by PANS, including how families make sense of the disease and 
what journeys they have embarked on to help their children recover 
while navigating the complexities of health- care systems. We examine 
what happens to families’ search for answers when health- care profes-
sionals and health- care systems are being challenged by both market 
forces in health care and by the uncertainties brought about by a new 
condition. The acute presentation but chronic course of PANS, along 
with infectious or environmental triggers, neuropsychiatric symptoms 
and autoimmunity, add to anthropological debates about diagnostic 
fluidity, ambiguities, uncertainties and controversies that challenge the 
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traditional biomedical separations between acute and chronic, and infec-
tious and non- communicable, diseases (Manderson and Smith- Morris 
2010; Nissen and Risør 2018; Smith- Morris 2016). Just as with diagno-
ses, as explained above, this edited volume highlights chronicity and care 
as socially constructed spaces that allow researchers to critically examine 
the culture of biomedicine and its increasing reliance on market forces 
(Manderson and Smith- Morris 2010; Mol 2008). In the case of PANS, 
then, chronicity merges with diagnostic uncertainty and complex care 
needs in powerful ways. In this chapter, we examine how health- care 
providers and families negotiate what is known and unknown about the 
diagnosis and clinical course of PANS within a context in which market 
forces determine how much families need to pay out of pocket to pro-
vide care for their children, if they even have sufficient social capital, eco-
nomic resources or indebtedness capacity.
Ethnographic research
We started to investigate the rising ‘epidemic’ of childhood chronic con-
ditions in 2017. From initial clinical reports and anthropological analysis 
(Bock et al. 2008; Perro and Adams 2017), it became evident that clini-
cians and researchers were acknowledging that environmental factors 
were affecting children’s bodies immensely. Paediatricians saw dramatic 
shifts in their clinical practice, from acute and easy- to- treat conditions, to 
epidemics of complex conditions with long- lasting effects and difficult care 
needs. We started to follow some discussions in online forums where pri-
marily families, but also some health- care professionals, debated the new 
conditions, offered support and shared information about local health- care 
networks. Parents would recommend clinicians (sometimes local, often 
not) who they considered knowledgeable and experienced with the diag-
nosis and treatment of PANS. It was also very common for families to share 
stories about health- care professionals who not only disregarded their 
concerns, but also became hostile if families challenged their knowledge 
or tried to propose that their children might have PANS. Online forums, it 
seemed to us, constituted web- based communities of care in which families 
confronted uncertainties through the sharing of knowledge and resources, 
and found much- needed recognition and emotional support.
In 2017 and 2018, we attended conferences in the United States 
and England in which researchers and clinicians presented advances in 
treatment and research, and explained different theories of the physiopa-
thology of PANS. The conferences were attended by some practitioners, 
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but they were significantly outnumbered by families with children with 
PANS. In both the online forums and the conferences, it became clear 
that families were suffering as they confronted the many unknowns that 
still characterise this condition, and the largely unresponsive health- care 
systems, both in the United States and Europe.
With the help of a graduate student, we conducted a more system-
atic analysis of the threads of a US- based online forum of families with 
children with PANS (Dolce et al. under review). This analysis, plus the 
other information we had collected, allowed us to develop a protocol for 
ethnographic interviews in which we focused our attention on families’ 
experiences with PANS, their ‘journeys’ to access care, and their sources 
of support. We used ‘family illness journeys’ as a main data- gathering 
technique, an adaptation of ‘illness narratives’ (Kleinman 1988) and 
‘bureaucratic itineraries’ (Abadía- Barrero and Oviedo 2009). In this 
chapter, we focus on these ethnographic interviews: mean length = 2 
hours, 49 minutes each, 22 children diagnosed with PANS/ PANDAS (9 
girls, 13 boys), 85 per cent white, 10 per cent Latinx, 5 per cent black. 
All families were living in the United States, although two families had 
moved to the United States in recent years to get care from practition-
ers specialising in PANS/ PANDAS. The results we present are from our 
analysis of both preliminary data collected and all 20 interviews, and 
we describe two families in detail as a way to represent what it is like to 
have a child affected by PANS, and the challenges to finding adequate 
sources of care and support. We use PANS, PANDAS and PANS/ PANDAS 
interchangeably, since participating families may have received either 
diagnosis.
Making sense of the unknown
In the interviews, parents would quickly and vividly recall the moment 
when a dramatic and extremely intense cascade of odd behaviours and 
movements, severe anxiety and personality changes took over their chil-
dren, and marked the before and after of a life of worries, anxiety and 
uncertainty. Leah remembered that her 11- year- old son Ethan had just 
started eighth grade and was working with the school district behaviour-
ist to manage his anxiety and difficult transition to middle school. He also 
seemed sick, and over the course of a few days, red bumps had spread to 
his head and neck. At urgent care, the doctors prescribed an antihista-
mine. When the rash spread to his leg and they returned two days later, 
they prescribed a corticosteroid. At soccer, Ethan reported that he ‘kind 
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of blacked out’. He said ‘he had moved and he had no idea what hap-
pened’, which, Leah recalled, ‘freaked the hell out of’ her. Leah’s worries 
increased, and by Saturday she had seen three or four of these episodes. 
The next morning, Ethan’s breathing sounded awful, and they rushed 
him to urgent care, where the doctors said Ethan had two bacterial infec-
tions and prescribed antibiotics and full bed rest. It was discovered much 
later, however, that Ethan had hidden the antibiotics and had not taken 
them – another out of character behaviour that suggested PANS- related 
OCD. Ethan’s parents continued to see episodes and, after consulting 
with an acquaintance who is a paediatric neurologist, Ethan was sent for 
an electroencephalogram (EEG). The neurologist concluded that Ethan 
had a complex movement tic, and that an unusual response to the pred-
nisone might explain everything that had happened. The next morning, 
Leah called the school district behaviourist to let him know what was 
happening, and he asked if Ethan had been tested for PANDAS, which 
Leah had never heard of. He explained that he had seen kids who got sick 
and then developed mood swings and/ or tics, and found that it was con-
nected to a recent sickness.
Leah hung up, opened a browser in the computer and typed ‘tics 
+ odd behaviour + children’, and retrieved pages and pages of infor-
mation about PANS/ PANDAS. She immediately called the paediatri-
cian, sent him more videos of Ethan, and asked for him to be tested for 
PANDAS.2 Based on the response she received on the phone, she doubted 
the paediatrician knew what PANDAS was. In a video she shared with 
us, we saw Ethan moving from one side of the exam room to the other, 
going up and down from the exam table, making noises and chewing his 
hands. Ethan’s whole body was out of control, and his terrified little sis-
ter insisted to Leah, almost yelling, that Ethan was choking. According 
to Leah, the paediatrician had no idea what he was looking at, and just 
said, ‘he will be OK’. That night, Ethan almost choked himself brushing 
his teeth. Leah managed to page the neurologist on call, who said that it 
sounded like Ethan had OCD. Leah asked, ‘ “Do you mean PANDAS?, and 
he’s like, ‘Oh, we don’t believe that exists.’ ”
Both in the online forum and in our interviews, parents described 
many similar interactions with health- care professionals who ‘do not 
believe’ in PANS/ PANDAS as a diagnosis. OCD, anxiety and complex tic 
disorders, among others, are offered as possible diagnoses, and referrals 
to neurology, psychiatry, cognitive behavioural therapy programmes and 
so on are recommended as part of the therapeutic plan. According to the 
literature, and confirmed in our interviews, patients frequently report 
a clear- cut association between an infection, the development of some 
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neurological, psychological and psychiatric symptoms, and effective 
response to antibiotics (Calaprice et al. 2018). In other cases, however, 
families seem to hit a wall with an unresponsive or partially responsive 
health- care system that delegitimises their suffering (Ware 1992) and 
forces them to search for answers and solutions inside and outside the 
established health- care networks and protocols.
Uncertainties, incompetence or a problem of medicine?
Renée C. Fox (1957) argues that medical students quickly realise that 
training in medicine is about learning how to deal with uncertainties. 
After medical school, physicians continue facing two basic types of 
uncertainty. One:
derives from limitations in the current state of medical knowledge. 
There are many questions to which no physician, however well 
trained, can yet provide answers. The second type of uncertainty 
results from incomplete or imperfect mastery of available knowl-
edge. No one can have at his command all the information, lore, 
and skills of modern medicine. (Fox 1998, 237– 8)
When new conditions emerge, and medical knowledge is trying to make 
sense of them, the two types of uncertainty described by Fox (1998) 
seem to be particularly relevant, even more so when one of biomedicine’s 
social roles is helping contain patient’s anxieties as a result of uncertainty 
(West and West 2002). In our research, however, parents of children with 
PANS/ PANDAS questioned whether we should think of lack of knowl-
edge as uncertainty or as incompetence. Parents also experienced rigidity 
in the medical system, and a lack of humility and empathy from physi-
cians when facing the unknown. This adds to a ‘double burden’ of living 
through a disease and having one’s experience doubted by the institu-
tion that should offer answers (Dumes 2019; West and West 2002). In 
many narratives, families expressed anger at the sense of arrogance 
and dismissal of their pleas to consider their perspectives on their chil-
dren’s health, and they also engaged in larger reflections on the seeming 
impossibility of medicine to be open, acknowledge its own limitations 
and expand current understandings. ‘What’s wrong with these doctors?’ 
was a rhetorical question that many families asked.
After speaking to the on- call neurologist, Ethan was started on an 
anti- hypertensive medication that reduces nerve impulses and controls 
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tics. Things got better, according to Leah, but Ethan still was having ‘3 to 
13 of these tic episodes a day’. When he started to bang his head against 
the wall, they switched to another ‘nerve- calming’ medication, which did 
not seem to help much. The next day, Leah took Ethan to their naturo-
path, who ‘took one look at him’ and told her, ‘This is not a kid with a tic 
disorder … No. He’s sick,’ meaning that he had an untreated infection. 
She ordered labs, and advised Leah to keep Ethan at home and to keep 
on searching for the right diagnosis and the right clinician: ‘She basically 
told me to find a physician who knew what the hell they were doing.’ 
The next day, Leah brought Ethan back to the paediatrician’s office to see 
another doctor in the practice to get ‘another perspective’. But this doctor 
was also dismissive, and concluded that Ethan ‘could be at school’. Adam, 
Leah’s husband, responded incredulously: ‘No, he can’t be at school. He’s 
sick!’ Their narrative could be interpreted as a dynamic characterised by 
frustrated parents reckoning with an unmovable medical establishment. 
This failure to listen and show compassion resonates with long- term dis-
cussions about the crisis of the hegemonic medical model (Menéndez 
1985), in which the technical aspects of disease diagnosis and therapeu-
tics are trumping the intersubjective practices of care and caring (Ayres 
2009; Kleinman 2009; Mol 2008).
The following day, Ethan developed very bad headaches. Leah called 
the paediatrician and neurologist, and both advised her to go to the emer-
gency room (ER). Adam responded angrily to the people at the ER who 
were going to send them home: ‘Listen to me. This is insane. We’re now at 
day 19 [from the onset of his first symptoms].’ Finally, Ethan got admit-
ted, but to neurology, which Leah realised ‘was not what he needed’. They 
did an EEG and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and found nothing, 
but they also ‘gave him fluids, which gave him a bit of a bounce because 
he was sick’. Leah and Adam insisted on being seen by infectious disease 
specialists but, instead, they were thrown more unfitting differential diag-
noses, such as ‘stereotypic movement disorder’, ‘conversion disorder’, 
or a return to the prednisone hypothesis. They decided to go home and 
just follow up with the gastroenterology (GI) out-patient clinic, because 
Ethan was also complaining of stomach pain. Leah elaborated on their 
decision: ‘not that [going home] was against medical advice, they had 
nothing to offer … they had no idea what was going on with our kid’.
They visited family for the holiday weekend and, while there, they 
started to see something new: Ethan was passing out. Leah’s parents came 
to their home to help, and they started to see more cycles of odd move-
ments and passing out. Leah immediately began making phone calls. 
First, she followed up on an application she had submitted to a children’s 
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mental health clinic at a teaching hospital about an hour away. They 
told her, ‘No we don’t think it’s PANS or PANDAS, based on the paper-
work.’ Then she spoke to their neurologist, and he asserted that ‘This 
is a conversion disorder, because nothing else changes like this,’ mean-
ing the course of symptoms changing in such a progressive fashion. The 
next day, at the GI consultation, they faced what Leah describes as ‘the 
first person with a brain’. The GI physician saw Ethan going through the 
cycles of odd movements and passing out, and immediately interrupted 
them and asked them if Ethan was a normal child. ‘And we’re like, yeah, 
and, by the way, I’m going to show you a video of him literally two days 
ago [participating in his soccer team’s division championship],’ and the 
GI responded, ‘This is an infection, because nothing else moves like this.’
Ethan now got readmitted to the local children’s hospital, but 
this time to see the medical management team that did investigations. 
The paediatricians on that team examined Ethan and still saw a bit of 
the rash. They brought in neurology again, even though Leah’s mother, 
who had worked as an administrator at a top medical centre, ‘was liter-
ally screaming in their face’, saying ‘we need infectious disease!’ Leah’s 
mother explained, ‘That is the only way they hear you. I know how to talk 
to doctors, I have worked with doctors my whole life. You don’t penetrate 
the ego unless you scream at their face.’ Despite Leah’s worries that her 
mother’s aggressive approach to advocate for Ethan’s needs was going to 
jeopardise his whole care, she did convince the neurologist, and infec-
tious disease was finally called.
Even though one might think that doctors in some fields are unfa-
miliar with a new disease entity such as PANS/ PANDAS, this narrative and 
our other data suggest that paediatricians, including both primary care 
and specialists, are either lagging behind or actively resisting incorporat-
ing the new disease into their way of thinking about children who, all of a 
sudden, develop neuropsychiatric symptoms. The infectious disease spe-
cialist who saw Ethan that day at the hospital did agree that an infection 
was probably behind Ethan’s diagnostic puzzle, but that did not prompt a 
shift toward treating any underlying infections, and Leah explained, ‘He 
didn’t say PANS or PANDAS either, by the way. He just said yes, obviously 
there was some infection and it caused a tic, and then all the anxiety and 
all of this became a conversion disorder,’ still suggesting that his current 
psychiatric symptoms were not related to an active infection. A paediatric 
psychiatrist was also brought in and concurred with the conversion disor-
der diagnosis. This psychiatrist had been identified as a practitioner who 
treated children with PANS; however, Leah concluded that the psychia-
trist had a limited understanding, and only accepted a PANS/ PANDAS 
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diagnosis for children who presented with the classical manifestations 
and progression of symptoms, and had an active strep infection. Leah did 
not doubt that these physicians were well- intentioned, but, reflecting on 
her own growing knowledge of PANS, and the many failed interactions 
with a long list of doctors, she concluded: ‘They are just incompetent. 
They just don’t know enough.’
Bloodwork completed during Ethan’s hospitalisation revealed 
active mycoplasma infection, but the doctors concluded that his body 
was already fighting the infection, and they did not prescribe antibiot-
ics, which would have been the first line of treatment if Ethan was diag-
nosed with PANS. Instead, Ethan was referred to a partial hospitalisation 
programme for children with combined medical and psychiatric illness 
that provides therapeutic and behavioural interventions. In addition, 
Ethan was sent to the neurology department of a top- rated children’s 
and teaching hospital two hours from their home. The experts from this 
hospital diagnosed Ethan with ‘post-infectious neuropsychiatric syn-
drome’. They explained that they often see neuropsychiatric symptoms 
with mycoplasma and that they are not sure why, but that they think it is 
related to the pain response. They also recommended a partial hospitali-
sation rehabilitation programme, but one that was more pain oriented. 
Leah had entered this new neurology appointment armed with a well- 
developed and researched argument that Ethan had PANS, but she was 
told, ‘We don’t believe in PANS.’
Parents’ frustrations and confrontations with an unmovable medi-
cal establishment are indicative of biomedicine’s belief system (Good 
1994) and the limits of an epistemology that falls short at explaining par-
ticular diseases (Dumes 2019). In the case of PANS, in spite of the clinical 
evidence, both in terms of symptoms and labs, and in terms of improve-
ments after adequate treatment, physicians not only ‘do not believe’ that 
PANS exists, but also become adversarial if families bring up the diag-
nosis, and even turn them away from their clinics. This adamant resist-
ance most likely indicates that by bridging neurological, psychiatric, 
immunological, nutritional, infectious and environmental processes in 
a single condition, PANS destabilises biomedical hegemony (Menéndez 
1985) – that is, a kind of knowledge and practice structured around 
‘modern’ divisions, such as acute infections versus chronic conditions, 
the mind and body dichotomy, and distinct body systems that correspond 
to medical specialties. It is not just that biomedicine has failed to catch up 
with diseases such as PANS, but also that, in order to acknowledge PANS, 
it needs a structural transformation. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of 
the specialty doctors who treat PANS are not mainstream, and practise 
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integrative, osteopathic or naturopathic medicine. As one family said, 
they ‘think outside the box’.
The same day as the neurology appointment, Leah received a call to 
say that the partial hospitalisation programme had a spot open up. They 
were desperate for help, so for two months, Leah stayed with Ethan in 
another state while he participated in this programme, and Adam stayed 
at home to take care of their daughter. The practitioners in this programme 
actually did not doubt that Ethan had PANS. However, insurance did not 
cover treatment for PANS, as it had not been recognised by the American 
Academy of Paediatrics and was not included in the reimbursement nego-
tiations between insurers and providers, so they used the conversion dis-
order diagnosis code to get coverage for the partial hospitalisation. This 
also meant that they could provide only therapeutic and psychopharma-
cological interventions that corresponded to conversion disorder; they 
could not provide PANS treatments, such as those to fight infections or to 
support the immune system. ‘There was progress’, Leah acknowledged, 
but only because Ethan developed coping skills for managing his symp-
toms. After the two months, she recalled, ‘It’s just not enough progress … 
to function in the real world. He was not really better. So [we] went home.’
Adam then called the unit at the National Institute of Health that 
was financing PANS research. He was given a list of physicians who 
treated PANS in the states surrounding where they lived, but all of them 
had stopped taking new patients or had very long waiting lists. Leah 
called a friend of a friend who also had a son with PANS and had been 
active in the PANS advocacy community. She recommended their own 
doctor, one of the well- known physicians who treated children with 
PANS, but she warned that this doctor was expensive and did not take 
insurance. First- time appointments for these uncovered doctors are typi-
cally between US$1,200 and US$1,500, plus all the lab tests they order, 
some covered and some not, and the hundreds of dollars worth of sup-
plements and herbal antimicrobials often prescribed, making this route 
prohibitive for many families. For this doctor, the waiting time was three 
to four months, but Leah ‘got lucky’ because of a cancellation, and she got 
an appointment in a month:
So in April [six months after Ethan’s first symptoms], we went to 
their office and they said, ‘he is sick.’ Number one, he needed anti-
biotic. They put him on 500 milligrams a day of azithromycin. They 
also put him on a bunch of herbal stuff because they [the medical 
team] are a combo of an MD [medical doctor] and an ND [naturo-
pathic doctor]. And honestly within four days we saw Ethan back.
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When we asked her to explain how ‘Ethan was back’, Leah said, ‘He was 
feeling better. The episodes, as we came to call them, were gone. That 
was huge. Unbelievable.’
Nonetheless, Ethan was not cured. Like most of the families we 
interviewed, they still had to manage symptoms, ups and downs, and 
occasional flare- ups. Leah and Adam continued with their out-of-net-
work ‘medical team’ and uncovered costs (such as supplements), but 
after meeting a US$300 deductible, they did get partial reimbursement. 
At the time of the interview, a year after the first episodes, they felt that 
Ethan was ‘progressively getting better’. Still, Leah reflects on the expe-
rience: ‘It’s all negative. He’s been through hell, as have I.’ Although 
she recognised that finally finding their medical team was positive, she 
concluded: ‘But beyond that, I don’t have any faith in doctors anymore. 
I can’t imagine that [Ethan] does [either].’
A collapsing model of medical care, inadequate social 
welfare and family destruction
Similar to Leah and Adam’s story, Carla described a challenging jour-
ney to get proper care for her son Simon. However, the ways in which 
PANS and lack of support affected them economically were far more pro-
nounced. Simon had many medical conditions, including autism, and 
even though caring for him was difficult, Carla, a successful professional, 
was managing. ‘But the short story of our disaster is PANDAS, because 
Simon was doing really good, and I was so happy. I was working. Simon 
was happy at school and he did Christmas plays, and I’m like, oh my God, 
it’s a dream, we can actually survive autism.’ Simon’s symptoms began 
with a weird rash. Over a couple of weeks, the rash got bigger and ‘He 
started to get a little bit more of OCD and started developing weird fears.’ 
As months went by, Simon became more fearful and anxious. His OCD 
was out of control, and he started to have psychotic episodes and even-
tually refused to go to school, an out-of-district placement for children 
with special needs where Simon was thriving. Seven months later, after 
many frustrating appointments, Simon got an appointment with a phy-
sician who treated PANS/ PANDAS. Simon’s bloodwork came back posi-
tive for streptococcus, babesia and mycoplasma. Fortunately, this doctor 
was covered by insurance. After antibiotics, Simon improved, but by this 
time he had lost much of the developmental progress he had made, and 
managing him was more difficult. His school did not understand the 
changes in his behaviour. Carla did her best to educate the school about 
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PANS/ PANDAS, and worked with them on developing a behaviour inter-
vention plan for Simon’s aggressive episodes, which were triggered by 
severe anxiety and OCD. The plan mandated that at no point should they 
restrain him or put him in their isolation room, which would magnify his 
fears. However, soon after, Simon was restrained and put in isolation. 
The same day, Carla decided to pull Simon out of the school. She recalled, 
‘They just couldn’t get it.’ In her view, the school was used to treating all 
behaviours the same way, and even though they ‘went over and over and 
over what the reasons were for’ Simon’s behavioural changes, the school 
was not able to adapt their approach. Even though she brought in test 
results and paperwork from Simon’s doctor, the more Carla explained 
‘No, this is PANDAS … this isn’t autism … this is PANDAS,’ the more she 
felt that the school personnel disregarded her as a ‘crazy’ mother.
So Carla gave up on the school, and tried to home school and keep 
working. Even though her employer was extremely flexible, she reported:
I just couldn’t do it. I was getting sicker and sicker, and my cardiolo-
gist said, you’re going to kill yourself and he’s not going to have a 
mother. So in March of 2015, I resigned. My hope was, if I give him 
full time, we’ll get this PANDAS thing straightened out, you know, 
like three months, maybe four or five months, and then I’ll go back 
[to work]. And he just never got better [sighs]. And he just kept get-
ting new problems after new problems after new problems. I blew 
through retirement, and then, I’d say by June 2017, we were like 
dead poor. So now we have food assistance, he has SSI [supplemen-
tal security income]. And we are poor. We just live off US$560 of 
child support [from his father] and Simon’s SSI, which is a constant 
fight. I got to tell you, being poor is a full- time job.
Even though Simon’s initial appointments for PANS were paid for by 
insurance, this case should not be thought of as ‘covered’ care. Since 
Carla is very good with numbers, she calculated for tax purposes that she 
had spent tens of thousands of dollars in medical care for Simon, which 
was the result of care being partially covered. Many of the diagnostic and 
therapeutic needs, such as special diagnostic procedures, herbal medi-
cations, homeopathy and supplements that many of the clinicians who 
treat children with PANS/ PANDAS believe to be important for supporting 
children’s immune system are not covered. Then, a combination of hav-
ing to quit her job to be able to better care for Simon, and the amount of 
uncovered expenses, explains how Carla went from having a good salary 
and owning a house to going bankrupt and living in a family member’s 
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basement in such a short period of time. In this part of the narrative, 
we see how people experience the functioning or malfunctioning of the 
health- care system and the larger welfare system. On the one hand, it is 
clear that people’s social, economic and cultural capitals are all impor-
tant tools to navigate health- care systems successfully (Abadía- Barrero 
and Oviedo- Manrique 2008), but clearly, in complex care, social sup-
ports outside of the health- care system are of extreme importance for the 
family’s wellbeing.
Yet, in Carla’s case, poverty continued to be the most important fac-
tor that determined the kind of care she could afford for Simon. Although 
Carla was divorced from Simon’s father and had custody, Simon still 
had private insurance through the health benefits provided through his 
father’s employer. Carla was also able to get public insurance (subsidised 
government insurance that pays providers directly for the care of peo-
ple who qualify based on limited income) as a secondary insurance to 
pick up whatever the private insurance did not cover. However, the doc-
tor who they had been seeing for PANS treatment was suddenly dropped 
from the insurance company’s coverage network, and he became ‘out of 
pocket’. According to Carla, the insurance company dropped the physi-
cian for being an outlier, meaning that he acknowledged PANDAS and 
was ordering tests and prescribing treatments that were making him 
unprofitable for the network, a situation that has been described in 
other contexts (Ardila- Sierra and Abadía- Barrero 2020). Because of his 
removal from the network of covered providers, Carla explained, ‘It’s 
really difficult now. [We see him only] twice a year because we’re poor.’ 
Before, when he was part of the insurance network, Carla could schedule 
appointments based on medical need; now, she has to make the ‘choice’ 
of seeing him based on what she can afford, spacing out visits as much 
as possible, rather than scheduling appointments according to Simon’s 
medical needs. ‘We see him for 10 minutes for US$175, but if you go 
even a speck over 10 minutes, it’s US$350.’ When they told her this at the 
last visit, she said ‘I don’t have US$350.’ The clinic agreed not to charge 
over US$175, but Carla agonised. ‘I’m scared of next time. And I have to 
be super prepared when I go in. This time I wasn’t, because I had a lot 
of questions for him, and I talked a little longer than I was supposed to, 
and I didn’t know about [the increase in the fee].’ The prospect of rising 
expenses and being stuck in poverty prompted Carla to acknowledge, ‘I 
don’t know how much longer we’re going to be able to do it.’
In this narrative, affordability of medical care aligns with research 
that indicates that the market of insurance companies (Waitzkin and 
Working Group for Health Beyond Capitalism 2018) is the social force 
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that shapes everyday moral debates about how much care people can 
afford (Abadía- Barrero 2015; Mulligan and Castañeda 2017). Families 
also reported the experience of providers needing to stick to codes and 
covered procedures that might not fit the medical needs of their patients, 
as in Ethan’s case. Providers who are ‘kicked out’ of the insurance net-
works, or who decided from the very beginning not to bother with insur-
ance in order to provide what they consider adequate care, also manage 
complex moral agendas in health- care delivery. Since these uncovered 
physicians are overbooked, and their waiting times are very long, they 
impose time limits so that they can be available to other patients. In addi-
tion, first appointments are often two to three hours long, which is con-
sidered necessary to gather a full history, progression of symptoms, and 
often a recounting of tests, misdiagnoses and complex treatment jour-
neys. Insurance will not cover a three- hour first appointment, and fami-
lies too are typically hesitant to pay US$1,500 for a first appointment, 
plus additional hundreds or thousands of dollars in uncovered specialty 
lab tests. However, they reach a point of desperation as they become tired 
of appointments with doctors who do not ‘believe in’ PANS, cannot find 
help covered by their insurance plan, and can no longer tolerate their 
child’s suffering. Even though many families will not be able to afford 
these uncovered physicians, they are undoubtedly helping families in the 
context of a failed medical system that is denying adequate care for chil-
dren with new and complex disorders. The failures of the larger social 
welfare infrastructure are also visible, as families do not receive adequate 
economic support, disability insurance, unemployment insurance or any 
home- based interventions. Importantly, when Carla quit her job to take 
over Simon’s everyday care and school needs, he improved significantly. 
If an adequate welfare system were in place, perhaps Carla’s life would 
not have been destroyed by PANS/ PANDAS.
Carla felt strongly that money had been the biggest barrier to help-
ing Simon: ‘If I had the money, we would do the IVIG [intravenous immu-
noglobulin]’, which, according to the existing protocols, is reserved for a 
handful of non- responsive and severe cases (Calaprice et al. 2018). In her 
mind, she would calculate how many treatments they could afford based 
on the price, ‘you know, US$ 6,000, or whatever it is now’. Carla thought 
of IVIG as the next logical step in Simon’s care, but ‘we can’t go any further 
until we can do that’. Carla, like other parents confronting PANS/ PANDAS, 
is very aware that the children need a range of care practices that are not 
necessarily medical: calm environments, relaxing time, rest, supplements, 
and good-quality food without toxicants and with plenty of microbes – that 
is, ‘organic’, as MDs, NDs and osteopathic doctors at the forefront of these 
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new epidemics are advising (Perro and Adams 2017). In Carla’s case, if 
she had money, she would have Simon ‘on a better diet, because when we 
got poor he couldn’t have all organic, and the supplements that he needs 
more regularly’. The care demands of this generation of children affected 
by PANS/ PANDAS and other complex medical conditions do seem to defy 
reductionist conceptualisations around health- care costs and risk assess-
ments for cost- effective calculations of coverage (Waitzkin and Working 
Group for Health Beyond Capitalism 2018). When asked what she would 
like to see in the future, Carla mused, ‘That it’s more accepted by the main-
stream medical community so … the kids can get treated and actually have 
lives … I don’t think any of our lives are going to change until it’s accepted, 
because right now, the only people who can get fixed are the rich.’
Both Ethan’s and Simon’s families suffered tremendously, witness-
ing the decompensation of their previously thriving child and confront-
ing a medical system that inconsistently recognised and treated their 
child’s disorder. However, Ethan and his family managed the economic 
impacts without going into poverty; Ethan’s school was responsive and 
adapted to his needs; his mother missed ‘just’ six months of work; they 
had better out- of- network coverage and lower deductibles (US$300, as 
compared to US$6,000 under Simon’s father’s insurance plan); they 
did not lose their house; and they could afford the completely uncov-
ered costs, such as supplements and healthy foods. Two families in our 
interview sample filed for bankruptcy, and several others could only 
afford treatment by incurring significant debt, or through family help, 
friends’ support and donations (for example, through GoFundMe). 
These experiences highlight how an insurance- based medical system 
and inadequate welfare system, in combination, fail to protect families 
in the United States who are increasingly facing complex childhood ill-
nesses that destabilise the hegemony of biomedical care and its market 
‘logics of care’ (Mol 2008).
Conclusion: Diagnoses as uncertainty, chronicity and 
hope for the future
Carla thinks of PANS as a ‘life sentence. That’s what it is. It’s destroyed 
any hope I had of my son having a life, and it’s taken mine away from me. 
I never thought I’d be wanting just plain autism, but this is harder than plain 
autism.’ Carla consistently presented her narrative through the lens of eco-
nomic precarity, but she reflected on the different aspects that make PANS/ 
PANDAS care even more challenging. In terms of what made it harder:
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I’d say money, and then probably medical community support, 
because if the conventional community supported it, you wouldn’t 
have to fight for it so much. It’s like sometimes I wish Simon had 
cancer, you know, because then you’d have all the fundraisers 
[because other people] feel sorry for you. It’s that [doctors] don’t 
understand. It’s like he’s got something worse, you know, to me it’s 
worse. It is insidious and it’s a constant torture, but to have that 
support, that would be great. That would be really great. So money 
and physician support.
Such painful paradoxes in medical care, such as wanting ‘just plain 
autism’, or that Simon ‘had cancer’, refer to the moral assessments of 
deservingness that surround particular diagnoses (see the introduc-
tion to this book). In addition, for people living in poverty, certain dis-
eases mean not only better medical care, but also access to economic 
resources that are made available to particular groups of patients out 
of moral assessments or histories of advocacy and activism (Abadía- 
Barrero 2011).
For most families in our study, the uncovered and exorbitant costs in 
a market- based health- care system, and the lack of a medical establishment 
that ‘listens’ and ‘acknowledges’, are prime determinants, not only of the 
child’s care, but of the overall family’s struggle to ‘survive’ PANS/ PANDAS. 
The uncertainty around the child’s future worsens when the medical estab-
lishment ‘doesn’t believe in PANS’. For other patients, it was extremely puz-
zling that clinicians might acknowledge and even track severe infections 
via the presence of antibodies, but refuse to prescribe any treatment or to 
call the children’s condition PANS/ PANDAS. Families could not make sense 
of this, given that PANS/ PANDAS is recognised, and is included in official 
websites, such as that of the US National Institute of Health.
The aggressiveness with which some doctors interacted with the 
families, and the denial of PANS/ PANDAS as a legitimate diagnosis, 
might be understood, following Veena Das (1995), as a reaction to a sort 
of ‘poisonous knowledge’ that could destabilise biomedicine’s belief sys-
tem – a certain ‘code of silence’ around a knowledge that must remain 
hidden in order to preserve the structuring order of medicine. With 
PANS/ PANDAS, the idea of medical specialties with ultra- specialised 
knowledge seems very ineffective in dealing with a complex syndrome 
that not only cuts across specialty boundaries, but also asks for a remake 
of the understanding and treatment of diseases. Indeed, an infectious 
disease that leads to autoimmunity and a set of neurological and psychi-
atric manifestations challenges many of the diagnostic and therapeutic 
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silos and pathophysiological explanations of diseases. For example, the 
pathophysiology of the gut– brain axis is changing how mental illness is 
understood (Kelly et al. 2015; Liu and Zhu 2018). Indeed, many chil-
dren with PANS/ PANDAS are prescribed pre- and probiotics to reconsti-
tute a healthy microbiota and seal the blood– brain barrier, considered 
an important part of treatment by many PANS/ PANDAS clinicians. While 
the infectious diseases specialty has been established based on the need 
to destroy pathogens, a healthy microbiota helps in processing the food 
we eat and signalling all the components of the neuro- immuno- endocrine 
axes or immune- neuroendocrine network (Kelly et al. 2015; Liu and Zhu 
2018; Perro and Adams 2017).
Medicine is supposed to help families manage uncertainties (West 
and West 2002), and health care is supposed to be part of comprehensive 
welfare systems that avoid catastrophic expenses and help families navi-
gate difficult and extraordinary times. However, both biomedicine and 
the insufficient US welfare system are failing families with children with 
PANS/ PANDAS. Not only is the suffering of children and families not 
being acknowledged, but also families’ life projects are being derailed as 
they need to search for answers and pay out of pocket for adequate care. 
In this process, many leave their jobs and undergo significant financial 
strain, even bankruptcy. Perhaps the increasing rates of new and chronic 
childhood diseases will force a structural transformation of biomedicine 
and the health- care system that supports it. Privileging a ‘logic of care’ 
over the ‘logic of profits’ seems a step in the right direction. While most 
families hope for a cure for PANS/ PANDAS, and full insurance coverage, 
all do agree that the current medical system is failing them.
Notes
 1. Both authors are considered first authors and both made equal contributions to the chapter.
 2. Although there is no test for PANS/ PANDAS, bloodwork can identify active infections or 
immune system alterations and clarify course of treatment.
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Chronic living in zombieland: Care 
in between survival and death
Marcos freire de Andrade neves
Introduction
A former builder, Paul Lamb1 lives in a house on the outskirts of Leeds, 
England. Ever since 1990, when he broke his spine in a car accident that 
left him almost completely paralysed from the neck down, Lamb has 
been living under constant care in his now adapted home. After the acci-
dent, as he recovered from multiple injuries, a medical specialist gave 
Lamb 12 years to live, suggesting he should use this time to put his affairs 
in order. While Lamb’s tetraplegia embedded his new living in chronicity, 
the 12- year prognosis confined his life within a specific temporality. The 
accident was a turning point in his life: he would no longer be able to 
work in the same profession as before, or even to walk; his living would 
need to be rearranged, and his dreams, expectations and desires revis-
ited. As he reorganised his everyday living in chronicity, reconciling his 
new routine with different habits and an unfamiliar way of being in the 
world, pain emerged to be a fundamental concern.
Lamb’s chronicity meant experiencing pain as a constant and dis-
tressing feeling that permeated his new day- to- day life and informed his 
daily living. Pain was no longer occasional and peripheral, but constant 
and pervasive. It evolved to be a major aspect of his everyday living, cre-
ating a form of suffering that had to be responded to and cared for – and, 
as such, care had to be organised around this new reality. With the goal of 
improving his quality of life, care was provided through a configuration 
of health- oriented practices and technologies that pervaded almost every 
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assistance. Lamb’s chronicity placed him inside a configuration of care 
devised to preserve his life and improve his wellbeing, particularly via 
the implementation of, and his adherence to, a specific drug regimen 
designed to alleviate his pain. But as his pain grew stronger and ever 
more intense, higher dosages of medications were needed.
Echoing the notion of care as tinkering (Mol et al. 2010), frequent 
adjustments in Lamb’s caring routine were made necessary to better 
respond to his new living circumstances. A main focus of such adjustments 
was pain medication. In order for them to be effective, Lamb had to comply 
with strict medical and pharmaceutical instructions that would provide a 
clear blueprint to diminish his suffering and improve his quality of life. His 
adherence to this regimen was also necessary for his own survival, mak-
ing him an active participant in a project of staying alive (Stevenson 2012, 
601). Over the course of this project, however, drugs ended up playing an 
ambiguous role. As higher dosages were needed to diminish his pain, the 
side effects from continuous drug consumption started to become appar-
ent. Over time, Lamb’s short- term memory began to fade. He started to 
feel numb and confused, depersonalised and, in his own words, zombie- 
like. He soon came to realise that any drug- based response to his pain 
could only be effective if he was, for all intents and purposes, sedated.
The drug regimen designed to increase his quality of life also 
became the main source of a lost sense of self and personal dignity. By 
targeting the suffering produced by constant and intense pain, this con-
figuration of care ended up creating the conditions for a different kind 
of suffering to emerge, one that made him question how far he would be 
willing to go to collaborate with this project – to collaborate in staying 
alive. Following Lamb’s trajectory, this chapter discusses a situation in 
which the interplay of chronicity and care responded to a specific form of 
suffering by creating a different one, ultimately making a person’s desire 
to stay alive – to survive – cease to be absolute and to become conditional. 
In this sense, Paul Lamb’s trajectory is a prism of the circumstantial fac-
tors that shape a person’s experience in chronicity and care, but one that 
raises a fundamental question: what follows when the desire to die a spe-
cific kind of death is articulated as a form of deservingness within politi-
cal formations and configurations of care designed to be life- oriented?
Living in chronicity; living with affordances
The first I time I heard Paul Lamb’s name was during a conversation 
with Dr Libby Wilson, a retired physician who, in 2000, founded the 
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organisation Friends at the End (FATE), which advocates for end- of- life 
choices in Scotland.2 Dr Wilson used to check on Lamb, who was then 
a member of FATE, regularly, either by phone or in person, visiting him 
in England. During one of our meetings in Glasgow, Dr Wilson seemed 
rather concerned about Lamb’s situation: ‘If he gets a urinary tract or a 
chest infection’, she told me, ‘he would have to go to the hospital, where 
he doesn’t get a voice.’ Besides, if this happened, he would require high 
doses of morphine: ‘But if he takes too much of it, it confuses his brain, he 
says he can’t take too much of it because he doesn’t want to be a zombie.’ 
At that time, I had been talking with several members of organisations 
that either provide or advocate for assisted suicide, so Lamb’s story reso-
nated with me. Thus, not long after this conversation with Dr Wilson, 
I went to visit him.
‘I never thought I would walk again,’ Lamb told me when we met 
in his home, a two- storey house in a quiet residential neighbourhood 
on the outskirts of Leeds. At that time, in 2016, he had lived 14 years 
past the original 12- year prognosis given to him in 1990 in the aftermath 
of the car accident that left him paralysed from the neck down – with the 
exception of his right hand, with which he controls his electric wheel-
chair. Similarly to Jain’s (2007, 78– 9) take on prognosis as something 
that appears to be a concrete scientific fact that can activate terror, Lamb 
remembered how he felt when July 2002, his deadline, arrived: ‘I’m going 
this year,’ he told me, ‘I’m going because my 12 years are up. It was so 
implanted in my head. It was like me being on hot bricks. I haven’t got 
done in life what I wanted to get done, so I don’t feel like I’m ready to go 
yet.’ The affects mobilised by his prognosis fostered an impression that 
he was living a life with a predefined expiration date. No matter what he 
did or felt, what he wished or desired, his life was bound by a straitjacket 
of time. But 12 years after the accident, Lamb was still alive. After out-
living his prognosis – a prognosis he inhabited, experienced and feared 
for over a decade – Lamb was furious: ‘I went flying back to the hospital, 
and I wanted to tell this specialist what I thought of this 12- years- to- live 
thing, how it affected me,’ he shared, visibly outraged.
Lamb’s prognosis embedded his living in a particular temporality, 
one that restricted his life to a deadline established on the basis of what 
he initially perceived to be a concrete scientific fact voiced by a medi-
cal specialist, but which turned out to be, above anything else, a main 
source of anxiety. As Jain (2007, 80) points out, living in prognosis ‘is 
about living in the folds of various representations of time’, and it was 
precisely in between different temporalities, juggling the reality of his 
daily routine with the affects and imaginaries elicited by inhabiting such 
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a prognosis, that Lamb rearranged his living. Outliving his prognosis 
made him realise, despite his first impressions, that this straitjacket was 
actually loose. ‘I’ve lived my life in a way, I took a lot more gambles with 
my body and things, but I must have done something right in a way’, he 
concluded, ‘because I’m over 26 years now, and I still don’t feel like I’m 
going anywhere.’
Lamb’s accident was severe, almost fatal, and had a profound 
impact on his life and everyday living. From that moment on, he started 
to inhabit a diagnostic category that disconnected his individual body 
from the environment around it, affecting his mobility and autonomy 
while, at the same time, emphasising aspects of dependence. Lamb and 
his family were living in the same house at the time of the accident, 
so continuing to live there was a vital step to preserve his wellbeing. 
However, because of his tetraplegia, both his living conditions and the 
environment around him needed to be reorganised. As critical disability 
theories of affordances have shown, disability is not something located 
within the individual body, something that can be defined in terms of 
individual ‘lacks’ and ‘abnormalities’, but rather is ‘a problem of society’ 
that emerges from discrimination, oppression and various other obsta-
cles and barriers (Dokumaci 2019, 165). In this sense, disability emerges 
from the disconnection between the individual body and the environ-
ment around it (Stoffregen 2003) – or, in the words of Vivian Sobchack 
(2017, 62), from the realisation that the world is not your dance floor.
As Lamb’s tetraplegia had an acute impact on his mobility, his house 
ceased to be a resourceful environment that facilitated his autonomy. 
Rather, his tetraplegia uncoupled his individual body from the material 
possibilities afforded by his house, a disconnect that ended up restrict-
ing his possibilities of action and reframing his disability in terms of 
dependence. Even with the assistance of a wheelchair, he could no longer 
move autonomously inside the house, thus exposing a problematic link 
between his individual body and the socio- material assemblage that com-
posed the environment around him – the wheelchair that allowed him to 
move, the stairs that prevented him from using the wheelchair. As the 
material environment around him put in place barriers that hindered his 
mobility instead of facilitating it, his house was no longer an affordance 
(Dokumaci 2020); it was no longer his dance floor. In order to continue 
to live there with his family, Lamb had to realign his house to his mobility 
needs, which included the installation of a small lift.
Lamb’s chronicity and disability made dependence a particu-
larly severe condition, so to have his house back as an affordance that 
facilitated his mobility was a vital step in creating an environment that 
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promoted his autonomy and wellbeing. Nonetheless, besides the mate-
rial conditions of disability – such as Lamb’s house – Dokumaci (2020) 
suggests that intimacy and care play important roles in the making of 
disability worlds, to the extent to which people can also be seen as affor-
dances. If dis/ ability is distributed according to heterogeneous socio- 
material configurations, rather than something located in the body alone, 
home- and- care become metonymic of the affordances that produce 
dis/ ability in relation to individual bodies. To adapt his house was to fix 
the problematic link between Lamb’s body and its environment, dimin-
ishing his dependence by realigning the material conditions to his mobil-
ity needs. By doing so, Lamb could once again move autonomously inside 
his own house, a situation similar to what Winance (2006) describes as 
an able person- in- the- wheelchair. In this sense, realigning the material 
affordances of his house with his individual body was vital in producing 
an environment where Lamb could ably move. But even though this re - 
alignment was a fundamental step towards his wellbeing, other forms of 
care were equally needed to preserve his health – in particular, to avoid 
the development of pressure sores on his skin and to diminish the risk of 
contracting infections.
After recovering from his multiple injuries and returning home 
from hospital, Lamb was eligible for the National Health Service’s (NHS) 
continuing health- care package due to his chronic health needs, which 
would allow him access to social and medical care free of charge, includ-
ing at home. To be eligible for this state- funded care, a person needs 
to be assessed by a team of health professionals, with a decision made 
according to the complexity and intensity of each individual case. This 
includes not only a person’s current health situation, but also future risk 
factors. Although Lamb was eligible for this public- funded ‘package of 
care’, access to care can be challenging (Kennedy’s chapter in this volume 
offers an interesting glimpse into some of these challenges in the context 
of patients with dementia), and the first care agency he went to did not 
have enough personnel to attend to his needs, making it necessary for 
him to go to hospitals on a regular basis. When Lamb protested that the 
agency was funded with public money to offer continuous care, and was 
responsible for his health and safe being, they suggested that he move 
to a nursing home instead. This was his red line, as Lamb recalled tell-
ing them: ‘If it ever comes to that, if you come to my home to take me to 
a nursing home, you’ll find that when you come, I won’t be here.’ They 
understood what ‘not being here’ implied. The message was loud and 
clear, so they interrupted him, warning that he should stop, otherwise 
they would have to report him. ‘Well’, Lamb remembered answering, 
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‘do what you like, but you’re not gonna put me in a nursing home. Ever. 
Nursing homes are just a waiting room before your final death.’ Lamb’s 
protest was fruitful and he was eventually able to find a different public- 
funded care agency, only this time with the necessary resources to pro-
vide him with full- time home care.
Home care was essential for Lamb’s wellbeing, as it redistributed 
the pieces that produced his dis/ ability in a different fashion, connect-
ing them in a way that diminished his dependence and enhanced his 
autonomy. To this end, while his house played a primary role in this new 
redistribution, this assemblage could only be complete with medical care 
provided by professional caregivers and, fundamentally, pharmaceuti-
cals. During our conversation, Lamb told me:
I want to hang on to life as much as I can. And from the beginning 
I’ve always been the same. Always. And I’ve been on a bit of jour-
ney with all this that’s been going on. But even if I come out of it, 
and I’m certainly a lot better off now, pain- wise, much more under 
control, although it’s still bad. But what my biggest fear is … I’ve 
got a pressure sore a few years ago, on my butt, and it lasted for 
five months. And it was only a small one. And I’ve seen people with 
huge ones, you know, they are not gonna heal. Not a chance. And 
this little one was concerning, very concerning, because I was on 
one side and then on the other for five months, in bed, and after 
that it took me a month or so to get used to getting up again and 
sitting in the chair and building my strength up. But I’m only too 
aware of what can happen with my body.
While Lamb’s tetraplegia caused him to lose sensitivity and control of 
his body, it conversely made his body more visible to him. In this regard, 
Lamb’s life and living in chronicity enabled a new relationship between 
him and his own body to surface, a relationship that relied on several 
affordances to diminish dependence and restore his autonomy. And in 
this new relationship, his individual body emerged as a crucial matter of 
concern that relied on pharmaceutical care in order to preserve its health 
and to manage its pain.
The pharmaceutical embrace
Anthropological discussions have shown various ways to empirically 
apprehend and conceptualise care, often emphasising its complex, 
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unstable and ambiguous qualities. Stevenson (2014, 3), for instance, 
defines care ‘as the way someone comes to matter and the correspond-
ing ethics of attending to the other who matters’. It is, thus, not a matter 
of good intentions or necessarily a positive aspect, but rather a complex, 
messy and ambivalent set of relationships within which one comes to 
matter for various reasons. This ambivalence of care, its aversion to easy 
categorisations, was likewise stressed by de la Bellacasa (2011, 100), 
who suggested that ‘a way of caring over here could kill over there’ – mak-
ing it necessary to ask ‘how to care’ in each specific situation. But at the 
heart of this ambivalence, however differently it may be articulated or 
manifested, lies what Ticktin (2011, 3) defines as the primary subject of 
care, the suffering body.
While losing control of his own body made Lamb more aware of it, 
losing sensitivity made pain more pervasive. ‘Every hour I’m awake, every 
minute I’m awake, I’m in pain,’ he told me. We were on the first floor of 
his house, in his study. He was sitting across from me, in his wheelchair, 
and a caregiver remained nearby in case he needed any assistance. They 
were both gentle and good- humoured, friendly and affectionate, but 
when Lamb started talking about pain, his voice switched to a different, 
rather intense tone. He went on:
There isn’t one doctor or pain specialist that’s ever taken that away. 
And every tablet of whatever it is, I guarantee, the only thing they 
do is to start numbing the brain and make you go in what I call zom-
bie side, and then you sleep, but then you’re not you. I have been 
with a pain specialist for a lot of years now and he can’t get it to 
that. When doctors argue the case against me, they say, we doctors 
can at least take away the pain. And then, if you’re terminal, with 
cancer or something, then you go to this palliative care. To so many 
people, they don’t take away the pain. The only time you’re actu-
ally away from it is when you’re not awake. When you’re asleep. So 
after 26 years … all these medications are a form of suppressing 
your brain, calming you down, and making you almost zombie- like 
sometimes. My GPs have gone round the clock for 26 years trying 
to, and they have never been able to get through to my pain.
Ever since Lamb’s accident, pain evolved to become a common experi-
ence in his life: an experience that grew ever more intense, pervading 
every aspect of his everyday living and placing his body as a subject 
of caring interventions. If people can be affordances in the creation of 
dis/ ability worlds, Lamb resorted to professional caregivers in order to 
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prevent his family from experiencing his pain with him. Despite its inten-
sity and ubiquity, he opted to shield his family from it: ‘Nobody likes to 
see people in pain,’ he told me, stressing that even after living under care 
for almost 30 years, his children – who were 11 and 9 years old at the 
time of the accident – never even saw a single catheter.
In its manifold ways of manifesting itself, pain is not only physi-
cal and individual, but also complex and social. It inhabits the indi-
vidual body while also encompassing social and political lives, and the 
ways through which we acknowledge and attribute importance to pain 
and suffering, argue Harper et al. (2015, 10) based on Brown’s (1995) 
work, can be a ‘constitutive feature of modern political and social life’. 
For instance, it was precisely a multifaceted understanding of pain that 
inspired the hospice movement and enabled the emergence of palliative 
care as a discipline. Following an encounter with a patient in the late 
1940s, Cecily Saunders, founder of the first modern hospice and cata-
lyst of the movement, proposed the idea of ‘total pain’. According to her 
proposal, total pain was based on the premise that pain should be under-
stood in its full complexity, taking into consideration biographical and 
sociocultural contexts alike in order to organise and provide care (Clark 
1999). To this end, Saunders (2001, 9) suggested four main dimensions 
to pain: physical, mental, social and spiritual.
However effective palliative care can be in certain circumstances, in 
others it may lack the tools to ameliorate someone’s pain. As Rehmann- 
Sutter and Hagger (2013, 3) have shown, there are several factors of suf-
fering that cannot be resolved by palliative care, such as continuous loss 
of function, dependency on caregivers, reliance on medication, severe 
pain and the loss of perceived dignity. According to them, in the US state 
of Oregon, where both palliative care and physician- assisted suicide are 
legally available options, between 1998 and 2009, 88.2 per cent of the 
terminally ill people who carried out assisted suicides had previously 
received high- quality palliative care, a figure that increased to 95.1 per 
cent from 2008 to 2009 (Rehmann- Sutter and Hagger 2013, 3). This 
holistic understanding of pain as something inherently complex that 
inhabits the individual body, but which cannot be limited to it, paved the 
way for new forms of care and medical disciplines (Seymour et al. 2005). 
However, it also promoted a common misconception that sees pain as 
something necessarily manageable, something that can be kept under 
control through the right medical and pharmaceutical means.
This perception of pain as something that can be managed via 
medical care and, more specifically, through the administration of phar-
maceuticals, can be linked to a broader shift that saw public health 
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strategies drifting away from prevention and clinical care and closer to 
drug- based, technical responses to disease and illness (Biehl and Eskerod 
2007, 97– 100). This pharmaceutical embrace suggests, as Biehl points 
out in the context of HIV medication, the consolidation of a discourse 
that sees a patient’s adherence to a ‘regimen of life- extending drugs’ as 
a form of individual salvation that produces ‘new and productive lives’ 
(Biehl and Eskerod 2006, 459). When Lamb’s pain became chronically 
severe – or severely chronic – it was responded to via the implementation 
of a specific drug regimen designed to alleviate his pain and diminish his 
suffering.
In order for this regimen to be effective, Lamb had to collaborate 
with it by following medical prescriptions and, by doing so, taking upon 
himself the responsibility for his wellbeing. This shift towards technical 
solutions, particularly based on pharmaceuticals, can produce situa-
tions where living with less chronic pain can only be achieved through 
overmedication – or, as Lamb puts it, when the person becomes ‘zombie- 
like’. At one level, Lamb’s adherence to a specifically designed drug regi-
men was displayed as the proper and most effective way to mitigate his 
pain. However, in his everyday life in chronicity, his adherence ended 
up producing unintended consequences. ‘This is what annoys me with 
doctors, that can be on television and say, yes, we can reduce the pain,’ 
Lamb protested. ‘They can’t. They can’t.’ This prominence of drug- based 
responses, however effective it can be in certain cases, often contrasts 
with the day- to- day realities of people living with pain, to whom effective 
pain mitigation can only come at a high personal cost. To Lamb, the price 
was his own sense of self and personal dignity:
As well as all that I used to be on, I used to be on a medicated tab-
let called Gabapentin, and I was on 3,000 of that a day. And my 
pain specialist, he noticed my short- term memory has been getting 
worse, and he says to me, ‘That’s simply down to Gabapentin, that’s 
the one, Paul,’ 26 years always on the maximum, so the maximum 
goes up, my medication went up, and he says, that’s what’s taking 
your short- term memory. If you can get off a few of them … After a 
month, I got off a lot, and if you ask any medical people they’ll tell 
you that is a lot. So I’m off now.
While seeking to diminish one form of suffering, this drug- based caring 
response culminated in the emergence of a different one. Thus, it is cru-
cial to understand pharmaceuticals beyond their materiality, as moral 
technologies (Biehl 2005) that acquire meaning when embedded in 
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specific contexts, both absorbing and entangling ideas, values and poli-
cies (Pordié 2014, 51– 3). The focus on technical responses to pain and 
suffering produced medications that are effective, but that failed to con-
sider the conditions and implications of their own efficacy.
Within this broader context of pharmaceuticalisation of care and 
public health, adherence to a drug regimen connects individual bodies 
and chemical actors under the guise of wellbeing, a link that holds the 
potential to produce healthy and productive bodies (Rose 2001, 16). To 
be a citizen thus becomes tantamount to assuming an active role in the 
pursuit of one’s own health (Rose 2001, 6) – or, to put it in Stevenson’s 
(2012, 2014) terms, to actively collaborate in the project of staying alive. 
However, this potential can only be achieved through a hierarchisation 
that favours physical over functional, cognitive and emotional health. 
As pharmaceuticals occupy an ever more prominent position in public 
health and care strategies, a person’s pursuit of their own health and 
wellbeing becomes fundamentally entangled with their collaboration 
with drug regimens – and similar situations can be seen in contexts as 
varied and diverse as Brazil (Biehl 2004), India (Ecks 2014) and the 
United States (Dumit 2012).
In the context of Lamb’s chronicity, to adhere to a drug regimen was 
to perceive himself, and to be perceived by others, as actively collabo-
rating in staying alive by assuming responsibility for his own health and 
wellbeing. To be a good citizen was to experience this pharmaceutical 
embrace by adhering to a specific drug regimen that focused on his physi-
cal health, on his individual body, while neglecting other factors, such as 
his own sense of self and dignity. Nonetheless, to abandon this regimen 
could be tantamount to giving up on himself. Yet if Lamb’s willingness 
to stay alive, to survive, was underlying his collaboration and adherence 
to this drug regimen, what happens if this will to survive gives way to 
something else? When Lamb realised that making his suffering legible to 
medicine ended up triggering a drug- based caring response that jeopard-
ised his own sense of self and personal dignity, he questioned the terms of 
his collaboration and decided to articulate his pain away from medicine 
and into the law.
Judicialising the suffering body
In 1990 the second applicant was involved in a car accident as a 
result of which he sustained multiple injuries leaving him paralysed. 
He is completely immobile with the exception of his right hand 
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which he can move to a limited extent. His condition is irreversible. 
He requires constant care and spends every day in a wheelchair. 
He experiences a significant amount of pain, as a consequence of 
which he has to take morphine. He feels that he is trapped in his 
body and that he cannot enjoy or endure a life that is so monoto-
nous, painful and lacking in autonomy. (European Court of Human 
Rights, on Paul Lamb)3
In the aftermath of Lamb’s accident, as he learned to live in chronicity, 
pain emerged to be a fundamental concern and distressing factor in his 
everyday living, as well as a main source of suffering. His pain needed 
to be cared for, to be managed, but in order to do so, his suffering had 
first to be recognised (Butler 2009). It was necessary to communicate 
his pain, to make it visible, in order to legitimise a form of suffering that 
could bring about an effective caring response. This process of recogni-
tion invests suffering with political, social and moral meaning, and it can 
often take place in diverse sites, such as medicine and law (Harper et al. 
2015, 21– 2) or the media (Richards 2014, 2017). When Dr Wilson first 
told me about Paul Lamb, she was rather upset about the outcome of a 
court case brought by him against the UK government. After 23 years 
living in chronicity with the assistance of full- time, public- funded care-
givers, Lamb decided that compromising his own sense of self and per-
sonal dignity was too high a price to pay for mitigating his pain.
As Biehl (2013) argues, the judicialisation of the right to health 
is an important facet of the process of pharmaceuticalisation of care 
and public health, insofar as the prevalence of drugs as the preferred 
response to disease and illness coexists with a lack of access to them. 
Under these circumstances, the judiciary is often the site where access 
can be established – constituting a form of clinical court that can link 
the goal of improving health with the right technical tools to achieve it. 
Whereas the connection between pharmaceuticalisation and judicialisa-
tion is clear in a context where health is the ultimate goal, this connection 
produces a blindside in which suffering is similarly articulated away from 
medicine and into the law, but instead of claiming access to health, the 
goal is to bring about a certain kind of death. When Lamb joined an on - 
going case in the UK’s High Court, he did so to request judicial authorisa-
tion to receive assistance in dying with the use of lethal drugs.
In the UK, where Lamb lives, it is illegal under the Suicide Act 
1961 to receive assistance in suicide – despite suicide itself being lawful. 
Because of his tetraplegia, Lamb stated in the court case that he was una-
ble to take his own life without third- party assistance – thus preventing 
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him from carrying out a lawful act for which assistance is criminally sanc-
tioned. It was not his intention to die immediately. Rather, he wanted to 
be authorised to do so if and when the pain he constantly feels and, so far, 
has managed to endure becomes unbearable for him. He was still craving 
for life and wanted to remain alive for as long as he could. ‘After 26 years 
now, going to the 27th year, the things that happened to my body … 
I have all kinds of things,’ he told me, ‘so the day when I feel I can’t do 
it anymore, and that day will come, I’ve been told it’ll come, if I got at 
that stage, somebody better put me out of my misery.’ His experience 
in chronicity, while collaborating with a drug regimen that imposed a 
compromise between pain and his own sense of self and personal dignity, 
produced a particular kind of suffering that made his willingness to col-
laborate no longer absolute. Now, fully aware of what could happen to 
his body and fearful that his pain, which remains constant and intense, 
could become unbearable, the circumstances he was willing to endure in 
order to stay alive became conditional. He would manage his pain for as 
long as he could, but was unwilling to return to the ‘zombie- side’.
His initial involvement with the court case, however, was inciden-
tal. It was Tony Nicklinson, a British citizen with locked- in syndrome, 
who initiated the case at the High Court to challenge the law on assisted 
suicide and murder, which did not recognise the possibility of eutha-
nasia (Richards 2014; Ward 2015). After Nicklinson’s case failed, he 
refused nutrition and died six days after the High Court ruling. As Lamb 
recounted, ‘Tony was legally allowed to take his case to the Supreme 
Court, but he didn’t have the strength, he gave up.’ After Nicklinson’s 
death, his widow, Jane Nicklinson, and their solicitor contacted Dr 
Wilson to enquire whether she knew anyone who could help them tak-
ing the case back to court. Dr Wilson contacted Lamb, and the three of 
them went to visit him in Leeds. During this visit, Jane Nicklinson and her 
solicitor asked Lamb if he would be willing to help them in the case. He 
recalls them saying that they would name him ‘L’, so he would not have ‘to 
come out in the open’. Following Lamb’s consent, he became L for a few 
weeks, until the solicitor got back in touch with him to inform him that 
everyone was thinking that L was a fictitious character. She wanted him 
to ‘come out in the open’. Lamb was not sure what coming out in the open 
entailed, so he asked her. ‘Well, it means there might be a few people 
coming to see you,’ she clarified. Once again, Lamb consented.
To his surprise, he started to receive phone calls every half hour 
from 11 a.m. to 7.30 p.m. He was on television and in newspapers. He 
started to fear people would go to his house and place signs on his front 
lawn stating what a bad person he was for ‘going against God and all 
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that’. But it was quite the opposite, he conveyed with a shy smile on his 
face. People were being mostly supportive. ‘That’s why I joined in,’ Lamb 
concluded: ‘to get it going again in the system. But they sent us to the 
High Court first and, lo and behold, it failed again.’ During the court pro-
ceedings, he was taken by an overwhelming frustration: ‘I barely nearly 
opened my mouth there,’ he complained. He kept hearing judges saying 
that they had ‘sympathy for the likes of Mr Lamb’, without being able to 
react, despite being present while they expressed their sympathies. He 
remembered thinking to himself, ‘No, he didn’t say that,’ until his frustra-
tion got the better of him and he no longer managed to hold back: ‘Please 
don’t say that word sympathy again. I don’t want your sympathy, I don’t 
want anybody’s sympathy,’ he said, this time out loud. ‘It’s just ridiculous 
if you can’t say something,’ he said to me, finally asking, ‘I mean, do you 
want people to have sympathy for you?’
Similarly to Nicklinson’s original case, their joint case was rejected 
at the High Court and, subsequently, at the Supreme Court in a seven to 
two decision. Around this time, Lamb’s solicitor suggested the possibility 
of taking his case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – but 
to do so would be expensive. Lamb remembers their conversation:
I’ve been on legal aid from the beginning and, on money terms, it’s 
not the kind of money that … Top solicitors earn a lot more on pri-
vate cases. So when the legal aid ran out after the Supreme Court, 
they said they didn’t want to take it to the ECHR now. And that was 
that. And my solicitor said to me, ‘Is there any way you can earn a 
hundred to two hundred thousand pounds?’ And I went, ‘No, apart 
from selling my house, and that’s going to my children and grand-
children.’ And she said, ‘Oh well, we can’t go any further unless you 
can get that money together.’
The same house that played a fundamental role in preserving his well-
being, that was adapted to his new living circumstances, was now at risk 
if he decided to take the case to the ECHR. Lamb already owned that 
house at the time of the accident, which made it easier for him to save the 
money necessary to eventually add the small lift. The financial resources 
necessary for a high- profile court case, however, would be beyond his 
means. ‘How on earth can we raise two  hundred thousand pounds?’ 
Dr Wilson recalled thinking when she heard about this conversation: ‘[The 
solicitor] just sort of abandoned him at that stage, and said, you’ve got to 
get two hundred thousand pounds, it will take about two or three years, we 
are not interested any more. Once it failed, she wasn’t interested in him. 
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She was completely callous, really, about the human side.’ As he lived 
the day- to- day reality of his court case, Lamb’s suffering and chronicity 
became embedded in a complex system that transformed his body into 
a site of dispute between his request to receive assistance in dying and 
political subjectivities, medical rationales and forms of care that see 
life as something that needs to be preserved regardless of individual 
circumstances.
While articulating his suffering to medicine, Lamb placed himself 
inside a configuration of care designed to protect his body and preserve 
his health. However, when the side effects of the proposed drug- based 
response became unbearable, he articulated his suffering away from med-
icine and into the law, but he did so by emphasising a deservingness to 
die under his own terms over an entitlement to health that made him feel 
zombie- like. As Huschke (2014) points out, the construction of deserving-
ness can be performed, and courtrooms are sites where this often takes 
place. For instance, in the case of Christian Rossiter, an Australian citi-
zen who requested the right to die, this was granted following his argu-
ment that he was unable to undertake ‘any basic human function’, such 
as, among others, ‘wipe the tears from [his] eyes’ (Menezes 2011). Court 
cases for the right to die negotiate deservingness and entitlement by per-
formatively contrasting specific lives and trajectories with official law.
On the one hand, as many have argued (Docker 2015; Karsoho 
et al. 2016; Menezes 2011; Richards 2017; Verhofstadt et al. 2017), 
pain and suffering are common tropes in requests for assisted dying, and 
often help to justify the request (Andrade Neves 2020). On the other 
hand, there are other sites where pain and suffering can be articulated 
to attain legitimation – such as the media. Physicians ‘may try to heal 
pain and suffering’, write Harper et al. (2015, 9), ‘but what counts as 
necessary or unnecessary suffering, suffering that should be prevented 
or allowed to continue, can be decided by law’. In Lamb’s case, the court 
did not recognise his suffering as sufficiently legitimate to be granted 
access to the kind of death he requested – the court considered him unde-
serving of a voluntary death. Similarly to his, ten other cases4 request-
ing assisted death, either by euthanasia or assisted suicide, reached the 
European Court of Human Rights – of which, two were initiated in the 
United Kingdom. In several other court cases concerning assisted dying, 
such as Pretty in the UK (Ward 2015), Rossiter in Australia and Chantal 
Sébire in France (Menezes 2011), the responsibility to legitimise suffer-
ing and translate this recognition into a decision over life and death fell 
on judges and not on doctors (Harper et al. 2015). Despite their different 
circumstances and specificities, all of these cases concerned a perception 
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of suffering – psychological or physical – that was articulated away 
from medicine and into the law in order to find an alternative to health- 
oriented care, which dismissed the possibility, or legitimacy, of voluntary 
assisted death.
Final remarks
If initially Lamb’s willingness to stay alive, to collaborate in improving his 
quality of life by adhering to a drug regimen designed to alleviate his pain 
and improve his wellbeing, was absolute, the consequences of overmedi-
cation made him question the conditions under which he would be will-
ing to further cooperate – that is, the conditions he would be willing to 
endure in order to preserve his own survival. Harper et al. (2015, 21– 2) 
suggest that both medicine and law are sites where pain and suffering 
can be made legible in order to attain social and moral meanings. By 
making his pain legible to medicine, Lamb was offered a caring response 
that could only be effective through overmedication. When he requested 
judicial authorisation to die, Lamb articulated his suffering away from 
medicine and into the law, walking down a different path to legitimise his 
suffering body not only as a subject of care, but also as deserving to die a 
specific kind of death, if he so wished.
According to Sarah Willen (2019, 17), personal sense of dignity is 
elusive, and the empirical challenge would be precisely to explore how 
this sense is lived as ‘a powerful drive to make life bearable’. With his life 
caught up between chronicity and care, it was precisely Lamb’s personal 
sense of dignity that was negatively affected. When the will to survive 
gives way to a wish to die a specific kind of death – making death emerge 
as a person’s ultimate goal, instead of something to be avoided at all 
costs – the individual body can articulate its suffering away from an enti-
tlement to health and into a deservingness to die. However, by living his 
life in chronicity and care, Lamb’s personal sense of dignity was affected 
by, on the one hand, the pharmaceutical embrace that made him zombie- 
like and, on the other hand, the financial realities of the court case and 
the law’s lack of recognition of him as someone who deserves access to 
assisted death. As Lamb protested during our conversation:
It should be a fundamental right of somebody to say, I’ve been going 
on for years with this chronic pain, I’ve had enough, I had a life, and 
if you can justify yourself to the professionals as to why you can’t do 
it anymore … I believe the law should be there to help people.
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Paul Lamb’s trajectory in chronicity and care chronicles how different 
discourses, from care to live to a deservingness to die, can be mobilised 
and rearranged in the name of suffering.
In this sense, Paul Lamb crystallises a situation where chronic liv-
ing was closely linked with the use of pharmaceuticals – but instead of 
preventing suffering, they changed its form instead. Whereas a medical 
response to Lamb’s pain highlighted an ambiguous role where pharma-
ceuticals were both the solution and source of suffering, when articulated 
to the judiciary, Lamb once again resorted to pharmaceuticals, only this 
time, instead of seeking to employ them as tools intended to give life, they 
were to be used to terminate one. As he attempted to articulate his suffer-
ing away from medicine, following a long judicial path that led him from 
the High Court to the ECHR, his life became enmeshed in a dispute where 
multiple social forces were at play, jeopardising his affordances – such as 
his house – and further compromising his own sense of personal dignity.
By living a life in chronicity under care and articulating his pain 
to both medicine and law, Lamb’s body turned into a site where politi-
cal subjectivities, entitlements and deservingness were negotiated and 
disputed. When articulating his suffering to law, it was made clear to him 
that the death he requested was not a death he could have. ‘I wonder 
sometimes what do you have to do to shake something up,’ Lamb told me 
during our conversation, which he ended with a final reflection:
I mean, for all intents and purposes, would it make a difference if 
I was to say ‘By the way, country, I’m going to Switzerland in these 
next 20 days unless you can do something proper to sort this out.’ 
How far would they allow me to go? The whole way? Would any-
body care?
Notes
 1. Paul Lamb’s case has been widely publicised in the United Kingdom, and he is a well- known 
figure in the right- to- die context. When we met, Paul Lamb signed an informed consent form 
in which he opted for the use of his real name, waiving anonymity. Because of this, and in order 
to preserve the specifics of his own trajectory that were made public over the course of several 
court cases and media appearances, his real name is used throughout the chapter.
 2. From 2014 to 2017, in the context of my doctoral research, I conducted an ethnography of 
transnational assisted suicide. This research focused on the circulation of documents, people 
and technologies across national borders, particularly Switzerland, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. It was during this research, as I followed these flows against the background of 
organised assisted suicide, that I met and interviewed Paul Lamb at his house. This chapter is 
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 3. Application no. 1787/ 15, page 2.
 4. Pretty v. the United Kingdom (2002); Haas v. Switzerland (2011); Koch v. Germany (2012); 
Gross v. Switzerland (2014); Lambert and Others v. France (2015); Sanles Sanles v. Spain 
(2000); Ada Rossi and Others v. Italy (2008); Gard and Others v. the United Kingdom (2017); 
Afiri and Biddarri v. France (2018); Mortier v. Belgium (2019).
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We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their 
ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where 
a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, 
and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, 
by using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped 
entirely anew, but only by gradual reconstruction. (Neurath 
1973, 198– 9)
Neurath’s ship is, forever, fixed at sea, mended from within its affor-
dances; never to be repaired in a dry dock. This well- known analogy 
reminds us that questions of health, like questions of knowledge or iden-
tity, are encountered, confronted and (re)constructed in the midst of 
things – entangled in the indeterminacies of social relations, the contin-
gencies of historical process and the potency of affect. Health – the sine 
qua non of ‘a good life’ – conditions our embodied capacities to live well, 
to be in and have different bodies and, as a consequence, to be in and 
have different worlds (Merleau- Ponty 2012). When things go wrong – as 
they invariably do – we must take our moorings from where we are – in 
the thick of living. For those who have to manage chronicity – live and 
suffer with and care for it – these truths are, as Jain (2007) reminds us, 
intimately and enduringly, a feature of living in prognosis.
Neurath’s ship is particularly poignant in the context of the rise, 
spread and efforts to manage COVID- 19. Local and global responses have 
been constructed and reconstructed in an ocean of uncertainty, without 
a coherent blueprint for guidance, and with effects which are either miti-
gated or intensified by variable infrastructures of care, support and wel-
fare. Indeed, as our editors, Montesi and Calestani, remind us, COVID- 19 
has thrown the frailty of health-care and welfare infrastructures into 
stark relief. In many parts of the world, it has made visible the very 
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processes which have given rise to this fragility in the first place: the pri-
vatisation of public goods, the failures to provide safe, secure work, and 
the erosion of the social contract between society and the state. A global 
pandemic is indeed a salutary reminder that we have no view from 
nowhere, no dry dock to land. COVID- 19 provides a sobering context 
within which this volume comes to fruition. It is one that further sharp-
ens our perspectives on matters of health as simultaneously matters of 
society, culture, political economy and history; matters that the contribu-
tors to this volume never lose sight of. The trials of chronic living are, 
thus, painfully and profoundly part of the present moment (Manderson 
and Smith- Morris 2010; Manderson and Wahlberg 2020). Opportunities 
to live well in chronicity are increasingly compromised at the fault lines 
of care, as well as by the limits of techno- medical promises. However, it 
is also at these fault lines that vulnerability to harm, systematic neglect 
and exclusion are emerging to foster new solidarities of interest within 
and across nations. Managing Chronicity in Unequal States thus attends to 
chronic health as a cross- national concern. It can be read as a composite 
of journeys, all equipped with navigational points to illuminate the lived- 
with and emergent tensions between political economy and the social 
relations of health care.
Cartographies of chronicity
I will start these journeys in the US, with the problem of paediatric acute- 
onset neuropsychiatric syndrome (PANS). PANS is a diagnostic conun-
drum which unsettles the epistemic authority of biomedicine. Without 
categorical certainties, as LaRusso and Abadía- Barrero show, a diagno-
sis of PANS fails to unlock the institutional or social pathways to care. 
PANS thus reveals the particular ways that regimes of care, and the 
institutional bridges on which they depend, are contingent on the defi-
nitional properties of chronic conditions, pulling problem- definition and 
problem- response into direct alignment. In the absence of an aetiologi-
cal narrative, families shoulder the responsibilities of care as well as its 
costs – financial and moral. This engenders desire for the kind of chronic-
ity one can trust: a cancer or, in the case of this particular neuropsychiat-
ric syndrome, ‘just plain autism’.
Moving to the UK, chronic pain and its pharmaceutical regimes of 
care constitute sites from which other desires – the desire to live or die – 
become profoundly intertwined, and where efforts to alleviate suffering 




the ground of care. In doing so, this does not constitute an imperative for 
better care, but for a better death. Andrade Neves explores the moves the 
patient must make beyond medical and national infrastructures to make 
pain legible as a judicial concern, positioning the law as final arbitrator 
for the deserving subject.
Staying in the UK, and with the navigational labours of care, 
Kennedy attends to dementia care as families manage complex bureau-
cratic and administrative processes to assume the autonomy, right and 
capacity to decide for others. Bureaucracy produces ambivalent affects, 
urging a rethink of how the requirements and distributions of care and 
support can best be recognised and enacted. Bureaucracy is an impor-
tant seen- but- unseen care infrastructure. It is one brought into the fore-
ground by many of the volume’s contributors. It provides a significant 
lens for Flaherty’s work on health- care access and liminality in the US 
Virgin Islands (USVI). Here, citizens live at the margins of US health- care 
provision, and at the mercy of ambiguous logistical and governmental 
arrangements. In the USVI, the provision of a functioning health- care 
system is decoupled from statutory commitments to care, giving rise to 
a haphazard logic of access to life- sustaining medical equipment, drug 
therapies and welfare coverage. For those in the USVI who are ‘poor, 
black and culturally other’, living with multiple chronic conditions has 
meant substituting hospice care for other forms of therapeutic care, 
denying even the possibilities and potentialities for chronic living.
Proceeding to Tanzania, and staying with problems of marginal-
ity, Brocco describes how those with albinism are vulnerable to attack, 
commodification and stigmatisation. Albinism exists on the thresholds 
of moral order, the occult and social norms. It is at these thresholds that 
questions of responsibility for caring and inclusion are turned back on 
to the suffering subject, not only to establish new relations of care but, 
in doing so, to mitigate the lived- with effects of austerity, economic and 
political instability, impoverished health- care coverage, encroaching 
marketisation and limited human rights. This raises the critical question 
of deservingness – a motif central to all  chapters – which shapes the logics 
of exclusion and abandonment. Kottai and Ranganathan employ deserv-
ingness to explicate the entangled relations of homelessness, addic-
tion, and mental and chronic health, all bound to problems of poverty, 
violence and neglect in India. They do so via the effects of psychiatric 
interventions, their persistent failure to engage the structural conditions 
of chronic health, and their complicity in reinforcing and reproducing 
health inequalities. In Montreal, Motta- Ochoa and Arruda are similarly 
concerned with issues of street- level addiction and homelessness, and 
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the individualising project of public health responses. Interrogating the 
pharmaceuticalisation of public health, they position the human pharma-
kon (Biehl 2011) as site of experimentation, self- care and the reciprocal 
relations of addiction, but also as the site of critique on harm reduction in 
the context of marginal living in Canada.
As the specificities of ‘place’ matter to the ways in which chronicity 
is differentially drawn, experienced and managed, so too does the inter-
secting work of ‘time’. In Mexico, Bresciani is concerned with the social 
and cultural complexities of alcoholism, as part of a historical ethos of 
suffering. For Mexico’s dispossessed populations, alcoholism is a colonial 
and cultural legacy, a distinct interweaving of ritual, social obligation 
and deviance, as well as the contradictions this produces. However, in 
the absence of welfare state supports, alcoholism opens up new spaces 
for mobilising public health. Evangelical churches, in particular, have 
stepped in to ensure new forms of intervention are tied to new forms of 
conditionality, reconfiguring the historical and cultural narrative of alco-
holism in the process.
Just as chronic conditions are end points of historical processes, so 
too are the regimes of health and welfare on which they depend, them-
selves products of the shifting balance between labour, capital and the 
state over time (Esping- Anderson 1990). Nordic countries have long 
been the exemplar of welfare state provision. Recent years have seen 
them increasingly vulnerable to private interests via market- driven 
reforms. Focusing on eldercare in a marginal town in Finland, Takahashi 
challenges the normative dichotomies of private versus public health, 
and home versus institutional care, so bound to contemporary discourses 
of state– market relations. Instead, she advances new hybridised cares-
capes, to unsettle the differential moral and economic obligations tied to 
family, community, friendship and the salaried worker. She shows how 
carescapes are continually redrawn to offer new possibilities for manag-
ing inequalities to care, within which state and market interests cannot 
so easily be pulled apart or naively critiqued. These are issues which res-
onate loudly within the UK in particular, showing stronger alignments 
between state and private market interests in health care, expressed as 
new forms of ‘corporate’ welfare (Shaoul 2011). Public–private interests 
are a backdrop to Ballesteros’s chapter. Living in London, she offers a 
testimony of caring for a chronically ill child, and reflects on the chang-
ing support needs of parents, and their encounters with the precarious 
circumstances of those on whom they depend. Left to the vagaries of 
unstable privatisations, infrastructures of care and support are always 
primed to fall apart. Advocating for a hybridised model of regulated care, 
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Ballesteros provides new ways of thinking about family in the context of 
chronicity and what it means to live a good life.
Waymarking entanglements
Taken together, the chapters in this volume show the entangled territo-
ries of chronic living to be inherently political- economic as they focus on 
the variable reconfigurations of welfare states: the effects of neoliberal 
health- care reforms; the precarity of labour; the consequences of auster-
ity; infrastructural and logistical breakdowns; the outsourcing of care 
and the effects of and on migration, displacement, marginalisation and 
dispossession for and of equitable health- care access. These entangled 
territories are vexed and troubled spaces. They constitute what Biehl 
and Locke (2017, xi) describe as leaky social fields, worlds which are ‘at 
once material, social and symbolic, simultaneously precarious and in 
motion’, and where ‘individuals and collectives are constituted as much 
by affects and intensities as by structural forces’. The quest for wellbeing, 
for the good life, the desire for death – for things to be otherwise – the 
urgencies to care for others and oneself, are affective states examined in 
different ways and in different places by the contributors to this volume.
Such sensitivity to the complex, political and enmeshed character 
of health has long been the concern for the critical medical anthropolo-
gist. This is exemplified via the tensions which arise between ‘upstream’ 
forces and ‘downstream’ effects, but also importantly by attending to 
what mediates and intervenes their interrelations (Yates- Doerr 2020). 
Attending so necessitates critical diligence to the ways in which life-
worlds are differentially threaded and composed. From the perspective 
of those whose lifeworlds matter to us, how precisely is such complexity 
encountered? Or, as Elizabeth Roberts (2017, 596) puts it, ‘what does 
an entangled prescription for being in the world do for those who have 
always had to stay with the trouble?’ What this volume shows is that 
for those who stay with the trouble – the migrant, the parent of a sick 
child, the person dependent on alcohol or drugs, the person who self- 
medicates, the welfare recipient, the paid or unpaid carer – chronicity is 
not endlessly entangled in the myriad features and connections of every-
day life, but empirically and materially grounded, mediated through 
sited and identifiable waymarks – encounters with specific personnel in 
specific institutions, in specific times and in specific places. It is via these 
waymarks that the contours of chronic living are traced, and the unequal 
and stratified effects of health and its care are documented. Managing 
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Chronicity in Unequal States provides us with such waymarks: empirical 
starting points from which to take our bearings.
What I have appreciated most about the contributions to this vol-
ume is precisely their capacity to stay with the troubles of others; to 
station themselves in alignment with their interlocutors, to show how 
life’s demands and possibilities yield, as Haraway (2016) suggests, 
unexpected collaborations and combinations. Although troubles may be 
existential, moral or practical matters to be resisted or resolved, for the 
ethnographic participant, for the ethnographer, they provide methodo-
logical affordance. Troubles disclose the tacit, taken- for- granted orders 
of everyday living (Garfinkel 1967); they also provide the means to work 
through their hazards (Greiffenhagen et al. 2015). Throughout this vol-
ume, chronic troubles reveal not only what it has meant to live well, but 
also what it might mean to live well again as the project of becoming 
through chronic living (see Ballesteros). At the same time, they direct 
our attention to what it means to die well, to desire final endings (see 
Andrade Neves). The troubles of chronicity remind us that the problems 
we face today are end points of cultural histories – colonial and post- 
colonial – thus, the cumulative problems of others (see Bresciani). We 
are shown that critique is not born from the dogmas of abstract theoris-
ing, but that it is always and already in the world, emerging from the 
standpoints of alienation, stigma and precarity, through which an under-
standing of neglect, disregard and deservingness fasten their hold (see 
Brocco; Flaherty; Kottai and Ranganathan). Chronic troubles reveal the 
social, ambivalent and productive relations of care, as public and pri-
vate interests collapse, converge and hybridise (see Takahashi), or when 
bureaucratic and administrative imperatives reframe human agency and 
decision making (see Kennedy), or indeed when self- medication as self- 
care subverts normative perspectives on harm reduction and addiction 
(see Motta- Ochoa and Arruda). Chronic troubles are epistemic troubles. 
They underlie diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainty, and as a conse-
quence construct all manner of barriers to recognition, care, welfare and 
support (see LaRusso and Abadía-Barrero). Taken together, the preceding 
chapters advance and extend our appreciation of chronicity, not merely 
as an affective personal state, but as a social practice, a set of ongoing 
and enduring labours for all those bound to its demands (Kierans 2019).
Managing Chronicity in Unequal States thus engages what Biehl 
and Locke (2017, x) describe as a ‘conscientious empiricism wedded to 
a radical analytical openness’. Critique is organised from the vantage 
of the ethnographic subject, thus modulating the interpretive impulses 
of the ethnographer (Love 2010). From here, new ways of thinking about 
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the relationship between sickness and the state, aetiology and therapeu-
tics, power and human agency, emerge through a peopling of critical 
theory (Biehl and Locke 2017). Empathising as our contributors do with 
the predicaments and trials of their participants, this volume retains eth-
nographic rigour in its sensitivity to the diverse lives of others, and their 
efforts to live otherwise.
Making and unmaking of worlds: ‘Becoming’ with 
chronicity
Managing chronicity is, with little doubt, an everyday reality for more 
and more people. What this means in practice, and how best to do it, 
is less a concern of and for biology than of and for political economy 
(Manderson and Wahlberg 2020). It is, therefore, towards questions of 
political economy that we are urged to reorient our perspective. In reori-
enting so, chronicity is shown to be lived out and managed in the midst 
of things – to return briefly to Neurath – in the unknown and uncer-
tain spaces between bodies and worlds. It is from inside these uncertain 
spaces that the variegations of state– market– society relations are made 
visible; that new connections are made, and new relations are formed 
(Strathern 1992); that new ways of caring are established, and new 
agendas forged (Tsing 2013). This volume shows that one can grasp 
both the scale and complexity of chronic living, while attending to its 
lived ground. It helps to break the deadlocks in thinking that accompany 
the persistence of inequalities, their capacity to overwhelm and unmake 
the world. Managing Chronicity in Unequal States provides us with cri-
tique, but also with optimism, rarely found in examinations of sickness 
and suffering – this is its achievement. It provides us with the conditions 
for becoming, for remaking worlds (Goodman 1978), through solidari-
ties of concern.
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